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ABSTRACT
Armed groups are becoming increasingly significant international actors. International 
Relations as a discipline must analyze and integrate these actors if it is to effectively 
explain international politics. This thesis begins this process through examining the 
international relations of warlords.
Specifically, this thesis asks: how do warlords relate with states and other 
international actors? The thesis moves away from the greed-grievance debate, instead 
a Neorealist approach is used to analyze the relations of warlords. The conclusion 
reached is that warlords relate with states and other international actors in essentially 
the same way as states -  they seek to ensure their survival through the balance of 
power. Specifically, they relate in terms of internal power cultivation, alliances, and 
war.
The argument for this conclusion begins with a conceptual analysis of warlords, in 
which it is determined that warlords are non-state actors that use military power and 
economic exploitation to maintain fiefdoms which are autonomous and independent 
from the state and society. It is then demonstrated that the traditionally state -centric 
Neorealist approach can be used to analyze warlords, by arguing that warlords can be 
seen as empirically sovereign, ‘functionally undifferentiated’, Tike units’, which are 
motivated by survival, and exist in an anarchic system. Neorealist theory and its 
notions of self help, internal power cultivation, alliances, security dilemma, and war 
are examined and it is demonstrated how these concepts describe and explain warbrd 
international relations.
The validity of using the Neorealist approach is tested throughout the thesis in 
vignette case studies on warlords including the National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPLF), the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and Afghan warlords as well as in 
two major case studies on Somali warlord relations with the UN and Ethiopia and the 
Lord’s Resistance Army’s (LRA) relations with Uganda, Sudan, and the Sudanese 
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).
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“Another infirmity of a Commonwealth is the immoderate greatness of a town, when 
it is able to furnish out of its own circuit the number and expense of a great army; as 
also the great number of corporations, which are as it were many lesser 
Commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrails of a natural 
man.”
- Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter XXIX
8
CHAPTER 1 -  INTRODUCTION
Armed groups -  non-state organizations that have the capacity for systematic military 
action -  are becoming increasingly significant actors in international relations.1 For 
most of the Cold War armed groups were typically local or mainly involved 
internationally via another state. But, by the end of the Cold War, armed groups 
started ha ving international lives of their own. Their relations became international in 
the sense that they participated in interactions with a state or inter-state organization 
across at least one national border, which were not on the behalf of a state or 
intergovernmental organization. This internationalization was most evident initially 
in the cases of drug cartels and international terrorists, but it has come to include other 
types of armed groups such as warlords and insurgencies.
This new trend is linked to the more general phenomenon of globalization. 
John Mackinlay theorizes that there has been a ‘globalization of insurgency’ in which 
the improvement in transport technology, proliferation of information and 
communication technology, deregulation of international markets, and increase in 
migration have allowed many types of non-state actors (NSAs), including armed 
groups, to break their local bonds.3 Because of this, armed groups are now regularly 
involved in a multitude of international interactions, ranging from business dealings 
with multinational corporations to alliances with neighboring states to warfare with 
both states and other armed groups.
1 See footnote number 105 in Chapter 2 for a more detailed description o f this definition of armed
group.2
Based on the definition of transnational relations provided in Risse-Kappen 1995
3 Mackinlay 2002
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At the same time, local armed groups are increasingly raising policy concerns 
for international actors. States and related inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), 
such as the United Nations (UN), now have to consider armed groups in their policy 
deliberations. State failure has meant that a state government may no longer be able to 
cope with armed groups within its territory. The implication is that international 
organizations or states may have to relate directly with an armed group instead of 
being buffered. For instance, the UN has had to directly contend with militias in 
Somalia because there is no state to maintain the traditional role of barrier between 
domestic and international actors. States’ foreign policies may also demand alliances 
with armed groups, as the United States found in its war in Afghanistan.
While armed groups’ influence on states and olher international actors was 
also common during the Cold War, it has become a more significant issue now 
because of two factors. Firstly, armed groups are more independent from states and 
therefore have potentially separate policy goals, which cannot be addressed by only 
dealing with a state’s motivations. Secondly, armed groups are relatively more 
powerful actors now and can therefore demand more equitable relationships. 
Together, these two factors -  independence and relative power -  have produced a 
situation in which armed groups must be considered relevant international actors.
It should not be held that just because armed groups are not states or formal 
international organizations, they cannot take part in international relations. In fact, 
armed groups regularly do so, as Christopher Clapham notes:
Although formal participation in international diplomacy is restricted 
to properly constituted states, which are recognized as such by other 
states and permitted to belong to international institutions such as the
10
United Nations, insurgent movements may for many purposes be 
regarded as quasi-states themselves, and they exercise many of the 
functions of statehood, including the conduct of external relations...
The diplomacy of ‘non-juridical states’, to adapt Jackson’s 
terminology, thus provides an intriguing counterpoint to that of 
juridical statehood, as well as being of considerable interest and 
importance in its own right.4
Yet, this ‘non-juridical’ diplomacy is rarely studied and poorly understood by the 
field of International Relations (IR).
With the growth in the importance of the international relations of armed 
groups, it has become necessary for IR theorists to make sense of these interactions. 
IR as a field of study is duty-bound to analyze and theorize about all international 
actors in order to fulfill its purpose of understanding international politics. At first 
these actors were mainly states and the field did well studying them. As more actors 
have come to have active international lives it has become important to analyze them 
and integrate them into interstate models. Armed groups are only the latest such 
example. A parallel trend occurred in the 1960s and 70s when there was a growth in 
the importance of the international relations of other NSAs, such as non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and multinational corporations (MNCs). This led to a new set 
of concepts, including the term NSA, and theoretical frameworks for understanding 
these organizations’ international relations.5
It is necessary fa  IR theorists to begin the process of theorizing about armed 
groups and integrating them into broader models of interstate relations. Now is the
4 Clapham 1996: 222, 23
5 For instance, Keohane and Nye (1971), Huntington 1973. The analysis continues, with for instance 
the recent collection Non-State Actors in World Politics (Josselin and Wallace 2001).
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proper time to do so because armed groups have reached a stage where they can be 
considered key actors in international politics in the sense that any analysis of 
international politics which did not incorporate the influence of armed groups would 
not provide an adequate and effective explanation. As Donald Rothchild notes:
[it] seems strangely incomplete when scholars of international relations 
concentrate attention on juridical norms of sovereignty or the balance 
of power between sovereign states, because such foci fail to reflect 
certain critical facets of the reality of internal and external relations 
current^ occurring across Africa (and to some degree, across Eurasia 
as well).6
Specifically, we must analyze the role of armed groups, even if they exist within 
sovereign states, in order to fully comprehend international politics. Though 
Rothchild only refers to Africa and Eurasia, we could extend his statement to most of 
the world. For instance, an analysis of US foreign relations would be wholly 
inadequate if it did not acknowledge the place of international terrorism and 
insurgency. It is with this in mind -  armed groups need to be integrated into 
explanations of international politics -  that this study has been undertaken.
The incorporation of armed groups into the general explanation of 
international politics is a task beyond the scope of this study. One of the most 
daunting aspects is that armed groups differ from each other so radically. Even a 
casual observation of armed groups immediately shows that there are many different 
types of active armed groups. These range from highly decentralized, cellular
6 Rothchild 2002: 190
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structured international organizations to state-like, long-term rebellions. Briefly, it is 
possible to differentiate at least five different types of armed groups, which might 
have relevance to international relations. These include:
• Criminal gangs, such as the Russian or Sicilian mafia
• Terrorist groups, such as A1 Qaeda
n
• Traditional guerilla insurgencies, such as the Maoist rebels in Nepal
• Proxy-militias, such as the janjeweed in Sudan
• Warlords and their organizations, such as Rashid Dostum or Charles Taylor 
Each of these groups differ, at the least, in organizational structure, means of
warfare, goals in fighting, and the nature of their international relations. For example, 
terrorist groups will have ‘cellular’ structures and symbolically use violence against 
civilians to bring “widespread attention to a political grievance and/or [to provoke] a
O
draconian or unsustainable response.” Prima fasciae, it seems that their international 
relations will differ radically from, for instance, a traditional guerilla insurgency, 
which will tend to use a relationship with civilian society for support.
Therefore, just as a general theory of international relations for all types of 
actors is out of reach, a truly general theory of the international relations of armed 
groups may be impossible -  for, different types of actors may have different 
motivations and different types of interactions. This necessitates a more focused 
approach. Rather than addressing all types of armed groups, this study will be focused 
on a specific class. Though this will not answer the big question -  an explanation of 
the international relations of all armed groups -  it will provide a foundation to 
answering this general question, both in that one group out of many will be
7 ‘Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist’
8 Baylis et al. 2002
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theoretically understood and that there may be lessons learned for theorizing about 
other types of armed groups.
WARLORDS
This study will focus on the class of armed groups known as warlords. There are 
several reasons for focusing on this class in particular. Warlordism is an area that has 
generally been under-theorized. During the Cold War there were extensive studies on 
insurgencies and guerillas of various forms and recently there has been a heavy focus 
on terrorism. However, warlordism has only been addressed in a handful of studies.
At the same time, warlords are a common type of armed group, one that is 
becoming increasingly important in international relations. A cursory reading of 
recent news articles easily demonstrates their importance. Warlords such as Taylor, 
Dostum, and Hussein Aidid have all been prominent actors in regional politics and 
their exploits have had global implications. While their relations may not have the 
global implications of a Great Power, they are often at least as influential as many of 
the world’s smaller states. Indeed, their reach is in some ways surprising. For 
instance, Stephen Chan notes:
Warlords have had their hands on the machines. They have laundered 
their monies through the Bank of Credit and Commerce and, since that 
bank’s demise, have not given up on what currencies and the 
movement of currencies mean. From the warlords of China who, for a 
time, held Chiang Kai Shek captive and were in a position to change 
Chinese history; to the conscious use of warlords in short-term strategy 
that has now produced something the West did not expect in
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Afghanistan (the Mujahideen factions used the West too); to warlords 
who fight for national or at least ethnic liberation while exporting 
drugs, like the Karen in Burma; to the warlordism of Lebanon in the 
1980s.9
Yet, as with other types of armed groups, we are poorly equipped to understand these 
various international relations, for as Chan goes on to note, warlords “have intruded 
upon international relations but have been excluded from the discourses of 
International Relations.” 10
Warlords are also a highly independent form of armed group. They are 
relatively free from the motivating influence of other actors -  i.e. they are not proxies 
for a state -  which means that their decision-making can be studied independently of 
other actors. This separates them from proxy militias like the Sudanese janjeweedor 
any number of the insurgencies funded by one of the Superpowers during the Cold 
War. Such actors cannot be effectively analyzed without reference to a state, as their 
decision-making will be essentially derived. Warlords, on the other hand, exist in and 
of themselves. As we shall see, they support themselves with mini-economies, have 
their own private armies, and maintain autonomous and independent foreign relations. 
Therefore they are best studied as a separate actor.
A major gain from looking at warlords is that the lessons learned from their 
examination may be applicable to other types of armed groups. Their independence 
means that by understanding how a warlord would make a decision we can apply a 
prediction of an idealized, unbiased decision, of what an uncontrolled armed group
9 Chan 1999: 165
10 Ibid.: 165
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would do in a given situation. Such an analysis could, for instance, then be applied to 
a proxy militia and then adjusted to account for the influence of the exterior state.
The only work specifically focused on the international relations of warlords is 
an edited volume by Paul B. Rich, Warlords in International Relations:n In it, Rich 
encourages the “widen[ing of] the compass and range of IR as a discipline” in order to 
take into account warlordism. 12In his chapter, Chan criticizes the field of IR for its 
mostly exclusive focus on states, and exclusion of non-state actors such as warlords. 
While Chan turns to issues of identity and modernity as an alternative, his point is 
clear: it is necessary for IR to take into account warlords as relevant actors.
Rich admits that this collection is only a beginning of the necessary research 
and this study will pick up where his collection, and the field in general, has left off. It 
is an attempt both to increase our understanding of the international relations of 
warlords, as a specific instance of armed group, to integrate warlordism into 
international relations theory, and to lay the groundwork for integrating the study of 
other armed groups into our understanding of international politics.
The first step in understanding the international relations of warlords is simply 
to ask how they relate with other international actors. Therefore, this thesis seeks to 
answer the question: how do warlords relate with states and other international 
actors? Or, put another way, what are the international relations of warlords? The 
next step, then, is to narrow down the best way to answer this question.
APPROACHES TO ANALYSIS
In the collection, Rich addresses the place of warlordism in regard to several debates. 
He discusses the relationship of warlords to theories of modem warfare. For example,
11 Rich 1999
12 Ibid.: xvi
13 Chan 1999
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he sees warlordism as an example of the ‘wars of the third kind’ which have arisen 
over the last of couple decades.14 While there is much to be learned from the analysis 
of warlords and warfare, it is strictly speaking not an analysis of their international 
relations. With more of an international focus, he looks at warlordism in relation to 
the global economy, while in another chapter Neil Cooper looks at warlordism and the 
arms trade.15 Rich also looks at warlordism’s connection to the doctrine of 
sovereignty, specifically, in relation to the weakening of the state’s sovereignty. 
Finally, Rich addresses the place of warlordism in relation to intervention and other 
attempts to mediate the effects of state failure. The other authors in the collection 
focus on specific warlords and each takes similar approaches to Rich, though with a 
general slant toward area studies. For instance, there are articles on warlordism in 
Rwanda and Somalia.16
The approaches taken in Rich’s collection are typical of examinations of the 
international relations of armed groups in general, and warlords in particular. We can 
speak of three different basic approaches.
• The first is the traditional descriptive approach taken by area studies experts.
• Another, more recent approach, is to examine the economic aspects (including 
international economic relations) of armed groups.
• Finally, a theoretical approach focuses on how armed groups contribute to 
state failure, and in doing this, it addresses the issues of the international 
relations of armed groups.
14 From Holsti 1996. Also see Kaldor’s notion of ‘new wars’ (Kaldor 1997) and the analysis o f warfare 
put forth by Alvin and Heidi Toffler (Toffler 1995).
15 Cooper 1999
16 McNulty 1999, Makinda 1999
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Area Studies
There are a significant number of area studies texts that focus on analyzing specific 
armed groups, including warlords. In focusing on armed groups, they cover the 
international relations of these groups as a matter of course. For instance, Douglas 
Johnson covered the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in detail.17 Most of 
the essays in Rich’s collection are similarly approached from an area studies
IQ
perspective. The area studies approach is especially helpful in understanding the 
details of a particular warlord, as well as the domestic, and sometimes, regional 
context.
Some authors have used a regional approach to the study of internal wars 
which does provide some valuable insight. An example is Michael Pugh and Cooper’s 
edited volume War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges and
Transformation}9 As the title suggests, they and the other authors are partial to the 
economic approach to analysis, but Pugh and Cooper also point out the importance of 
examining not just economic networks from a regional level but also military, 
political, and social networks. This allows them to, for instance, note how the 
“various political alliances in a regional conflict formation can influence the structure 
of regional arms networks.” While the authors are focused more on the causes and 
conduct of warfare, as opposed to the international relations of warlords per se, it does 
provide a valuable lesson to take note of: this is that even so-called internal conflicts 
cannot be understood without an international approach.
However, the area studies approach in general fails to truly theorize about 
warlords from a generic perspective of them as a class of international actor. This is a
17 Johnson 2003
18 Rich 1999
19 Pugh and Cooper 2004
20 Ibid.: 31
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general weakness of the approach. Even Pugh and Cooper’s valuable analysis still 
only expands the level of analysis, rather than taking a fully generalized and 
theoretical approach. David Laitin, in his analysis of armed groups in Somalia, makes 
the case for why such a specific approach is weaker than a more generalized, 
theoretical approach:
...there is a compelling reason to hold under some suspicion casual 
theories that rely almost entirely on local conditions and factors. Such 
explanations give us virtually no purchase on the question of what type 
of civil war was fought in Somalia and what are general guidelines fa* 
reducing its likelihood. Accepting any of these explanations implies 
that we need special experts on every county who would be able to 
use their local knowledge to foresee devastating civil wars. The 
problem with is not that it is costly. Rather, the problem is that the 
record of area experts (whether it be those who studied international 
the Soviet Union, South Africa, or Somalia) in foreseeing catastrophe 
(or in the case of South Africa, in foreseeing that catastrophe would 
reach its full limits only within the townships) is not very impressive.
More important, by focusing principally on local conditions for a 
conflict that has already occurred, we get very little purchase on how 
to identify conditions in other places, where systematic third-party 
intervention could play a decisive role in dampening imminent civil
91war, with the possibility of unimaginable noncombatant suffering.
21 Laitin 1999: 151
19
Essentially the same issues apply to the study of the international relations of 
warlords. The descriptive and comparative approach of area studies necessitates 
specific analysis of each different warlord and his relations. The problem with this is 
that there is neither a generally applicable understanding nor much predictive ability. 
Therefore, a foundational point of this study is to begin to provide a theoretical 
understanding of the international relations of warlords. However, this should not be 
taken as a complete denial of the value of the area studies approach. In fact, far from 
discounting the insights gleaned from area studies, this study will use area studies 
literature as a basis for a more theoretical understanding. It will provide an alternative 
explanation which has value in combination with a more holistic account of any 
particular warlord -  just as a theoretical account of a particular state’s international 
relations would be combined with specific studies of that state’s history, politics, and 
culture.
The Political Economy Approach
The large literature on war economies does often focus on the international economic 
relations of armed groups and is theoretical in nature. This literature has provided a 
fairly rigorous analysis of how, when, and why armed groups, including warlords, 
interact with international economic actors. More generally, the political economy 
approach provides a functional perspective on armed group relations. This, as Mats 
Berdal acknowledges is valuable in itself. He notes:
[b]y posing the question of what functional utility violence may be 
serving to participants in wars -  to elites, ordinary people caught up in 
war, and external actors that stand to gain from conflict -  it becomes
20
possible to discern how a set of vested interests in the continuation of 
war may emerge.”22
The political economy approach is exemplified in, for instance, the work of Berdal, 
David Keene, and Paul Collier.23 William Reno provides a particularly good political 
economy take on warlords in his work Warlord Politics and African States.24 Reno’s 
theory focuses on how “rulers control markets to enhance their own power.” As 
already noted, Rich also borrows from the political economy approach in his call for 
an analysis of warlord’s interactions in the global economy.26
However, the political economy approach only illuminates one part of the 
larger and much more complic ated international relations of warlords. Even some of 
the originators of the so-called ‘greed’ thesis have come to admit the need to 
incorporate other factors. For instance, the World Bank Report Breaking the Conflict 
Trap: Civil War and Development Policy notes that “[w]hile the prevalence of natural 
resources secessions suggest that greed cannot be entirely discounted, it does not
appear to be the powerful force behind rebellion that economic theorists have
01assumed.” Indeed, as Berdal himself notes “one-sided attention to economic 
motives... runs the risk of creating a distorted picture of what is driving actors to 
violence and war.”28 While Berdal is referring to conflict analysis, his insight is 
equally applicable to the analysis of the international relations of those actors 
involved in conflict.
22 Berdal 2003: 483 (italics in original)
23 Berdal and Malone 2000, Keen 1998, Collier 2000
34 Reno 1998
25 Ibid.: 30
26 Rich 1999
27 World Bank 2003; noted in Berdal 2005
28 Berdal 2003: 490
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In particular, this literature tends to discount the political, diplomatic, and 
military aspects of armed groups. Karen Ballentine notes that
...economic incentives and opportunities have not been the only or 
even the primary cause of... armed conflicts; rather to varying degrees, 
they interacted with socio-economic and political grievances, 
interethnic disputes, and security dilemmas in triggering the outbreak 
of warfare.29
For instance, while political economic analysis might note the fact that Taylor took 
part in extensive trade with foreign firms, there is significantly less, if any, 
commentary on his non-economic diplomatic relations.
Yet it is the diplomatic and military relations of armed groups that are most 
interesting; for the military and diplomatic relations of warlords are those that tend to 
most concern states and therefore drive international politics as a whole. States are 
almost certainly involved with warlords in economic relations, however, these 
relations are minor compared to the much larger undertaking of warfare or broad 
strategies of international diplomacy. An analysis of warlordism must be able to 
comment on these aspects of warlord relations if it is to provide an adequate 
understanding of international politics.
Moreover, the war economy literature is divorced from broader IR theory. 
This is due in part to its roots in area studies and conflict analysis. Though the war 
economy literature does take into account international relations, it is not concerned 
with international relations as the central problematic. Rather, the approach is
29 Ballentine 2003: 260
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typically concerned with explaining how and why states fail or with the nature of 
internal wars.
Another foundational point of this study is that it will attempt to provide a 
more comprehensive approach, which incorporates political and military aspects of 
warlordism, along with economic factors. Furthermore, it will use an approach which 
can be incorporated into IR theory. At the same time, this study admits the importance 
of explaining the economic aspects of warlordism and will address the issue in some 
detail; for, as Berdal notes, “once civil wars have broken out, their logic and trajectory 
cannot be understood without an appreciation of the economics underpinning them.”30 
This is just as interstate economic relations must also be taken into account in 
comprehending a state’s military and political relations. Thus, this study is intended to 
build upon, not necessarily replace, political economic insights.
State-Failure Approach
In his work Africa and the International System: The Politics o f State Survival, 
Clapham provides an impressive attempt at a more general theoretical account of the 
international relations of armed groups. While Clapham focuses on armed groups in 
general, his theoretical points are also applicable to warlords. In this work, Clapham 
specifically addresses the international relations of insurgents in regard to their 
weakening of the state and in doing so, he addressed issues such as the diplomatic 
aspects of armed groups.
As is apparent from the title, Clapham’s work is focused on states. In one of 
the latter chapters, the international relations of armed groups are explored from the 
perspective of illustrating how armed groups contribute to the breakdown of the state.
30 Berdal 2005: 692
31 Clapham 1996
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Clapham introduces the subject as: “one of the clearest symptoms -  and also causes -  
of state decay in Africa was the growth of armed opposition movements against the 
state... which came to pose a serious challenge not just to individual states, but to the
'yyAfrican international order as a whole.”
Although Clapham’s examination is helpful in understanding state failure, it is 
not an adequate explanation for the purposes of this study. This is because the 
approach he takes is primarily focused on explaining state failure, not international 
relations. While the understanding of state failure has been a necessary and valuable 
pursuit because of the growth in failed states, the focus on analyzing armed groups 
from this perspective has meant that analysis has been less effective than it could be.
Essentially, the problem is that the groups are not seen from the perspective of 
entities in themselves, but as sub-units in relation to another unit. In effect, they are 
modeled as germs infecting a natural state. Warlords are seen as fundamentally 
domestic actors with a single overriding domestic concern -  that being to make the 
state government collapse. This leaves little to say about the warlord’s relations 
outside of the rationalization of destroying a state. For instance, the question is left 
open as to how a warlord relates with an external state which is not involved with the 
host state. Moreover, there is no integration with wider international relations, for 
instance, in hew changes in the relations of other states will cause the warlord to 
change his actions.
The state failure approach also tends to provide an inadequate analysis once a 
state is overthrown, if a warlord clearly isn’t working to overthrow a state, or if the 
warlord is fighting multiple states. For example, the Somali National Front’s (SNF) 
relations with Ethiopia throughout the mid-nineties cannot be adequately theorized
32 Ibid.: 208
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about once the Somali state collapsed, since there was no state for it to cause to fail. 
Rather, an explanation of these relations must be based on other factors. Another 
example is the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), whose international relations -  in 
Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are not necessarily best 
described as being orientated toward the failure of the Ugandan, Sudanese, or 
Congolese states.
Along these lines, another of the foundational points of this study is to draw 
analysis away from the perspective that theorizes about armed groups, and warlords in 
particular, in relation to a state towards the perspective that they are separate political 
units that can be examined in and of themselves. For instance, in discussing 
sovereignty and its relation to warlordism, it is common to refer to how warlords 
contribute to the breakdown of sovereignty in failed states.33 Instead, this study will 
look at the degree to which a warlord organization is itself sovereign. The benefit of 
doing this is that warlord relations can be more broadly understood.
It should be noted that this study is not meant to replace discussions from the 
perspective of the state, since the analysis of state failure is also an important debate. 
Rather, the perspective that this study takes is meant to serve as the starting point of a 
separate debate. Such a debate is valuable for understanding armed groups in 
themselves and, more importantly, it helps in determining responses to these actors. 
Moreover, it provides insight into broader international relations and foreign policy 
questions.
Thus, summarizing the above points, what this study proposes is an approach 
to the study of warlords which meets three requirements:
33 See for instance, Rich 1999
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• It should be theoretical in nature, specifically, in such a way that can be 
integrated into wider IR theory.
• It should be comprehensive, focusing on all-important facets of the 
international relations of warlords, especially the extremely important political 
and military aspects.
• And, it should be focused on warlords as separate actors which relate with 
states, rather than as sdb-actors in relation to states.
THEORETICAL APPROACH
Rather than describing specific actors and their actions, there is a need for a generic 
understanding of warlords, one which is predictive. In other words, a theory is 
needed. A theory explains why a set of probable associations, or laws, hold.34 
Theories do this through the use of a theoretical construct, or concept, which is made 
up, but which provides the connection, and thereby the explanation, of a series of 
associations. These associations allow for prediction ihrough the deduction of what 
will happen in future cases based on the application of the theoretical construct to 
available information.
The specific type of theory we are looking for is one which explains the 
international relations of warlords as actors. In order to do this, it is necessary to have 
a conceptualization of the notion of warlord which treats it as an organization. Even 
more ideal is a theory that explains these relations in such a way that we can integrate 
our understanding of warlords with our understanding of other international actors. In 
particular, one which would integrate them with the dominant groups in international 
relations, i.e. states. In order to do this, the theoretical approach must be able to
34 Waltz 1979
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address the military and political relations of warlords, as these relations are the 
primary type of interaction between states.
Rather than making up such a theory, it is more efficient to borrow a theory 
which has already proven itself useful in explaining some relations of international 
actors. For this, we can turn to the large body of IR theory. This is a natural approach 
given that warlords are international actors and therefore come under the rubric of IR.
International Relations Approach
Within IR there are multiple theories which can be used to examine the international
' JC
relations of an actor. However, the specifics of this thesis severely limit the possible 
choices. The constraints arise from the nature of the question being asked and from 
the nature of warlords as the actor inder scrutiny.
This thesis is addressing a ‘how’ question, therefore the theory which it uses 
must be descriptive as well as predictive. Moreover, it is a generic question, about a 
category of actors, and therefore the theory it uses must be able to generalize about a 
category of actors. This precludes the use of, for instance, many types of identity 
based theoretical approaches. Though an identity based theoretical approach may 
have many valuable points to make concerning the nature of particular warlords and, 
for instance, their relationship with ethnicity, it will be of limited use in analyzing 
how warlords, taken as a generic category of armed group, relate. As such, this study
35 Another possible way to incorporate warlords into theory is to create an entirely new, more inclusive 
theory of international relations. For example, some (non-Realist) theorists have posited that there may 
be unlike units in international systems. John Ruggie’s formulation o f the medieval system, in which 
there are differentiated and overlapping sovereignties is an example (Ruggie 1986). However, this is 
overcomplicating the matter, rather than completely refaming our entire theory of international 
relations, it is better to simply incorporate warlords into what we have now.
36 For example, Constructivist or identity based theorizing has already been used to describe armed 
groups by area studies experts, but it is inadequate for reasons noted above. In particular, 
Constructivism is not generalizing enough nor can it necessarily link warlords with interstate 
theoretical accounts. Examples of this type of work are theorists who have examined the ethno-politics 
behind the wars in the former-Yugoslavia (i.e. Kaplan 1994b).
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will take into account identity issues and other more specific theories, but will not rely 
on them for the bulk of analysis.
Additionally, within the set of theories which address relations, there are some 
specific features of warlordism which make it difficult for some theories to analyze 
them adequately. Firstly, unlike states, they are fundamentally illegitimate. Secondly, 
they are necessarily highly focused on relationships based on military force. These 
features make warlords different than states, which are legitimate, as well as most 
other types of non-state actors which IR does study, i.e. NGOs, which are not military 
organizations. In order to be valid, a theory of warlord international relations must be 
able to adequately account for these two factors.
0 7
Warlords are illegitimate on two levels. On a normative level, warlords are 
anathema to liberal ideals, or for that matter, all civilian political communities’ ideals. 
They are also illegitimate in terms of international laws and institutions. This means 
that they cannot take part in international law, contracts, offical diplomacy, or any of 
the other formal or official relations which we take for granted in regard to states. 
Thus, it is necessary to take into account warlord’s informal relations38
While this lack of formal recognition by the international community does not 
preclude them from analysis by many of the variants of the Liberal school of 
international theory, it does limit the effectiveness of the use of such theories. This 
branch of theory includes both the classical and the more recent Neoliberal varieties.39 
These theories focus on the ways in which states have developed peaceful means of 
interaction based on incorporation into governing institutions. Since warlords are 
essentially illegitimate they cannot directly take part in these institutions. Therefore
37 This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
38 Some of the specifics of this illegitimacy o f warlords will be addressed in Chapter 3 in reference to 
the notion o f juridical sovereignty.
39 See for instance Dickinson 1920, Baldwin 1993, and Keohane and Martin 1995
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any analysis of warlords from the Neoliberal perspective will be more likely to treat 
warlords as actors acted upon or obstacles to policy implementation rather than as 
units which actively and independently relate with other units. Furthermore, though 
Neoliberalism is more accepting of non-state actors, it tends to focus on international 
organizations, NGOs, MNCs, and others that are more concerned with 
interdependence than with conflict.
An attempt by a Liberal or Neoliberal theory to analyze warlords would 
produce an inadequate explanation of how warlords relate with states and other 
international actors. Warlords will have considerable informal relationships with 
actors and these must be explained. Moreover, warlords tend to relate in terms of an 
offensive, rather than cooperative manner. Therefore, this class of theories will not be 
used.
As their very name implies, warlords are concerned with war. Other 
interactions are secondary to this fact and any theory which is to analyze warlords 
must account for warfare. Warlords are involved in significant economic interactions, 
however, these interactions, as will be demonstrated, tend to be means not ends. 
Moreover, states tend to interact with warlords in terms of political and military 
interactions.
For this reason, International Political Economy (IPE) theory is of limited help 
in the analysis of warlords.40 Warlords do take part in economic relations, but it is the 
military factors that dominate the existence of warlords and IPE has little to say about 
these relations. Moreover, warlords do not take part in the sort of formal, macro-level 
economic issues, institutions, and organizations which IPE is focused on, such as
40 On IPE, see for instance, Strange 1988 and Friedman and Lake 2000
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placement within formal international financial systems and institutional membership 
in the International Monetary Fund (IMF).41
The theory used to describe the relations of warlords must comfortably 
address these issues of politics and war head on and must be flexible enough to accept 
informal, de facto relationships which are based on power. Liberal theories and IPE 
may be helpful in understanding ways to get warlords to cooperate or describing their 
economic relations. However, the first goal of our analysis must be to adequately 
describe warlord’s most basic relations.
Realism and Neorealis m
Realism is powerful in its ability to describe and predict the actions and relations of 
international actors. The theory of Realism has been formulated in many different 
ways 42 At its basis, it assumes that politics is governed by laws which have their 
roots in human nature; that interest, in terms of power and/or security, are the factors 
which determine relations in an anarchic environment; and that actors are rational. At 
the same time, it does not generally comment on the juridical or normative relations 
of actors, except possibly to “refuse to identify the moral aspirations of a particular 
nation with moral laws that govern the universe.”43 Moreover, Realism has been 
applied to many epochs of international politics, from ancient Greece to the modem 
day, during which time it has addressed many different types of actors in different 
types of systems.
41 There are of course other theories used to examine international relations that have not been 
discussed here. These include, but are not limited to, the various post-positivist theories, including 
Critical Theory, as well as Marxism. Critical Theory, and its cousin Critical Security Studies, are more 
concerned with questioning the basic foundations of international relations and security studies and 
these basic foundations are not questioned, nor need they be, by the study o f warlordism and therefore 
would not likely lend much theoretical insight to this study. Similarly, Marxism is so far removed from 
the basic precepts which are assumed in even making this study possible and relevant, that a Marxist 
theory of warlordism is best left for a completely separate study.
42 See for instance, Morgenthau 1993, Mearsheimer 1995, Waltz 1979
^Morgenthau 1993: 13
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Given this understanding of Realism, it is valuable in analyzing the 
international relations of warlords for several reasons. Warlords, unlike say NGOs, 
exist in the pragmatic world of conflict and ‘de factoness’, rather than the world of 
international agreements and other peaceful means of relating that states have 
developed. Realism is a theory which is more focused on such pragmatic relations and 
is willing to dismiss the relative importance of international agreements. Also, 
Realism’s focus on these military and political aspects makes it well suited for 
explaining the relations of the essentially bellicose warlords. Thus Realism is able to 
incorporate seme of the essential factors necessary for a theory of warlord 
international relations. However, the fact that in many ways traditional Realism is 
more of an approach to the study of individual actors and their psychology -  as has 
been said, it is be best viewed as more of “an attitude regarding the human 
condition”44 than as a proper theory -  leaves it unable to offer a truly generalizeable 
account of warlord international relations.
Since Kenneth Waltz’s canonical work Theory o f International Relations was 
published in 1979, many Realists have turned to systemic level explanations of 
international relations.45 This text formed the foundation of what has since been called 
Neorealism. Such explanations are extremely productive in theorizing about 
international relations because they are more rigorous than so-called ‘Political 
Realism’ which is focused on hard to quantify psychological beliefs. Systems, or 
‘structural’, reasoning is more exacting in that it treats all actors as similar units and 
then allows for potentially measurable differences in a single variable. In the case of 
Neorealism, this variable is power.
44 Gilpin 1986: 305
45 Some, such as those who count themselves as ‘Neoclassical Realists’, have since turned back from 
systemic level thinking to look inside of the state.
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In particular, Waltz’s theory has made sense of the fact that different types of 
states, such as liberal democracies versus totalitarian dictatorships, act in essentially 
the same way at the systemic international level. By looking at the systemic level and 
not focusing on the internal features of states, Waltz could limit differences and make 
comparisons of like actors. His theory could then make explanations by referring to 
one variable -  that being power -  and one motivation -  that being survival. Within a 
Neorealist view, it is clear how actors will make decisions, i.e. how they relate, and 
this makes theorization about particular actors or completes of actors possible. 
Neorealism is able to do this because it reveals the constraints on all the possible ways 
an actor may act. Therefore, as Waltz notes, it is a truly predictive theory.46
Neorealism is valuable for theorizing about warlords for the same reasons that 
it is valuable for theorizing about the relations of states. It can make comparisons 
between actors which seem to differ internally, but act similarly at the international 
level. It is able to demonstrate how actors will relate by revealing the constraints on 
their choices. It is also a predictive theory and can provide some rigor in the analysis 
of warlords. Beyond this, Neorealism has the same benefits as Realism in that it is 
focused on political and military relations and does not rely on juridical legitimacy in 
its analysis of actors. Due to all of these benefits, this study will use Neorealism to 
analyze the international relations of warlords.
Ironically, the feature of Political Realism which seems to make it seem more 
applicable to analyzing warlord relations than Neorealism, actually makes it less so. 
Political Realism is a theory which focuses on the unit, and sometimes the individual, 
level of analysis. Since it is more of an attitude than theory, it would be easy enough 
to apply this attitude to warlords, who are often called ‘Machiavellian’ anyway.
46 Waltz 1979
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However, to analyze warlords at this level would only continue the practice of 
focusing on the differences between warlords and states, which only serves to make it 
more difficult to integrate warlords into models of interstate relations. Therefore, it 
potentially falls into the same problems as area studies. Neorealism, on the other 
hand, treats all actors as essentially the same in type and thus provides for the 
possibility of a general theory.
This decision to use Neorealism is made even though the theory draws a 
starker line between states and NSAs than Realism and is arguably the most state- 
centric theory of international relations. This will of course mean that the argument 
for using Neorealism to analyze warlords will be considerably more complicated than 
the one to use Realism. In a sense, the theory must be reinvented or renewed to take 
into account these actors. But, the payoff will be far greater than that which would be 
gained from the use of another theory.
Beyond the applicability of Neorealism to armed groups, there are numerous 
other points of disagreement about the value of Neorealism in general and about how 
it should be used in practice.47 For example, there are debates about the exact nature 
of the anarchy which Realism assumes. Some theorists argue that there are different
48types of anarchy and we should not necessarily assume one type or another. 
However, most of these debates are not the focus of this study. This study merely 
assumes that the same advantages and disadvantages of the theory in regard to states 
also apply to warlords.
Another criticism of Neorealism is its inability to adequately theorize about 
the formation and termination of states.49 This weakness will also hold true for the 
analysis of warlords. As with states, it will not be possible to adequately treat how and
47 See for instance, Keohane 1986 and Baldwin 1993
48 See for instance, Constructivists such as Alexander Wendt (1995)
49 See for instance, Keohane 1986
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why warlords become warlords or how and why they stop being warlords. This, 
however, is not central to the thesis question, which is focused on how warlords 
relate, not how they form or how they end. In essence, this study has the same 
ambition as Waltz -  to talk about relations, not about formation or termination. Such a 
narrowing of study is necessary for a theoretical understanding of any topic, since 
“theory is not a statement about everything that is important in international political
en
life, but rather a necessarily slender explanatory construct.” Having said that, the 
thesis will make some comments on warlord formation and termination throughout 
the study as it comes up. In particular, some attention will be paid during the 
conceptualization of warlords, in discussing the nature of warlords and anarchy, and 
in the case studies.
A further issue to take account of in this use of Neorealism is that Waltz is 
concerned with ‘why’ questions, whereas this thesis is concerned with a ‘how’ 
question. To put this into another language, Waltz is mainly creating a ‘theory of the 
market’, not a ‘theory of the firm’. But, in a sense, this study seems like it is asking 
for a theory of the firm. This is not as threatening as it seems however. Waltz also 
discusses how states relate in small case studies throughout his work. Furthermore, 
analysts since 1979 have applied his theory to states in the same way as this thesis 
will apply his theory to warlords, i.e. they ask how states will relate generally. The 
purpose of this study is to integrate warlords into the system which Neorealism can 
theorize about. To put it back into the language of economics, it is attempting to 
integrate non-firms, e.g. churches, into the theory of the market, a market which is 
accustomed to dealing only with firms. In doing this it answers the thesis question by
30 Waltz 1990: 32
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providing a system-level understanding of how warlords relate. It is in this sense that 
the thesis takes a Neorealist approach.
There are other systemic level, or ‘structural’, theories of Realism. For 
instance, John Mearsheimer has developed what he calls ‘Offensive Realism’, which 
is in many ways similar to Waltz’s version of structural realism, but places stress on 
the notion that all states have innate offensive capability and that these states can 
never be sure that another state will not use its offensive capability.51 However, by 
making the case that Waltz’s Neorealism can analyze warlordism, the case is 
implicitly made that other forms of structural realism could also likely analyze it. In 
other words, if it works in this case it will likely work in others. In addition, Waltzian 
Neorealism is the most widely accepted form of structural realism and the oldest, 
which means that there is more debate to draw from. Finally, Waltz’s theory simply 
offers a better explanation. For these reasons Waltz’s theory of Neorealism in 
particular will be used to theorize about warlords.
The use of systemic Realist theory to depict warlord relations has been 
attempted once before, though not with reference to the international relations of 
warlords. Hsi-Sheng Ch’i, in his work Warlord Politics in China: 1916-1928, used 
the systemic theory of Morton Kaplan to model the relations of warlords within 
China.52 Ch’i, a historian, used the systemic theory to meaningfully explain the 
historical data of the known warlord alliances and breakups. While Ch’i used 
systemic Realism without reference to international relations or the essential premises 
of the discipline of IR, his work does demonstrate that there is something to be gained 
in taking the systemic Realist approach and adds credence to this study’s attempt to 
use the theory.
51 Mearsheimer 1995
52 Ch’i 1976; Kaplan 1957
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Hypothesis
Having illustrated the thesis question and the theoretical approach which will be used 
to answer this question, it is now possible to make a hypothesis of what the answer 
will be. Neorealism describes set patterns of relationships -  or “law-like 
regularities”53 -  which states form with each other. Specifically, states will form 
balances of power and fight wars with each other. Moreover, Neorealism explains 
these relations in terms of the ensuring of survival in a self help system. This study 
will demonstrate that these patterns of relationships also apply to warlord 
international relations. Thus, the hypothesis of this study is that warlords relate 
with states and other international actors in essentially the same way as states -  
they seek to ensure their survival through the balance of power. Specifically, they 
relate in terms of internal power cultivation, alliances, and war. As with state 
analyses, this study will explain these relations.
This thesis is therefore an attempt to apply the Neorealist theoretical approach 
to warlords and then to use those conceptual tools of the theory to describe the 
relations of a particular actor -  warlords. It is not an attempt to create an entirely new 
theory of international relations, though some modification of the typical formulation 
of Neorealism will take place. Nor is it an attempt to detail the specific international 
relations of any particular warlord, though this will be done to some extent as a means 
of testing the theory. Rather it will answer the question of how warlords relate 
generally by integrating them into a systemic analysis.
53 Waltz 1979: 116
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ARGUMENT OUTLINE
There is a high price to pay to come to these conclusions about the international 
relations of warlords. For, due to the nature of Neorealism and warlords some fairly 
major theoretical barriers must be overcome.
Firstly, it is not completely clear what a warlord is and various different 
commentators include many different types of armed groups in the warlord category. 
As such, the first challenge of this study will be to find a definition and 
conceptualization of warlordism which will allow us to clearly define what actors are 
warlords and make rationalized comparisons with seemingly related armed groups. In 
effect this will involve making a political analysis of warlords in a similar manner as 
has been done for states by political theorists.
Secondly, Neorealism usually deals with states and warlords are clearly not 
states. Moreover, the theory focuses on relations in the anarchic international system 
and not on interactions within the delineated boundaries of a (failed) state. Therefore, 
the next step in this study will be to examine the nature of Neorealism and 
demonstrate how it is possible to use the theory to analyze warlords.
After resolving these definitional and theoretical issues, the study will have to 
move on to applying some of the concepts of Neorealism to warlords. These include 
the concepts of self help, the balance of power, the security dilemma, and war. In 
order to apply these concepts, it will be necessary to first examine and understand 
Neorealism in detail and then to individually apply each concept to warlords, so as to 
make assurances that the concept functions correctly.
The following chapter summary will briefly illustrate the method by which 
this study will address these issues and answer the thesis question:
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Chapter 2
One problem to confront in this study is that, as with the term ‘state’, there is no 
agreed definition of warlord. In Chapter 2, the traditional definition of warlord will be 
deconstructed in order to detail the essential features. Some of the relevant concepts 
include the fact that warlords are NSAs with autonomy and independence from the 
state. Warlords gain their autonomy and independence through military and economic 
power. They also have private political communities which can be cohesively 
governed and directed by a leadership.
This conceptualization of warlordism will allow us to make rationalized 
comparisons of warlords with related groups. For example, criminals and terrorists do 
not have the autonomy of warlords, while traditional insurgents and proxy militias do 
not have complete independence from the state and society in the way that warlords 
do. Based on this conceptual analysis it will be possible to move onto the theoretical 
approach.
Chapter 3
Chapter three will demonstrate how it is possible to use the Neorealist approach 
describe, explain, and predict the relations of warlords. The method to proving the 
validity of the use of a Neorealist approach will be to first demonstrate that Realism 
can be applied to warlords and then that the supplementary features of Neorealism 
also apply.
This chapter will make its argument by demonstrating how warlords can fit 
into Robert Gilpin’s assumptions about Realism, which may be taken as criteria for 
the theory’s use.54 Firstly, Realism deals with the group level of human activity. The
*  Gilpin 1986
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previous chapter will have demonstrated that we can treat warlords as unitary actors -  
i.e. groups. Furthermore, the notion of sovereignty will be examined and it will be 
shown that warlords are ‘empirically’ sovereign, although not ‘juridically’ sovereign. 
In addition, it will be established that we may treat warlords as ‘like units’, which 
Waltz and other Neorealists demand, and furthermore it will be demonstrated that 
they are ‘functionally undifferentiated’.
The next step is to demonstrate that warlords are motivated in the same way as 
states. The literature treats the motivations of armed groups as driven either by 
identity dynamics (grievance) or economic factors (greed). However, these 
motivations will be found to be instrumental in nature and are just some of the range 
of motivations that warlords may have. It will be argued that these drives are better 
covered under the heading of power. And it will be demonstrated that, just as with 
states, warlords must first be concerned with survival before they may pursue other 
activities.
A more subtle understanding of ‘collapsed’ and ‘fragmented’ states will be 
provided which will allow us to theoretically link the ‘domestic anarchy’ of such 
states with the international system. Domestic anarchy has been theorized about 
before, but as a ‘closed’ system, disconnected from international anarchy. This 
chapter will demonstrate how that is not necessarily the case and how we may speak 
of ‘open’ anarchic systems in states and therefore treat warlords as international 
actors.
Finally, this chapter will discuss how state failure and the nature of anarchy 
perpetuate the anarchic system in which warlords exist and strengthen the autonomy 
and independence of warlords. This is parallel to the reproduction of the state system 
which is theorized by various historical sociologists and IR theorists. Taken together,
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this chapter will demonstrate that the Neorealist approach can in fact be applied to 
warlords.
Chapter 4
This chapter will examine how the conceptual tools of Neorealism can be applied to 
describe warlord international relations. It will describe the theory of Neorealism and 
its concepts of self help, the talance of power, the security dilemma, and war. It will 
then examine how and to what degree these concepts can be used to theorize about 
warlordism. Neorealism and its constituent concepts, such as the balance of power, 
are traditionally only applied to states and to apply the theory to warlords is 
controversial at the least. Therefore the approach to this chapter will be to first 
illustrate the concept as it is traditionally understood and then to demonstrate its 
applicability to the analysis of warlord international relations.
Briefly, self help describes the need for an actor in anarchic systems to rely on 
itself for security. Neorealism assumes a self help system. As will have been 
demonstrated in Chapter 2 and 3, warlords are motivated by survival in an anarchic 
system, just as states are, and therefore we can conclude that a self help situation can 
also be used to describe warlord relations.
The balance of power traditionally refers to relationships between states, but it 
too may be applied to warlords. The concept of the balance of power describes the 
forces driving actors to build up power internally or to align in order to offset the 
power of any one actor which attempts to gain hegemony. This section will look at 
hard balancing -  the formal military and diplomatic aligning of states — as well as 
soft balancing -  which is less formal and not necessarily military-orientated in
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relation to states. The concept of balance of power will then be discussed in relation to 
warlordism.
The security dilemma, which describes the situation in which self help 
orientated actors will bring about further insecurity by trying to provide for their own 
security against peer actors, will also be examined. The security dilemma will be 
described in relation to states, in internal anarchic systems regarding non-state actors, 
and finally in mixed systems which include states and non-state actors, including 
warlords.
Finally, this chapter will examine the nature of interstate, or ‘anarchic’ -  
which is a means of balancing power -  and internal, or ‘hierarchic’ war. While 
warlords are usually considered to take part in hierarchic war, this chapter will 
illustrate how they also take part in anarchic war.
TESTING THE VALIDITY OF THE APPROACH: CASE STUDIES 
Having examined the nature of warlordism and illustrated how a Neorealist approach 
can help to describe, explain, and predict warlord international relations, it will be 
necessary to test whether the Neorealist approach is valid.55 In other words, while the 
first piece of the study will demonstrate that the conceptual tools of Neorealism can 
be applied to warlords and how they can be used to answer the question of how 
warlords relate with other actors; the second piece of the study will make the 
argument that the insights from the Neorealist approach match up with observed 
reality and provides an explanation of these observations.
55 The theory of Neorealism has been tested extensively on state to state interactions over the past two 
and a half decades. While this is not the place to review the findings of these tests, the ongoing use of 
the theory clearly shows that it has some value, at least relative to other theories o f international 
relations.
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The purpose of a theory is to explain. Specifically, to explain “regularities of 
behavior and [these regularities should lead] one to expect that the outc omes produced 
by interacting units will fall within specified ranges.”56 By ‘explain’, Waltz means 
“...to say why the range of expected outcomes falls within certain limits; to say why 
events repeat themselves, including events that none or few of the actors may like.”57 
Thus, we can call a theory valid if it describes and explains the regularities of 
behavior of interacting units. In order to determine if a theory really is explaining the 
regularities, it must be tested.
Of course it is not possible to use a truly experimental approach to determine 
the effectiveness of the theory. As with most other studies of international relations, 
case studies will be used to determine the validity of the theoretical approach.
Waltz listed a seven step approach to testing a theory, which he applied to 
Neorealism in relation to states. Briefly, the steps are to begin by inferring hypotheses
f O
about observable tests. Then the theoretical definitions and concepts are applied and 
outside variables are eliminated or controlled for. Finally, the theoretical hypotheses 
are tested against observations. Rather than stopping at one test, multiple distinct and 
demanding tests should be performed. If a test is not passed, one should not consider 
the theory falsified, but instead “ask whether the theory flunks completely, needs 
repair and restatement, or requires narrowing of the scope of its explanatory claims.”59 
Thus, we can conclude that if a theory can explain relations in multiple, demanding 
tests which compare predicted hypotheses to actual historical outcomes, it is a valid 
theory.
56 Waltz 1979: 68
57 Ibid.: 69
58 Ibid.: 13
39 Ibid.: 13
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Waltz’s final point is important in that while no theory can ever be proved to 
be true in the strong sense of proof, we can infer whether or not it is a functionally 
useful theory. If it is found to be useful, than a theory should be kept and continued to 
be applied. These further applications of the theory have the additional role of acting 
as continuing tests of the theory.
Such a testing approach can also be used to determine if a Neorealist approach 
can be validly used for the analysis of warlords. A case of a particular warlord will be 
presented and hypotheses will be generated about how we should expect the warlord 
to act. Then, the observed actions of the warlord will be documented and compared 
with those we expect. If it is found that the actors acted as expected -  i.e. that the 
observations conform to theoretical predictions -  and Neorealism can explain why the 
warlords acted as they did, then it will be considered to have demonstrated the 
validity of the theoretical approach. While Waltz sought to test whether the theory of 
Neorealism was valid in general, this study will seek to test whether it is valid to use 
in the particular case of warlord actors. The case studies in this thesis will attempt to 
do just that.
Throughout Chapters 2, 3, and 4, vignettes -  in effect small case studies- will 
be used to illustrate the concept(s) being discussed. These vignettes will include 
examples from warlords in many different regions, including Taylor in Liberia, the 
RUF in Sierra Leone, the LRA in northern Uganda, Somalia warlords, and Afghan 
warlords. These vignettes will apply the generalized testing model discussed above. 
However, in order to provide a more rigorous test of the validity of the Neorealist 
approach, two extensive case studies will be used, the second of which will be more 
demanding than the first.
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The case studies will each be divided into two separate tests. The first 
concerns the validity of the definition of warlords and the concepts that have been 
developed to describe warlords. The use of the definition to classify and analyze 
seemingly alike groups provides reason to believe that it is a suitable definition. Also, 
the conceptualization will be tested to see if it helps to explain the warlord’s actions. 
The second test will be to use the Neorealist approach to explain the international 
relations of the warlords in question. The usefulness of the theoretical approach will 
then be determined by its ability to match hypotheses to observations.
The following chapter summaries will briefly illustrate the case studies which 
will be used:
Chapter 5
In the first case study, the Neorealist approach will be tested in relation to warlords in 
Somalia. The definition of warlord will be applied to chssify and analyze multiple, 
seemingly alike actors. Specifically, different groups in Somalia -  including faction 
militias, warlords, business militias, court militias, and Islamic militias -  will be 
examined and the definition of warlord will be used to differentiate all the groups.
Following this process, the Neorealist notions of anarchy, self help, and 
survival will be addressed in the Somalia situation. It is necessary to examine these 
issues in Somalia in order to ensure that the system meets the minimum requirements 
for the use of the Neorealist approach. I.e. is Somalia an anarchic environment, is it a 
self help system, and are the actors motivated by survival? Once this has been 
accomplished it is possible to test hypotheses.
Multiple hypotheses will be tested. For instance, warlords in Somalia should 
be more concerned with the survival of the organization than with other factors, such
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as grievances against particular actors. Therefore they should align with other actors 
regardless of grievances Another hypothesis is that war should be over survival, 
rather than control of the state.
These hypotheses will be addressed through the examination of two specific 
instances of warlord international relations. The first is the 1993-94 UN intervention. 
The second is the relationship between the SNF, Ethiopia, and A1 Ittihad. The second 
examination is a particularly good case to look at in that it meets Waltz’s appeal that 
“[o]ne should... look for instances of states allying, in accordance with the 
expectations the theory gives rise to, even though they have strong reasons not to 
cooperate with one another.” 60
Chapter 6
In the second case study, a more demanding test will be conducted. In this case study, 
the international relations of the LRA will be examined. The LRA is an infamously 
difficult organization to analyze. Moreover, this case study will examine a fragmented 
state (a term to be defined in Chapter 3) as opposed to a collapsed state, like Somalia, 
as in the previous case study. Though this case iudy will also be in Africa, the 
situation and actors are so different from those in the Somalia case study that it should 
provide a more general analysis than even a case study set outside of Africa.61
As in the first case study, the definition and conceptualization of warlordism 
will be applied to the LRA. This will be done in order to see if it is a warlord and if 
so, whether we can sensibly organize the empirically observed features of the 
organization under our definition. Prima fasciae, the LRA does rot seem to be a
® Waltz 1979: 125
61 For example, a case study on Afghan warlords would resemble the Somalia case study even more 
than the LRA resembles the Somalia case study.
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warlord and therefore the demonstration that it is will provide a more demanding case 
study to look at.
The Neorealist theoretical account of the LRA’s international relations will 
then be applied in order to see if it is able to effectively describe the relations of the 
organization and make predictions about it (in the sense that the hypotheses are 
correct and explanations are better). This test will be accomplished by examining the 
LRA’s relations with the Ugandan state, the Sudanese state, and the Sudanese
fOPeople’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). It will be found that a dynamic 
balance of power has formed between the LRA, SPLM/A, Uganda, and Sudan.
Chapter 7 - Conclusion
The conclusion to this thesis will provide a summary of the argument and then some 
implications of this study will be explored. The most obvious conclusion and 
implication of this study is that it provides an effective analysis of the international 
relations of warlords.
The introductory discussion of this study, concerning the need to integrate 
armed groups in general into IR models of international politics, will be rejoined. This 
study has in many ways begun this integrative process and the degree to which it can 
be used to theorize about other types of armed groups will be discussed. In particular, 
the conclusion will address the degree to which the Neorealist approach can be 
applied to other types of armed groups, including: de facto states, traditional guerillas, 
clan-based militias, and proxy militias.
62 Throughout this study I will generally refer to the single organization of the SPLM/A, except in cases 
where the distinction between the military or political portion of the organization is specifically 
relevant, these portions will then be referred to as the SPLA (Sudanese People’s Liberation Army) and 
the SPLM (Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement) respectively.
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The conclusion will also address some theoretical and practical implications of 
this study. The theoretical implications include insights into the nature of sovereignty 
and anarchy. Practical implications include insights to be used in policy-making 
concerning the response to warlords which arise from this study.
Note on Methodology
A brief note on methodology is in order here. This thesis is primarily applying the 
insights of a theoretical approach to a particular type of actor. In doing this, it has 
been necessary to perform close-readings of theoretical texts, such as Theory o f 
International Politics, as well as extensive research on the actors involved. The source 
materials for understanding these actors have come from primary and secondary 
sources. These materials include: books, journal articles, research institute, NGO and 
IGO reports, news articles, and miscellaneous documents such as mission statements.
In some instances the existing literature or available primary documentation 
has not provided the necessary empirical knowledge to effectively discuss a particular 
warlord or event. In such cases, empirical case studies have been based on field work. 
This fieldwork was carried out in four separate trips, the first to Uganda and Kenya, 
including visits to Kampala, Gulu, internally displaced person camp in northern 
Uganda, and Nairobi; the second to Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan, including visits to 
Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Rumbek, and Khartoum; the third to Ghana and Liberia, 
including visits to the Budaburam Liberian Refugee Camp, Monrovia and 
Tubmanburg; and the fourth to Washington, DC.63
Semi-structured interviews were used to collect information on warlords and 
the organizations with which they interact. In particular, the case studies involving
63 Due to local insecurity it was not possible to perform fieldwork in Somalia, however, interviews 
concerning Somalia were conducted with relevant personnel in Kenya.
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Sudan, Somalia, and Uganda are partially based on interviews. In cases of specific, 
generally unknown information, or direct quotes the interview is noted in the 
footnotes.64
64 These interviews fall into three categories tf anonymity. Some o f the interviewees granted full 
permission for citation. In such cases, direct quotes are footnoted as the person’s title and their name is 
included with this title in the bibliography. Due to the sensitivity of this research, some of these 
interviews were conducted under the condition o f non-attribution to a name. In such cases the person is 
referred to by a description, such as ‘UN Source’, which has generally been agreed upon with the 
interviewee. In the bibliography, the person is just referred to by their description and their name and 
title has been withheld. In other cases, the person required the interviews to be entirely anonymous. 
These interviews were not recorded and there are no direct quotes attributed to them in the text, 
however, entries with a description have been left in the bibliography. A separate sheet with non- 
attributable names and titles is provided for examiners.
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CHAPTER 2 - DEFINITION AND CONCEPTUALIZATION OF WARLORD
The first step in an analysis of the international relations of warlords is to define and 
conceptualize them. This, however, is no easy feat. Paul Jackson points out that “at 
the beginning of the twenty-first century, the label warlord has come be used very 
broadly to cover a wide range of clan and political leaders who use armed civilians to 
impose power.”65 Recent instances of warlordism have included very different types 
of men and organizations including Taylor in Liberia and clan based militias in 
Somalia; while journalists and academic s have used the term to negatively refer to 
men from Dostum to Mobutu Sese Seko to Saddam Hussein. A definition of 
warlordism is needed which allows for a rationalized comparison.
Furthermore, the concept of warlord needs to be explored in significant detail 
in order to produce the degree of understanding necessary for a theoretical analysis of 
their international relations. Nation-states have been examined in detail by academics 
ranging from Max Weber to Charles Tilly and the high degree of theoretical 
understanding of states has facilitated the theoretical analysis of their international 
relations. In comparison, there has been relatively little conceptualizing about 
warlords. To facilitate theorizing about warlord international relations, it is necessary 
to perform a conceptual analysis in a manner producing a level of detail approaching 
that of our understanding of states.
The intent of this chapter is to explore some of the proposed definitions of 
warlordism and then to provide a conceptual framework hat can be used for 
analyzing warlords from the perspective of their international relations. The historical
® Jackson 2003: 134
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definitions of warlordism will be discussed, including those used by analysts of the 
Chinese warlord period and by Africanists. After tracing this definitional history, the 
chapter will move on to look at more modem definitions. The chapter will then 
incorporate other aspects of warlords into a broader conception of warlordism, 
including economic relations, barbarism, and the effects of globalization. Political 
community, governance, autonomy, and independence are found to be very important 
in understanding warlordism and these concepts will be explored in some detail. It 
will be concluded that, fundamentally, warlords are NSAs that use military power and 
economic exploitation to maintain fiefdoms, which are autonomous and independent 
from the state and society. To conclude the chapter, this definition of warlordism will 
be used to make rationalized comparisons with other actors.
CONTEXT 
Historical Definition of Warlord
It is important to take a historical view of warlordism because it, like other political- 
military organizations such as empires or city-states, seems to be a natural political 
formation that appears in various forms and in different locales throughout the ages. 
In particular, warlords and their organizations often arise out of the weakening or 
collapse of larger political structures such as empires or states. Examples of what we 
might refer to as warlords date back to antiquity and include the heroes of ancient 
Greek epic poetry, late Western Roman Empire military leaders, including the half­
legendary King Arthur, and the Vikings of Medieval Europe.
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For instance, M. I. Finley quotes one passage from the Iliad  which details the 
nature of “war” during the Greek dark ages (i.e. the period which Homer wrote
f f iabout). The passage is a description by Nestor about a raid on Elis:
Would that I were in the prime of my youth and my might as steadfast 
as when a quarrel broke out between us and the Eleans over a cattle 
raid. ...Exceedingly abundant was then the booty we drove out of the 
plain together, fifty herds of cattle, as many flocks of sheep, as many 
droves of swine, as many herds of goats, and a hundred and fifty bays, 
all mares... And Neleus was glad at heart that so much booty fell to me
f n
the first time I went to war.
Such a passage is not out of the ordinary. Throughout the Iliad and the Odyssey the
ITO
heroes assume that warfare involves raiding for booty. Though the Iliad is not 
strictly historical it is generally argued that the notions of Greek life, including 
warfare, which it portrays are a reflection of reality.69 It is easy to draw parallels 
between such practices and more contemporary forms of warlordism -  non-state 
armed groups fighting “war” for loot.
In the modem age, the term warlord has been used to describe competing 
provincial military and political leaders during the period after the fall of the Qing 
dynasty in 1911 and up to either 1927, when Chiang Kai Shek was able to restore
66 Finley 1956
67 Homer 1999: 132, 33; quoted in Finley 1956
® A. Jackson 1993. It should be noted that Alastar Jackson argues that Finley overemphasis the place
of raiding as war for the Homeric age Greeks and believes that fighting for honor played the more
major role; however, he does not disagree with the basic point that during the period which the Iliad
portrays, raiding was common.
Finley 1956, A. Jackson 1993
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some form of order, or the beginning of the Anti-Japanese war in 1937.70 The term is 
a translation of the Chinese junfa which, like the English term warlord, has a
71pejorative connotation. As opposed to an earlier term, dujun, which simply meant 
‘supervisor of military affairs’, junfa connotes military activity without an aim or 
purpose -  an important distinction still applied today. The word warlord was used as a 
translation by foreign correspondents in their sensational descriptions of the violent
7)tactics used by the jun fa .
James Sheridan gave a formal academic definition of warlord in his seminal 
work on the subject of Chinese warlord, Chinese Warlord: The Career o f Feng Yu- 
hsiang. He defines a warlord as an actor who “exercised effective governmental 
control over a fairly well-defined region by means of a military organization that 
obeyed no higher authority than himself.” 73
Many later authors have continued to rely on Sheridan’s definition.74 The 
staying power of his definition is due to its simplicity and applicability. In essence, it 
demands only two features of a warlord actor. The first is that the actor must exercise 
control via military power. The second is that the actor is the highest level of a 
hierarchy. Sheridan’s definition was most notably taken up by Africanists in the 
1980s, who began applying the concept of warlord to African military actors.
73 See Lary 1985, Roberts (1989) and McCord (1993) for historical and theoretical discussions of the 
period.
71 The word ‘warlord’ itself is possibly derived from the literal translation o f Kriegsherr, a formal title 
of German Kaisers. Colin Darch (1989) holds this view.
72 Rich 1999
73 Sheridan 1966: 1
74 For instance, Diana Lary defines China’s warlordism as “a system in which China was fragmented 
into a series o f satraps, each controlled by a commander answerable only to himself or to those more 
powerful, in a military sense, than himself.” (Lary 1985: 2)
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African Warlords
The contemporary debate about warlordism, and in particular the discussion of what 
actually defines a warlord, began with the application of historical studies of Chinese 
warlordism to military actors in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 1989 special issue of the 
Review o f African Political Economy, which focused on ‘Warlords and Problems of 
Democracy’, is considered to be a milestone in the warlord debate.75 The literature 
these authors were referring to was pioneered by historians like Sheridan in the 1960s 
and took on growing detail in the 1980s with authors such as Diana Lary’s analysis of 
soldiers in the warlord period.76
In particular, authors such as Roy May and Roger Charlton applied the 
concept of warlordism to military actors in the protracted conflict in Chad during the 
1980s.77 According to Charlton and May, the Chadian state developed an internal 
militarism through two related processes: “a process of de -institutionalization and 
organizational decay at the level of the central government. [And it involved] a 
concomitant and progressive growth of regionalism, ultimately emerging as a 
regionalization of the whole political process.”78 This was combined with a “reliance
7Q
on force of arms to settle political disputes and to determine policy.” From this, 
Charlton and May drew a parallel with the Chinese warlord period.
In both cases, these warlords “relied upon their personal politico-military 
skills to establish first, their control over a regional power-base and second, [drew] 
upon the economic resources of their fiefdoms, to expand, by force if necessary, their 
domain of effective power.”80 Put more simply, a warlord had two necessary
75 Review o f African Political Economy -  16 (45/46)
76 Sheridan 1966, Lary 1985
77 Charlton and May 1989
78 Ibid.: 17
a
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characteristics, “a private army and an area under his control.” As each of these 
warlords attempted to expand, they bumped into each other, creating conflict, aptly 
described as ‘internal anarchy’ in the China example.
Charlton and May go on to argue for the analytic value in applying the warlord 
model to Chadian politics. From these foundations, the term warlord, and its basic 
definition, was used to describe numerous political actors throughout sub-Saharan 
Africa and later the Balkans, Middle East, and Central Asia by both academics and 
the media.82
CONTEMPORARY DEFINITIONS
Since the 1980s there has been a continued interest in warlordism. In particular, the 
Sierra Leonean and Liberian wars in West Africa, clan fighting in Somalia and 
Afghanistan, and a scattering of other potential candidates including the DRC and 
Chechnya have been put forward as examples of warlordism. In order to analyze these 
conflicts theorists have returned to the earlier writings of the Chinese historians as 
well as of the Africanists of the 1980s in pursuit of an accurate definition of 
warlordism.
In their analyses, most theorists have kept intact the central tenets of the 
definitions used by the Chinese historians and the Africanists. Sheridan’s definition in 
particular is echoed in more recent analyses. For example, Antonio Giustozzi defines 
a warlord as a “particular type of ruler, whose basic characteristics are his 
independence of any higher authority and his control of a ‘private army’, which 
responds to him personally” in his analysis of Afghan warlords. Jackson notes that, 
“the term warlord has been used... to describe a man who is in control of a particular
81 Ibid.: 20
82 See, for instance, Shawcross 2000
83 Giustozzi 2003:2
54
group or area and who does not answer directly to a higher authority -  although they 
may defer to stronger warlords.”84
This traditional definition of warlordism is still widely used because it is a 
clear, empirical description of warlords. Some actors in Somalia or Afghanistan do in 
fact have private militaries and do not answer to a higher authority. This is a 
fundamental feature of warlordism and sets it apart from many other forms of political 
organization.
Beyond these basic features, commentators on warlords have noted three 
supplementary factors. The first are the economic issues wrapped up in warlordism. 
The second feature is warlordism notorious barbarism. Lastly, there are the effects 
that globalization have had on warlordism.
Economic factors
A feature of warlordism often remarked on by theorists is its self-serving nature. 
Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz note that warlords are “quite literally, 
businessmen of war, that is, they relied on violence as the main instrument of their 
economic activity.”85 Another author notes that the raison d ’etre of warlordism
ozr
should be the “pursuit of narrow, commercial self-interest.”
The economic rationale for warfare is nothing new, even Aristotle mentions 
the use of war fighting for economic gain. In his Politics he remarks, “it also follows 
that the art of war is in some sense... a natural mode of acquisition.” 87 Warlords, 
however, are thought to make economic exploitation their primary justification for 
warfare. These accusations are not unfounded. It has been reported that Taylor made
^Jackson 2003: 134
85 Chabal and Daloz 1999: 85
86 Robinson 2001:123
87 Aristotle 1958: 21
55
oo
hundreds of millions if not billions during his time as a warlord in Liberia. Reno 
takes this position to be the essential feature of warlordism and bases his theory of 
warlordism on their use of economic markets.89 Whether or not it is of primaiy 
importance, clearly economic profit is essential to warlordism and must be taken into 
account in an analysis.
Barbarism
Warlordism is almost synonymous with barbarism, savagery, and ‘senseless’ acts of 
war. Numerous authors have reflected on the almost unimaginable suffering that 
warlords have caused, usually for seemingly senseless reasons. For example, Ralph 
Peters refers to “erratic primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with 
no stake in civil order... [who are] as brutal as ever and distinctly better-armed.” 90 
Chris Hedges remarks concerning warlords are also illustrative:
They carry their phallic weapons slung low at an angle toward the 
ground. Most of these fighters are militiamen, those who stay away 
from real combat, have little training or discipline, and primarily 
terrorize the weak and defenseless. And they look the part, often with 
tight black fatigues, wraparound sunglasses, and big ugly jeeps or cars 
with tinted windows. For them war is about empowerment. They have 
turned places like the Congo into Hobbesian playgrounds.91
88 Reno 1998
89 Ibid.
90 Peters 1994: 16
91 Hedges 2002: 163
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No analysis of warlordism can fail to incorporate an explanation of the 
savagery of the warlord. Simply noting that warlords are ‘evil’ or ‘psychotic’ is of 
little analytical value.92 Rather it is necessary to explain why they act in such savage 
ways toward even members of their own community, break treatie s, and in general 
rebel against the idea of an orderly society.
Combined with this savage outlook, warlords are generally held to be weak, 
by and large ad hoc organizations, with no interest in forming an orderly state. For 
instance, Clapham describes ‘warlord insurgencies’ as being:
distinguished by personal leadership, generally weak organizational 
structures, and still weaker ideological motivation. In those cases 
where they managed to overthrow incumbent regimes, they generally 
proved unable to establish effective governments in their place.
In other words, warlords are seen as a purely destructive force. In fact, our notion of 
barbarism goes back to the Greeks who felt that what “rendered a people barbarous 
was their unwillingness to make anything of themselves. They left no mark on 
history.”94
Warlords are clearly barbaric in this manner. They do not attempt to construct 
for others including future generations, but only to destroy or to take for the 
immediate usage. They are, as Thomas Hobbes says, “like worms in the entrails of a 
natural man.”95 Warlords are thought to exist only for their own ends and, even when 
given the chance, will not civilize themselves or provide public goods for those
92 Keen 1998, 2000; also see Vinci 2005 for a specific example.
93 Clapham 1996: 212
*  Coker 2002: 92
95 Hobbes 1998
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civilians that they rule over. Thus, while states may commit ample atrocities and 
otherwise act in savagely violent ways, what sets warlords apart is the uselessness of 
their violence, for at least the state can argue that it committed evil for some greater 
good. A conceptualization of warlordism must also take into account such barbarism 
as well.
Globalization
Another important feature of contemporary warlordism that gives us a clue into its 
true nature is that warlords are integrated into the global system. As Mark Duffield 
notes, “today’s successful warlords may act locally but they think globally.”96 While 
the term globalization, which denotes the increase in economic, political, social, and 
other forms of connectedness and interdependence by actors around the world, is an 
imprecise term, it is an issue which must be taken into account in the analysis of 
warlords.97
Globalization has facilitated a much more intimate relationship between local, 
neighboring actors and distant actors in the international system. This is possible 
because of at least four factors pointed out by Mackinlay:
• improvements in transport technology (and its availability in all parts of the 
world, including developing countries);
• the proliferation of information and communications;
• deregulation of international economies and markets;
• and increased migration.98
96 Duffield 2001: 175
97 Berdal (2003) makes this point in regard to the study o f civil wars.
98 Mackinlay 2002: 16
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These factors have converged, along with historical events such as the end of the Cold 
War, to allow local actors like warlords to gain access to international markets and to 
take part in international politics.
In particular, the economic ramifications of globalization need to be taken into 
account in an analysis of warlords. The international economic connections of 
warlords allow them to buy and sell goods and services in international markets 
without regulation by the state. Of central importance to warlords is the ability to sell 
commodities under their control through the international market, for instance, the 
case of Jonas Savimbi’s diamond sales and other goods to foreign firms. At the same 
time, warlords are able to purchase goods on the international market, and especially 
important to them are small arms and other tools of war.99
Furthermore, political and diplomatic issues arise in relation to globalization 
and these also must be taken into account in relation to warlords. Globalization has 
made possible political connections between warlords and other actors, which were 
traditionally reserved for the state. For example, previous to the global incorporation 
of communication networks, it would not have been possible for a local warlord to 
communicate with far off state actors, except possibly through long-distance travel 
(which also would have been very difficult). Now, however, it is possible for a 
warlord like Taylor to be interviewed on BBC through a satellite phone while still in 
Liberia or for Savimbi to make the journey to Washington, DC to visit with his 
patron, Ronald Reagan. In order to fully conceptualize warlordism, it is necessary to 
include these international connections as a fundamental feature of warlordism. In
"Cooper 1999
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fact, the prominence of these international connections is part of the impetus for this 
study.
A recent definition provided by Duffield incorporates the international 
connections of warlords. He defines a warlord as:
the leader of an armed band, possibly numbering up to several 
thousand fighters, who can hold territory locally and, at the same time, 
acts financially and politically in the international system without 
interference from the state in which he is based.100
Here Duffield keeps intact the tiaditional feature of warlordism in which the warlord 
is able to control territory (implicitly) through military force. Where Duffield diverges 
with the traditional definition of warlordism is that he explicitly demands a 
connection with die international system and the warlord’s independence from the 
state. These factors, as the following section will make clear, are as central to 
warlordism as are its more traditional aspects, such as its enlistment of private 
militaries.
CONCEPTUALIZING WARLORDS AND WARLORD ORGANIZATIONS
Having looked at some of the different definitions of warlord, we can begin to put 
together an inclusive definition and explore some of the concepts which underlie 
warlordism. Many different concepts have come up in the definitions which others 
have used, even if they are taken for granted, in addition, there are some underlying 
concepts which theorists have ignored altogether. The following section will explore
100 Duffield 1997: 18, noted in Mackinlay 2000: 48 (italics added for emphasis)
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some of these concepts which underlie warlordism, including the notions of non-state 
actor, autonomy, political community, singular actor, and independence. Other issues 
which must be addressed in regard to warlordism include economic, motivational, and 
military aspects.
The Warlord
A warlord is a man, but we should not see the warlord as only an individual. Warlords 
include men like Dostum, Taylor, and Mohammed Farah Aidid. These warlords 
control organizations. This organization is an emergent entity made up of the sum of 
its individuals. These individuals combine together into a cohesive unit, which can, 
for theoretical purpose, be treated as a single actor. The warlord as an individual is the 
highest authority over this organization -  as will be illustrated below.
More generally, the warlord organization is identified with the warlord as an 
individual. This is typical of armed groups. Charles King points out that
as conflicts drag on, the distinction between the aims of the struggle 
and the personalities and perceptions of leaders charged with achieving 
them can begin to fade. Combatants on either side may come to 
identify their own leaders with the struggle itself.101
This can have practical consequences, as King also discusses the notion of “gambling 
for resurrection” in which “although accepting defeat or agreeing to negotiation might 
entail fewer costs than pressing for total victory, political leaders -  thinking of the
101 King 1997: 30
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109consequences of defeat for themselves -  may decide to carry on the fight.” It also 
has the consequence of causing theorists to refer to the organization, and its 
motivations, in terms of individual leaders.
Yet, while in practice it might not be possible to replace a warlord because he 
is the central link in the chain of authority, in theory he is replaceable. In this sense 
the warlord organization exists as a separate, definable entity.103 There are examples 
of warlord replacement as well as counterexamples. For instance, Aidid was replaced 
upon his death in 1996 by his son Hussein Aidid.104 On the other hand, the National 
Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) collapsed soon after Savimbi’s 
death in 2002. The explanation is that in warlord organizations, as with other military 
organizations, the leader’s death weakens the organization significantly. In some 
cases, this weakness is enough to cause the complete collapse of the organization, and 
in others it is not.
Thus, even though the term is usually applied to a single individual, it more 
rightly refers to a cohesive group. This is the same way that we treat a state run by a 
dictator as a single group even though we refer to the individual dictator as the 
instigator of policy and may even refer to the state in terms of the dictator when 
speaking of the origins of policy. Accordingly we should treat the warlord as in fact 
being a ‘warlord organization’, but we may continue the common practice of referring 
to the entire organization as simply ‘warlord’.
102 Ibid.: 31
103 Yet, we could not separate the warlord organization from the warlord, for then he would just be a 
man.
104 McKinley 1996
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Political Community
This begs the question, what is the warlord organization, how is it defined? 105 One 
problem with defining the warlord organization is that it is often assumed that 
authority is territorially based and, by extension, that a definition of warlord should be 
based on control of a fixed territory. This assumption is made because it is in 
reference to a fixed territory with distinct boundaries that we define the state. But, as 
Jeffrey Herbst has shown, territorial control is not always as important as authority 
over people.106 While Herbst was referring to Africa, sovereignty as authority over 
people can also apply to other areas and other groups. For example, we assume it in 
reference to nomadic tribes in Central Asia throughout history. This sort of 
sovereignty was also found in Europe. For example, “[t]he Roman Empire contained 
political-legal units based on people, holding that Roman citizens and local tribes 
were ruled and treated differently although they were to be found in the same 
geographical area.” 107
Unlike the state, the population that is under the warlord’s authority is not 
based on territory, but is instead based on membership through initiation and specific 
inclusion. With the state, membership is defined by being bom within a specified 
territory, or otherwise attaching oneself to the territory. The warlord organization, on 
the other hand, is made up of those who are specifically initiated. In effect, this 
usually means those that have undergone some sort of recmitment process and are 
part of the patronage system. For example, a person may join and becomes a paid
105 The broadest category which we can use to describe a warlord organization is that it is an ‘armed 
group’. By this we mean that it is a non-state organization which has the capacity for systematic 
military action. This, o f course, is a very expansive definition, meant more to separate out groups such 
as mobs or non-violent criminals, than to include specific types. However, the concept o f armed groups 
does incorporate the different types of organizations which we would like to include, from organized 
criminal gangs to terrorist groups to warlords to rebel insurgencies.
106 Herbst 2000
107 Vollaard 2001:94
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member of the militia of Mohammed Qanyare, a Somali warlord. However, initiation 
into membership can be achieved in other ways, such as forceful conscription. For 
instance, a child who is forced to fight for the RUF becomes a member of the 
organization. Often the process of initiation will include imbuing physical and 
emotional markers, such as tattoos or shared memories of trauma. This process of 
initiation and inclusion differentiates those in the warlord organization from other 
forms of compulsive inclusion, such as being part of a family, clan, or ethnic group.
Initiates are not only known to themselves, but are also seen as separate by 
other political communities. Tattoos, uniforms, costumes, speaking a different dialect 
or using slang are all means by which a member of the warlord organization can mark 
him or herself as separate from other political communities. At times initiation can 
include acts which make it difficult for the individual to return to another political 
community, such as when LRA abductees are forced to kill or maim members of their 
own family or village. In general, the manner in which members of the warlord 
organization treat civilians draws a stark line between them and the local 
population.108
Members are included into a clearly delineated organization, which is in
1OQessence, an enclosed political community. Political community is defined by a 
definite in-group and out-group distinction.110 However, this boundary determines 
more than just the separation of one group from another, indeed it determines -  to use 
Schmitt’s terminology -  friends, who are those also under the authority of the 
warlord, and the enemy, who are, usually, everyone else.111 For the state this friend 
enemy distinction is based on fixed territorial boundaries or, for a nomadic tribe, it is
108 Duyvesteyn (2005) notes this in regard to the Somali and Liberian wars.
109 This is a strongly developed ‘group’ distinction, as opposed to a ‘grid’ distinction to use Mary 
Douglas’ term. Douglas 1970, based on Soeters 2005.
ll0To use the terminology from Simmel’s classic work, Conflict (Simmel 1955).
1,1 Schmitt 1996
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based on ethnicity and familial relation etc. For the warlord, this boundary is based on 
inclusion and retention in the warlord organization. Members are exclusively part of 
this political community -  in the same way that those who live in a state are 
exclusively citizens of that state -  and in this sense tie political community is 
enclosed.112
As with the state, this friend-enemy distinction must be continually redefined 
and reinforced. For example, in Liberia, it has been noted that “[a]s the overall threat 
to a faction decreased, as it did in some area after Cotonou [a multifaceted agreement 
between the factions, including cease-fires], cohesion reduced.”113 Also, as with 
states, the paramount way to (re)create the friend-enemy distinction is through war. 
This helps to explain the warlord’s continual need fcr conflict -  without it, his 
organization may simply dissolve. This insight echoes Weber, who notes, “[t]he 
charisma of the warlord rises and falls with its efficacy and also with the demand for 
it; the warlord becomes a permanent figure when there is a chronic state of war.”114
The warlord political community is separate, but related to existent political 
communities, such as clans. Often warlords arise out of a sub-national political 
community which has a defined border. The most common examples of this are clans, 
as occurs in Somalia or Afghanistan. The leaders of such armed groups, which are by 
definition militias -  since they are the non-professional armed extension of a civilian 
community -  are more rightly called ‘warleaders’. However, the warlord becomes a 
warlord in the sense that he breaks away from a dependency on the clan. Though he 
may continue to use the rhetoric of clan, he must base his motivation on other factors 
-  to be discussed below. (In Chapter 5, the case of Somali warlords will be examined
1,2 Of course there may be dual citizens in a state and, similarly, in a warlord organization people may 
be part o f multiple political communities. However, on the whole, most people will have a single 
membership.
113 Alao, Mackinlay, and Olonisakin 1999: 47
114 Weber 1978: 1142
and the relationship between warlord and clan will be specifically addressed.) This 
firm line between warlordism and clan militia is an important distinction to make 
because it better reflects reality and is starkly evident in the fact that many warlords 
do not arise out of clans or other political communities -  though they may attempt to 
adopt such rhetoric or otherwise use such a relationship instrumentally. (Sections in 
Chapters 3 and 4 will detail some of the instrumental benefits for warlords which arise 
from aligning with clan, ethnic groups, or other communal groupings.)
Accordingly, we should call the enclosed political community that the warlord 
controls a fiefdom. The term fiefdom can refer to a specific piece of territory, which 
warlords may more or less temporarily control. There is no doubt that warlords 
sometimes control territory and the people on that territory. But there is also a second 
meaning of the word which is more apt for this discussion. This is that the word can 
be used in the sense that it is an organization which is controlled by a dominant 
person or group. It is more rightly in this sense that the warlord has a fiefdom. Thus, it 
is the fiefdom that the warlord is the highest authority over.
This notion of membership rather than territorial control aligns with empirical 
observations of warlordism. For example, Qanyare has had control over specific 
pieces of territory, including, for instance, Dayinle airport. But, it is not that we 
associate Qanyare’s authority with a specific piece of territory, even if he has 
controlled it for a long period of time. Rather, it is Qanyare’s authority over his 
private militia which is important. A defeat in one place and victory in another will 
cause Qanyare and his group of fighters to move, but he would still have authority 
over the group and be no less a warlord. In the same way, for the fighters in 
Qanyare’s militia, their loyalty is not to a territory, but to the organization, and by
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extension, Qanyare himself. The men do not answer to any government or authority 
other than him or their assigned superior.
It is this peculiar nature of the warlord political community that makes the 
common warlord practice of killing or looting from local populations appear more 
logical. It may seem to an outsider that a warlord organization made up of individuals 
from the same ethnic group, religion or community of the local population would not 
want to prey on these people because they are ‘the same people’. Therefore, when 
warlords kill this local population, they are often considered to be barbaric. The 
reason being that we typically think of killing within our own political community as 
savage and murderous, whereas we can justify the killing of our political 
community’s ‘enemies’.
But this is not how the situation should be understood. The individuals within 
the warlord organization have their own separate political community and see the 
local residents that they prey on as enemies. To members of the warlord political 
community it is acceptable to kill those outside of the political community in the same 
way as it is seen as acceptable for citizens from one nation to kill citizens from 
another nation during wartime, even if they are of a similar ethnic or religious 
background.
This allows us to understand a seemingly paradoxical organization like the 
LRA. The LRA is made up solely of Acholi people from northern Uganda and 
southern Sudan. Yet, the LRA also extensively preys upon the Acholi people -  
torturing, abducting, and looting from them on a regular basis. To some this may 
seem contradictory as it is assumed that the LRA would not want to alienate the 
people that they have sprung from and should militarily represent them against other 
groups. However, when we keep in mind that the LRA personnel have defined
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themselves separately from the Acholi people, their actions seem more rational. They 
have their own political community and it is not based on ethnicity, but on initiation 
and indoctrination.115 Therefore, to the LRA the Acholi people are as much outsiders 
as any other political community would be and therefore violence against them is as 
acceptable as agahst any other political community in a conflict.
This is only one of the ways in which a warlord political community differs 
from civil political communities; a related point is that due to the nature of the 
warlord political community, the idea of ‘public goods’ is completely alien. Only 
those initiated into the warlord political community are able to obtain goods from the 
organization and these goods are in themselves the glue which holds the organization 
together. This is one of the features that separate the warlord from the state, which 
does provide public goods to those within its territory. Unlike the state, the warlord 
“does not primarily direct the peaceful struggle of man with nature, but the violent 
struggle of one community against another.”116 But, the warlord organization is 
nonetheless a political community and political communities are dominated in the 
Weberian sense of the members of the community not just being ruled by force, but of 
also having an interest in obedience.117
Warlord Governance and Command
The warlord’s authority over a population implies the existence of governance. 
However, warlord governance is extremely different from that found in a state or even 
a guerilla insurgency. In a state there is a clear citizen base and a military is formed 
out of this citizen base. Even in a guerilla insurgency there is a base of people who
115 Chapter 6 will discuss this initiation process.
116 Weber 1978: 1141,42
117 TUM
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continue on with their lives while they may be governed by the insurgents or 
otherwise contribute to the rebel’s fight.
Warlordism, on the other hand, “veers toward a total combination of military 
and political means. Warfare in effect becomes politics and politics warfare in a 
permanently militarized anarchical society.”118 All members of the warlord political 
community are part of a military organization, and even the economy is 
fundamentally wrapped up with the military. This is pure praetorism -  i.e. the 
intervention of the military into political life and breakdown of civilian/military 
relations.119
Consequentially, the warlord’s praetorian governance structure is the same as 
its command, control, and communication structure. In the warlord organizations,
political organization is the same as military organization, and to command the
1
military is to govern. In order to bring about such domination, the warlord 
organization must have a:
• leadership,
• hierarchical control structure,
• set of tactics and strategies to carry out, and
• method for effectively communicating orders.
The leadership of a warlord organization, and in particular, the warlord 
himself, can set the rules of governance. For instance, Joseph Kony, the leader of the 
LRA, has instituted an entire quasi-religious governance and command institution. 
Warlords like Dostum and Taylor relied heavily on patrimonial, looting based internal
118 Rich 1999:6
119 Warlords may therefore be understood as ‘real’ warriors as John Keegan defines them. They see war 
as a way o f life, like the Cossack. (Keegan 1993) Mackinlay notes this point. (Mackinlay 2000) Their 
political community is run by, and made up of, military personnel and the perpetuation of their way of 
life depends an economy based on conquest and looting as does their continued recruitment.
120 In Clausewitzian terms, this is the complete combination of people, government, and army. 
(Clausewitz 1989)
69
economies to maintain authority. As with other political organizations, we can 
classify the different means by which warlords gain authority.
In order to effectively govern a political organization, the warlord may obtain 
authority from charismatic, patrimonial, or rational (legal) sources, just as states 
can.121 These are the sources of political authority which Weber attributes to political 
organizations. Though Weber admits that authority can come simply from force, this 
is an unreliable form of authority and therefore the leader must legitimize his 
authority in some manner. As Robert Dahl notes, authority from legitimate sources “is 
not only more reliable and durable than naked coercion but also enables a ruler to
1 •yy
govern with a minimum of political resources.” Charismatic power ongmates m an 
individual. Patrimonial power derives from direct exchange from the top of an 
organization down the hierarchy. Finally, bureaucratic power is instilled in the 
organization itself. In general, the warlord organization is a non-bureaucratic form of 
organization.123 Rather, the warlord relies on patrimonial and charismatic sources of
For the warlord organization, patronage usually comes in the form of looted 
goods or other monetary inducements which flow down from the highest levels of the 
organization to the lowest fighters in the warlord organization. The patronage creates 
a bond between the warlord and the fighters in the political community. This 
patronage is the incentive which allows the warlord to retain preeminent control over 
the fighters, for it is a mirror of patriarchal domination. As Weber notes:
121 Weber 1958, 1978
122 Dahl 1965: 19. This point is made more generally in concern to armed groups by Duyvesteyn
authority.
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[u]nder patriarchal domination the legitimacy of the master’s orders is 
guaranteed by personal subjection... The fact that this concrete master 
is indeed their ruler is always uppermost in the minds of his subjects.
The master wields his power without restraint, at his own discretion 
and, above all, unencumbered by rules, insofar as it is not limited by 
tradition or by competing power.124
This unrestrained power, which is gained from direct, personal connections with the 
warlord, creates a hierarchy of power which can be observed in all warlord 
organizations, even seemingly unorganized groups. This reliance on patronage for 
governance is the major factor in the warlord’s ever-present need for economic 
exploitation -  a point which will be addressed in more detail below.
The reliance on patronage also helps to explain why the warlord as an 
individual is so central to the organization. The warlord will almost always attempt to 
monopolize the economic connections which dominate the warlord organization’s 
economic system.125 In so doing, the warlord as an individual becomes a necessary 
link in the chain of organizational control. While Reno stresses the economic 
repercussions of the warlord’s centrality to the organization, here the ‘political’ 
repercussions -  in the sense of politics being about determining who gets what, when,
19/iand how -  are to be stressed. And, in this sense, patronage is what defines the 
internal politics o f the warlord organization.
Charismatic power is also important for the warlord. For example, the LRA is 
governed by the mystic Kony, who ‘Uses... spiritualism to maintain control, starting 
with his overall vision of liberation and destruction and continuing with individual
124 Weber 1978: 1006-07
125 Reno 1998
I26Lasswell 1936
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127spirits that ‘guide’ specific military tactics.” Or, for instance, in Liberia “success 
and influence depended more on a commander’s power in his own right as a 
dominating personality in the faction hierarchy than on his capabilities as a military
178leader.” This too helps to explain the prominence of the warlord as an individual in 
the warlord organization, for it is in him that charismatic authority resides.
Warlords have their own personalized organizational systems for maintaining 
a hierarchy of domination with corresponding discipline and communication. In 
general, these systems will be much less efficient than in conventional militaries. 
Often discipline is low and based on force and abuse. Communication is basic, though 
satellite phones and other high-tech equipment are regularly used by warlords who 
may obtain technology as easily as any other group can through globalized trade 
networks. Another factor, which Reno has argued, is that warlord organizations lack a
1 9Q
structured bureaucracy in the way which most states have. This will also serve to 
make the warlord organization significantly less efficient, though not necessarily less 
effective, than states. Nonetheless, even though warlord organizations are often 
characterized as nearly chaotic organizations, there is always a system in place for 
controlling fighters.
With the ability to direct troops in place, a warlord must develop a strategy 
and set of tactics with which to manage warfare. The strategies can be borrowed, such 
as the guerilla strategies developed by Che Guevara or the military doctrine of a 
state’s army, or made up by the armed group itself, as the ‘Holy Spirit Tactics’ of 
Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement.130 In some cases, they seem to fight with 
essentially no strategy and few tactics other than random shooting, as is often said
127 Refugee Law Project 2004: 13
128 Alao, Mackinlay, and Olonisakin 1999: 47
129 Reno 1998
130 See Guevara 1961 and Behrand 1999
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about warlords of the Liberian and Ugandan conflicts. However, even in these
instances, there is in fact a rational set of tactics and strategies. The specifics of these
1^1
strategies will be detailed in the case study chapters to follow.
The warlord’s ability to govern and direct the warlord organization and 
thereby to function as a single, cohesive actor can be observed in the various instances 
of warlordism. For example, this is what allowed Dostum to direct his forces to assist 
the United States in its war against the Taliban. While his forces are not commanded 
as efficiently as modem militaries, like the United States’, they were nonetheless 
commanded and controlled. Similarly, while the National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) may not have been the most effectively governed organization, Taylor’s men 
did not completely run wild. In particular, Operation Octopus -  a surprise invasion of 
Monrovia- though an overall failure, is generally held to have proven Taylor’s ability 
to carry out complex, sustained military actions.132
With a set of strategies and tactics in place, a warlord must move on to teach 
these to the fighters in the organization. Since such strategic doctrine is, in effect, the 
praetorian organization’s government, or constitution, by indoctrinating new troops, 
the warlord reproduces and reinforces the organization over tme. Even the most 
simple and barbaric warlord still institutes some form of training and indoctrination
131 This organizational structure of a warlord organization (and all armed groups for that matter), based 
on command, control and, communication, can usually be broadly divided into centralized and 
decentralized strategies. Warlords practicing centralized strategies attempt b control their members 
through a tight network of hierarchical command. This necessarily involves better discipline and 
communication technology. A decentralized strategy is less dependent on discipline and technology as 
it allows for more independence in the ranks. The non- (or less) hierarchical organization of the group 
means that lower level commanders can have more independent control. The trade-off is that there is 
greater danger of factionalization. One solution to this problem is a bottom -up ideology o f control in 
which soldiers are inculcated with a set o f beliefs that reflect those o f the command; therefore, when 
command is relinquished, they can be trusted to continue the strategy. Most terrorist organizations use 
some degree of a decentralized br ‘cellular’) structure. Another method of ensuring control is to 
predict the probable motivations and actions of groups and arm them accordingly as is used by the 
Sudanese government with the janjeweed.
132 See for instance Duyvesteyn 2005
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for the fighters. For example, the LRA gives extensive combat training to its soldiers. 
One returned fighter noted:
In Sudan they gave us training far three weeks. ...I was also trained to 
shoot, and how to put together guns and handle the weapons-  
antipersonnel mines, antitank mines, SMG, LMF, PKM, mortars.133
Additionally, new fighters in the LRA are given spiritual education and indoctrinated 
into the organization with formal mystical processes, such as spreading shea butter on 
their bodies.134
The warlord organization, therefore, should be seen as a structured, 
cohesively organized, singular actor. There is a political community and the warlord 
has the organizational reach to command and direct the organization as he wishes. 
The organization can thereby act as a whole.
Autonomy
Within the framework of IR theory, warlords are NSAs in that they are, “at least in 
principle, autonomous from the structure and machinery of the state, and of the 
governmental and intergovernmental bodies above the formally sovereign state.” 135 
NSAs take part in transnational relations in the sense that they are “regular 
interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or 
does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental 
organization.” These actors include many different types of organizations, such as
133 Interview with ‘Sarah’, a returned LRA fighter, reported in HRW 1997.
134 See HRW 1997 and Refugee Law Project 2004
135 Josselin and Wallace 2001: 3
136 Risse-Kappen 1995: 3
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MNCs, such as Shell Oil, NGOs, such as Oxfam, religious groups, such as the 
Catholic Church, as well as various military organizations, such as Executive 
Outcomes or Hamas. However, warlords are qualitatively different from other NSAs 
in that they are completely autonomous and independent of the state.
More than being autonomous from the state’s structure, warlords are not 
subject to the state’s authority at all. Warlords are essentially autonomous actors. This 
feature is reiterated in most of the earlier definitions of warlord. The warlord’s 
autonomy makes it the highest authority and this authority extends to both its internal 
and external relations.
The warlord’s authority over its affairs seems paradoxical since almost all the 
Earth’s territory is regulated by one state or another and states are by definition the 
highest authority over entities within their territory. At the base of the state’s authority
1X Iis its monopolization over the legitimate use of force. Through a process of 
cooption and force, the nation-state has generally been able to make itself the most 
powerful actor within its territory.138 This authority assumedly extends to NSAs. For 
instance, while Microsoft operates multinationaly it is still regulated by American law 
and is therefore not completely autonomous.139
Warlords, however, are not subject to regulation by states because, in some 
instances, the state ‘fails’ and a non-state actor may become powerful enough, relative 
to the state, to rival its authority. The state ‘fails’ as it looses control over the 
population within its territory. Eventually, the state’s authority and, lacking that,
137 This traditional conception of the state comes from Weber who says that “a state is a human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use o f physical force within a 
given territory.” (Weber 1958: 77)
138 See Tilly 1995 andl997 for details on how this process occurred in Europe.
139 In some instances, this authority may be indirect. States can invest authority in other ent ities, such as 
IGOs like the UN. In turn these entities may regulate certain NSAs.
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control, are weakened to the point where another actor can exert its own control. In 
such instances, the warlord can wrestle away its own autonomy.
Military Force
Warlords are able to maintain autonomy from the state because they have the military 
ability to do so. As noted, the warlord organization is praetorian in nature -  it is in 
effect an army. The nature of the warlord military force depends on the particular 
warlord. Examples range from conventional forces split into companies and platoons 
and using assault rifles and artillery to irregular units of child soldiers using machetes 
and technicals.140 The military force may not necessarily be enough to topple a state, 
but it is certainly enough to scratch out some territorial control for at least a temporary 
period. This military force can not only be used against the state to make them 
autonomous, but it is also used internally to serve as the reservoir of power that allows 
the warlord to maintain authority over the warlord organization.
In particular, the warlord will turn to asymmetric means in order to assure its 
autonomy. We may call this particular bread of asymmetric warfare, the warlord way 
o f warfare. The warlord necessarily exists inside a state and states in general, even 
ones which are failed, tend to have powerful military capabilities. In contrast, 
warlords are much smaller organizations and they cannot co-opt society or use 
international backing with the ease that states do. This makes warlords relatively 
weak. In order to overcome this asymmetry, warlords must turn to asymmetric ways 
of warfare.
Asymmetric warfare denotes a mismatch between the capabilities of 
belligerents involved, where at least one of the sides changes its tactics or strategies to
140 Technicals are trucks with heavy machine guns or other weapons mounted on them.
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exploit the asymmetry.141 The usual type of asymmetric warfare we refer to is that 
practiced by guerillas, however, warlords cannot rely on the civilian population in the 
way that guerillas can. Also, unlike terrorists, which also practice asymmetric 
warfare, warlords do not exist (e.g. hide) within the state.
Therefore, warlords must turn to their own breed of asymmetric warfare. This 
type of warfare is an extremely violent and savage one. It generally involves attacking 
civilians rather than military targets, using “destabilization” tactics,142 such as through 
committing conspicuous atrocities, and relying on the use of fear as a force 
multiplication strategy.143 Yet, it is a highly effective form of asymmetric warfare 
which allows the warlord to fight protracted conflicts with states that can last decades. 
This need to turn to brutal forms of warfare helps to explain why warlords are 
barbaric.
The autonomy of the warlord is exemplified in all that they do. For example, 
the NPFL answered to no authority other than Taylor. The same could be said about 
the organization controlled by Dostum in Afghanistan. Neither the Taliban nor any 
other government could count itself as an authority over the men who made up his 
warlord organization. This meant that when the United States wanted to enlist the help 
of Dostum and his men, they had to deal directly with him.
This military ability also allows the warlord to remain the highest authority 
over the organization’s external relations. Since the warlord has the military ability to 
rival the state it can maintain its own, separate foreign relations for the simple reason 
that the state cannot stop it from doing so. Thus, warlords interact with the 
international environment directly rather than having their interactions regulated by a
141 This definition is an amalgam of typical definitions o f asymmetric warfare. See for instance, 
Hammes 2004 and Joes 2004. The precise definition of asymmetric warfare is not central to this 
argument.
142 De Waal 1997
143 Vinci 2005
77
state; a point that is noted in Duffield’s definition.144 For example, Taylor made 
business deals with various foreign companies, while some Somali warlords have 
aligned themselves with Ethiopia. These points will be revisited from a theoretical 
standpoint in Chapters 3 and 4.
Self-Perpetuating Organizations
The warlord organization is not autonomous for a temporary period, rather, it exists 
continuously. Put another way, the organization perpetuates itself. Defense against the 
state or other aggressors is part and parcel of this self-perpetuation. States are 
similarly self-perpetuating organizations.
Civil political communities, such as states and tribes, are not only separate 
from other political communities, but are also self-perpetuating organizations. These 
organizations have people which reproduce at a rate that is at least the level at which 
people die. They also have a governance structure to rule and direct the members of 
the organization and the ability to teach new generations the same rules and norms as 
previous generations and thereby continue to reproduce their community’s 
organizational structure. Moreover, they have economic systems which can provide 
food and other basic necessities with which to survive.
Like other political communities, the warlord political community can 
perpetuate itself. In order to be such a self-perpetuating organization, the warlord 
must be able to accomplish some very similar objectives to that of civil political 
communities As has already been demonstrated warlords have a leadership structure 
and the ability to indoctrinate new people. They must also have the ability to recruit 
new members, at least at the rate necessary to sustain its ranks, and the economic
144 Duffield 1997
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ability to provide for the survival of its members and to procure a military ability with 
which to defend the organization.145 These final two requirements are exceptional in 
that they force the warlord to solve some very difficult problems.
The Problems of Mobilization
We can refer to these minimum requirements for self-perpetuation as the ‘problems of 
mobilization’. 146 They are problems in the sense that there are obstacles which must 
be overcome in order to perpetuate the organization. They are not just problems for 
warlords to solve, but rather problems for any self-perpetuating armed group.
Most importantly, a warlord must be able to motivate personnel to fight for 
him and must therefore answer the potential recruit’s question, ‘why should I fight 
and, possibly, die for you?’ We can refer to this as foe problem of motivation. As 
Collier points out, there are certain dilemmas wrapped up in convincing people to 
fight.147 Firstly, there is the collective action problem, in which it is a ‘public good’ to 
fight and therefore there will be free riders who want the good, but do not have an 
incentive to help personally. Secondly, there is a coordination problem. While people 
might join a large force, they are not apt to join a small one because they may feel it 
would not be able to accomplish the objectives. Finally, there is a time-consistency 
problem, in which soldiers have to fight before they achieve their objective (or attain 
benefits). This means that while it is easy for the leader to promise benefits, 
individuals recognize he may not be trustworthy and that promises may not be made
145 While there are other possible issues to address, such as a defensive base or intelligence capability, 
these issues are not necessary in the same way that the main two requirements are. For example, armed 
groups like terrorists can mobilize without having a base camp, while warlords regularly function with 
little to no intelligence capability. However, a warlord would not be a warlord if it did not have people 
and weapons.
146 Also see Vinci 2006c
147 Collier 2000
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good after victory. These problems are compounded in a dynamic environment like, 
for instance, Somalia where it is difficult to predict the future.
A more straightforward problem is how to obtain and move equipment -  what 
we can call the problem of logistics. The equipment necessary to mount an armed 
struggle depends on the particularities of the conflict and the environment in which it 
is taking place. For example, the LRA has simple needs -  machetes and Kalashnikovs 
are suitable weapons and the essentials of survival are truly basic -  some millet and 
second hand cloths. On the other hand, the Afghan mujahideen needed Stinger 
missiles carried long distances on donkeys to effectively combat the Russians.
There are a finite set of ways to solve these problems of mobilization. 
Specifically, it is possible to describe only four basic ways that the problem of 
motivation can be solved and four ways that the problems of logistics can be solved. 
Warlord solutions to the problems of mobilization will be found across the entire 
spectrum of possible solutions, however, there are some definable tendencies.
Motivation
Broadly speaking, people can be motivated to fight in four ways:
• They can fight out of a sense of loyalty,
• They may feel that fighting is mutually beneficial for survival,
• They may simply be forced to fight, and
• Finally, there may be economic incentives to fight.
Warlords rely on each of these means of motivation. The following section will 
demonstrate what each form of motivation entails and how warlords take advantage of 
it.
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Loyalty
Loyalty may arise from several sources. One important origin is being a member of a 
definable community, such as an ethnicity, tribe, nation, or religion. Related to this, a 
group may form out of a belief in a particular idea, such as the need for revolution. 
Finally, individuals may be convinced by the personal charisma of an individual.
Individuals derive both instrumental and existential benefit from membership 
in a community and this will give an individual reason to perpetuate the groups and 
thereof, compellence to fight. Instrumentally, there is advantage from an association 
with others that may potentially bring economic or other benefits. Especially 
attractive in conflict environments are the potential strategic and defensive gains. 
Existentially, individuals can benefit from participatory membership in a group, 
ranging from a ‘sense of belonging’ to a higher purpose for their actions. In general, 
individual rewards do not need to be immediate, and can be promised for future 
collection. Men will fight in order to attain or retain these benefits.
Loyalty generates trust, or ‘social capital’, between the individual and the 
group (and its leaders) which gives him a reason to feel that fighting today may lead 
to benefit tomorrow. This allows leaders to effectively promise future benefit. Related 
to this, by participating in groups, “people leam to set each decision in the context of 
past and future decisions about other matters: I’d better not free-ride now because
140
other people didn’t free-ride last time, and if I do, they might free-ride next time.” 
The group itself will reinforce these perpetuating activities through social pressure on 
members to conform.
One of the most powerful forms of loyalty is ‘primary group loyalty’, a 
phenomenon which seems to be the core motivation for individuals to continue
148 Collier 2000: 99
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fighting in wartime situations. In the seminal studies, Men Against Fire: The Problem
o f Battle Command, by S. L. A. Marshall and The American Soldier: Combat and Its
Aftermath, by Samuel Stouffer, the authors found that US soldiers were most driven
to continue fighting by loyalty to their immediate units.149 Though there has been
some more recent debate about the merit of such views,150 the findings were recently
reaffirmed in a US Army War College Study on Iraq.151 The more generalized form of
this case is that extrinsic factors, i.e. social relationships, as opposed to intrinsic, i.e. a
1‘warrior spirit’, are important in understanding combat motivation.
Self help
As loyalty pulls people into a group, the security dilemma pushes them together. In 
some states the government’s authority over society has collapsed completely, in 
these ‘collapsed states’, the nature of security changes radically. Jack Snyder and 
Robert Jervis describe the security situation in a collapsed state as replicating the 
“pattern of Hobbesian competition for security in the ‘state of nature’, where no 
sovereign power protects fearful individuals from each other.”153 In such a situation a 
security dilemma develops in which “each party’s efforts to increase its own security 
reduce the security of others.”154 Within this environment, an actor must rely on ‘self 
help’, i.e. he must provide for his own protection.
Continuing the parallel initiated by Snyder and Jervis, just as the security 
dilemma drives individuals to fight with others out of a sense of mutual threat, it also 
does the reverse, causing them to align with each other for defense. This may be seen
149 Marshall 1947 and Stouffer 1949
150 Particularly in the case of Marshall. See for instaice, Williams and Canedy 1999 (noted in 
Newsome 2004)
151 Wong et al. 2003
152 Newsome 2004
153 Snyder and Jervis 1999:16
154 Ibid.: 15
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as resembling the classic balance of power, in which weaker actors align against more 
powerful actors. Therefore, while an individual may not feel loyalty to a particular 
group, he will join them if he feels it to be the best way to survive. The same goes for 
group-to-group alliances which, in conflict environments, use the logic of ‘the enemy 
of my enemy is my friend.’ Thus, while the security dilemma may help to explain 
why ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia armed against each other it also helps to 
explain why these same groups cons olidated themselves.
Coercion
Individuals may be coerced into fighting. The most basic method is to apply a 
physical threat. Throughout history, this has ranged from enslavement to conscription. 
Somewhat more sophisticated means of coercion rely on psychological manipulation. 
For example, the LRA abducts child soldiers and then uses a systematic process of 
traumatization to psychologically manipulate them into fighting. More commonly, 
various social and ‘peer’ pressures may be used to ‘recruit’ fighters. Rather than 
solving the problem of motivation, coercion circumvents it.
Economic incentive
Recent conflict analysis literature has focused extensively on the economic incentives 
of conflict and demonstrates how economic incentives motivate fighters. Authors 
such as Keen and Collier have analyzed the role that economics have played in 
conflicts.155
The essential point is that economic incentives provide an immediate, rather 
than promised, benefit to fighters, allowing for a ‘bottom-up’ motivation to fight.
155 See for instance, Keen 1998, Berdal and Malone 2000, Collier 2000 and Duffield 1998
83
Immediate economic gain eliminates the free-rider problem because only those who 
participate will benefit.156 It also removes the problem of coordination for, even on a 
small scale, there is still benefit to be had; and, it removes the problem of time-
1 c n
consistency because there is the potential for immediate benefit.
Logistics
There are four basic methods used by armed groups to obtain weapons and
equipment.
• They can manufacture (or grow) it,
• Steal or loot what they need,
• Purchase it from other groups,
• Or be given it by an external actor.
Again, warlords rely on each of these means of logistics. The following section will 
demonstrate what each form of logistical procurement entails and how warlords take 
advantage of it.
Self-supply
A straightforward way to attain weapons and survival goods is to make them. 
Historically, groups would farm or collect food and manufacture their own weapons. 
The primary benefit of this is that a group can be completely self-sufficient.
While farming and collecting food is possible, it is not necessarily an efficient 
use of resources since it is not the ‘core competency’ of armed groups. Some armed 
groups do make their own explosive devices, such as Hamas, the Irish Republican
150 Collier 2000
157 Ibid.
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Army (IRA), and Iraqi insurgents. But, in general it is difficult for many nation­
states, much-less armed groups, to manufacture their own modem weapons.
Looting
The easiest way for an armed group to obtain the weapons it needs is to steal them. 
When a state collapses, weaponry is often easy to obtain by looting. However, 
obtaining weapons from an active army may be difficult since it involves ‘picking 
oneself up by the bootstraps’ as it is usually necessary to have some weaponry in 
order to raid other groups for theirs. Moreover, as Cooper notes, weapons captured 
from the government “are not usually sufficient for the successful prosecution of war 
against the state, and most sub-state groups rely either on supplies from sympathetic 
government or the black market.”158
Obtaining food and water by looting b a relatively simple process, as most 
farmers are usually unarmed. Yet simply taking food is not always the most efficient 
method. Rather, as Mancur Olson notes, it can be preferable to ‘regularize’ theft.159 
Olson comes to this conclusion in his examination of the nature of collective action, 
which he undertakes in order to explain how dictatorships and democracies emerge 
out of anarchy.
Olson provided an account of how even in a state of anarchy, ‘bandits’ -  by 
which he means any armed group -  and those whom they prey on would both be 
better off if the bandit were to monopolize and rationalize theft. ‘Roving bandits’, 
which occasionally plunder a community, leave the community with no incentive to 
produce because individuals will feel that anything they do produce may potentially 
be stolen. Whereas, if a ‘stationary’ bandit takes his theft in a more regularized form,
158 Cooper 1999: 21
159 Olson 1993
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i.e. taxes, and maintains a monopoly of theft in the area, those who inhabit the area 
will have an incentive to produce. For “[i]f he steals cnly through regular taxation, 
then his subjects know that they can keep whatever proportion of their output is left 
after they have paid their taxes.”160 This gives them an incentive to save and invest. In 
turn, the extra income generated by the inhabitants due to investment will lead to 
larger gains by the stationary bandit over time. Therefore, it is in his interest to leave 
some income to the inhabitants whilst also protecting them from ‘roving bandits’.
Olson specifically refers to the Chinese warlord Feng Yuhsiang in justifying 
his logic. He notes that Feng was preferred by the local villagers as a stationary bandit 
over that of the roving bandit warlord, White Wolf. A similar logic holds for 
contemporary warlords. For instance, there is some anecdotal evidence that civilians 
preferred life in a more stable Taylorland than to that outside, between the various 
warlords controlling Liberia during the civil war.161
Purchasing
Another way to gain necessary resources is to simply buy them. The effects of 
globalization have been particularly good to insurgencies as they have made many 
goods, especially weapons, easily available, even in the most remote parts of the 
world 162 However, a reliance on purchasing weapons demands that the armed group 
has an economic system
As the recent war economy literature has noted, this is not out of the question 
for armed groups. In particular, they have often come to rely on the extraction of 
natural resources, such as diamonds or timber, to exchange for goods in the global
160 Ibid.: 568
161 Multiple interviews, London, UK October 2005 and Monrovia, Liberia, June 2006
162 For a discussion of how this is so, see Mackinlay 2002
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16“}marketplace. This is how, for instance, the RUF in Sierra Leone armed itself as did 
UNITA after its ties with the United States were broken.
In most cases, looting is only the start of the acquisition process, next it is 
necessary to sell the loot in order to buy what is really needed. As Reno noted in his 
analysis of Liberia, “Taylor recognized at the start of his conquest of Liberia that he 
would have to quickly find money to buy guns... The fastest way to generate hard 
currency lay in selling abandoned assets in areas under NPFL control.” 164 Eventually 
this loot -  sell -  buy cycle can become much more complex.165 For instance, Taylor 
set up the ‘Bong Bank’ to act as the intermediary with arms dealers and “soon found 
he could tap more sustainable logging operations to fund military operations.”166
External support
Lastly, armed groups may be given the equipment they need by external sources. 
Generally this is done for strategic reasons. Throughout the Cold War, one or the 
other superpower often funded insurgencies in states which were clients of the other 
superpower. For example, the United States helped fund the mujahideen in 
Afghanistan in their fight against the Soviets. And, of course, armed groups can rely 
on being given resources by local residents or diaspora who support the cause. This 
issue of external support will be covered in some more detail in Chapter 4, under the 
discussion of internal power cultivation and alliances.
163 See, for instance, Duffield 2001
164 Reno 1998:95
165 Much o f the war economy literature is fo cused on analyzing these sorts o f cycles.
166 Reno 1998:95
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Warlord Solutions to the Problems of Mobilization
In practice, there are some definable trends in warlord’s solutions to the problems of 
mobilization. Firstly, many warlords founded their organization based on some form 
of communitarian loyalty for motivation. For example, in Somalia, most warlords had 
some sort of connection with clans and clan-based loyalty dominated motivation (this 
example will be explored in more detail in Chapter 5).
However, warlords generally move away from communitarian forms of 
loyalty as it becomes clear what their true intentions are. This makes it more difficult 
for the warlord to convince fighters to remain loyal. At the same time, there are 
disadvantages in relying on loyalty to a communitarian cause, such as that the 
warlord’s authority may be usurped by an outside figure, such as a clan elder.
In cases where they do maintain a pretence of communitarian ideals, they do 
so cynically, and with an instrumental focus. For instance, in regard to rise of warlord 
organizations in Liberia, Eboe Hutchful and Kwesi Aning note that:
[t]he leaders of these factions claimed to have built their armies to 
defend their own ethnic groups against attacks from other armed 
factions. Ethnicity, however, was employed simply as a fa?ade to 
camouflage political ambitions and aspirations to maintain power
\fnwithin a small circle of Liberia’s elites.
Instead of relying on communitarian loyalty, warlords generally move toward 
an economic incentive or more generally patronage based system of motivation. In 
particular, looting becomes the most viable form of remediation. For example, the
167 Hutchful and Aning 2004: 209
NPFL had few if any ideological benefits, but it could pay its fighters well in loot. As 
has been reported,
Most [fighters] did not receive a cash salary -  their food and essential 
survival needs were ‘found’ from local sources. Looting captured 
houses was seen as a legitimate reward for months, sometimes years, 
of extreme hardship.
This is not a new phenomenon. For instance, Ch’i notes how economic incentives, 
usually in the form of the ability to plunder, were the major means of recruitment and 
retention for warlord armies in China during its warlord period.169 As with 
contemporary warlordism, such incentives were necessary because of the soldier’s
170general lack of ideological or personal commitment to the warlord.
Economic incentives are so valuable for warlords because they can motivate 
fighters continually and with no need for constantly reinforced ideological teachings 
or other processes that might interfere with the warlord’s autonomy. Warlords need 
only offer fighters the opportunity to loot or other economic incentives because this is 
a convenient way for him to initially motivate people to fight and to retain loyalty, 
especially in the impoverished areas where warlordism tends to be found.
Although not necessarily a primary means of motivation, the warlord is also 
likely to turn to coercion as a reinforcement of motivation and as a means to 
incorporate new members.171 Brutal violence is an easy way to indoctrinate troops and
168 Alao, Mackinlay, and Olonisakin 1999: 46
169 Ch’i 1976
170 Ibid.: 83
171 We should not take the warlord political community to be solely made up of adult men. They do 
have women and children as members. Women are often made into combat soldiers by warlords. At 
other times women may act as porters or ‘wives’ to warlord fighters. Child soldiers are also commonly
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enforce loyalty. Other forms of psychological manipulation may be used to recruit 
new members, including offering addictive drugs. In many cases, warlords can rely on 
the recruitment of war orphans, who may not have anywhere else to turn to for 
protection.
At the same time, warlordism may become a self-fulfilling prophesy, as the 
insecurity they create forces individuals to think in terms of self help, and in instances 
join the warlord organization. In many instances, the local population, especially 
young men, can only turn to enlistment with the warlord to find any security. As 
Christopher Coker notes, there has been the growth of a “neo-feudal security regime 
in which the only protection against violence is membership of gangs, clans, or 
allegiance to personal warlords or leaders with their respective feudal affiliations and 
ties.”172 In total, it is often the case that it is safer to be part of a warlord organization
t n'y
than it is to be a civilian.
Furthermore, these ties are not always forced; but may themselves “create a 
strong sense of identity” in that “[n]eo-tribal affiliations can provide what spirit of 
community there is in much of the world, and that spirit often feeds off war.” 174 This 
breakdown in identity is itself partially an outgrowth of warlordism and, again, in this 
sense warlordism may create a vicious spiral.
More generally, appeasing a warlord may be the only way to remove his 
threat. For example, when Taylor ran for President of Liberia in 1997, his (unofficial)
175campaign slogan was: "You killed my ma; you killed my pa; I'll vote for you," and
used by warlords as has been extensively documented by NGOs such as Human Rights Watch (e.g. 
HRW 1997). Children may even be bom into the warlord organization as occurs with the LRA.
172 Coker 2001: 115
173 Keen 1998
174 Ibid.: 115
175 30 June 2005 IRIN
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“the overwhelming vote for Taylor was in reality a vote for the only leader who could 
deliver peace.”176
The reliance on patronage only adds to the warlords pressing economic needs. 
Weapons are also extremely important as are basic food and clothing necessities. In 
order to meet these economic needs, the warlord must exploit resources. Warlords 
cannot easily turn to taxation in the way that more legitimate political actors can. 
While warlords can turn to external supporters, they are careful about the loss of 
independence and are notoriously disloyal when their interests change. Instead of 
being seen as dependents, external suppliers tend to supply warlords when their 
interests converge rather than when they hope to change the warlord’s interests.
In general, warlords tend to turn to looting to meet their economic needs. This 
aspect of warlordism is explained to some degree by Clapham, who notes:
Since it was difficult for insurgents to develop regular structures of 
production, the export of goods from insurgent-held areas was liable to 
degenerate into a once-for-all sale of anything that could be carried 
away, with very damaging effects on long-term economic 
development. Given the problems of bulk transport under guerilla war 
conditions, low bulk and high value items had an obvious attraction.
This explained the lure of Angola’s diamond mines to UNITA, and the 
extension of the Liberian war over the frontier into the diamond- 
mining areas of Sierra Leone.177
176 Alao, Mackinlay, and Olonisakin 1999: 119
177 Clapham 1996: 233
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Here Clapham is commenting on all forms of insurgency (in Africa) but it is clear that 
this applies more to warlords than to other types of armed groups. The reason for this 
is that most other types of armed groups have some form of connection with the 
community that will prevent them from too much excess in their looting, warlords do 
not have such a connection. At the same time, traditional insurgencies seek to take 
over the state and therefore may not want to completely destroy that which they hope 
to one day run. Again, warlords do not necessarily have such ambitions -  and if they 
do, they are not likely to care much about the health of the state in any case -  and 
therefore they may show a degree of excess not seen in other types of armed groups.
The implication of this analysis is that while it is true that these funds do 
benefit a warlord or his followers, this is not necessarily to say that this is the reason 
why warlordism exists. Seen from another perspective, economic exploitation serves 
as a way of perpetuating the warlord organization, just as national economies and 
taxes perpetuate states. This point will be taken up again in Chapter 3.
Independence
178All international actors are interdependent to some degree, including warlords. For 
instance, even states must rely on logistical arrangements with foreign powers, 
sometimes even potential enemies, to provide for weapons and other equipment. With 
this in mind, we must treat warlord independence as relative.
The test of an armed group’s independence will be based on the degree to 
which it can demonstrate control over its decisions. If, for instance, the armed group 
is fully funded by a state and carries out those states’ orders, it is clearly not 
independent. On the other hand, if it is only reliant on its own home-made weapons
178 In fact, it may be held that all organizations are. (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978)
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and never communicates with outside actors, it is clearly independent. In most cases, 
however, there will be some degree of a mixture. Within such a qualification, the 
warlord is independent, at least to the same degree as an average state.
Parasitical Nature
The warlord’s independence is an odd and complicated one since the warlord is 
parasitic off of what we may call the ‘host state’. It is in this sense that warlords are, 
as Hobbes remarks, “like worms in the entrails of natural man.” 179 This parasitic 
nature of the warlord is a return to an older form of warfare, as Coker tells us, which
1 SOhas existed since before the Axial Period of history. Coker points out that pre-
civilizational warriors were “resented even by those whom they were supposed to be
defending. The...armies they commanded had to be fed and provisioned, and the
181security they provided was often oppressive.” The warlord organization’s 
parasitism means that it is absolutely illegitimate in the sense that it has no legitimate 
reason to expect to receive any gains, since it provides nothing, but instead forces 
others to give.
It is this parasitical nature of warlord political communities that fundamentally 
differentiates it from the state, tribe, or other form of self-sustainable political 
community. The warlord taps into the people and economic resources of a state, and 
 ^ siphons ofjfwhat is necessary.182 It would not be possible for a warlord to exist as an 
entity without a state of some sort. If such a situation were to occur, the warlord
179 Hobbes 1998: 221
180 Coker 2002
181 Ibid.: 168
182 For this reason, it is not essential for the warlord to control the state. It may be desirable, as a route 
to further power -  as for instance Taylor eventually took control o f the Liberian state -  but it is not 
necessary. As Clapham noted, “leaders like Taylor and Aidid, or equally Savimbi, seek to take over the 
recognized national governments of their respective states, but could run their own quasi-govemmental 
operations in the absence o f fixed territories, formal governmental structures, or international 
recognition.” (Clapham 1998b: 8)
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organization would necessarily have to transform its organizational structure into one 
that was a de facto state of some sort, which had the organizational structure to rule 
over a larger, self-sustaining political community. This, in fact, does occur if, for 
instance, the warlord takes over a state completely. However, usually the warlord 
does not do this and simply continues a parasitic existence.
Yet, it is also this parasitic nature that allows the warlord to also return to an 
older form of almost absolute warfare. In his analysis of the Scythians, Coker reminds 
us that nomadic warriors such as the Scythians could deploy up to 70 percent of male 
population to fight -  an astounding figure.183 Yet, warlords are able to employ an even 
higher percentage of fighters. They may even reach up to near 100 percent of the 
members of their political community for fighting. The reason is that they do not need 
to provide for any of the requirements of subsistence, except through warfare and 
looting of various degrees. They do not even need to have women with which to bare 
them children to produce new warriors, given that they simply abduct or bribe others 
from outside communities to fight for them. Though, of course, many warlord 
organizations do have women fighters.
Although the warlord organization is parasitic, it is nonetheless an 
independent organization and truly separate from the state. The warlord is not 
dependent on the state’s public goods, or any other state or entity. The warlord 
organization simply loots what it wants. Nor does the warlord organization need 
defense from outside actors. Rather, the warlord organization provides for its own 
security. When a warlord does make alliances with other states, he is sure to maintain 
his decision-making authority, as is illustrated by the high rate of warlord’s cheating
183 Coker 2002
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on, or otherwise backing out of alliances which no longer suit him. The warlord’s use 
of alliances will be covered in more detail in Chapter 4.
The warlord is also independent from society. The warlord organization is its 
own political community and is therefore separate from society. It may exploit local 
civilians, just as the warlord may exploit any group; however, it is not dependent on 
local civilians for goodwill. This differentiates him from national resistance 
movements or traditional guerilla organization, which must rely on the support of 
local civilian communities. The differentiation is important, since by aligning with 
society, the warlord may have to provide concessions, whereas by looting from 
society, the warlord does not lose any deckion making authority.
It is the warlord’s independence from society which separates it from other 
types of autonomous and independent armed groups. Some insurgents come to control 
large swaths of territory as well as large populations. These insurgents, however, 
usually depend on society. Using standard guerilla doctrine they base their power in 
the ability to align themselves with society and use its resources to combat the 
government. This is how, for example, Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) was able to maintain itself, even without turning to significant
184external support. This alignment allows the guerilla to make the organization 
independent from the state, but in turn it limits the guerilla’s independence from 
society. However, this is acceptable to the guerilla organization because they are not 
attempting to separate themselves from society, but rather to take power over society 
from the government or to secede from the state with society. The warlord does not 
turn to society for support, nor does he then turn to dependency on an external state
184 See Kasfir 2002 for an analysis o f NRM popular support.
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sponsor -  traditionally the other means for an insurgency to gain support. This 
differentiation between the warlord and traditional guerilla organizations will be 
covered in more detail below.
Similarly, clan and tribe based militias are also autonomous and independent 
from the state at times, however, they are based on a larger society. For instance, in 
Somalia some of the militias are direct extensions of the clan and are thus commanded 
by the clan elders, who are outside of the militia structure, not by a warlord, who 
would be at the top of the militia structure. These groups are therefore not true 
praetorian political communities. (Chapter 5 will compare and contrast clan-based
igr
militias with warlords in more detail, j  
Warlord Administration
Conversely, warlords can opt to expand their rule to cover civilians outside of the 
warlord political community. For instance, after the 1990 ceasefire in Liberia, Taylor 
set up and administered an area known as ‘Taylorland’, with its capital in Gbamga. In 
this administered area, he and the NPFL provided a basic structure for administering 
local law and justice. They also used it as an economic base from which to trade with 
Western corporations.
Such warlord administrations threaten the independence of the warlord and the 
immediate warlord political community. Just as with the warlord organization, 
coercion is not a very effective means of authority and therefore the warlord will 
generally need to make concessions to the civilian community and legitimate his 
authority. In other words, the warlord may need to not only take, but also give to
185 For instance, Clapham refers to ‘internal’ and ‘external’ insurgencies, in reference to whether the 
insurgency is located inside the ‘target’ state, and therefore receives support from the local population, 
or in a neighboring state, and therefore receiving support from that state Clapham 1996
186 Also see, Vinci 2006b
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society. Doing so may force structural changes in the warlord organization and its 
very nature may change. This defines the boundary at which the warlord organization 
bleeds into other types of political organizations, such as ‘embryonic’ or ‘de facto’ 
statehood. These boundaries will be examined in the comparison section to follow.
Proposed Definition
To summarize, warlord organizations are truly a different form of political community 
from the western liberal nation-state, tribes, or other political communities which we 
are accustomed to considering. The warlord organization was found to be an armed 
group in the sense that it is a non-state, unitary actor and it maintains its autonomy 
through the use of arms. The warlord organization is also a political community based 
on membership and inclusion, rather than territorial connection, and this fiefdom is 
able to govern and perpetuate itself indefinitely. Furthermore, the warlord is 
independent from all other actors, as the state is, and he uses economic or other 
exploitation to maintain this independence.
This conceptualization has provided an understanding of warlords in the same 
way that we have an understanding of the nature of states. It has brought out many 
complex ideas, but, as with states, it is possible to simplify the definition into a form 
which includes the most important concepts and which reflects, though also builds 
upon, previous definitions.
We may define warlords as: non-state actors that use military power and 
economic exploitation to maintain fiefdoms which are autonomous and independent 
from the state and society.
We can operationalize this cfefinition and test whether an actor is a warlord by 
first asking whether he has a political community over which he is the highest
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authority. Is this fiefdom autonomous; i.e. does the group have the military power to 
do what it wants? Secondly, we can ask if the group is independent; i.e. does he have 
the ability to obtain the personnel and equipment and can he direct this force
effectively and cohesively enough to be autonomous, without loosing decision
making authority.
Conceptualizing warlords in the terms presented above serves some analytic 
goals. Firstly, the organization and methodologies of warlords make sense and our 
definition aligns with empirical observations of warlordism. Secondly, warlord 
organizations can be neatly integrated into IR theory and in general, interactions with 
both domestic and international actors make sense from a theoretical level. The 
following chapters will use this definition to address how warlords relate with states 
and other international actors.
Before moving on, however, it is important to note that this conceptualization 
also provides a parsimonious way of differentiating warlords from related actors. It 
will be helpful to compare warlords with other types of armed groups. By doing this 
we can clear any confusion as t) which actors are warlords. Moreover, we will 
understand what factors make other types of armed groups unlike warlords. This will 
be helpful in the conclusion of this study, when the applicability of the Neorealist
approach to other types of armed groups will be discussed.
COMPARISONS WITH OTHER ACTORS
As noted in the introduction, many different types of actors are called warlords, even 
if they are not and, vice versa, warlords may be referred to by other names. In many 
cases it will be difficult to distinguish the warlord from different types of armed 
groups, especially the guerilla insurgent. Moreover, there may be a certain amount of
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evolution by one type into the other. This may cause confusion in analysis as it does 
in reality. However, by using the concepts and definition developed in this chapter, 
comparison can be quite precise.
The following sections will compare warlords with other types of 
organizations. Specifically, it will differentiate warlords from criminal gangs, 
terrorists, traditional guerillas, proxy militias, de facto states, and ‘embryonic’ states.
Criminal Gangs
Unlike warlords, criminals skirt the state’s imposed law and order, but they are still 
very much dependent on it. As Mackinlay puts it “the Mafia live as citizens of a free 
society in most cases, and their freedom to move and communicate is not guaranteed 
by their own military strength, but by the institutions of the state.”187 Even if 
organized criminals were able to rival the state, they probably would not. Robinson 
remarks that organized criminals
are not likely to gain greatly where no regulation or control exists 
because enforced laws are needed to differentiate the products and 
services they offer. It is the perverse contradiction of the gangster 
existence that, although he undermines the state or states in which he
operates, he depends on their basic stability for his commercial
188success.
Criminals are parasitic on the state in that their economic gain comes from subverting 
the state’s law and order. For example, drug <4alers’ added value is in providing a
187 Mackinlay 2000: 7
188 Robinson 2001: 127
product which is illegal under the state. If drugs were to be legalized, drug dealers 
would cease to exist.189
It should be noted that, by definition, warlords are considered criminal by the 
state(s) which they occupy and likely by the international community. They are 
‘criminal’ in the sense that they are a rival to the state’s legitimate authority. 
Furthermore, their reliance on economic exploitation and violent tactics makes them 
immoral and illegitimate by any measure.
However, warlords are not like criminal gangs because they do try to separate 
themselves from the state. They do not need, nor want, the state’s public goods. Their 
benefit comes controlling their own fiefdom and taking what they want from other 
communities. Thus, while warlords are technically illegal organizations, they are not 
professional criminals in the usual sense of the term.
Terrorists
Warlords are sometimes accused of being terrorists because of their reliance on such 
savage forms of violence, however, they are clearly not terrorists upon closer 
examination. Terrorists use violence committed upon civilians to bring about political 
change or bring attention to a political or cultural grievance through direct pressure on 
a government or indirectly through the backlash from a government’s draconian 
response to the terrorist’s violence. The terrorist typically exists within a society and 
relies on secrecy to remain undetected until his attack. Thus, unlike the warlord, the 
terrorist does not try to separate from the state.
Warlords may also use terrorist tactics as well, since these tactics are often 
effective in asymmetric warfare.190 However, we must be careful to make the proper
189 Or, at least find an alternate racket. For example, when Prohibition ended, the American mafias 
were forced to find other businesses such as gambling and extortion to fund themselves.
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distinction between terrorist organizations and organizations which use terrorist 
tactics. The warlord organization is made up of an inclusive political community 
which wishes to remain autonomous from broader society. They are less concerned 
with changing a specific government policy or drawing attention to a particular 
political or cultural issue and therefore we should not confuse them with terrorists per 
se.
Traditional Insurgents
Traditional insurgents rival the state, but cannot gain their independence from it, or 
from society.191 Guerilla warfare depends on the enlistment of the help of the local 
population in its war against the state, as Mao Tse-tung said, “because guerilla 
warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither 
exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and co-operation.” The 
local population is used for voluntary recruitment, it provides economic aid including 
food and other supplies, and in Maoist doctrine it provides shelter for the military to 
disperse into during attack by the government. In many cases guerillas will also sleep 
in civilian villages and, in general, can still be considered a part of the community. 
Furthermore, since the local population is still subject to the state’s authority and 
dependent on its public goods to some extent, the guerilla is indirectly connected
190 There are also hybrid organizations, such as Hezbollah, which use terrorist tactics and control 
territory. In the case of Hezbollah, it was more proper to describe them as an insurgency, as they were 
specifically fighting against Israeli occupation. Now it may be better to describe them as a de facto 
state or even political party.
191 I will use insurgent to refer to those who rival the state’s authority in order to overthrow the state 
and take power Guerillas are those who use guerilla warfare doctrine in order to rival the state. These 
terms overlap but are not necessarily the same. Warlords may also use guerilla warfare doctrine and in 
many cases they may be considered insurgents in that they are rivaling the state’s authority. However, 
it is not necessarily the case that they are trying to take over the state. For instance, many Afghan 
warlords use more conventional warfare tactics. Also, since there is no real state to speak o f in southern 
Somalia, it does not make sense to call Somali warlords ‘insurgents ’.
192 Mao 1961, reprinted in Campbell 1967: 260
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with, and therefore reliant on, the state. The insurgent organization can be reliant on 
local society because it does not want to separate from the state, but to replace it.
Related to the traditional insurgent is the secessionist guerilla, which wants to 
split off and create a separate but equal state. In calling for a continuation of the state 
under a separate leadership, the insurgent can enlist the support of the local 
population. For instance, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) fought for 
secession from Ethiopia. As an organization it was integrated into society and enlisted 
the voluntary services of society.
The warlord on the other hand, creates a completely separate, enclosed 
political community, which at best ignores local communities or at worst parasitically 
lives off of them. Warlords are not reliant on a local population for support; rather 
they tend to be predators on the local population. Indeed, predation is one of the most 
common signs of a warlord organization. When not directly exploiting a local 
population, warlords use other economic means to perpetuate themselves, especially 
the sale of natural resources, as warlords in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the DRC have 
done. In a similar manner, they d> not need the good will of a local population to 
recruit new members. Instead, they may use economic incentives or force to acquire 
new personnel. The conclusion is that warlords can rival the state without necessarily 
enlisting the help of the local population.
Additionally, warlord organizations will also have a different structure from 
insurgent organizations. As Mackinlay points out:
There is a strong relationship between [a popular movement’s] 
structure and the appeal it makes to the supporting population. If a 
popular insurgency is proclaiming self-determination, then it should
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reflect structures designed for that purpose, and not be overwhelmingly 
organized for greyarea trading and the exploitation of natural
193resources.
For example, the insurgency will often have a relatively large portion of its 
organization devoted to political issues, education, and public relations. A typical 
example is the EPLF. Warlords on the other hand, will doubtfully focus much 
organizational attention on these issues; though they may focus at least some attention 
in order to attempt a legitimization of their financial dealings, as Taylor did when he 
set up, amongst other things, a television station and bank within Taylorland.194
Foreign-Funded Guerillas/Proxy Militias
The other method for mounting an effective guerilla war, especially prominent during 
the Cold War, is to rely on foreign aid for support. This sort of support allows the 
guerilla to separate itself from the local population, as for instance, the Greek 
Communist guerillas were able to do in finding shelter in the states north of Greece.195 
A related example is proxy militias, which are organizations set up and controlled by 
the state in order to carry out policy goals. An example of a proxy militia is the South 
African and Rhodesian funded organization Mozambiquan National Resistance 
(RENAMO).196
Such groups are an extension of another state’s military or intelligence service 
in that their aims are dependent on and to some degree controlled by another state. At 
the extreme they would not even count as NSAs, in that they would not be
193 Mackinlay 2002: 70
m  Harris 1999
195 Joes 2004: 19
196 Resistencia Nacional Mo9ambicana (GlobalSecurity.org 2005c)
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autonomous from the state at all. Warlords are, however, truly autonomous and 
independent NSAs in that they are not hierarchically commanded by another state.197
De Facto States
Another class of NSA which may resemble a warlord organization is a ‘state-within- 
state’, Paul Kingston’s term, or ‘de facto state’, Ian S. Spears’ and Scott Pegg’s
1 QQ
term. These organizations have many of the features of a state, but are not granted 
legitimacy as a state by the international community. In his discussion of the 
empirical nature of states-within-states, Spears notes that:
states-within-states have imposed effective control over territory 
within a larger state and may have an impressive array of institutional 
structures that, among other things, allow taxes to be collected, 
services to be provided, and business with other international actors to 
be conducted.199
Somaliland is a case in point. The former British protectorate was incorporated 
into Somalia after decolonization. It subsequently fractured into warlord rule after 
Barre’s departure in 1991, along with the rest of Somalia. As the rest of Somalia 
continued on into a deep state of anarchy, Somaliland consolidated factional rule into 
state or state-like rule. Analysts have pointed out the numerous marks of statehood
197 While a warlord is not a proxy militia, he may provide his organization’s services for a fee to 
another state. For example, numerous Afghan warlords were funded by the United States in its war 
against the Taliban. In fact, many warlords begin to some extent as proxy militias or have phases where 
they are more or less fully funded by a foreign state. An example would be UNIT A and its shift from 
foreign backing to the use of resource exploitation for funding. (Global Witness 1998)
198 Kingston 2004; Spears 2004; Pegg 1998, 2004
199 Spears 2004: 169
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that Somaliland has, including an elected President, its own visas, and embassies, as 
well as some public good including a relative monopoly over violence.200
However, de facto states are structured much more similarly to a state than are 
warlord organizations. What sets de facto states apart is that, unlike warlords, they 
have a territorial based, civil political community, and provide public goods -  just as 
states do. In addition, de facto states are significantly more developed and have a 
much more complex organization that allows for the typical social, political and 
economic structures that define (full) states. Also, in general, these political entities 
generally want to become states. Pegg makes this explicit in his definition of de facto 
states, he distinguishes “the de facto state from other entities that might exercise 
functional control over a given piece of territory but that either did not have political 
goals or had political goals different from secession to a sovereign statehood.”201
Warlords, in contrast, have private fiefdoms and do not provide public goods. 
They are not necessarily trying to become states, nor do they have the structural 
organization to do so, as they are praetorian in nature.
Embryonic States
Paul Jackson attempts to make the case that warlords may become like de facto states 
and that we should in fact see them as ‘embryonic states’. He notes that
warlords represent an attempt to reestablish stability within anarchy.
All warlords, to an extent, are rebuilding patronage networks and the
200 Bryden 2004
201 Pegg 2004: 201
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means to enforce contracts -  quasi-government operating a monopoly 
of violence within established, although flexible areas.202
Of their apparent illegitimacy, Jackson goes on to say that many states, if not most 
states, formed through violence. He remarks, “[t]he history of the state is littered by 
homicidal leaders who were precisely those who were most likely to succeed in the 
context of anarchy with no restrictions on the use of force.”
Such an evolution is not out of the question. Warlords will attempt to create a 
more legitimate rule as soon as the opportunity presents itself. Weber notes this in 
relation to those who have gained power through war. He remarks: “...as soon as their 
domination has been stabilized, the royal power and those with vested interesting it, 
the royal following, search for legitimacy, that is, for the mark of the charismatically 
qualified ruler.”204
And, in fact, we see this occur regularly with warlords. For example, in 1997, 
after having stabilized his power, Taylor ran for and won the Presidency of Liberia. 
Recently, many warlords in Afghanistan have been attempting to be elected to 
national governance or to make themselves a local governor.
However, the sort of political organization necessary to provide public goods, 
and thereby gain legitimacy, is very different from that employed by warlords. This 
would involve ideological changes in order to support the state and a much more 
complex gowmment and bureaucracy to provide social and economic welfare. The 
warlord’s private political community dismisses the idea of public goods, which are
202 Jackson 2003: 147
203 Ibid
204 Weber 1978: 1143
205 Though, these warlords have had difficulties in doing so, and some have not been allowed to run. 
(BBC 6 September 2005)
106
necessary for state-like legitimacy. In other words, for a warlord organization to 
become a state would mean that it was no longer a warlord organization.
CONCLUSION
This chapter examined the nature of warlord organizations and provided a deep 
conceptual analysis which incorporated the central features of warlords and warlord 
organizations. It looked at the warlord as an individual; the nature of the warlord 
organization as a political community; and the nature of warlord governance and 
command. In doing so, it was found that warlords were cohesive, singular actors. The 
chapter also made the case that warlords are autonomous actors and gain this 
autonomy through military force. It found that warlords are self-perpetuating 
organizations and use different strategies to acquire the personnel and equipment they 
need to perpetuate themselves. Finally, it was observed that even though warlords are 
parasitic on states, they are independent organizations. In total, warlords were defined 
as: non-state actors that use military power and economic exploitation to maintain 
fiefdoms which are autonomous and independent from the state and society.
In making this analysis, this chapter explained why warlords act as they do 
and integrated many of the observed features of warlordism. For instance, this chapter 
has argued that warlords are able to be so savage because of their enclosed political 
community’s disassociation from society and their need to fight a particular form of 
asymmetric warfare which does not rely on society. It found that the warlord as an 
individual is so central to the organization because the non-bureaucratic warlord 
organization relies on this patronage as well as charismatic leadership the warlord is 
the central link in the patronage chain. It also found that warlords are highly 
concerned with economic exploitation, but that rather than being a goal of the
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warlord, economic exploitation is instrumentally used. The chapter also explained 
how the warlord’s jealously guarded autonomy and independence are what allow the 
warlord to act autonomously in the international system.
Based on this conceptual analysis, we are now in a position to offer some 
preliminary insights to the central question of this thesis: how do warlords relate with 
states and other international actors? We can say that warlords have their own 
independent and autonomous foreign relations. This means that they are free to make 
their own alliances, make war with whom they wish, and otherwise exist separately 
from the state. In other words, it seems that warlords interact in a similar way to the 
way that states do -  using conflict and negotiation. Just as with the state, warlord’s 
main agents are the “diplomat and soldier,” 206 even if they are not called that. This is, 
however, a superficial answer.
In order to add depth to this answer, it is necessary to use a theoretical 
approach to take this understanding of warlord and explain what sort of relations we 
can expect from them. The first step of defining the subject of study has been 
accomplished. The next step in the process of answering the thesis question, then, 
must be to demonstrate if and how we can use a Neorealist approach to theorize about 
warlord international relations.
^K eohane andNye 1971: ix
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CHAPTER 3 -  WARLORDS AND NEOREALISM
Chapter 2 thoroughly conceptualized warlords, thereby providing some insight into 
how they relate with states and other international actors. In this chapter this 
conceptualization will be taken and used to lay the foundation for a theoretical 
understanding of warlord relations.
As argued in the introduction to this study, the Neorealist approach is the best 
suited for describing and explaining the relations of warlords. The reason for choosing 
a Neorealist approach is wrapped up in the nature of warlordism. Specifically, 
Neorealism is the theory best equipped to get past the apparent differences between 
warlords and states, to analyze the political and military relations of warlords, to deal 
with the ‘de facto’ nature of warlordism, and to provide a description and explanation 
of their relations which can be integrated into traditional models of international 
politics.
There have been attempts to use specific concepts from (Neo)Realist theory in 
the analysis of armed groups. In particular, Barry Posen was the first person to 
consider internal conflicts using Realist notions when he applied the concept of the 
security dilemma to ethnic conflict.207 Realism is a promising avenue for 
understanding internal wars because of its insights concerning the universality of 
human nature (that man is driven by ‘fear, honor and greed’), the centrality of 
anarchy, and its focus on the balance of power.208 Others, including Stephen David,
Posen 1993
208 As noted by David (1995).
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Nelson Kasfir, and Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, have followed Posen in using the 
concept of security dilemma to describe the nature of internal war.209
However, this chapter is not an attempt to discover the causes of internal wars 
and it is not an attempt to only apply a single concept from Neorealism to an armed 
group. Rather, this chapter is concerned with understanding the international relations 
of warlords. In order to do this, it is necessary to apply the entire theory of 
Neorealism, not just a single concept. This will involve demonstrating that any criteria 
that Neorealism demands of actors to be analyzed as units in the system are met by 
warlords.
The structure of this argument will be to first illustrate what the criteria are for 
using Realism to analyze warlords and then what the additional criteria are for using 
Neorealism to analyze warlords. This is the most effective way to make the argument 
because Neorealism is in effect an extension of Realism and Neorealism therefore 
makes assumptions about actors meeting the criteria of Realism. The specific 
framework which will be used to examine the Realist criteria is one illustrated by 
Gilpin, where the assumptions of Realism are divided into issues of group, 
motivation, and anarchy. For each assumption, it will be demonstrated that 
warlords do meet the criteria. After this is complete, the additional criteria of 
Neorealism -  based on Waltz’s work -  will be addressed and it will be demonstrated 
that warlords also meet these criteria. By demonstrating that warlords meet all of the 
criteria of Neorealism, it will be possible to conclude that the Neorealist theoretical 
approach can be used for analysis.
David 1995, Kasfir 2004, and Snyder and Jervis 1999
210 Gilpin 1986
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Realist and Neorealist Criteria
Gilpin describes three essential assumptions of Realism.211 The first is that it is 
focused on group rather than individual explanations. The second is that there is a 
focus on power and survival by these actors. Lastly it deals with actors in an anarchic 
system.
We can extrapolate from Gilpin’s assumptions and say that these assumptions 
are criteria for the use of Realism for analysis. The object of study must be a group; 
this group must be motivated in terms of power and/or security; and, this group must 
exist in an anarchic system
Beyond these basic criteria for Realist analysis, there are further criteria for 
Neorealist analysis. These include that the actors must be specific types of groups, 
based on Waltz’s Theory o f International Politics, in particular they must be 
sovereign, functionally undifferentiated, ‘like units’. Furthermore, it must be possible 
to make the assumption that their primary motivation is survival. As with Realism, 
Neorealism assumes an anarchic environment.
Prima fasciae it seems that warlords are not analyzable using Neorealism 
because they do not seem to meet the criteria. For instance, they do not seem to be the 
right kind of group in that they are not states. They do not seem to be motivated by 
power or survival, but rather by greed or grievance. Lastly, they exist inside of a state, 
which is considered to be a hierarchic, not anarchic system. While it may not seem to 
be the case at first, in fact warlords do meet the requirements for Neorealist analysis, 
as the following argument will make clear.
211 Ibid
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GROUPS
It is often assumed that Realism only deals with states, or at the least, city-states, such 
as those of ancient Greece or Renaissance Italy. The implication is that other actors 
within a state, even one which is collapsed, cannot be analyzed by Realism. However, 
Realism is, in fact, concerned with the interactions of social groups in general. Gilpin 
illustrates the importance of groups in his discussion of the three fundamental 
assumptions of Realism. He notes:
...the essence of social reality is the group... This is another way of 
saying that in a world of scarce resources and conflict over the 
distribution of those resources, human beings confront one another 
ultimately as members of groups, and not as isolated individuals... In 
the modem world we have given the name “nation state” to these 
competing tribes and the name “nationalism” to this form of loyalty... 
the name, size and organization of the competing groups into which 
our species subdivides itself do alter over time -  tribes, city-states, 
kingdoms, empires, and nation-states- due to economic, demographic, 
and technological reasons.
Nelson Kasfir describes some of the key features of a group that could be 
analyzed using Realism. He specifies that we cannot treat any potential political unit 
as rele vant members of an (domestic) anarchic system.213 Specifically, he points out 
that there must be leaders that “have the capacity to commit their units to politics that
212 Ibid.: 305 Specifically, these are what Gilpin calls “conflict groups” based on Ralf Dahrendorf s 
concept. (Dahrendorf 1959)
213 Kasfir makes this point in relation to there being groups around which individuals can bond and 
thereby set up a security dilemma. However, it can also apply to more general units in the system. 
(Kasfir 2004)
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their members cannot undermine.”214 In other words, the groups must be cohesive. 
Furthermore, he notes that while such cohesiveness works well for states and their 
assumed “impervious containers” and “autonomous rulers”, it does not necessarily 
apply to all forms of social groups which are generally “informal collectivities whose 
membership may rapidly change and whose leaders often have little legitimacy and 
uncertain capacity to induce compliance among their followers.”215 Thus, he 
concludes, it is necessary to examine the internal characteristics of the social groups 
in question in order to determine whether they are capable of taking part in a security 
dilemma -  which we may extrapolate to mean that they can be analyzed in terms of 
Realism.
Kasfir is exactly right, some groups are more cohesively formed than others 
and therefore it is necessary to make an internal analysis of the group to determine if 
it is an acceptable actor. Kasfir is referring to the concept of ‘unitary actor’. These are 
actors that have a cohesive body of members which can be directed by a leadership in 
a structured fashion and therefore act as a singular entity in terms of motivations and 
goals.
Warlords meet this requirement. In Chapter 2, exactly the type of examination 
of the internal characteristics of the social group that Kasfir calls for was performed. 
It was found that warlords have a definable inside/outside boundary. The warlord 
organization is made up of a cohesive group which has a continually self-reinforcing 
organizational structure. Finally, the group is commanded by a leader, the warlord 
himself, who can enforce compliance to his commands. Thus it is possible to 
conclude that warlords have exactly the type of group which has the “impervious
Zl4 Kasfir 2004: 62
2,5 Ibid.: 63
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container”, i.e. inside/outside boundary, and autonomous leader that Kasfir refers to 
as a necessary ingredient for analysis. In other words, warlords are unitary actors.
However, this is not the only requirement. Most types of armed groups are 
groups in this sense. But, all armed groups cannot necessarily be the object of 
(Neo)Realist study. One of the reasons is that some goups may not have international 
relations at all, if for instance, they are solely domestic actors. For example, the Klu 
Klux Klan may be a group, but it does not really have international relations or what
91 fwe might call a ‘foreign policy’ to speak of. Additionally, even if groups do have 
international relations, they may still just be the extension of another actor. For 
example, RENAMO had international relations, but it was better seen and analyzed as 
an extension of Rhodesian and South African foreign policy.
In order to be considered a relevant actor for Realism, an actor must have 
independent foreign relations. This demands that the actors have the ability to take 
part in relations across national boundaries without being constrained by another 
actor. In other words, the actor must be autonomous. Secondly, the actor must not be 
an extension of another actor’s foreign policy, but rather must be an independent 
actor.
In Chapter 2 it was demonstrated that warlords meet these requirements. 
Warlords are autonomous and independent actors. They have the military ability to 
rival the state and thereby maintain autonomy in their own relations with international 
actors. They also have the economic and organizational ability to maintain 
independence, including over their own foreign relations.
A further trait common to actors which are analyzable by Realism is that they 
are sovereign. Sovereignty is implied by the requirements outlined so far -  i.e. being a
216 Traditionally, foreign policy is a term only applied to states. However, it can be used to apply to any
set o f relations which are conducted across national boundaries on the behalf o f the actor’s interests.
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unitary actor which has independent foreign relations. Clapham hinted at the 
sovereignty of some armed groups when he noted that “[militarily effective 
movements meet the most basic criterion for statehood, which is physical control over
917territory and population.’ In particular, Clapham points to the EPLF, UNITA, and 
the NPFL. Clapham also notes that these militant groups also “act like states in 
important respects.”218 These actions include licit and illicit economic interactions and
91Q“important and sometimes formal, diplomatic relations with external states.” 
However, Clapham never makes the strong argument that armed groups can be 
sovereign. This study can make this stronger argument.
The concept of sovereignty reflects the notion of being the highest authority 
over internal and external affairs. However, the exact nature of sovereignty is 
notoriously difficult to describe, much less define. One helpful approach for using the 
concept is to separate it into constituent facets. This approach is used by Hedley Bull,
990Robert Jackson, and Stephen Krasner amongst others. The most basic, and useful, 
distinction we can speak of is between empirical and juridical sovereignty. While 
states have both, warlords have the former but not the latter.
Empirical (De facto) Sovereignty
Being an autonomous, independent actor is central to the notion of sovereignty. The 
idea that autonomy and independence convey sovereignty goes back to the origins of 
the debate over the definition of sovereignty. Jean Bodin, the French lawyer and 
political thinker, noted “he is absolutely sovereign who recognizes nothing, after God,
2.7 Clapham 1998: 150
2.8 Ibid.
219 Ibid.: 152
220 Bull 1997, Jackson 1993, Krasner 1999
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221that is greater than himself.” Bodin goes on to examine in a more detail how a 
sovereign must be the highest authority and not subject to authority himself:
persons who are sovereign must not be subject in any way to the 
commands of someone else and must be able to give the law to 
subjects, and to suppress or repeal disadvantageous laws and replace 
them with others -  which cannot be done by someone who is subject to 
the laws or to persons having power of command over him.222
In other words, a sovereign actor is the highest authority, one which is autonomous 
and independent from the commands of any other actor. Sovereignty in terms of 
autonomy and independence may be referred to as ‘empirical sovereignty’ or ‘de facto 
sovereignty’.
Bodin’s account of sovereignty is exceptional in that it introduced the idea that 
sovereignty is indivisible.223 This is opposed to the overlapping sovereignties of the 
medieval era. His view arose out of an ongoing debate about the nature of power 
which lower level magistrates held. Bodin’s contribution was to ask “what 
prerogatives a political authority must hold exclusively if it is not to acknowledge a 
superior or equal in its territory.”224
Bodin’s conception of sovereignty is foundational to more modem concepts of 
sovereignty in that it elicits the notion of an ‘exclusive’ sovereignty -  this being the 
point that there can only be one final authority over any given individual. Generally, 
this final, exclusive authority is the state. Though, the state’s government may be
221 Bodin 2002:271
222 Ibid.: 273
223 See Bodin, Franklin trans. 1992
224 Ibid.: xv
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split, as for instance, the United States’ government is, into different branches, and in 
this sense it may differ from Bodin’s original formulation. Nonetheless, for the 
purposes of international relations, sovereignty exists as a single authority, and 
thereby the basis was set for a system of states which had exclusive authority. This 
flows from the extension of the argument that “there had to exist in every 
commonwealth a single individual or group in which the entire power of the states 
was concentrated.” This applied to France, as well as other kingdoms such as 
England or Spain, and now applies to all states.
Typically, we speak of sovereignty in terms of control over territory, but in 
some cases sovereignty arises through control over people. Territorial control should 
not be a limiting factor because we can talk about sovereign groups that are definable 
by their control over people rather than any particular piece of territory. As noted 
earlier, Herbst points out that in the case of African states, where geography and low 
technology made sovereignty over territory difficult to enforce, sovereignty was 
expressed over people.226 This personal sovereignty is applicable to warlords in 
relation to their effective authority over the warlord political community. However, 
this is not to say that warlords do not also control territory. Often warlords will 
formally control some piece of territory on a temporary to permanent basis. However, 
the basis for the warlord’s sovereignty is in membership in the warlord organization, 
not territory.
It is in this sense that the warlord has sovereignty -  it is an empirical reality of 
being the highest authority over individuals. This sovereignty is exclusive in that there 
is no other authority which also has final authority over the individuals that are 
members of the warlord organization. Members of the warlord organization are loyal
225 Ibid.: xxii
226 Herbst 2000
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to the warlord, not to the state. Although they may come under the sway of other 
authorities, whether religious, social, or other, these authorities are superseded by the 
warlord who can overrule their dictums. For Herbst, sovereignty ‘trails o f  in 
concentric rings as an individual is further and further from the sovereign. For 
warlords, the enclosed political community is defined by initiation and is exclusive, 
which means that those within it are under the authority of the sovereign exclusively. 
Thus, there is not the overlapping sovereignty that Herbst implies or which is
997theorized concerning the medieval period by Bull or John Ruggie. At the same 
time, the warlord has complete authority to make internal policy decisions and control 
the foreign relations of the warlord organization. Such features are the essential 
constituents of empirical sovereignty and hence warlord are empirically sovereign.
This sovereignty applies even in cases where the warlord forces those under 
him to call him sovereign. As Bodin notes concerning the tyrant who prolongs 
sovereignty entrusted to him, “the tyrant is nonetheless a sovereign, just as the violent 
possession of a robber is true and natural possession even if against the law, and those 
who had it previously are dispossessed.”228 For this reason it is necessary to separate 
empirical sovereignty, which exists as something that is possessed in fact, even if not 
legitimately, from sovereignty which is granted legitimately, either by a people or 
external governments.229
227 Herbst 2000, Bull 1997, Ruggie 1986
228 Bodin, Franklin trans.: 6
229 This means that the warlord does not necessarily possess what Jackson calls ‘positive sovereignty’, 
which is a reflection of legitimacy by both the international community and the people (Jackson 1993). 
For Jackson positive sovereignty “presupposes capabilities which enable governments to be their own 
masters: it is a substantive rather than a formal condition.” (Ibid.: 29) This feature o f positive 
sovereignty we have separated out into empirical sovereignty, for, it is possible to have one without the 
other. Jackson goes on to note that states with positive sovereignty “[possess] the wherewithal to 
provide political goods for its citizens” (Ibid.: 29). While warlords do not provide public goods, they do 
have a private political community to which they provide goods. The concept of positive sovereignty 
refers to a separate situation o f the provision of public goods to those outside of the direct hierarchical 
system of the governance structure and we should not confuse the two. Thus, in the sense o f providing
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States are in most cases the highest authority over the population which lives 
within their borders, however, this is not what defines them as states. Rather, another 
view of sovereignty -  which we can trace back to the convenient date of the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648 -  has come to dominate thought about sovereign actors. And, 
although warlords are empirically sovereignty, they do not possess this form of 
sovereignty.
Juridical Sovereignty
Warlords are sovereign in the sense that they are autonomous and independent from 
other sovereign actors, but they are not considered sovereign by sovereign states. 
‘Juridical sovereignty’ is granted recognition by the international community and 
signals that a state is equal to other states in the international system and, in particular, 
that these states will not (legitimately) interfere in the state’s domestic affairs. 
Juridical sovereignty not only provides ‘ffeedom-ffom’ outside interference, to use 
Jackson’s formulation,230 but also grants the sovereign state certain privileges such as 
the ability to take part in international law and contracts, to be a member of the United 
Nations, to engage in official diplomacy with other states etc. As Jackson puts it, 
states have been “internationally enfranchised and [thereby] possess the same external 
rights and responsibilities as all other sovereign states.”231 These are important 
privileges and they are not granted lightly.
The international community jealously guards the right to official juridical 
sovereignty. As a general rule NSAs are not granted juridical sovereignty. In fact,
public goods in exchange for legitimacy, the warlord is not legitimized by a society and is not 
sovereign in this sense.
230 Jackson 1993
231 Ibid.: 21
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they are not even allowed to seem like they have sovereignty by interacting on an 
equal basis with sovereign states. For instance, it has been pointed out that:
when NGOs, corporations, and revolutionary movements interact 
directly with states, the non-states and the states are considered to 
operate as legal equals. Employing the logic of the law, either both or 
neither is sovereign. Fear of attribute recognition explains the general 
hesitation of government officials and senior members of international 
secretariats to meet with insurgents or to consider national liberation 
movements entitled to protection under the humanitarian laws of
232war.
The basis for granting sovereignty by the international community is not entirely 
obvious.
Armed groups are recognized to some degree in international law, however, 
this is not enough to grant sovereignty. At one level, international law differentiates 
between insurgencies which desire to change the national government and those 
which attempt to combat a foreign occupation force, known as ‘National Resistance 
Movements’. The first type gains “international legal significance only through the 
effective control of territory and population, i.e. through the recognition of ‘pseudo 
statehood’.” In such a case, control of the government may lead to recognition as 
the sovereign state -  however, the group would then effectively loose its status as an 
‘armed group’. National resistance movements on the other hand can appeal to the 
legal concept of national self-determination. In such cases, again, if the group does
232 Weiss and Chopra 1995: 100
233 Noortmann 2001: 67
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not come to control the stafe it continue to be less than sovereign, even in cases, such 
as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) which has been observer status to 
the United Nations General Assembly.
Similarly, peace agreements between armed groups and states, even 
illegitimate warlords, “are agreements within the meaning of Article 3 of the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties.”234 Through such agreements armed groups can 
obtain “international legal personality... irrespective of the recognition of states.” 
Nonetheless, such recognition is clearly not juridical sovereignty and does not confer 
any such benefits.
Empirical sovereignty is clearly not a route to internationally recognized 
juridical sovereignty. Even in a case like Somaliland, where there is a government 
which presides over a territory, has a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical 
force, and even possesses popular legitimacy, the international community has not 
granted sovereignty. With this in mind, warlords have little chance of being granted 
juridical sovereignty since they do not have any bottom-up legitimacy for their rule 
nor do they necessarily have control over a permanent, defined territorial base.236
Importantly, juridical sovereignty cannot be partial -  it is all or nothing.237 
This means that no matter the particular requirements of sovereignty which are met, 
the actor will still officially be the same as any other NSA in terms of the rights and 
responsibilities of sovereignty. This is true even if it is a laundry list of state-like 
qualities, as in the case of Somaliland. Thus, even though warlords may possess 
empirical sovereignty, they are still considered as ‘unsovereign ’ as any other NSA.
234 Ibid.: 68
235 Ibid.: 69
236 The warlord’s lack of juridical legitimization is more parallel to taking with force in war, where the 
unit who controls a piece of territory is its owner no matter who used to own it, at least until another 
unit is able to take it.
237 Weiss and Chopra 1995: 98
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Since warlords lack juridical sovereignty, they are not granted the rights of 
sovereign states, in particula r, the right of non-intervention. Under international law, 
and more importantly under international norms, intervention by one state into 
another is not legitimate, except in certain narrow instances.238 This norm and rule 
protects states from outside aggression.239 Warlords, of course, do not have such 
protection. Thus, the host state is fully legitimate in combating a warlord. In fact, the 
host state has a positive right to protect its own sovereignty by maintaining a 
monopoly on the use of force within its borders.
Lack of juridical sovereignty also means that warlords cannot formally take 
part in the international community. As Krasner points out, “international recognition 
is a constitutive act in the sense that the absence of recognition precludes the kinds of 
activities that recognition itself facilitates.240 If an actor is not sovereign it cannot 
officially contribute to the same system of connections between sovereign states. If 
the actor cannot contribute they cannot, in theory, take part at all. Since warlords have 
not contributed, they are not allowed to take part.
However, this does not necessarily mean that actors without juridical 
sovereignty cannot take part in international diplomacy at all. Warlords can and do 
take part in informal international diplomacy as well as economic relations. Although 
these relations are not exactly parallel to relations by states, they are comparable in 
motivations and execution.241 This begs the question, how is this so? The international 
system of states has a class of interactions and relationships which are officially
238 Intervention may, for example, be legitimate for humanitarian reasons if  decided so by the United 
Nations Security Council.
239 Though, o f course, such laws and norms are not absolute and can be broken if the logic of self help 
demands it.
240 Krasner 1999: 18
241 More on this in the Section III of this chapter.
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closed to actors that are not juridically sovereign, yet, some actors, including 
warlords, do take part.
Clearly there are a set of relationships which are not dependent on ‘official’ 
recognition, but are instead based on de facto recognition. These relationships are in 
many ways similar to the official relations between states. They include diplomatic 
communications, contracts, alliances, joint-declarations of war, understandings about 
the treatment of prisoners etc. But, these relations are not part of the official set of 
rules and regulations which govern, or attempt to govern, the interactions amongst 
states. Such unofficial diplomacy, as we might call it, is the privilege of those actors 
that can demand it from states. In particular, empirically sovereign actors, like 
warlords, are given the concession. These relationships are at the heart of this study 
and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
This, then, is a conceptionalization of warlordism in terms of sovereignty. 
Warlords are empirically sovereign but not juridically sovereign NSAs. In order to 
distinguish warlords from other types of sovereigns as well as some other types of 
armed groups, we may refer to them as ‘sovereign armed groups’ (SAGs). The 
sovereignty experienced by warlords is not equal to that bestowed on states in all
242ways. In a sense, SAGs are the opposite of Jackson’s ‘quasi-states’. Quasi-states 
are endowed with absolute juridical sovereignty by other states, but they have limited 
empirical sovereignty. Warlords, on the other hand, have empirical but not juridical 
sovereignty.
Guerilla organizations, de facto states, clans, and related groups may also be 
SAGs. Their independence and autonomy from the state grants them empirical 
sovereignty, but like warlords, they do not have juridical sovereignty. However, in
242 Clapham (1996) makes a similar distinction, though, as noted above, he does not make the strong 
case about armed groups being sovereign.
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reference to these groups it is not proper to speak of the armed group in and of itself 
being sovereign, rather, the society which the armed group is based on is also part of 
the total organization. Therefore, Sovereign Non-State Actor (SNSA) might be a more 
proper term. Neorealist analysis is also likely applicable to these groups, however, 
this study will continue to focus on warlords specifically and revisit these types of 
actors in Chapter 7.
Although warlords have a complicated relationship with sovereignty, they are 
sovereign in the way necessary for analysis using Realism. Realism focuses on the de 
facto relationships between international actors. Generally, it dsmisses the constructs 
of international law and other forms of formal contracts as nothing more than a poor 
reflection of the reality of relationships. Realism can coherently comprehend how and 
why these contracts can be overridden without regret by an actor if its interests so 
demand it. Warlords can interact in such informal ways, even though they may not be 
officially recognized, moreover, they can demand that other sovereign actors interact 
with them in such ways.
Neorealist criteria
Neorealism has more strict criteria of actors than Realism. Actors must be sovereign, 
as in Realism. Beyond sovereignty, an additional set of requirements arises because 
Neorealism is a systems theory, which means that the actors must all be effectively 
the same or similar in type and differ only in a set number of variables. Additionally, 
it must be possible to make direct comparisons between the differences in these 
variables.
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Waltz’s theory of Neorealism meets that similarity requirement by demanding 
that actors be ‘like units’.243 The basic feature of being a like unit is wrapped up in 
Waltz’s understanding of sovereignty. He notes that to be a like unit: “is to say that 
each state is like all other states in being an autonomous political unit. It is another 
way of saying that states are sovereign.” 244 Waltz goes on to describe sovereignty in 
more detail:
[t]o say that a state is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it 
will cope with its internal and external problems, including whether or 
not to seek assistance form others and in doing so to limit its freedom 
by making commitments to them.245
In other words, being a like unit demands that an actor be autonomous, the highest 
authority, and independent. Such a feature is common to other structural versions of 
Realism as well. For instance, Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little also 
make this point in their description of ‘similar units’ which are defined as “the highest 
authority in all matters of government over their specified territory and people, 
including the right to wield power independently.”246
Warlords are like units.247 Warlords, as discussed in the previous chapter, are 
independent, autonomous, NSAs, which have de facto sovereignty. They decide for
243 Waltz 1979
244 Ibid.: 95
245 Ibid.: 96
246 Buzan et al. 1986: 38
247 Buzan, Jones and Little (1993) argue that Waltz need not make such an argument. The authors note 
that the unlike units may be evolving into, or out of like units. With, for instance, the medieval period 
being a middle ground between the hierarchical system of the Roman Empire and the anarchy o f the 
European state system. They conclude: “anarchy may remain constant, but units can shift into and out 
of alternative pattern o f  differentiation of function.” (Ibid.:43) This is one formulation of a ‘mixed actor 
model’. However, it is not necessary to refer to such models or conceptualizations of Realism or 
Neorealism for the formulation stated in this study. The warlords which have been discussed are in fact 
like units.
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themselves how to solve internal and external problems and are unequivocally the 
highest authority over their internal population. Warlords are, in the Waltzian sense, 
sovereign, as Waltz only refers to empirical sovereignty and never to juridical 
sovereignty. Waltz does not mention international recognition or other juridical 
sovereignty issues as a requirement. What is important for him, and other Neorealists, 
is the ability to ‘decide for oneself how to act. Warlords have exactly this sort of 
authority over their own actions.
One apparent difference b that they are not the highest authority over a stable, 
definable territory, as Buzan, Jones, and Little call for (though, notably, not Waltz). 
However, this should not preclude Neorealist analysis, for as was discussed earlier, 
sovereignty need not necessarily be territorially stable. Furthermore, the acceptability 
of the instability of territory is illustrated by the fact that Neorealism is thought to still 
apply to states even when their territory changes. Through conquest and defeat, a 
single state’s ferritory can change significantly, as illustrated, for instance, in the 
radically changing boundaries of the German state from World War I to the end of 
World War II or the formation and then break-up of the Soviet Union. The warlord’s 
territorial instability should be seen in a similar light -  the actor continues to exist, but 
changes its territory depending on conquest and defeat. The dictums of Neorealism 
should therefore still apply.
It is a subtle but important distinction to note that warlords should be 
considered likeunits, but not states. Being a state demands that an actor have both the 
empirical and juridical aspects of sovereignty. However, being a unit in a structural 
analysis only demands that an actor have the empirical aspects. Though Waltz 
generally refers to states in his study, the theory of Neorealism is actually concerned 
with the interaction of like units, which Waltz is clear about. It is this confusion
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between unit and state which tends to make it seem so impossible to incorporate non­
state actors into Neorealism. However, by clarifying this confusion it makes sense to 
use the Neorealist approach with certain NSAs. Accordingly, although warlords are 
still to be considered ‘non-state actors’, they should be taken as being the right sort of 
unit for Neorealism.
Actors in Neorealist models must also be what Waltz calls “functionally
94ftundifferentiated” in that it is such undifFerentiation which makes them like units. 
Specifically, he requires that “[e]ach state has its agencies for making, executing, and 
interpreting laws and regulations, for raising revenues, and for defending itself.” 249 
These functions are aptly chosen for it is only by having these that an actor can be a 
unitary, autonomous, and independent actor. Making, executing, and interpreting laws 
permits the actor to maintain a cohesive, unitary stance in relation to external actors, 
as they allow the leadership to be able to direct the entire organization cohesively 
enough to attain goals. The ability to raise revenues is also necessary, as it allows the 
actor to maintain independence. And, most importantly, autonomy can only be had 
with the ability to defend against aggressors.
Thus, the actors analyzed by Neorealism must not only have similar external 
traits, i.e. sovereignty, they must also be like each other internally. This seems to be a 
strange requirement coming from Waltz who goes through great pains to clarify that 
he is talking about systemic level relations and does not want to discuss the internal 
structures of states st all. We can assume that the requirement is for similar reasoning 
to Kasfir’s call to examine the internal structure of actors: if the actors are not 
internally structured in a particular way, they will not act externally in the same ways 
as expected.
248 Waltz 1979: 97
249 Ibid.: 96
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Warlords also meet the requirement of being functionally undifferentiated. 
Warlords have a political community and system for its governance. Although a 
warlord organization may not necessarily have written laws, there clearly are a set of 
rules which are followed by its members and methods to ensure that these rules are 
abided by. Also, as discussed warlords have economic systems capable of supporting 
the warlord organization. Finally, they have a military ability which is able to defend 
them from aggressors.
The exact structure of warlord organizations may differ from that of states. 
This seems to be in disagreement with Waltz who believes that since sovereignty 
forces all states to have to perform similar functions, their internal organization will 
converge and become similar. If we take similarity to mean that the internal 
organization will become bureaucratic, then Waltz fails to explain reality as many 
states have lost their grip on a truly bureaucratic form of governance and have fallen 
into what Clapham has called “neopatrimonialism” or what Reno calls the “shadow 
state”.250
However, if similarity means falling within Weber’s typology of governance 
— e.g. patrimonial, charismatic, or bureaucratic — then it is tme that warlords are 
similar to states. For, as noted in Chapter 2, warlords usually rely on patrimonial or 
charismatic sources of authority. Thus, if we are to reason that ‘developing’ or failed 
states, which may not have strong bureaucratic structures, are potentially analyzable 
using Neorealism then we must also reason that warlords can be analyzed as such -  
and we may conclude that this is in fact the case.
Warlords also differ in their capability to carry out governance functions. For 
instance, warlords can usually defend themselves from the threats of failed states, but
250 Clapham 1985, Reno 2000
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almost certainly would be destroyed by a great power. They are also able to project 
power to some extent, as for instance the LRA does when it attacks Uganda from 
bases in Sudan and the DRC. Of course, warlords could not project power into far off 
states, as the great powers can. However, most small or microstates could not project 
power very far either. Warlords also differ in their ability to govern, some having 
weak systems of governance based on simple charisma and others having stronger 
systems in place. This, however, is not just a feature of warlords, as states also differ
251in their ability to govern and is readily apparent in the observation of failed states. 
These quantitative differences between warlords and states should not be seen as a 
liability, in fact Waltz explicitly notes that states will differ in their capabilities -  this 
is integral to a systemic theory.
Warlords and Great Powers
Having noted that warlords will differ in capability to states, and in general will be 
relatively weak international actors, it is important to address the issue of whether 
warlords are too weak to be considered by Neorealism. Waltz, and Neorealists who 
have followed him, tends to focus on the great powers. This is because “...the units of 
greatest capability set the scene of action for others as well as for themselves” in a 
systems theory.252 More specifically, states determine the system and NSAs must play 
by their rules. For instance, Waltz notes:
States set the scene in which they, along with non-state actors, stage 
their dramas or carry on their humdrum affairs. Though they may 
choose to interfere little in the affairs of non-state actors for long
251 See for instance Huntington 1968
252 Waltz 1979: 72
periods of time, states nevertheless set the terms of the intercourse, 
whether by passively permitting informal rules to develop or by 
actively intervening to change rules that no longer suit them. When the 
crunch comes, states remake the mles by which other actors operate.
This is an important objection for Neorealism to make because Neorealism is founded 
on the belief that theories should simplify the world. In the simplification process, 
only the most important -  i.e. most powerful -  actors are analyzed, for Neorealism, 
these are states. Therefore Neorealists require that the great powers be addressed as 
the primary actors if one is to have a general theory.
However, this should not discount the analysis of smaller actors. For, Waltz 
also notes that
[t]he theory once written also applies to lesser states that interact 
insofar as their interactions are insulated from the intervention of the 
great powers of a system, whether by the relative indifference of the 
latter or by difficulties of communication and transportation.254
Moreover, we might note that in regional and sometimes worldwide politics, small 
states can have a power balancing or other effect on great powers and in this way can 
make systemic changes which allow for analysis by Neorealism. Therefore, we should 
take it that Neorealism can be used to examine regional international relations 
between lesser actors.
"  Ibid.: 94
254 . n i
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Warlords should be considered as powerful as small states and in some cases 
even more powerful. Afghan warlords have had a massive effect on Central Asian 
regional politics and have served in alliances with great powers, including the United 
States and Russia, as well as regional powers like Pakistan or Iran. In Liberia, when 
Taylor was still a warlord, he and his warlord organization were arguably more 
powerful than some of the states in the region, such as Sierra Leone. In an example 
which will be covered in more detail in Chapter 5, Somali warlords have had regional 
effects, as well as an effect on a great power -  the United States -  to the point of 
forcing the US to reassess its strategic intents. Therefore, we should consider warlords 
as acceptable units for analysis to at least the degree that small states are acceptable 
units for analysis.
Having made this final point, it is possible to conclude that warlords are 
minimally acceptable groups for Neorealist theoretical analysis. They are unitary 
actors with independent foreign relations, they are empirically sovereign, and they 
have similar governance structures to states. Therefore, they are sovereign, 
functionally undifferentiated, like units. Furthermore, while Neorealism mainly 
focuses on great powers, the approach can be applied t> smaller powers, including 
warlords. Although warlords may be the right kind of actor for Neorealism, there is a 
further question to ask, which is whether they have the right kinds of motivations, and 
therefore act and relate in the ways predicted by the theoretical approach.
MOTIVATIONS
The previous section found that warlords are the right kind of group, but this does not 
necessarily mean that we can use a Neorealist approach to theorize about them. 
Actors in both Realist and Neorealist accounts must be motivated to act in certain
131
ways, otherwise, the logic of the theory will simply not apply. For Realism, the 
motivation must come from the pursuit of power and security. For Neorealism, the 
actors must be motivated by the pursuit of survival.
Waltz specifically notes that the pursuit of survival is an assumption about the 
motivation of states as actors. His justification is that any “theory contains at least one 
theoretical assumption.”255 However, his assumption is not completely invented, but 
is based on a generalization about empirical observations of states’ actions and 
motivations concerning the pursuit of power.
While it might be acceptable to simply assume that warlords are also 
motivated by a drive for survival, it is better to examine to what degree this is true. 
Therefore the argument of this section will be to first examine the factors which are 
typically thought to motivate warlords. Usually it is held that either they are driven by 
‘grievances’, such as ethnic hatreds, or they by economic goals, i.e. making a personal 
profit. However, it will be shown that warlords are not primarily driven by either of 
these motivations, but in fact their actions are determined by the broader pursuit of 
power and security.256 From this perspective, we can make the same jump that Waltz 
does to the assumption of survival as the principal motivator or action.
Grievance
A conventional approach for understanding the motivations of armed groups, 
including warlords, is to assume that they represent grievances of certain groups 
within society. In particular, such explanations refer to ethnic, tribal, or nationalist 
drivers in society. The catch phrase that is often used is that there are “ancient
" W altz  1979:117
256 Also see Vinci 2006
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hatreds” which come out in the form of conflict. For example, the conflict(s) in the 
former Yugoslavia could be explained as the culmination of ongoing animosity 
between the Serb, Croat, and Muslim (Bosniak) ethnic groups. By extension the 
specific actions of armed groups in Yugoslavia, such as the Serb militias, could be 
seen as being motivated by a desire to redress these ancient hatreds. The implication 
is that warlordism was one of the vehicles for such conflict.
It is certainly true that some individuals, and even leaders, of armed groups 
may be motivated wholly or in part by grievances of various sorts, but the motivations 
of individuals do not necessarily cumulate in the motivations of the group. For 
instance, if the individual fighters are driven by a hatred of another clan, we might 
think that the group itself can be described as being motivated by such hatred and 
would make decisions in such a way.
However, it is fallacious to think that the motivations of individuals in an 
organization are the same as the motivations of the organization as a whole. The 
reason is that armed groups are unitary actors in that they have the administrative 
structures to function as a single unit. This means that there is a distinct group level of 
analysis which is wholly separate from the individual level of analysis. The 
implication of this is that the motivations of the individuals in the armed group, 
including the leader of the group himself, may be different from the motivations of 
the armed group as a whole.
In fact, it is empirically evident that the group-level motivations of warlords 
are different from the individual-level motivations. In particular, it has been observed 
that warlord organizations are not driven first and foremost by grievance motivations,
257 This view was exemplified by Robert Kaplan (1994b).
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but rather that these grievances are instrumentally used.258 Susan Woodward makes 
this point in reference to armed groups during the war in the former Yugoslavia.259 
Woodward points out that “the black-and-white portrayal of ethnic conflict that 
characterized discussion of the Yugoslav case is, in fact, an understandable and potent 
way to generate sympathy and mobilize loyalties and support for action.”260
Woodward’ s approach is to take an instrumentalist or constructivist approach 
to identity and it is this approach which is most relevant for this study. The 
instrumentalist approach takes identity, usually in the form of religion, ethnicity, or 
nationalism, as a tool which can be used and manipulated for political reasons.261 A 
slightly less strong version is maintained by constructivists who take a middle ground 
and argue that identity can be changed, but only to a limited extent.262 The 
instrumental (and to a lesser extent the Constructivist) approach is opposed to 
primordialists who see ethnic identity as a permanent element of an individual’s 
identity.263
There is not the space or need to cover the intricacies of the numerous debates
concerning these views of ethnicity and identity, however, other theorists have made
the necessary argument. For instance, Isabelle Duyvesteyn makes a similar argument 
as is needed here in making the case that the warlords in Liberia and Somalia acted in 
political terms and that grievances were used toward their political goals, not the other 
way around. 264 She based her argument on the fluidity of identity and its observed use 
only when necessary.
258 The parallel in IR literature to the role of identity in motivating actors are moral motivations for 
policy.
^W oodward 1995
260 Ibid.: 14
261 See for instance Horowitz 1985
262 See for instance Lake and Rothchild 1998
263 See for instance Stack 1986
264 Duyvesteyn 2005
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The discrepancy can be explained in reference to the problems of mobilization 
and political community discussed in Chapter 2. Warlords may use several different 
methods to recruit and retain their fighters. Loyalty based on connection to a cause is 
one of these potential motivators. At the same time, the warlord political community 
demands that the friend/enemy boundary continually be maintained and redefined and 
grievances can also be instrumentally used for such goals.
Thus, it is essential to take a group level approach to understanding the 
motivations of warlords and to keep in mind that, as with states, the ‘moral’ drivers of 
policy are often illusionary and hypocritically used to stimulate the ‘real’ policies 
which are governed by other motivations. While these groups may say that they are 
motivated by a particular cause, and use this as propaganda, their actual actions are 
much more rational in nature. When analysts do admit the rationality of warlord’s 
conflict, they do not generally turn to politics however, but instead they tend to turn to 
economics.
Greed
Opposed to grievance explanations for the conduct of armed groups are those who 
focus on the economic aspects of conflicts. As Keen succinctly commented, “war may 
be a continuation of economics by other means.” 265 However, it should be kept in 
mind that “this does not necessarily mean that the wars are caused by economic 
shortcomings, but rather that the conduct, and continuation, of the war is determined 
by economic incentives.”266 In other words, while an armed group may be initially 
motivated by grievances, their impetus for continuing to fight may be driven by the
Keen 2000: 27 (italics in original)
266 Angstrom 2005: 11
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pursuit of economic goods. Such a view has been amply discussed in the literature 
and even demonstrated, to a certain extent, using statistical modelling.267
It is also true that individual fighters in an armed group are often motivated by 
economic incentives, such as the ability to keep what they loot. Yet, as the previous 
section demonstrated, individual goals do not necessarily translate into group goals. 
The same is true for economic profit as it is for redressing grievances. While an 
individual may just be fighting with a warlord to make some cash, just as a soldier 
may join the armed forces of a nation to get money for college, it does not necessarily 
mean that the armed group as a whole is driven by an urge to make money, just as it is 
doubtful that a nation’s military is directed solely by the pursuit of profit.
However, even on the group level, economic incentives seem to motivate 
armed groups. This is particularly the case for warlords. As Berdal notes, there is a 
“popular and much publicized image of the modem warlord as concerned exclusively
J f Q
with plunder for personal enrichment and conspicuous displays of wealth.” It is 
true, prima fasciae, many warlords do make large profits from their organizations. 
Moreover, these ‘businessmen of war’ rely “on violence as the main instrument of 
their economic activity’.
But, rather than being ai end, this generated wealth is used instrumentally. 
Armed groups must obtain the means of fighting, from weapons to an ability to pay 
their soldiers. Chapter 2 illustrated the logistical needs of warlord organizations and 
these logistical needs must be met in some manner. Economic exploitation provides 
such a means. For instance, in the case of the NPFL, Duyvesteyn notes that the “[t]he 
wealth [generated by Taylor’s business dealings] was a means to an end: it was a way 
to keep the NPFL going. The foreign currency that was earned was used to buy
267 Collier 2000
268 Berdal 2003: 491
269 Chabal and Daloz 1995: 85
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^7 0equipment and train the NPFL fighters.” Just as with states, we should not confuse 
the need of armed groups to make a profit in order to maintain itself and reinvest for 
future growth with it necessarily being only a profit making enterprise.
In general, the individual accumulation of wealth in armed groups can be 
explained by the nature of these organizations. Since armed groups are rarely 
bureaucratic organizations, with a separation between specific individuals and the 
structure of the group, the wealth generated by the organization must be assigned to 
specific individuals, and therefore it is seen accumulating in the accounts of a specific 
individual. It must also be kept in mind that armed groups are based on ptronage 
models of power and, as such, the top leaders are the keystones to the patronage 
system and they must accumulate sufficient economic resources with which to 
establish and maintain the loyalty of their troops. However, this is not to say that the 
wealth is only meant for that particular person, nor is it to say that it is the only 
pursuit that drives the organization. It is more accurate to see wealth generation as a 
means of perpetuating the group, just as some states use conquest to perpetuate the ir 
own war machine.271
Finally, economic-based arguments, in general, overemphasize the role of 
profit in directing the actions of warlord groups; rather, such goals are more 
productively seen as one objective among many. Warlords are also concerned with 
other gains. For instance, they attempt to control larger territories or bigger armies. In 
Somalia, the various factions have continuously attempted to expand and control 
larger tracts of Mogadishu when possible. In northern Uganda, the LRA regularly 
tries to build up its army by abducting and initiating new members. Warlords also 
attempt to find recognition and legitimacy for their armies. Taylor regularly broadcast
^D uyvesteyn 2005: 83
271 A notable example was Hitler’s attempted drive to the Caspian region in order to attain the 61 
reserves necessary to fuel his army and continue his other political pursuits.
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to the BBC from his jungle hideouts using satellite phones and reports from 
Afghanistan show that the various factions of the Northern Alliance seemed to use 
their special operations counterparts as prestige items.272
Power
These diverse pursuits by warlords can all be summarized as a drive for power. 
Power, for our purposes here, can compromise anything that establishes and maintains
y r \
control of men by men. Such a definition of power is not without its faults and in 
general power is a concept whose definition is continually debated.274 However, this 
particular definition is that posited by Hans Morge nthau and therefore should not be 
taken as too controversial in a discussion of Realism.
Power is multifaceted. The notion of power includes economic wealth, which
77^is used to establish and maintain control of forces; military power, which can be 
used to directly control territory and people; and public legitimacy, which can be used 
to, amongst other things, pressure enemies. These factors can all be directed at 
establishing and maintaining control over men. The implication is that the pursuit of 
wealth, like the pursuit of territorial gain or authority over larger populations, is a 
means to the greater end of power.
There are many specific interests that a group may attempt to attain. For 
instance, under such interests we might find the redressing of political aspirations, 
such as economic development, which I. William Zartman has called ‘need’ in order
272 See Reno 1999 concerning Taylor; see Moore 2003 concerning the war in Afghanistan and warlord 
relations with US Special Forces.
273 Morgenthau 1993.
274 Defining power is notoriously difficult. See Baldwin 1993 for a discussion of the various issues that 
must be addressed. This study uses Morgenthau’s definition with the assumption that debates which 
apply to state power would also apply to warlords, what is important is not so much the exact definition 
of power but that it applies to both warlords and states equally.
275 To translate this into IR theory, the attempt to accumulate external resources in order to achieve 
domestic objectives is referred to by Neoclassical Realists as external extraction. (Mastanduno, Lake 
and Ikenberry 1989)
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to differentiate them from the more identity based desires, referred to by Zartman as 
‘creed’, but above as ‘grievances’.276 In general, the nature of interest will be 
contingent and depend on the period of history in question and the political and 
cultural context under which policy is created. Decision makers may not even realize 
what it is they want, as Morgenthau also makes the important observation that we 
should not judge a group by what the leader thinks are his motivations, rather, we 
must judge it by its actions.277
But, in all cases, power is a route to such interests because it is a fungible 
attribute. The notion of fungibility means that one type of power can be used for 
multiple types of interests. For example, a gain in the number of fighters versus more 
money can fungibly be related because money can be used to obtain fighters and, vice 
versa, more fighters can be used to obtain money. While there are some restrictions on 
the fungibility of power, within the bounds of a discussion of warlordism, where 
power is usually only military or economic in nature, we can assume that most types 
of power can be fungible for most types of interests.
Political leaders “think and act in terms of interest defined as power” 278 and 
this pursuit of power is not limited to states, but applies to all independent political 
groups. Morgenthau notes that a “tendency to dominate... is an element of all human 
associations, from the family through fraternal and professional associations and local
77Qpolitical organizations, to the state.” To reinforce the notion that the pursuit of 
power is not only a state objective, he goes on to say that “[b]oth domestic and 
international politics are a struggle for power, modified only by the different
276 Zartman 2005
^Morgenthau 1993
278Ibid: 5
279 Ibid.: 37
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conditions under which this struggle takes place in domestic and international 
spheres.” 280
We can conclude that warlords, like states, will “think and act in terms of
981interest defined as power.” This is because warlords are bound to the same logic as 
other political leaders. This is that by attaining power, they can attain their other 
interests, because power is fungible.282 They attempt to gain power through acquiring 
material resources, such as more troops and more weapons, land, cash, recognition 
etc. This power can, in turn, be used to meet any interests of the warlord or his 
fighters. In particular, power can be translated into the ability to remain autonomous 
and independent.
Survival
Power ensures survival. Survival is important because it is the minimum goal of any 
political unit, as its leaders must assure survival if they are to pursue any other less 
vital goals. Put another way, even though the interests of any particular group may be 
different, they all share at least this one objective. This is self-evident when we 
consider that if there were an actor that did not feel this way, it would not be around 
long enough to be worth considering. As Gilpin states, while groups may seek “truth, 
beauty and justice... all these more noble goals will be lost unless one makes
280 Ibid.: 39
281 Ibid: 5
282 To this we might add that the pursuit o f power by warlord organizations as a whole is reinforced by 
the tendency for individuals to pursue personal power. As Raymond Aron observed “[b]y participating 
in collective power men find satisfactions which sweep aside economic calculations and make 
sacrifices meaningful. The desire for power and pride in surpassing other men, are no less profound 
impulses than the desire for worldly goods.” (Aron 1958: 53, noted in Berdal 2003) Berdal remarks on 
the individual motivation for power in such warlords as Jonas Savimbi and Jokahr Dudayev, the leader 
of the self-declared republic o f Chechnya. (Berdal 2003) Although it has already been noted that 
individual drives do not necessarily translate into group-level motivation, it is worth noting that there is 
an individual level root to the group drive for power, and therefore that the pursuit o f power is no 
different in form than wealth accumulation or the redressing of grievances.
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provisions for one’s security in the power struggle among groups.’ Therefore, it 
could be argued that power is gained in order to survive.
Waltz takes this one step further and tuns this view of the relationship 
between the pursuit of power and survival around. He sees the assurance of survival 
as the single, key driving force behind states.284 Waltz notes that power is that which 
“...provides the means of maintaining one’s autonomy in the face of force that others
9RSwield.” And, “beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly 
varied; they may range from the ambition to conquer the world to the desire to merely 
to be left alone.” 286 These other aims may include power for the sake of power. Thus, 
even though wars may be partially attributable to greed or ambition, they are always 
motivated to some degree by fear for security. The purpose to taking the Waltzian 
step and assuming that survival is the chief motivator is that it allows for systemic 
theorizing as it minimizes the variables for analysis.
Warlords and Survival
We can also make the jump from the pursuit of power to the pursuit of survival with 
the motivation of warlords. As has already been noted, the economic goals of 
warlords are really orientated toward the perpetuation of the organization through the 
fulfillment of the needs of a patronage system of authority. The same goes for the use 
of various forms of hatredrorientated propaganda in order to motivate men to fight 
and potentially die. Warlords rarely turn to the creation of truth, beauty, or justice but 
they do have ulterior motives. They may, for instance, wish to fill as many Swiss bank
283 Gilpin 1986: 305
284 Waltz 1979
285 Ibid.: 194
286 Ibid.: 91
287 Gilpin 1986: 304
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accounts as possible, but even the most savage and uneducated warlord realizes that in 
order to achieve these goals, the organization must survive.
This is evident when we note the extremely long-winded nature of conflicts 
involving warlords. For example, even to this day, almost fifteen years after the 
collapse of the Somali state, the warlords in Somalia continue to attempt to hold the 
state back from reforming. Or, as Abiodun Alao, Mackinlay, and ‘Funni Olonisakin 
report in their analysis of the Liberian peace process,
[i]n Liberia, the warlords were usually ready to negotiate but not to 
relinquish their power, which is what would have shown that they were 
genuinely interested in a peace settlement. In these circumstances, only 
enormous outside pressure could bring warlords into a peace process as 
effective participants.288
In other words, warlords will do what it takes to survive and only give up survival 
when they realize that their power is matched.
This desire to perpetuate the organization directs the actions of warlords not 
only against internal actors, but also external or intervening forces. For instance, 
Duyvesteyn notes that in Liberia the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) wanted to “prevent Taylor from taking 
power and to disarm his troops.” However:
Taylor viewed disarmament as a threat to his claims to leadership. The 
ECOMOG interference was a threat to his almost unstoppable advance
288 Alao, Mackinlay, Olonisakin 1999: 119
^D uyvesteyn 2005: 30
and military success. To counter this threat, Taylor decided to attack 
and strive to expel the ECOMOG forces from Liberia.290
This logic is straightforward -  Taylor may have had explicit, alternative goals, 
however, the only way he could possibly carry them out was to first deal with the 
existential threats to him and his organization. This is exactly as we expect states to 
act. We should therefore conclude that, like states, the warlord’s actions are orientated 
first and foremost toward perpetuating the organization.291
Such a non-state actor survival motive is not exceptional. Again Coker’s 
insights into pre-civilizational warriors are illustrative. He notes that
[bjecause there was no political end for which the Scythians were 
fighting -  no ideas or principles, only the survival of a way of life -  
they were considered to be inferior warriors to the Persians [in the eyes 
of Herodotus]. For them, war meant something quite different than it 
did for Darius, who had invaded their land for ‘strategic necessity,’ to 
secure a flank before advancing further west.
The warlord, like the Scythian or so many other pre -civilizational groups, only desires 
to survive and fights war “without principle.”
Yet, this is from the Neorealist perspective not so different than the state. For 
the state too desires “only the survival of a way of life.” From this reading, Darius
290 Ibid.: 30
291 This motive to survive is a natural outgrowth of any protracted conflict, no matter what the initial 
cause. As Van Creveld notes: “...over time any war will tend to turn into a struggle for existence, 
provided only hostilities are sufficiently intensive and casualties sufficiently heavy.” (Van Creveld 
1991:145)
292 Coker 2002: 91
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himself was also acting out of the principle of survival, except for him the war was 
only indirectly improving the chances of his empires success, while for the Scythians 
it was directly improving their survival. This again reinforces the value of Neorealism 
as a basis for theorizing about warlords in that the parallel between warlords and 
states on the most essential level can be made, even if not on the more perceptible 
level.
To summarize, we may see warlords as being motivated by the pursuit of 
power, just as we may see this as the motivation of states. Furthermore, just as Waltz 
makes the jump to survival as the fundamental feature, we can make the same leap 
with warlords. Taken together with the previous section, warlords are the right type of 
group and motivated in the right way to be analyzed using a Neorealist approach.
Rationality
It is worth noting that, the motivation of warlords for power and survival meets what 
may be considered a supplementary feature of Realism and Neorealism, which is that 
it deals with rational actors.293 For many analysts it seems that warlords are not 
rational because they are focused on grievances or economic gain. However, as we 
have seen, warlords are actually focused on the pursuit of survival, which is itself an 
inherently rational goal. Beyond survival, warlords focus on the pursuit of power, 
which is a political goal and political goals are also themselves rational in nature.294
Even though warlords are barbaric, in the sense that they are illegitimate and 
unconcerned with morality or the creation of society, they are nevertheless strategic.
293 In fact, Waltz’s Neorealism does not require a rational actor assumption. States can indeed act 
irrationally, and they will pay the consequences for doing so. However, it may be thought o f as a 
requirement in that we assume that states most o f the time act in a rational manner.
294 The political focus of warlords has been noted by other authors. Probably the most explicit 
argument for this has been made by Duyvesteyn (2005) in her Clausewitzian aialysis o f the conflicts in 
Liberia and Somalia.
144
This point is clearly made by Coker in his critique of Peters, whose work Coker 
correctly reads is based on
the idea that because some of our enemies have little to lose, they are 
not true warriors. They do not behave rationally... By stereotyping 
them as savages, Peters is really arguing that people have different 
mentalities from ourselves.
The implication of this is that “[b]ecause they are deemed to act in this manner, they 
are also deemed to lack the ability to think strategically or tactically.” 296 These 
attitudes, as Coker makes clear, are dangerous because “the idea of strategy is not 
confined to the civilized world.”297 The point is reinforced by Alex De Waal’s 
examination of the savage tactics used by some African armed groups, what he calls a 
strategy of “destabilization”, are in fact a rational, if immoral, strategy.
The strategic and tactical prowess of warlords is amply demonstrated. Coker 
brings up the example of the Chechnyans who used various sophisticated tactics and 
strategies, even at the political level, to “multiply their combat power, a thoroughly 
rational technique.”299 A similar argument can be made for the rationality of the 
LRA’s strategic use of fear as a means of multiplying their forces and fighting a 
political battle with the Ugandan government.300
In this sense, warlords are rational. Rationality for Neorealism is usually based 
on a neoclassical economic understanding of the term, i.e. that actors have
295 Coker 2002: 95
296 Ibid.: 95
297 Ibid.: 95; Here Coker draws on the insights o f Colin Gray (1999).
298 De Waal 1997
299 Coker 2002: 96
300 Vinci 2005
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“consistent, ordered preferences, and that they calculate the costs and benefits of all 
alternative policies in order to maximize their utility in light both of those preferences 
and of their perceptions of the nature of reality.” 301 For warlords to be strategic in the 
sense illustrated above and to act to obtain and maintain security is to say that they are 
rational in the neoclassical economic sense.
The issue of warlord’s perceived irrationality seems to arise from the issue 
alluded to above in Coker’s engagement with Peters. That is that warlords have a 
different mentality -  or to use another language, they have a different perception of 
reality -  than states. However, within this perception of reality, the warlord does 
calculate costs and benefits and does make decisions based on those calculations and 
his preferences. In particular, this is based on his preference for survival at any and all 
costs. We should therefore conclude that warlords are in theory rational and this is no 
where better illustrated than in the warlord’s ability to fight such prolonged conflicts -  
something which would be impossible if he were truly not making rational decisions.
Nevertheless, the general rationality of warlords does not preclude individual 
warlords from making irrational decisions in practice. Time pressure and other factors 
can lead warlords, like states, to make irrational decisions. Neorealism does not 
preclude such irrational decisions, rather, it argues that the system will ‘weed out’ 
those actors which act irrationally -  a point to be revisited later. Thus, although there 
are some warlords who may break the bounds of rationality, and for instance decide to 
allow their organization to be weakened, these warlords will be terminated and 
replaced by other more rational warlords.
Importantly, the notion of the driving force as the pursuit of power acts as the 
“signpost”, allowing us to understand international politics. This makes it possible to
301 Keohane 1986b: 11
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avoid what Morgenthau called two popular fallacies: “the concern with motives and 
the concern with ideological preferences” 302 -  the first is fallen into through the greed 
perspective and the second by grievance. This is the signpost which allows us to 
effectively analyze warlords using a Neorealist approach, just as it does for states.
However, before we can make that claim fully, we must address the final 
feature of Realism and Neorealism combined, which is that the theories deal with 
anarchic systems. This poses a problem for analyzing warlords since they are, of 
necessity, found within a state and it is not immediately clear that we can treat the 
inside of a state, even a failed one, as an anarchic system.
ANARCHY
The previous sections of this chapter made arguments about Realism and then 
followed them with further arguments about Neorealism; this is not necessary in 
regard to the argument about anarchic systems. The reason is that Realism and 
Neorealism define anarchy in essentially the same way. Though Neorealism has a 
more rigorous conceptualization and goes into more detail and therefore this section 
will be based solely on the Neorealist formulation.
A central assumption listed by Gilpin as fundamental to Realism is its focus 
on interactions in anarchical systems. The same is true for Neorealism. Anarchy has
-vyi
been called “the fundamental fact of international relations.” By anarchy, we mean 
a system in which there is no central governance over separate units. The current 
international system is made up of nation-states and all territory on earth has been 
claimed by one nation-state or another. They are sovereign units that are, by 
definition, not answerable to anyone. The sovereignty of these nation-states both
302 Morgenthau 1993: 5
303 Art and Jervis 1986: 7
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creates and perpetuates an anarchic system, as the units interact without a higher 
authority.
Anarchic systems are opposed to hierarchical ones, in which there is a 
government, or sovereign, that has authority over all of the units. This sovereign 
structures the interactions of the units within the hierarchical system. Since 
Neorealism only applies to the analysis of actors in an anarchic system, it does not 
appear possible to use it to analyze actors that exist within a state, and therefore we 
could not use it to analyze warlords.
However, this supposition that states are always hierarchically organized is 
false. The assumption is that within a state, s  defined by its delineated territorial 
boundaries, there is a sovereign and actors are hierarchically related to the central 
authority. But, it is empirically evident that in some cases there is not a strong 
sovereign and that there may be anarchy within a state’s territorial boundaries. Waltz 
specifically addressed such grey area cases.
Waltz, Anarchy, and Warlords
Waltz specifically addresses the issue of failed states and anarchic systems, although 
he does not call them that and does not make any conclisions. After defining anarchic 
and hierarchic systems, Waltz asks the question “what about borderline cases, 
societies that are neither clearly anarchic nor clearly hierarchic? Do they no represent 
a third type?”3"
In particular he address the so-called Chinese warlord period which lasted 
from the 1920s to 1940s. Waltz notes that
304 Waltz 1979:116
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Nominally a nation, China looked more like a number of separate 
states existing alongside one another. Mao Tse-tung in 1930, like 
Bolshevik leaders earlier, thought that striking a revolutionary spark 
would ‘start a prairie fire.’ Revolutionary flames would spread across 
China, if not throughout the world. Because the interdependence of 
China’s provinces, like the interdependence of nations, was 
insufficiently close, the flames foiled to spread. So nearly autonomous 
were China’s provinces that the effects of war in one part of the 
country were only weakly registered in other parts. Battles in the 
Hunan hills, far from sparking national revolution, were hardly noticed 
in neighboring provinces. The interaction of largely self-sufficient 
provinces was slight and sporadic. Dependent neither on one another 
economically nor on the nation’s center politically, they were not 
subject to close interdependence characteristic of organized and 
integrated politics.305
This reading of Chinese history leads to questions about the nature and 
boundary of anarchy. He remarks “[a]s a practical matter, observers may disagree in 
their answers to such questions as just when did China break down into anarchy, or 
whether the countries of Western Europe are slowly becoming one state or stubbornly
w
remaining nine.” The essential issue here being what are the boundaries of anarchic 
systems? Do they necessarily lie on the juridically defined borders of states?
Waltz leaves the decision about whether or not to see such examples as 
anarchic or hierarchic up to argument. Beyond this he does not offer further advice on
305 Ibid.: 116
306 Ibid.: 116
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making the decision. It is, however, clear in what Waltz believes that it is necessary to 
make a decision as to whether they are one or the other. He remarks that
The point of theoretical importance is that our expectations about the 
fate of those areas differ wildly depending on which answer to the 
structural question becomes the right one. Structures defined according 
to two distinct ordering principles help to explain important aspects of
-T/Y7
social and political behavior.
The following section will make the case that in fact states containing 
warlords are anarchic systems. In order to do this, the section will closely examine the 
notions of failed and collapsed states. This literature was not available to Waltz at the 
time he wrote on the subject, but by looking at it now, we can make the strong 
conclusion about the anarchic nature of warlord states that Waltz was unable to in 
1979.
Failed States
Failed states ‘fail’ in that they stop fulfilling the requirements of statehood -  in 
whatever way we define a state’s requirements.308 There are many ways in which a 
state may fail, including the inability to provide welfare, to defend its borders, or to 
represent a people. In particular, it is often noted that they do not have what Weber
307 Ibid.: 116
308 In general, literature on failed states is concerned with examining the nature o f the state and locating 
what exactly has failed, how it has failed, and what this means for the reconstruction of the state. See 
Rotberg 2003 and 2004 for more on failed states.
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sees as the central feature of statehood -  a monopoly on the legitimate use of force -  
within the territory formally under their control.309
There are countless theories as to specific factors leading states to weaken and 
fail. For instance, Reno argues that in some cases the rulers of a state will 
systematically privatize the functions of the state and loot its resources, thereby 
leaving a hollow shell, something he calls the shadow state.310 Alternatively, the state 
may have weak control over specific areas due to geographic reasons. For instance, 
Herbst provides a compelling account of how low population densities in sub-Saharan 
Africa have made it especially difficult for states to maintain authority.311 A state may 
not have the economic resources to control significant portions of its territory. 
Without economic resources, the institutions and infrastructure of the state, from 
roads to civil servants, cannot be maintained.312 Protracted conflicts, begun for 
different possible reasons, may also eat away at a state’s ability to govern. No matter 
the reason for failure, in some instances, the state will fail to the extent that the 
government loses some or all of its control over its territory.
We may refer to states that have lost their authority over definable pieces of 
Iheir territory as ‘fragmented states’ and the areas outside the state’s central authority 
as ‘fragmented areas’. An example of a fragmented state is Columbia, with its large 
swathe of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) controlled territory. In 
some instances, the state may lose control over most or all of the territory outside of 
the capital city, as occurred in Liberia during that country’s civil war.
309 Weber 1958
310 Reno 2000, also see Reno 1998.
311 Herbst 2000
312 Mackinlay 2002
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In the extreme case of ‘collapsed states’ the state has failed in that the 
sovereign government is missing altogether.313 For example, in Somalia all remnants 
of a state apparatus had been destroyed by the time of the 1993 UN intervention and 
no effective government has reappeared since. Rather, there are multiple sub-state 
groups that control sections of territory or segments of the population. The same goes 
for much of Afghanistan during the early 1990s as well as early twentieth-century 
China.
Domestic Anarchy
In order to rectify this we must admit that collapsed and fragmented states cannot be 
theoretically considered as hierarchical systems, but should rather be considered as 
extensions of the anarchic system. In the case of collapsed states, this is a clear 
comparison to make. There is in fact no central authority, no leviathan in the 
Hobbesian sense. This makes it a simple observation to note that the domestic system 
is anarchic. The different subgroups are interacting without a higher authority; as 
David points out, when the state collapses, “domestic groups inside a country... 
behave much as states do in the international system.” 314
David, and other theorists of domestic anarchy simply assume that this 
complete state of ‘domestic anarchy’ occurs, but we can be more precise.315 Warlords 
(or other SAGs) arise in a state and these groups become autonomous. When there are 
multiple autonomous, sovereign groups which interact based on internal drives for 
power and security there is de facto anarchy. At first the state government may be
313 SeeZartman 1995 for more on collapsed states.
314 David 1997: 554-555
315 As noted above, Kasfir (2002) does point out that we need to examine the internal structures of 
groups in domestic anarchy in order to understand their cohesiveness. However, he does not refer to the 
concept of sovereignty.
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able to maintain some hierarchical order, but as the state government itself disappears, 
the state becomes a collapsed state.
A critique of using the concept of domestic anarchy is that it is not explanatory 
because most internal wars take place in states which still have a central government 
continuing to exert authority. However, this critique makes the assumption that 
anarchy needs to be universal within a state. Indeed, anarchy may be less than 
universal in a state.
In the case of fragmented states, the formulation of anarchy is slightly more 
complicated, but it exists nonetheless. In the areas where a state has authority, it is 
possible to consider the political body in control as a sovereign and the areas it 
controls as a having a hierarchal system. However, outside of such areas there may 
exist actors beyond its authority. These actors may be (empirically) sovereign in their 
own right. In such a system, the ‘state’, i.e. the body in control of a particular area and 
having been granted juridical sovereignty by the international community, is one actor 
among many. The interactions of these actors are those of one sovereign to another 
without a higher authority, i.e. anarchy. Thus in this situation of the fractured state, 
we should also see it as an anarchic system in the same way as the international 
system is anarchic -  i.e. containing multiple ‘containers’ of hierarchy which relate as 
equals.
To put it metaphorically, it is as if the doors to a house have been open, letting 
in the floodwaters of anarchy but there is still one room, its doors tightly shut, in 
which the waters have not found their way. It is here that the family continues to live, 
as other groups slop around the flooded remainder of the house attempting to also shut 
themselves in and make their own sovereign kingdoms. Yet, the outside community
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may still consider the house private property, though the neighbors may not practice 
what they preach.
Another, related critique is given by David, who argues that rather than the 
weakening of central authority causing civil wars, in some cases the strengthening of 
the central government is the root of conflict and sees it as a factor that disproves the 
“realness” of domestic anarchy.316 However, the situation he points out is expected if 
we assume that the ‘state’, by which we mean the internationally recognized 
government and the areas under its own authority, is in an anarchic system with other 
armed groups in the same anarchic system. War breaks out between these actors 
because, as we would expect, when two sovereign actors interact, we are left with a 
classic security dilemma situation. The state begins to look more aggressive, so the 
armed group does the same. In return, conflict breaks out. (Chapter 4 will discuss the 
security dilemma in more detail.)
It might also be argued that such domestic anarchy situations are only 
temporary and that we should instead see the activities of warlords and related actors 
as an exception found only in war. This is somewhat parallel to the way in which we 
must reconsider Neorealist thought during periods of interstate warfare -  e.g. borders 
between actors are overrun and change rapidly. However, the framework illustrated 
above is flexible and he lpful in understanding not just the immediate situation in a 
collapsed state, but also how it evolves over time. It is possible to model the growth 
and shrinking of warlords in their control over areas of a state, and thus redraw the 
map of our anarchic system over time. This makes it possible to track the changes in 
the dynamic environment of a failed state.
316 David 1995
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Test o f Anarchy
It is necessary to be cautious in the analysis so as not to see anarchic systems where 
they do not exist. David is right in saying that “anarchy cannot simply be assumed...
^17rather, most states most of the time can ensure compliance.” Collapsed states are 
straightforward to define as anarchic, however, fragmented states will have a 
government and there is often some grey area between the state simply being weak 
and it being fragmented. States regularly face threats to their monopoly over the 
legitimate use of force. Criminals, for example, are defined by their attempt to break 
the state’s laws and they often do so violently. However, criminals are not sovereign 
and their actions do not create anarchy. When the state addresses the issue of crime it 
does so as a sovereign to an element within its hierarchy. The differentiating factor is 
that the criminal does threaten the effective control of the state; in fact criminals rely 
on the state for providing a hierarchical system in which to exist, as noted in Chapter 
2. In contrast, the warlord does rival the state and has the military power to maintain 
its separate sovereignty.
In order to identify fragmented states this study proposes a simple theoretical 
test. An area is fragmented if an official of the state government cannot enter the area 
of the state due to the presence of a warlord, or other SAG, with the ability to 
overpower any force the government can muster. This is not necessarily a one-time 
event, but a reasonably long-term state of affairs. Simultaneously, from this we can 
conclude that there is a warlord (or other SAG) present which has de facto 
sovereignty. Thus, the state must not only be weak, but there must also be a stronger 
rival able to confront and overpower it. In this way, the test is able to determine if and 
where an area is anarchic.
317 Ibid.: 559
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For example, a taxman would in principle -  bureaucratic procedures apart - 
easily be able to go door to door anywhere in Belgium because he would be 
considered legitimate. Somalia would clearly be considered anarchic because there is 
not even a government to take the test. While in the FARC controlled areas of 
Colombia a tax collector would not be legitimate, nor could the state provide the 
coercive ability necessary to enter the area because FARC has a relative military 
superiority. This area would therefore be considered lawless and Columbia a 
fragmented state. But if a taxman was in a Kurdish area of Turkey, where a Turkish 
state official might not be considered legitimate, he could go in with enough 
protection from the government to not be under threat because the government is 
significantly stronger than any possible Kurdish resistance. Therefore, we should not 
consider Turkey a fragmented state.
In cases where warlords are more mobile, i.e. they control people but not 
territory, the test is able to give us an idea of whether or not the government is able to 
exert authority over individuals in a similar manner. If the state is able to rely on 
authority over an individual or otherwise control his or her actions, it is sovereign 
over that individual. If the state is unable to do this, since there is another organization 
which has authority or control over the individual, it does not have sovereignty over 
the individual. The organization of individuals which are not under the state’s 
authority is another sovereign, and the relations between this organization and the 
state is marked by anarchy, rather than hierarchy. This would be the case in northern 
Uganda, for instance, where the members of the LRA are clearly not under the 
authority of the Ugandan government. Therefore Uganda should be considered a 
fragmented state. The evidence is in the fact that in order for the government to
156
confront these individuals, it relies on military units, as it would if it were to confront 
the troops of another state.
To summarize, in a territory in which there are multiple sovereigns -  the 
system is in effect anarchic. These sovereign actors, whether they be the ‘state’ or 
warlords, each consider themselves as the highest authority and are driven by the 
pursuit of power and need for security. Systems with multiple, undifferentiated units 
that are not under a central authority are, by definition, anarchic. We can therefore 
expect that the logic inherent in a Neorealist approach would hold in such a situation 
because the actors, like in the international system, are in an anarchic environment. 
However, it is not clear yet whether or not this domestic anarchy is ‘linked’ to the 
international anarchic system.
Closed vs. Open Anarchic Systems
Conventionally, domestic anarchy is seen as a separate ‘closed’ system within a state, 
in the sense that it is insulated from and different in nature than the international 
anarchy that is presumed under Neorealism. As noted, others have drawn the parallel
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between domestic anarchy and international anarchy. In general, these authors are 
attempting to explain internal conflicts, and more specifically, ethnic conflicts 
(particularly in order to use the notion of security dilemma to illustrate the actions of 
ethnic or other groups within a failed state). However, they do not connect this 
domestic anarchy with international anarchy. For example, David notes that when 
central authority collapses in a state “a microcosm of the international system is
<3 1 Q
replicated within the state.” In their quest to explain ‘internal’ conflicts, these 
authors artificially divorce their areas of study, or systems, from the outside world and
318 See for instance, Jervis and Snyder 1999, David 1995,1997 and Kasfir 2004
319 David 1997: 557 (Italics added for emphasis)
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model the internal armed groups as interacting only with each other. The implication 
is that this difference would make integration of domestic actors and international 
actors within the same theoretical model impossible.
The primary reason for this separation is that it is assumed that domestic 
anarchy is fundamentally different from international anarchy. In particular, the 
difference is thought to stem from the different origins and history of anarchy within 
versus outside of states. For example, Kasfir notes that “within the state, anarchy does 
not have a priori status, rather it emerges when the state fails and it disappears when 
state authority returns.” 320 The implication here being that since anarchy is not the 
‘natural’ state of affairs, actors will make decisions differently and therefore standard 
IR theories of their behavior will not work. However, the argument for the 
exceptional nature of domestic anarchy due to its origins fails for a few reasons.
Empirically speaking, it is only contingent that a domestic hierarchy will 
return to all areas of a state. In Somalia or Afghanistan hierarchy has not returned for 
over a decade. Moreover, it can be argued that hierarchy never really existed in some 
areas of these states. The same could also be said of areas of the DRC, and other 
states.
This ‘natural state of affairs’ argument arises because in general, hierarchical 
systems have been reified, as if it has always and will always exist in the same 
borders that they have now. Rather, hierarchy is itself a contingent property of a 
system and depends on historical circumstances for any particular area. For instance, 
former Soviet states were once hierarchically aligned, but now have an anarchical 
relationship with each other, and it is possible to imagine a future in which they are 
hierarchically associated again. Similarly, in Somalia the assigned borders of the state
320 Kasfir 2004: 60
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once did not include the area known as Somaliland and we can imagine a future in 
which Somaliland is not included again. Therefore, we should not see the juridically 
defined borders of state as permanent, but rather accept the possibility that it may 
settle into separate units and vice versa.
Another objection is that neither the past nor the assumed future state of 
anarchy or hierarchy has necessary impact on the present actions of groups within an 
anarchic system. For instance, when an empire collapses or decolonizes, even though 
the states were once part of a hierarchic system, their actions will convert to reflect 
the anarchic environment. In the same way, even though a state may assume that it 
will one day be part of a hierarchic system, for instance as a member of the ‘United 
States of Europe’, it will continue to act as if in an anarchic system. The parallel 
applies to those in collapsed states. Groups may remember being part of a hierarchy, 
but the immediate necessities of life under anarchy demand decision-making as if, and 
only as if, living under anarchy for an indefinite and potentially permanent period cf 
time.
The hidden assumption made in thinking that domestic anarchy is temporary is 
that actors want a hierarchical system and will work to create and maintain one, 
however, this is not necessarily the case. It must be kept in mind that anarchy does not 
necessarily mean the presence of ‘chaos’ and violence and therefore, actors may 
potentially maintain an anarchic system indefinitely.321 The assumption is that actors 
will recreate hierarchy if they can because they do not want to live in an anarchic 
system. However, anarchy only connotes that there is no central authority, other 
authorities may be present, under which there is a hierarchy. These authorities may in 
fact not be in conflict with each other. For example, even at the height of its collapse,
321 I.e., it is not ‘chaotic’ in the sense that Robert Kaplan has referred to it. Kaplan 1994
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there were still local authorities operating throughout Somalia and there has been a 
return to widespread ‘peace’ in the sense of a lack of overt fighting, even though there 
is no effective central government. The same is true in the international system -  
although it is anarchic, it is generally not very chaotic. Thus, when a state collapses 
we should not think of the resultant situation as violent disorder, but as anarchic 
because there is always another authority to take control of a piece of territory. 
Therefore, actors could potentially live in domestic anarchy indefinitely, as there may 
not be enough pressure to force them back into a hierarchical system.
It might also be held that domestic anarchy is separate from international 
anarchy because the two sys terns are still separated by the juridically defined borders 
of the state, regardless of state failure. However, this is not the case either as armed 
groups, the state, and external states and other international actors treat the state shell 
as open, or permeable, and the two systems as linked.
Warlords clearly treat fragmented and collapsed states as an open anarchic 
system, which is intimately connected with the international system. They do not 
respect the authority of the state and treat it as a rival, not as the uppermost authority 
in a hierarchical system. Therefore they do not let the presence of any state or state­
like authority stop it from interacting with other actors in the international system. As 
such, warlords relate with other international a:tors based on their own agenda, not 
the host-states.
In a fragmented state, the state’s government will not legitimize a warlord by 
calling it autonomous, i.e. sovereign, but its actions against armed groups demonstrate 
the reality of it being an autonomous actor and potentially having its own separate 
external relations. (This is not an issue in collapsed states, since there is no
322Menkhaus and Prendergast 1995
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government to speak of.) For instance, the state will generally try to refer to warlords 
as criminals or terrorists or otherwise deemphasize the fact that the armed group has 
de facto authority in a particular area. However, in its actions, the state will have to 
admit the reality of the autonomous warlord’s authority. It will not try to enter the 
areas under control of the warlord except to combat it, as, for example, the 
government of Uganda does in LRA controlled areas. In other words, the state treats 
the intrusions into armed group controlled areas as invasions. Accordingly, while the 
state may wish to regulate the international interactions of the warlord, it cannot 
possibly do so and must simply accept the reality of its no longer being a ‘buffer’ 
between these actors and the international system. For this reason, we regularly see 
states admit that they cannot control drug dealing or other international actions 
emanating from armed groups within their defined territory.
Actors outside the domestic anarchic system also treat it as openly anarchic. 
While international actors have attempted to hold up the sovereignty of such states 
and demand that other states do so as well, the fact is, their actions do not point to 
such a strong view of juridical sovereignty. It is increasingly common for states to 
intrude upon the sovereignty of failed states, thereby demonstrating the lack of a 
state’s effective control over territory. In particular, state militaries interact in 
domestic anarchy as if it were international, as for example happens in US ‘snatch and 
grab’ operations in Somalia. Other states also invade at will -  not in order to attack 
the ‘state’, but to attack specific armed groups. This is, for instance, what happened in 
‘Africa’s World War’ in the DRC, when Uganda and Rwanda (amongst other states) 
invaded the DRC to attack the Interahamwe and other militias.
323 See, for instance, Menkhaus 2004
161
Even international organizations make the admission that the state shell is 
permeable in some cases. For instance, the OLS agreement between the UN, Sudan, 
and SPLA demonstrated that an actor other than the ‘state’ could be considered as a 
legitimate actor to be dealt with within a sovereign state and outside of its 
permission.324 Or, up until recently, in order to enter southern Sudan a visa was not 
obtained from the Sudanese state, but from the SPLA.325 International aid 
organizations regularly accept the necessity and legitimacy of obtaining the required 
visa. As such, they effectively treat the armed group as the sovereign unit, not the 
juridically defined state.
In addition, both states and international organizations also implicitly admit 
the de facto nature of armed group control. As noted above, some states excuse drug 
dealing or terrorism that erupts from areas within their territory, which are out of their 
control. The international community will generally accept this as reality and not hold 
it against the state, either legally or morally. This is happening in Columbia or 
Afghanistan for instance. Similarly, the ECOMOG intervention applied economic 
sanctions to NPFL controlled areas of the Liberian state, but not to other areas, and in 
doing so, admitted the de facto authority of the NPFL. While this is not a formal 
recognition of the reality of a warlord’s de facto control, it is an implicit admission.
We should conclude that domestic anarchy is real and linked to the 
international anarchic system. There is a fluid connection between the domestic actors 
and international actors, in that they interact as part of the same system. Actors may 
not rhetorically refer to the system as anarchy, and juridically speaking it is not. 
Empirically speaking, however, international actors do treat actors in domestic 
anarchy as they would actors in the international anarchic system.
324 See the OLS Ground Rules Agreement in Appendix C.
325 Author’s field observation, Nairobi, Kenya and Rumbek, Sudan, April 2005.
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Thus it is possible to conclude that domestic anarchy is real and is open. There 
is a fluid connection between the domestic actors and international actors, in that they 
interact as part of the same system. Though actors may not rhetorically refer to it as 
anarchy, and juridically it is not, empirically it is and the reality is that these actors 
must interact as if it were anarchy. Since actors relate as in aiarchy, our analysis 
should reflect this.
Beyond reflecting reality, by treating domestic anarchy as a continuation of 
the international anarchic system — i.e. ‘open system’ — rather than separate from it, 
it is possible to integrate the understanding of ‘internal’ warlords with external 
actors. An open anarchic system has the same rules as an international one and 
international actors may take part in it in the same way as they do in international 
anarchy, i.e. as equals. While international norms may force international actors to be 
covert in their dealing, they still nonetheless treat the warlords inside the state as 
separate actors. In the same way, warlords treat the international actors as equals and 
interact at will without reference to the state.
In a sense, this perspective involves taking the analysis of anarchic systems 
from the juridical level, in which actors are defined by recognition by the international 
community, to the empirical level, in which actors are defined by their de facto 
sovereignty over groups. In effect, the map of sovereignty is redrawn. Yet, it is 
redrawn with the same exclusivity as the juridical map of sovereignty -  thereby 
maintaining separate, autonomous units. In this way, it is possible to maintain the
326 It may even be possible to treat all domestic environments as anarchies, which are more or less 
under the authority of regimes. This would of course be a fundamental shift in the focus o f IR theory. 
While such a shift might help to solve some problems in the relationship between domestic and 
international politics, it is o f a much larger scope than this study.
327 I.e. there is no overlapping sovereignty as for instance Ruggie (1986) or Philip Cemy (1998) might 
call for.
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systematic nature of Neorealism and thereby theorize about warlords and integrate 
these NSAs into Neorealist models of international politics.
(Re)Producing the System
Before moving on, another point needs to be addressed, that is that there is a 
dialectical relationship between the anarchic system and warlords, just as there is 
between states and the international anarchic system. The domestic anarchy 
environment reinforces the sovereignty of units and thereby constantly reproduces 
itself just as the international environment does. Waltz argues that there is a self­
reinforcing nature to anarchic systems because sovereign units demand an anarchic 
environment, since they feel themselves to be the highest authority and therefore will 
not accept attempts at overriding their authority. At the same time, an anarchic 
environment will force units to buttress their sovereignty and self help focus in the 
face of potentially or actually competing like units. As Buzan, Jones, and Little put it:
[i]f all the units are subject to the survival logic of self help, then the 
shoving and shaping pressures on them of life in the anarchy will push 
their range of governmental functions toward sovereignty. If all the 
units are sovereign, then the organizing principle among them must by 
definition be anarchic. Thus anarchy tends to generate like units, and
328like units, by pursuing sovereignty, generate anarchy.
328 Buzan et al. 1993:39
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Waltz describes two specific processes -  competition and socialization -  which 
further reinforce this process (a point to be brought up again in Chapter 4).329
Connected to this, the pressures of international war strengthen each 
individual state. Tilly made the insightful claim that “war made the state and the state 
made war.”330 Here Tilly is referring to the formation of European states which 
evolved into their current, strong, cohesive structure through constant wars waged 
against each other which necessitated enhancing cohesiveness and the build up of 
power. Those states which were able to do so survived, while those that could not 
have gone extinct.331
Just as international war may strengthen states, wars between warlords and the 
state potentially strengthen the warlords (or cause them to go extinct). The argument 
is parallel to Tilly’s. Warlords are in competition with each other, with the host state, 
and (possibly) with other states. This competition forces them to strengthen their own 
organizational structure and economic system, or succumb. For example, as we saw, 
cohesiveness is a key ingredient of the actor’s sovereignty and therefore it, in 
particular, will be built up.
Simultaneously, this internal power struggle leads to a weakening of the state, 
considered as a whole, since stronger warlords can better rival the state. Thus, the 
warlord’s drive for sovereignty creates an anarchic system and this anarchic system 
further reinforces the warlord’s sovereignty. This helps to explain why internal 
conflicts can become so protracted -  it is a self-reinforcing process.
329 Waltz 1979
330 Tilly 1975: 42
331 In sub-Saharan Africa the process of securing authority, i.e. building cohesion, has occurred through 
‘elite accommodation’ (See Jorgenson 2004 and Bayart et al. 1996).
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CONCLUSION
This chapter’s argument has demonstrated that we can treat warlords as relevant 
actors for analysis using a Neorealist approach. They are like units in that they have 
sovereignty. They are functionally undifferentiated. They are motivated and act as 
states do, i.e. they pursue power and security -  and we can assume that this translates 
directly to the pursuit of survival. Furthermore, we can treat fragmented and collapsed 
states as open anarchic systems which are connected to the international system. 
While seemingly going against the grain of Neorealist theory, this subtle 
understanding of warlords and failed states reflects reality.
In making the argument of this chapter, it has become possible to argue that 
warlords should relate as predicted by Neorealist theory. Neorealism predicts that 
units will interact based on certain predetermined patterns. While it is traditionally 
held that these patterns should only apply to states, this chapter has demonstrated that 
they also apply to warlords. Thus, this chapter has brought us significantly closer to 
answering the central question of this thesis, which is how warlords relate with states 
and other international actors.
The next question to ask is, exactly what are these predicted relations? This 
chapter has only discussed the basic requirements of Neorealism; it has not discussed 
the features of this theory in complete detail. The next chapter will remedy this 
situation and begin with an examination of the basic tenets of Neorealism. Following 
this, the chapter will address exactly what sorts of relations we can expect between 
warlords and other actors in the international system. In making this examination, the 
thesis question will be answered.
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CHAPTER 4 -  THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF WARLORDS
The previous chapters have demonstrated that it is theoretically permissible to use 
Neorealism to model the international relations of warlords. It was found that 
warlords are sovereign, like units which are motivated by survival and that they exist 
in anarchic environments. These findings open up the possibility of answering the 
central question of this thesis -  how do warlords relate with states and other 
international actors -  in that it can be answered in the same theoretical manner that is 
used to describe the international relations of states. Specifically, Neorealism sets out 
a model which can describe how units will relate in an anarchic system.
The following chapter will describe the model and concepts that compromise 
the theory of Neorealism. The chapter will begin with an overview of the theory. It 
will then examine the specific concepts of the theory, including: the balance of power, 
security dilemma, and war. The examination will begin with a definition of the 
concept, an illustration of how it applies to states, and then a demonstration of how it 
applies to warlords.
OVERVIEW OF NEOREALISM
The most basic feature of Neorealsm is that it is a systems theory. This means that 
there are actors which are independent from each other, but which interact enough to 
create an autonomous system It is at this systemic level that analysis takes place.
The assumption of a systems level theory is that “[i]t is not possible to 
understand world politics simply by looking inside of states.” This is because by
332 Waltz 1979:65
167
doing so we can only be descriptive, since if something new or different occurs, a new 
variable must be created to describe it. As Buzan puts it,
[a] holistic/systemic approach rests on the premise that the whole is 
more than the sum of its parts, and that the behavior and even 
construction of the parts are shaped and molded by structures 
embedded in the system itself Where the effect of structure is strong, a 
reductionist approach is inadequate, and on this basis holism 
established a claim to a distinctive social science to analysis.333
Instead, it is necessary to examine the system itself in order to observe generalizations 
amongst actors’ relations.
This systemic -level approach is beneficial for the analysis of warlords. Rather 
than focusing on the differences between warlords and states, and their general 
uniqueness, a systemic theory refuses to focus on these internal features of the 
actor.334 In this way, we can more easily integrate our understanding of warlords into 
our understanding about other aspects of international politics because we can make 
direct comparisons between warlords and states. Therefore, it is possible to go further 
than simply describing how warlords relate with states and international actors; 
instead, it is possible to model their relations and see how they change based on what 
other actors do. As such, the analysis can potentially be predictive and therefore the 
answer to the question of how warlords relate will not just be in the past, but 
potentially a future tense answer as well.
Buzan 1995: 200
334 Although Chapters 2 and 3 focused on internal features of warlord organizations, this was only 
necessary in order to demonstrate the validity o f systemic analysis.
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This system w ithin which both states and warlords exist is both created by the 
interactions of the actors and influences the actors. Actors, which are all like units, 
directly create the structures of the system simply by acting as autonomous units that 
are motivated by survival. When these actors ‘bump up against’ each other they 
contribute to the system. The sum of their interactions is the system.
At the same time, the system shapes and constrains the political relationships 
between the actors. It does this through the dual processes of socialization -  in which 
actors create patterned relations with each other -  and competition -  which selects for 
specific behaviors -  between the actors. Together, these processes influence, but do 
not force the actions of actors in the system. Socialization means that certain patterns 
of interaction will be more commonly open to an actor than others, because other 
actors will tend toward these sorts of patterns, and that actors may not even be able to 
think outside of these predictable patterns when making decisions. The process is self­
reinforcing, as by repeating the pattern, the actors further reinforce it. The implication 
of competition is that while an actor may not choose to act in a particular way, a poor 
choice will lead to the extinction of the actor. Since actors can learn, they will soon 
come to know which interactions are more or less likely to lead to extinction and will 
make their decisions accordingly.
In these ways, the possible actions of actors in the system are constrained. It is 
the specific patterns to which they are constrained that answers the question of how 
they relate. However, in order to understand specifically in what ways the actor’s 
relations are constrained, it is necessary to understand a little more about the nature of 
the system.
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Self Help System
The international system is a self help system In an anarchical environment -  i.e. one 
in which there is no actor with authority over the other actors -  populated by actors 
desiring to survive, actors must uphold their own interests without recourse to others. 
This is because there is no central authority which can do so for an actor. Security is 
continually under threat since “some states may at any time use force, all states must 
be prepared to do so -  or live at the mercy of their more militarily vigorous 
neighbors.” . This condition is termed ‘self help’. The situation is self-reinforcing as 
“[i]n any self help system, units worry about their survival, and the worry conditions 
their behavior.”336
Within a state, i.e. in a domestic hierarchy, this is not he case. The state 
provides a hierarchical system of authority which conditions the relations of sub-state 
actors. In a hierarchic system, actors do not struggle over security, but over the means 
of control. This is the factor that seems to deny the applicability of a Neorealist 
approach to warlords, as it is assumed that warlords exist inside of a hierarchic 
environment and are only struggling over the means of control. However, as was 
demonstrated in Chapter 3, warlords exist in collapsed or fragmented states, which are 
open anarchic systems and as such are self help systems.
Warlords and the Self Help System
As was demonstrated in Chapter 3, warlords are effectively sovereign, functionally 
undifferentiated, like units; in addition they are motivated by the pursuit of security, 
thus, warlords should be considered in the same manner as states in the system. While 
warlords do exist within a state, they are not part of the hierarchy, as was
335 Waltz 1979:102
336 Ibid.: 105
demonstrated in the previous chapter. Rather, warlords exist separately from the state 
and therefore must provide for their own security -  as if the state were any other actor 
in an anarchical environment. The warlord is not struggling over the means of control 
necessarily, but rather over survival in the face of an aggressor. And, therefore, in 
order for the warlord, as with other actors “to achieve their objectives and maintain 
their security, [they] ...must rely on the means they can generate and the
1^7
arrangements they can make for themselves.’
One way that the self help situation of warlords seems to differ from the pure 
self help environment of the international system is that the legal implications of 
juridical sovereignty may seem to deter other states from attempting to directly attack 
a warlord within a third party state. However, this is not the case and in fact states 
regularly confront warlords across other state’s borders when they feel that their 
security is threatened. Chapter 5 will examine a particular instance of this, when 
Ethiopia crossed Somalia’s borders to confront groups by which it felt threatened 
Furthermore, for warlords, it is clear that the state border and legal implications of 
sovereignty make absolutely no difference. In Chapter 6, the case of the LRA’s 
attacks across state borders will be examined.
Power in the Self Help System
All of the actors in a Neorealist model differ, for theoretical purposes, only in the 
amount of power which they have. Power was defined in Chapter 3 as anything which 
establishes and maintains control of men by men. The purpose of power is to maintain 
autonomy “in the face of force that others wield.” 338 Waltz offers an operational 
definition of power, worded as: the “old and simple notion that an agent is powerful to
337Waltz 1979: 111
338 Ibid.: 192
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the extent that he affects others more than they affect him.” This definition of 
power is the one which will be used when discussing power throughout this chapter.
Power is measured by comparing the capability of units. This capability can be 
in terms of resources, territory, or other factors which allow an actor to affect another 
more than it is affected itself. Specifically, Waltz notes that power is determined by 
“size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military 
strength, political stability and competence.”340
In the self help system, actors will seek to survive and in doing this they will 
try to build up their power relative to other actors. Actors in a self help system 
interact with each other and therefore their security depends on other’s interactions. 
This means that power must be judged in relation to another actor, since power is 
what assures security and security is only assured in relation to others. Thus power for 
its own sake, like wealth or other interests, is a luxury, the first and foremost concern 
must be the assurance of survival.341
Warlords and (Relative) Power
The same operationalized notion of power applies to warlords, for the same reason it 
applies to states, i.e. it is a generalized notion342 Additionally, warlord power will 
also be determined by the same factors as that which determines state power -  i.e., 
“size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military 
strength, political stability and competence.”343 These factors were all implicitly 
included in the analysis of warlor ds in Chapter 2. Specifically: warlord fiefdoms are
339 Ibid.: 192
340 Ibid.: 131
341 An implication of this view, noted by some Neorealists is that this may then engender a ‘relative 
gains problem’ for states by making cooperation more difficult (Grieco 1993).
342 This definition does not preclude the argument in Chapter 3 and Waltz implicitly makes a similar 
case for states.
343 Waltz 1979: 131
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parallel to population and territory in states, their economic ability was covered under 
the issue of logistics, their military ability is clear, and the issue of political stability 
and competence is covered under the parallel traits of warlord governance and 
command, control, and communication. These features of warlord power can be 
objectively measured in the same sense that states’ can.344 Also, since warlords are 
primarily concerned with survival, they will be conscious of potential competitor’s 
strengths and attempt to match their own gains in order to secure themselves.345
A notable aspect of warlordism is that because they are concerned with 
relative gains rather than absolute ones, this may make them weak at an absolute 
level. It has often been noted that warlords are very poor military organizations and 
easily defeated by organized, conventional forces. For instance, the more organized 
Executive Outcomes mercenary force was easily able to defeat military actors in 
Sierra Leone when the government hired it.346 Later, a relatively small force of the 
British military was quickly and efficiently able to completely destroy the so called 
‘West Side Boyz’ warlord organization.
However, this weakness and cowardly behavior should be seen as an expected 
outgrowth of the environment which warlords usually arise. Most warlords exist 
within a failed state where there are multiple sub-state actors in conflict with each 
other. These military actors are often quite weak relative to conventional forces, but 
since they are in competition with each other rather than larger, more powerful 
conventional forces, they can afford to be weak. When there are states evolved in the
344 Though they may appear different to those who are use to the more well defined -  i.e. quantifiable- 
power capabilities o f the state.
345 Related to the issue of relative gains is Mearsheimer’s theory of Offensive Realism. Mearsheimer is 
associated with the theory which predicts that states will attempt to maximize their relative power in 
order to maintain a margin of security. (Mearsheimer 2001) The ideal situation for states in the 
Offensive Realist’s view is that they become the hegemon o f a region, or even the world, and thereby 
have no enemies that can possibly threaten them.
346 Shearer 1998
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conflict, they too are generally failed states themselves, usually because of equally 
poor technology and training or corruption, and therefore the warlords need only be 
strong enough to compete with weak powers.
Therefore when outside actors, from non-neighboring states use their more 
powerful forces we see how weak the warlords really are. This was the case, for 
example, when the United States and European powers joined the Bosnia conflict. 
Though, it should be kept in mind, that even in such cases, warlords may be able to 
empower themselves enough to even compete here, as the Chechnyans have been able 
to do with Russia.
Structure, System Change, and Hegemony
The distribution of capabilities determines the system structure and the structure is 
described by its polarity. This is the case because each actor in the system will have a 
varying amount of power relative to other actors. In some systems, multiple actors 
will have an approximately equal amount of power to each other and significantly 
more than any other lesser powers in the system, such systems are known as 
‘multipolar’ systems. In other systems two actors will have significantly more power 
than any of the other actors, this is known as a bipolar system. Finally, a ‘unipolar’, 
system arises when a single actor is significantly more powerful than any other actor.
The polarity of any given system can either be maintained or transformed. The 
system can be transformed through the elimination of a great power, i.e. those which 
determine polarity, through defeating them in war or with the empowerment of 
another great power. The system can be maintained if the great powers systematically 
do so through discouraging the empowerment of another great power or by not taking
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part in a system changing war, which could potentially defeat one or more of the great 
powers.
Given this relative nature of power, actors may attempt to attain hegemony. 
For, as Waltz notes “[organizations seek to reduce uncertainties in their 
environment.” 347 This motivation arises naturally from the drive for security, which 
attempts to avert unpredictable threats. It leads actors to attempt to impose and 
maintain hegemony in that they will want to sustain the present system through 
participation “in the management of, or [interference] in the affairs of, lesser 
states.”348 The goal of this hegemony is to maintain the system. In particular, great 
powers will have an incentive and ability to maintain hegemony in this way.
However, hegemony will not be sought at any cost. Actors prefer security over 
power and therefore they “recognize a trads-off between aggrandizement and self- 
preservation; they realize that a relentless search for universal domination may 
jeopardize their own autonomy.”349 This means that states will modify their pursuit of 
any hegemony based on their relative level of security at the time.
Warlords and Structure, System Change, and Hegemony
Warlords will of course never be a great power in absolute terms. There is simply no 
way that they could obtain the necessary power capability. Therefore some 
Neorealists may hold that warlords should not be seen as ‘real’ actors in the system. 
However, Chapter 3 made the argument for warlords being included in Neorealist 
models to the same degree as small states are. Furthermore, even if we were to agree 
that we cannot truly integrate warlords into global models, this study’s question could
347 Ibid.: 198. This observation is also central to Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salancik’s work. (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978)
348 Waltz 1979:198
349 Keohane 1986c: 174
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still be answered, as a Neorealist approach would still have much to say about how 
warlords should and will relate with other actors.
Also, due to this weakness, warlords are unlikely to ever be able to create or 
maintain true hegemony over the system -  even on a local level. Hegemony demands 
the ability to maintain a system. For warlords the system generally cannot possibly be 
maintained in the face of strong outside interventions. For example, as already noted, 
British peacekeepers were able to eradicate armed groups in Sierra Leone and recreate 
a hierarchical order within the Sierra Leonean state by effectively creating a unipolar 
hegemony over unit relations within the defined territory. In other words, they 
recreated the hierarchical system.
Nevertheless, on a more enclosed, local level, warlords may be major actors in 
the system.351 They can, for instance, create a multipolar system within a (collapsed or 
fragmented) state -  which is how we might de scribe Somalia, a topic to be covered in 
more detail in Chapter 5. They may also hold a place within a wider regional system. 
For instance, the LRA should be considered one of the major actors in the East
350 In some situations the warlord is able to force outside actors to take part in a multipolar system due 
partially to their own power, but more importantly due to the unwillingness of outside actors to use 
their full power in environments involving warlords. For example, in Liberia the ECOMOG forces 
were clearly able to defeat any of the Liberian warlords in a ‘stand up fight’ (Alao, Mackinlay, 
Olonisakin 1999). Yet, these forces effectively became another faction in the Liberian warlord system. 
They were not able to maintain control over more than a small portion of Liberia and could not build 
any sort of mutual trust with the NPFL (Ibid.). This created a situation in which Liberia was effectively 
a multipolar system. Whereas, a truly powerful outside actor would have been able to develop a 
unipolar hegemony of the system -  i.e. transform the system -  and maintain his new system, 
ECOMOG could not do this. Instead, the multipolar system was maintained.
Thus, while the total military forces of the Nigerian army could have, in theory, changed the 
Liberian system, their unwillingness to use these forces -  which would have meant effectively invading 
Liberia -  meant that they could not create and maintain a system change. In the absolutes of traditional 
Neorealist theory, this would not be considered a true hegemonic or system change ability by warlords, 
but more of a ‘friction’ due to outside factors. However, on the local level, and ceteris parabus, this 
sort o f situation is best described as the warlord(s) maintaining a system. A similar situation occurred 
in Somalia when the UN forces were effectively turned into another actor in a multipolar system. This 
situation will be covered in more detail in Chapter 5.
351 In a sense, warlords, by their very nature, are an example of system change. They create anarchic 
systems out of hierarchic ones by eking out an existence within a state.
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African system which also includes Sudan, Uganda, and the SPLM/A. This situation 
will be covered in more detail in Chapter 6.
The International Relations of States
The profound implication of the factors detailed so far is that it is possible to describe 
how units will act in the system a priori. The relations of actors in a self help system 
will fall into certain patterns. These patterns are dictated by the nature of the system, 
in particular, by the distribution of power in the system. While it may seem at first 
glance that actors in an anarchic, ungovemed system could relate in any way they 
pleased, for there is nothing stopping them from doing, this is not the case. Actors in a 
self help system are effectively constrained by the system to act in certain predefined 
patterns due to their nature and the effects of the system.
At a general level, units will act to provide for their own security relative to 
other units, put another way, they act to ensure their survival. The process can be 
described: a unit will observe the other units that it can possibly relate with. It will 
then determine the relative capability of these units. If it feels that there is a security 
concern, in that its power is relatively lower than a possible aggressor, it will act to 
gain more power, relative to that actor.352 In particular, units will act to prevent any 
unit from obtaining hegemony- which would infringe on their autonomy353
The means of affecting the distribution of power -  or balancing power -  at an 
actor’s disposal are through making “internal efforts (moves to increase economic 
capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies) and external 
efforts (moves to strengthen and enlarge one’s own alliance or to weaken and shrink
352 This follows the logic of the observe-orientate-decide-act (OODA) loop described by John Boyd. 
(Boyd 2004, 2004b)
353 Paul et al. 2004
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an opposing one).”354 Put another way, the actors relate in terms of cultivating internal 
power, forming alliances, or making war. These actions are the basic relations which 
sovereign actors can take part in, although out of these some more complex patterns 
may form, such as the spiral dynamic created by the security dilemma. Thus the 
fundamental relation of actors in the international system is to balance power and this 
balancing will occur when there are at least two sovereign units interacting that are 
concerned with their own survival (and act rationally).
It is from these actions that change occurs within the system. For example, 
an actor can cultivate power internally which will change the balance of power in the 
system by making an actor effectively ‘weigh more’ in capability calculations. This 
will cause other actors to need to change their level of power. These changes will then 
feed back into the system and cause the first actor to change its own power capability. 
Similarly, if two or more actors align, they will constitute a more powerful combined 
force. This will in turn cause other actors to align or cultivate power internally. In 
these ways, the distribution of power in the system will change.
It should also be noted that the balance of power is idealized, in practice it is 
very difficult to make effective. The most fundamental problem is that power defies
'IC fL
measurement and there is significant exaggeration of potential rival’s power. This 
will lead to insuring a safe margin of error. Therefore, it is possible that even if the 
system is in reality balanced, units will still build up internal power, align, or make 
war in order to create a margin of safety. Thus, shifts in the balance of power are 
expected as perceptions change, even if there is no actual shift in material capabilities.
354 Waltz 1979: 118
355 Gilpin (1983) provides a much more thorough understanding of how change comes about. However, 
for the purposes of this study, this more limited understanding is enough.
356 Sheehan 1996: 9
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Thus, a systemic theory can tell us how a particular set of actors will relate. 
Since it describes the entire system, including feedback loops, it is possible to obtain a 
generalized answer. In particular, it tells us that states will relate in terms of the 
pursuit of security through the balance of power. The specific means to balancing 
power, and therefore the specific relations we can expect, are those which cultivate 
internal power, alliances, and war.
The International Relations o f Warlords
The insights about international relations made by Neorealism also hold true for 
warlords. It has been documented in previous sections how warlords parallel states in 
the requirements of the Neorealist model. The logic of this argument leads to the 
conclusion that it is also possible to describe and predict the international relations of 
warlords in the same way.
Just as for states, the actions of warlords are effectively constrained by the 
system to have relationships based on certain patterns. Specifically, they will act to 
balance power through internal power cultivation, alliances, and warfare. It is in this 
sense that it is possible to answer the question of how warlords relate with states and 
other international actors.
To summarize the answer: Warlords relate with states and other international 
actors in essentially the same way as states -  they seek to ensure their survival 
through the balance o f power. Specifically, they relate in terms o f internal power 
cultivation, alliances, and war.
The following section will examine in more detail the specific patterns of 
relations that are carried out between warlords and other actors in the international 
system. The overall pattern of relationships is the balance of power. However, within
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this there are several specific forms of relationships and these relationships will be 
examined below. These include: internal power cultivation through obtaining and 
using economic resources as well as through increasing unit cohesion. Related to 
these internal actions, the feedback relationship of the arms race wil be examined. 
Alliances in terms of hard balancing and soft balancing will be examined as well the 
subtle relationships of diplomacy and demonstration of power. We can also expect 
more complex patterns to form. These include the spiral dynamics found in the 
security dilemma; the domestic security dilemma will be examined as well as ‘mixed 
security dilemmas’. Also, security dilemma intensifies and predatory motives in the 
security dilemma will be examined. Lastly, war will be examined, including a more 
detailed look at the warlord way of warfare. Each patterned relationship will be 
described in a general way. Then it will be examined in relation to warlords as actors, 
in order to see how it applies and if any modifications are necessary relative to 
standard formulations of the concept.
INTERNAL POWER CULTIVATION
The buildup of power internally can involve all of the various forms of power. An 
actor may, for instance, attempt to increase the size of its army, develop new 
technology, or grow its economy. The se processes raise the innate capability of the 
actor and thereby increase its intrinsic security relative to other actors.
States regularly take part in internal power cultivation. The two primary forms 
are to obtain and use resources and to increase cohesion. For instance, states may 
exploit natural resources within their territory or they may turn to the sale of their 
natural or other resources to external actors. They then use these funds for internal 
weapons development programs, infrastructure building, or other methods of
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increasing power. States also attempt to increase their internal cohesiveness, such as 
through building a nationalist ideology. The culmination of these processes is to 
effectively increase the security of the state.
Although internal power cultivation is internally based, it is an international 
relationship in that it creates change in the international system. The change in the 
unit’s power capability will cause other units to also attempt to change. This can then 
feedback and cause the initial actor to further cultivate its innate power.
Warlords and Internal Power Cultivation
Similarly, warlords attempt to cultivate their power through obtaining and using 
resources. In order to do this, warlords can use all of the economic independence 
factors noted in Chapter 2, including: self-supply, looting, purchasing, and external 
relations. The relative simplicity of warlord organizations makes truly internal 
development of power difficult. They are unlikely, for instance, to build the 
infrastructure necessary to mine iron deposits and then to manufacture weaponry. 
Rather, warlords tend to turn to looting and trade to build up their power base. In 
particular, warlords are inclined to exploit natural resources which they come to 
control. They will sell these resources to MNCs and use the profits to obtain the 
sources of power, such as more weapons or personnel.
In general, such resource based internal power cultivation is amply covered in 
the war economy literature and will not be examined in detail here. For instance, see 
Reno, Keen, and Duffreld for examples of how warlords gain economic power and 
transform it into military power. A brief example, however, will provide an idea of 
the complex arrangements necessary to gain the resources b maintain the warlord
357 Reno 1998, Keen 1998, Duffield 2001
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organization and cultivate power. Taylor’s NPFL serves as a good example of such 
complex relations. For instance, it has been noted that:
With control over vast territories rich in natural resources and mineral 
resources, the NPFL commenced the efficient and calculated 
exploitation of these abundant commodities. From this period, a 
lucrative business based on diamonds, timber, iron ore, and gold was 
initiated with French, Belgian, Turkish, and Taiwanese firms. To 
circumvent the blockade that had been placed on the ports of 
Buchanan, Harper and Greenville by the [ECOMOG] in 1993, these 
products were shipped through the Ivorian port of San Pedro. Ivorian 
intermediaries and their French counterparts dealt directly with the 
NPFL in order to avoid the export controls and restrictions resulting 
from the embargo. The NPFL is estimated to have made $450 million 
from these illicit exports during the course of Liberia’s war.358
As already noted in Chapter 2, Taylor then used the profits to build up his army.
Although these sorts of illicit relations are regularly attributed to ‘immoral’
warlords, we must keep in mind that states will take part in exactly the same kinds of
relations in order to contravene embargos. For example, Iraq under Saddam Hussein
went through extremely complex and illegal methods to sell illicit oil.359 At the same
time, states like Iraq have primarily used their funds to illicitly purchase weapons.360
However, there are some relevant factors which differentiate internal warlord
power cultivation from power cultivation by states. In particular, the lack of juridical
358 Hutchful and Aning 2004: 210
359IIC 2005
360 Langewiesche 2005
sovereignty is a disadvantage for warlords. As Reno notes, “[t]he sovereign [Interim 
Government of National Unity] IGNU regime in Monrovia could (and did) exercise 
its right to bring suits in foreign courts against firms that did business with Taylor.”
Of course, this is not too much of a disadvantage, as warlords do take part in business 
deals with foreign firms on a regular basis. At times, these may even be large, ‘well 
respected’ MNCs. For example, even with embargoes in place, Taylor did business 
with Firestone Tire and Rubber Company.
Thus, economic exploitation should be seen as a route to maximizing security 
for warlords. Economic exploitation and profit making has been taken to be the ends 
of their relations, particularly by some of those in the political economy school of 
conflict analysis. However, this economic exploitation should not be seen as an end in 
itself, but rather as a means for warlords to maximize their security by increasing 
internal power. In other words, for warlords relations of international trade are a 
means of balancing power, as they are for states.
Warlords also attempt to increase the cohesiveness of their organization in 
order to enhance their intrinsic power. The large literature on identity issues (i.e. 
grievances) and warlord organizations provides an example of the sort of cohesion 
building practices of warlords. For example, see Woodward, Stephen Ellis, and 
Richards and their analyses of Bosnian, Liberian, and Sierra Leonean warlords, 
respectively. One part of what these authors describe are the means by which 
warlords enlist support for their organization. Such support can be straightforwardly 
translated as cohesion building leading to increased power.
All of the motivation and C3 factors noted in Chapter 2, can be maximized to 
enhance cohesiveness, including the use of loyalty, economic incentive, self help, and
361 Reno 1998: 99
362 Ibid.
363 Woodward 1995, Richards 1996, Ellis 1999
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coercion as well as strengthening tactics/strategies, command, control, and 
communication ability. Warlords will, for instance, often use ethnicity or other 
identity features of an organization to strengthen their authority over fighters and to 
increase the cohesiveness of the political community. Again, as noted in Chapter 3, 
the grievances that a warlord takes advantage of are often perceived to constitute the 
goal of the organization. Instead, these grievances should be seen as an instrumental 
means to build up the power, and thereby maximize the security, of the warlord 
organization.
Arms Race
Gains in internal power, however, are only beneficial relative to other actors. If 
another actor makes equal gains in power, the original actor will not have changed its 
relative security. This can lead to a spiral dynamic known as an ‘arms race’.
An arms race occurs when two or more actors attempt to increase their 
security through the cultivation of internal power by the development of more 
numerous or more powerful arms.364 This spiral dynamic leads to an action-reaction 
pattern of the build up of weapons by each of the actors. As one actor makes a gain in 
power (i.e. adds more arms), this will be perceived by the other actor as a security 
threat, and therefore the other actor will attempt to make an equal or greater gain, and 
so on ad infinitum. Positive feedback between the units thereby contributes to the 
escalation in the production of arms on each side.
Such a simplified model of arms races does not necessarily reflect reality. The 
physicist/mathematician, Lewis Fry Richardson, put forward a theoretical model of
364 There can be spiral dynamics which do not explicitly involve arms. For instance, the ‘Space Race’ 
between the Soviet Union and United States.
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arms races, similar to the one noted above. However, Richardson’s model is in 
some ways too simplified. In particular, it has been criticized for explaining only a 
small portion of actual international relations between states, as was argued by Martin 
Patchen. The chief problem is that arms race models like Richardson’s are only 
based on single factors for causation and therefore do not necessarily reflect the much 
more complex reality. For instance, Dina Zinnes notes that Richardson does not 
“formally link defense expenditure and the outbreak of war.” Other factors which 
could be incorporated include technology, inflation, domestic political competition, 
and culture.
Nevertheless, the basic concept of the arms race is a valuable means of 
explaining a specific class of relations between international actors. Though it may be 
unable to explain specific events, such as when hostilities will erupt,368 it is clear that 
there is a relationship between arms buildup by htemational actors. At a basic level 
of describing such relationships, the arms race concept has significant explanatory 
force and provides a simple model, ceteris paribus, of explaining how two actors will 
relate and therefore it must be taken into account as a potential explanation of how an 
international actor will relate.
Warlords and Arms Races
Warlords can also take part in arms races. Arms racing occurs between warlords and 
other warlords and between warlords and states for the same reasons that it does 
between states. The self help nature of the warlord’s environment forces him to 
acquire arms that will leave him with the ability to neutralize or overpower potential
365 Richardson 1960
366 Patchen 1970
367 Zinnes 1976: 332. Noted in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001
368 See for instance, Gillespie and Zinnes 1977
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rivals. Warlords may try to build up their internal power base through the same sorts 
of social, political, economic, and military power practices as states. They can, for 
instance, recruit more soldiers, obtain more high tech weaponry by importing it, 
increase their resource base by looting more goods from the local population etc. 
What differentiates the warlord from states is the nature of the weapons and that they 
would likely acquire the weapons in a different manner.
As noted, warlords attempt to obtain weapons and personnel without 
becoming too dependent on outside actors and this has an effect on arms races. It 
means that the warlord will often have to rely on different sources than states because 
since states are so much more powerful, they can threaten to infringe upon a warlord’s 
autonomy. Therefore they will often turn to what Duffield refers to as the ‘transborder 
shadow economy’.369 This international black market, which is completely 
unregulated by states, has opened up arms sales to non-state armed groups. The illicit 
sales of arms allows armed groups to acquire weapons which twenty years ago would 
only be available from external, state-based allies such as intelligence agencies 
wishing to fund an insurgency for their ovn reasons. Now, the warlord does not have 
to accommodate any outside backer, but can instead be driven by his own 
motivations, as long as he has a way to fund his organization. In other words a 
warlord can maintain independence.
Arms races between warlords and states will most likely be asymmetric. An 
asymmetric arms race involves increases in offensive abilities by each side of 
different types of weapons. This reflects the usual asymmetric nature of conflict 
between a state and armed group. For instance, if the state adds more tanks to its 
offensive ability, the warlord may add more mines or improvised explosive devices
369 Duffield 2001: 136
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(IEDs). Warlords generally are forced to take part in such asymmetric arms races with 
states, though in some cases the state may be so weak that the arms race is symmetric.
ALLIANCES
Another method of balancing power is for units to form alliances with other units. 
This can occur when there are three or more actors in the system. An alliance between 
two states creates, for the intents and purposes of comparing power, a ‘super-group’ 
which combines the power of both actors into a whole. This super-group functions as 
a single actor in terms of the calculation of power capability by other actors in the 
system.
Actors may break the alliance at any time they wish, if it is no longer in their 
interest. Alliances do not exist as any more than a compulsive movement to maximize 
security for two or more actors. The official diplomatic rules surrounding alliance are 
nothing more than decoration. As soon as the security calculation of one or more of 
the actors changes, the alliance can, though not necessarily will, be broken.
Conversely, Ihe balance of power is a fundamental force which will draw
7^0together an actor w ith, potentially, anyone, even recent enemies. This flexibility of 
relations is an important feature of the balance of power. It demands that an actor 
align with another regardless of ideological or other preferences and, in the same way, 
an actor must be willing to cease an alliance in order to resume a balance.
It is also important to note that this demand of flexibility requires that actors 
potentially align with seemingly unlike actors if that is what is necessary to main a 
balance of power. E.g. it may be necessary for a state to align with a NSA such as a 
warlord. For instance, this occurred when the United States military aligned with the
370 Waltz 1979: 166
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Northern Alliance in the Afghanistan War. As we shall see in chapter 6, there was 
also such a state -  NSA alliance between Uganda and the LRA and Sudan and the 
SPLM/A.
Generally the weaker actors in a system of three or more actors will align 
against the stronger actor. As Waltz notes, “because power is a means and not an end, 
states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions... The first concern of states is not to 
maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system.”371 The weaker states 
will be more appreciated on the weaker side, as they will make up a relatively larger 
amount of the group’s power as a whole, and therefore have more say in the direction 
of the group. This is true, of course, only if the group is able to minimally deter the 
more powerful actor.
Actors may, however, join the more powerful actor in a system. This is known 
as ‘band-wagoning’. It is a rare occurrence, for the reason noted above, but does 
occur, in particular if there is already a hegemonic actor in the system.
Furthermore, there are strong obstacles of fear which an actor must overcome 
in order to cooperate. In particular, actors have two fundamental concerns.372 In an 
alliance, the possible gains may favor another rather than oneself. Since actors are 
concerned with relative gains, this creates a disincentive to cooperate which may only 
be overcome with a suitably powerful incentive to cooperate. Secondly, an actor may 
worry that it will become dependent on another actor’s “cooperative endeavors and 
exchanges of good and services.” Doing so would limit the self help ability of an 
actor, and in extreme cases makes an actor bse its functional undifferentiation- e.g. 
it might more resemble the province of an empire.
Ibid.: 126
372 Ibid.
373 Ibid.: 106
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Warlords and Alliances
Warlords form alliances for the same reason as other actors in anarchic systems. They 
wish to increase their security in relation to other actors in the system. When they 
cannot increase their internal power enough, they will seek to combine their forces 
with another actor in the system.
Warlords may form alliances with other warlords. For example, the aptly 
named Northern Alliance was made up of various warlords who had combined their 
efforts to balance the power of the Taliban. The Taliban presented a severe threat in 
that the group eventually became so powerful that it threatened the autonomous 
survival of warlords who resisted on their own. In order to counter this threat, smaller 
warlord organizations joined the Northern Alliance -  which also threatened their 
autonomy but to a le sser extent because it was not as dominated by such a powerful 
hegemon -  and in this way guaranteed their own continued survival.
Warlords can also form alliances with states. For example, the United States 
aligned with the Northern Alliance out of convenience, as both of the group’s security 
interests approved of such an alliance. Balances of power between warlords and other 
warlords and warlords and states will be illustrated in Chapters 5 and 6.
Like states, warlords will form alliances based on their security interest, and 
therefore with anyone with whom it is in their interest to do so. Warlords will not base 
alliance formation on identity or other issues. This, for instance, allowed the SNF to 
form and then break an alliance with Ethiopia, an issue to be covered in Chapter 5, or 
the Christian and Animist LRA to form an alliance with the Islamic Fundamentalist 
Sudanese government, an issue to be covered in Chapter 6. Security is the factor 
which will dictate alliance formation. Therefore warlords, like states, can “adjust to a
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shifting distribution of power by changing partners with a grace made possible by the 
absence of ideological and other cleavages.” 374
Moreover, warlords have the same concerns as expected in terms of alliances. 
They are concerned with relative power and therefore will only form alliances when 
the system forces them to do so because of the presence of a more powerful threat. 
Also, as noted in Chapter 2, warlords are concerned with their independence and 
therefore will be careful to not allow a more powerful ally to limit its independence.
The means by which warlords will form alliances may be different from that 
employed by states. States can use more formal processes to create alliances based on 
extensive diplomatic relations, which are held to be legitimate by other states. 
Warlords, on the other hand, cannot generally take part in formal, legitimate 
diplomatic exchanges and official treaty or alliance creation. Nonetheless, they are 
able to form informal alliances with other actors, including states. In general warlords 
often end up in secret alliances with states, who gain from such alliances by using the 
warlord for their ‘dirty work’. These alliances may even be quite long-lasting and 
cover multiple areas of exchange. For example, the LRA formed a decade long 
alliance with the government of Sudan, which involved arms trading, joint military 
operations, and basing rights.
In general, the balance of power, as Neorealism describes it, is a good model 
of the relations of warlords with other warlords and with states. It is a de facto 
arrangement of powers that occurs compulsively. The place of trust, loyalty, norms, 
and formality is completely erased, as actors align and break alliances to meet their 
interest. These alliances can therefore include warlords if doing so is convenient and 
beneficial to the security interests of the actors.
374 Ibid.: 125
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Typology of Balancing
The balance of power obtained via alliances can be further subdivided into hard and 
soft balancing. Warlords take part in both forms of balancing.
Hard Balancing
Hard balancing occurs when actors ‘hdopt strategies to build and update their military 
capacities, as well as create and maintain formal alliances and counter alliances, to 
match the capabilities of their key opponents.”377 In other words, hard balancing is the 
classic balancing behavior which Neorealist literature usually focuses on. An example 
of hard balancing would be the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which 
was formed between Western powers to balance the Soviet Union and its allies’ 
power.
Hard balancing seems to occur less frequently between states and warlords, 
but it does happen. The impediment to visible alliances is the inability of warlords to 
take part in formal alliances with states because such alliances would be considered 
illegitimate in international law. However, it should be kept in mind that, even in the 
balance of power between states, it is often the case that states make illegitimate and 
secret alliances with each other.378 It is these more secret, but no less demanding, 
alliances that we would generally see between a state and warlord. At other times an 
alliance between a state and warlord may not be formal, in the sense that there is no
375 Paul et al. 2004
376 Paul et al. (2004) also bring up the concept of ‘asymmetric balancing’. Warlord balancing is itself a 
form of asymmetric balancing and therefore the concept will not be discussed as a separate form here.
377 Waltz 1979:3
378 Secret relations between states are also common. States may use secret alliances in order to gain 
strategic advantage, as occurred for in the lead ip to World War I. They may also be necessary for 
ideological reasons, for instance, Iran had secret relations with Israel during the 1950s, 60s, and 70s but 
could not make these public because of the non-acceptance of Israel of a state by Muslim nations and 
for internal public opinion reasons. In these situations it becomes necessary for analysts to adopt 
inference as the method of proof.
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explicit treaty, but may otherwise be a strong and expected alliance. The alliance 
between the United States and Northern Alliance would be an example of such an 
alliance.
Soft-Balancing
Soft balancing falls short of formal alliances and is not as focused on purely military 
activities. It involves developing ententes, limited security understandings between 
states, limited arms build ups, and collaboration in international institutions.379 Soft 
balancing can also involve economic and public relations alliances between states. 
These activities can potentially be escalated into hard balancing military alliances.
The reality of soft-balancing is still not fully accepted. For instance, Stephen 
Brooks and William Wohlforth argue that the concept does little to explain current
1QA
international relations. Beyond ‘practical’ applications of the concept, in some 
ways it does not even align with basic precepts of Neorealism, which is more focused 
on ‘high politics’. Whatever the end-state of the debate on soft-balancing, it can be 
addressed in the case of warlords without necessarily arguing that it is a concept 
which is acceptable in Neorealist theory.
Soft-balancing also occurs with warlords. In many cases, a state and warlord 
will have similar interests in containing the power of a mutual rival, but not take part 
in formal bonds because of concern with international legitimacy or other issues. For 
instance, a state may turn a blind eye to incursions by a warlord in its territory if it 
feels that the warlord is weakening a rival neighboring state. At other times, a warlord 
and state may form understood economic alliances. For example, whether or not the 
DRC (then known as Zaire) had a formal alliance with Savimbi, there were clearly
379 Paul et al. 2004: 3
380 Brooks and Wohlforth 2005
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some ‘understandings’ and economic collaboration over diamonds. However, 
collaboration in international institutions and similarly official forms of soft-balancing 
will be off limits for the warlord.
Diplomacy and Recognition
A related point to note is that states take part in diplomacy and attempt to be 
recognized by other states. They do this in order to increase their internal strength, 
such as by obtaining aid, and to facilitate alliances. In both ways, states increase their 
relative level of security. Although such diplomacy cannot disregard the balance of 
power in a system, it can facilitate it.
Warlords also attempt to improve their security by taking part in diplomacy 
and gaining recognition.381 Diplomatic relations strengthen warlords internally by 
allowing them to access external resources, which help to build internal power. They 
also facilitate alliances. As Clapham notes in regard to African insurgents (a point 
which also applies to warlords):
.. .the functions of international relations for African insurgents were, 
in many respects, little different from those for recognized states. 
Insurgent leaders, like heads of state, used international contacts in 
order to strengthen their own control over their domestic political 
structure, gain access to external resources, and so far as possible 
ensure their own survival.382
381 Other armed groups take part in diplomatic relations. It is a standard method used by insurgents to 
gain international backing, such as by the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Public diplomacy for armed groups involves largely the 
same methods as diplomacy rned by states and includes appointed diplomats and objectives such as 
gaining economic aid.
Clapham 1996:223
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For example, Reno details how Taylor used his business connections to 
conduct diplomacy with the United States government. He explains:
[Taylor] engaged a Washington, D.C., firm that also represented a 
consortium member [with which Taylor was doing business]. With the 
firm’s help, Taylor could publicize his plausible argument that the 
Nigerian intervention represented a threat to Liberian sovereignty.
Here we see Taylor acting exactly as we would predict a survival orientated actor to 
act. He used diplomacy, if only a form of ‘public diplomacy’, to ensure the survival of 
his organization by attempting to gain the U.S.’ support against the threat of a 
Nigerian invasion.
Demonstration o f Power
However, in order to take part in diplomacy, an actor must be recognized by other 
relevant actors. States are recognized a priori by other states as sovereign actors 
which can potentially be aligned with. Warlords, however, must provide proof that 
they can be aligned with. The standard method used to do this is to demonstrate 
power. In addition, demonstrations of power grant the warlord the ability to improve 
its power internally.
Warlords demonstrate power in order to facilitate alliances. The relative power 
of warlord organizations is not easily calculated, since they do not necessarily control 
a territory, as a state does. In order to remedy this, the warlord must demonstrate that
383 Reno 1998: 101
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he has some power, such as by taking and holding territory, defeating government 
troops, moving a civilian population etc. In doing so, the warlord’s power can be 
calculated by states and, if it is found to be in their interest, an alliance can be formed. 
For example, when the United States decided to invade Afghanistan and remove the 
Taliban from power, it turned to the warlords of Afghanistan who had demonstrated 
some power in the state -  the Northern Alliance -  who controlled around 10% of the 
state’s territory.
Warlords also demonstrate power because by doing so they may improve their 
chances of recruiting individuals who are willing to join the organization. This is 
similar to standard insurgency doctrine which prescribes that insurgents use highly 
visible attacks as a way to promote their cause and force the state to react to them. By 
forcing the state to acknowledge them, the insurgency promotes its cause -  since like- 
minded individuals in the state will find a central force to congregate around -  and 
thereby strengthens its forces by gaining new recruits. It also serves to solve the 
coordination problem.384
Also, by being seen as an alternative to the state, an armed group may be able 
to attract external resources or funding from states. Warlords are notorious for such 
practices. For example, they will demonstrate their ability to control a resource, as for 
instance, Taylor did in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Though Taylor had no legal right to 
natural resources, he could demonstrate control over diamond and timber resources, 
which allowed him to negotiate deals with international corporations for the 
resources. These corporations, which are driven by the pursuit of profit, look to 
exploit the natural resources and will share profits with the warlord in exchange for
384 Collier 2000
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access or delivery of the raw naturalresources. Again, we see the high relative value 
of empirical sovereignty versus juridical sovereignty.
The warlord need not even demonstrate present control over resources, but 
only the possibility of future control. He can then simply sell the future rights for 
natural resources to a corporation As Clapham notes:
Insurgents [by which Clapham also includes warlords] could trade on 
the expectation that they might eventually come to power, and raise 
what were effectively insurance premiums from foreign firms which 
were anxious to protect themselves against the possibility. Given that 
the French state oil company, Elf-Aquitaine, depended heavily on 
Angola for its supplies, it was no more than commercial prudence for 
some of its senior managers to maintain close contacts with the 
[Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] MPLA government, 
while others did so with Savimbi and UNITA.385
Thus, Savimbi need only demonstrate potential power and capability to gain 
resources. These resources then, of course, can be turned into power capabilities, i.e. 
the profit is used to buy weapons and thereby to increase the internal power of the 
warlords.
In a sense, juridical sovereignty can be seen as a form of power, one which 
warlords do not possess, and therefore warlords need to compensate for this. 
Recognition of sovereignty by other international actors grants actors some 
assumptions about their overall power capability and this can be traded in for real
385 Clapham 1996: 234
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power. Moreover, juridical recognition may grant power in itself in that it allows an 
actor to take part in international organizations or obtain the benefits of formal 
diplomacy. Warlords do not innately have such power, rather they need to 
demonstrate that they are empirically sovereign. In doing this, the warlord can obtain 
some of the benefits of sovereign recognition, such as the ability to form (informal) 
alliances. Yet, they are never able to gain some of the more formal benefits of 
juridical recognition of sovereignty, such as the ability to take part in official 
international organizations. Nevertheless, warlords still can take part in relations with 
other actors that can be modeled in terms of power distributions, for juridical 
recognition is only one form of power amongst many.
SECURITY DILEMMA
Even though the balance of power may be defensive in nature, tension and conflict in 
anarchic environments is still rife. This is because, even without innately aggressive 
actors in a system, a security dilemma relationship arises between actors. The security 
dilemma occurs because states, or other units, will attempt to provide for their own 
security. In doing this they will amass power for defensive purposes. This amassing of 
power may then be perceived to be for offensive rather than defensive purposes to 
other actors. The perception of potential offense leads the other actors to amass power 
themselves for defensive purposes but, again, this may be perceived as being for 
offensive purposes and it is herein that the spiral of the security dilemma begins.
386 Barry Posen, who first applied the concept of the security dilemma to internal actors, puts it 
eloquently:
“the condition of anarchy makes security the first concern o f states. It can be otherwise only if  these 
political organizations do not care about their survival as independent entities. As long as some do care, 
there will be competition for the key to security -  power. The competition will often continue to a point 
at which the competing entities have a massed more power than needed for security and, thus, 
consequently begin to threaten others. Those threatened will respond in turn.” (Posen 1993: 104)
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Thus, it is the same factors which lead to the balance of power that also contribute to 
the security dilemma.
The security dilemma arises any time there are one or more units in an
' lQ 'J
anarchical system which are motivated by survival. John Herz first referred to the 
concept of the security dilemma in 1950 and, more recently, Jervis updated and 
refined the concept by applying game theoretical modeling to it.388 As already noted, 
Posen applied the security dilemma to non-state groups, specifically to ethnic conflict, 
in 1993.389
Domestic Security Dilemma
Posen notes that the collapse of imperial regimes can be viewed as a problem of 
“emerging anarchy.”390 He argues that in the collapse of empires, such as the Soviet 
Union, the sovereign disappears and sub-state groups, whether ethnic, religious or 
cultural, will seek security. Posen goes on to illustrate the security dilemma and 
demonstrate how it is applicable to security situations within a state.
After imperial collapse, the security dilemma is modified by the fact that 
groups will attempt to rebuild, either on their own or with the help of international 
actors, the state structures. This will lead to apparently different dynamics than are 
typical for international security dilemmas. For instance, actors may be driven 
towards acts of ethnic cleansing in order to obtain security. This occurs because 
unlike in interstate models, Posen’s model sees dispersed groups as the units of the 
security dilemma. These groups, because they are not enclosed, may be mixed 
together with other groups. For example, Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks were mixed in
387 Waltz 1979
388 Herz 1950, Jervis 1978
389 Posen 1993
390 t v ; a  . i  i \ a
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cities of the former Yugoslavia. As the groups attempt to gain security, they may 
come to perceive the other groups as threats and therefore want to separate themselves 
out. The offensive version of this is to forcefully separate out the threatening group, 
i.e. ethnically cleanse the area.
Warlord Security Dilemma
The warlord security dilemma more closely resembles the traditional international 
security dilemma than it does Posen’s domestic formulation. This is because warlords 
are unitary actors that are separated out from society and formed hto an enclosed 
community, unlike Posen’s formulation of dispersed groups. As was discussed in 
previous sections of this study, warlords are unitary actors in that they are made up of 
individuals and these individuals are cohesively bonded enough to have an effective 
leadership. While they may not necessarily be connected with a single territorial area, 
they will be separated from the external population, possibly literally separated into a 
roving band or base-camp of some sort Therefore the dynamics of these actors will 
differ from more amorphous ethnic, religious, or cultural groupings.
Moreover, we can expect that warlords will more closely follow the ideal 
security dilemma than the types of non-state groups that Posen is referring to. The 
cohesiveness of the warlord unit makes them more purposeful, and therefore, 
potentially, more predictable in the security dilemma. Like states, warlords can have a 
defined foreign policy and automatic reactions to perceived threats. This is unlike 
more amorphous ethnic groups which may react to a threatening stimulus, but do so in 
a more divided manner, with for instance, some subgroups or individuals being more 
aggressive than others.
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Thus, we should expect to see security dilemmas between warlords and other 
actors. In fact this does occur. However, for the warlord, unlike Posen’s formulation, 
security dilemmas will potentially involve states. We can refer to these as ‘mixed 
security dilemmas’.
Mixed security dilemma
The security dilemma was applied by Posen and others to NSAs in relation to other 
NSAs. However, as has been argued, the anarchic system which warlords exist in is 
open and therefore other states may possibly be involved. This means that the security 
dilemma can take place between warlords and other armed groups and warlords and 
states.
The mixed security dilemma can occur when warlords exist in both collapsed 
and fragmented states. In a collapsed state, the warlord may interact with other 
warlords and states outside of the boundaries which define the collapsed state. For 
instance, in Somalia such a mixed security dilemma occurs between Somali warlords 
and Ethiopia. The Ethiopian state feels threatened by the warlords within Somalia 
because they are obvious security threats that may either support internal Ethiopian 
threats, as with al Ittihad, or may be direct threats themselves. At the same time, 
Ethiopia’s defensive maneuvering may be perceived as a threat to warlords. This case 
will be explored in more detail in Chapter 5.
In fragmented states, the warlord may enter into a security dilemma with the 
host state itself as well as with neighboring states. For example, the LRA presents a 
threat to Uganda simply by existing as an entity which is not under the authority of 
the state within its boundaries. The LRA also presents a security dilemma for the
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Sudanese state, as it may attack inside Sudan. This example will be covered in more 
detail in Chapter 6.
Mixed Security Dilemma and Intervention
An additional benefit of the mixed security dilemma approach is that it can help 
explain intervention in terms which Neorealism can accept. When states fail and 
warlords appear inside of them, from a Neorealist perspective it seems that there is no 
reason to care. In fact, it is a positively beneficial state of affairs because failure and 
warlords weaken the potentially threatening state. Therefore it would seem like states 
should accept the presence of failed states, possibly even promote them, and certainly 
not intervene in them to end this less threatening situation
Interventions do, however, make sense if one considers that an armed group 
can enter into a security dilemma with a neighboring state. For example, as Taylor 
(and other warlords) grew in power, he came to represent a threat to neighboring 
states; eventually this threat led to an intervention. Similarly, warlords in Somalia 
were considered to be threats. Whether or not the warlord’s actions were for defensive 
purposes, neighboring states might perceive his actions as offensive threats and this 
would lead them to take actions to obtain increased security. The action used to obtain 
an increase in security in the face of the threat is intervention. Thus, the logic of 
mixed security dilemmas can not only help to explain these armed group-state 
relations, but also to explain a Neorealist conception of intervention.
391 One alternate possible explanation is that conflict might ‘spill over’ and ‘infect’ neighboring states. 
However, this does not explain interventions by non-neighboring states.
201
Security Dilemma Intensifiers
The security dilemma is intensified by two possible conditions. Firstly, if it is difficult 
to distinguish offensive and defensive weapons, actors will not be able to signal their 
defensive intent and this may cause other actors to be more likely to assume an 
offensive intent. Secondly, in cases where offensive operations are more effective 
than defensive ones, actors will choose the offensive course of action, which can in 
turn lead to preemptive war in the event of a crisis.
Posen illustrates how both ‘intensifiers’ of die security dilemma are present in 
internal, ethnic conflicts.392 Small arms are such weapons because they are innately 
applicable to offensive and defensive operations. Moreover, small arms are usually 
the weapons of choice for armed groups because they are inexpensive, upkeep is easy, 
and they are destructive when used in bulk.393 It is also intensified because small 
military forces can generate large amounts of terror in order to move a population. 
This gives an advantage to first strike capability. Therefore, we can expect that the 
security dilemma of armed groups, in ethnic conflict situations at least, will be 
intensified.
The warlord security dilemma also contains such intensifiers. Warlords in 
general rely on small arms. In addition, offensive operations are much more effective 
for warlords than defensive ones because of their particular style of asymmetric 
warfare. The warlord usually does not have many troops relative to states and he 
cannot rely on society to shield him, as insurgents can. Therefore the warlord must 
rely on the quick and dirty fighting that we associate with warlordism -  i.e. the 
warlord way of warfare -  in order to overcome these asymmetries. This form of 
warfare does often value offensive operations over defensive ones.
392 Posen 1993
393 Klare 2004
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Predatory Security Motives
Jervis and Snyder also use the concept of the security dilemma to explain the relations 
of actors in a failing empire. They add to this a discussion of the interaction of 
predatory and security motives. They note that:
The purest type of security dilemma is a situation in which security is 
the overriding objective of all the protagonists, yet attempts by one 
party to increase its security reduce the security of the others. At the 
opposite end of the spectrum some conflicts may be driven entirely by 
the desire of one or both parties to exploit or dominate the other for 
reasons that would not diminish even if security were not in
i 394jeopardy.
Snyder and Jervis admit that there are normally mixtures of security and predatory 
motivations by actors. They find that the security dilemma itself can give rise to 
predatory behavior, as well as “zero-sum conflicts of interest and inimical exclusive 
identities.” At the same time, predatory strategies can create or exaggerate the 
security dilemma.
This interaction of security and predatory motivations affects warlords in 
particular because they are by their very nature predatory actors. They often rely to 
some degree on forced conscription and looting in order to sustain their organizations. 
This means that they must take part in predatory activities. The warlord’s predatory 
nature leads it to be almost continuously fighting wars. Thus, although the warlord
394 Snyder and Jervis 1999:19
395 Ibid.: 23
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organization may only be defending its autonomy and surviving as an organization, its 
actions are almost always perceived as threatening. Moreover, warlords are concerned 
with their own continuing autonomy, and since they necessarily exist within a state, 
they will naturally be a security threat to the state. This is because states are 
existentially concerned with maintaining a hierarchy of authority within their territory 
and therefore they will feel threatened by warlords. Together these factors lead to an 
intensification of the security dilemma and makes it more likely to lead to outright 
conflict.
WAR
War is an infamously difficult term to accurately define and conceptualize. More or 
less inclusive definitions of the term are argued, often depending on reference to 
Clausewitz’s formulation of the definition of wars as “simply a continuation of 
political intercourse, with the addition of other means.” For instance, on one side of 
the debate, M. L. R. Smith argues that “[a]ll war, be it ‘low intens ity’ or otherwise, is 
inherently the same and can therefore be understood, in its entirety, within the
1 0 7Clausewitzian strategic paradigm.” This includes all kinds of actors, whether state 
or non-state. On another end of the spectrum, many conflicts between groups, even all 
contemporary conflicts, are not war, per se. For instance, Rupert Smith argues that:
[w]ar no longer exists. Confrontation, conflict and combat undoubtedly 
exist all around the world -  most noticeably, but not only, in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Palestinian 
Territories -  and states still have armed forces which they use as a
396 Clausewitz 1989: 100
397 Smith 2003: 35
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symbol of power. None the less, war as cognitively known to most 
noncombatants, war as battle in a field between men and machinery, 
war as massive decisive event in a dispute in international affairs: such 
war no longer exists.398
Moreover, there are several possible categories of war. For instance, John 
Mueller brings up just a few, including:
• major war or wars among developed countries,
• conventional civil war,
• colonial war,
• ideological war,
• unconventional civil war (under which includes terms such as new war, ethnic 
conflict, clashes of civilization),
• and policing wars.399
Within each such category, the primary question could the n be asked again, i.e. is it a 
war per se or simply the use of methods of warfare. However, these debates need not 
be addressed in this study, for the notion of warfare which is central to this study is 
that which is specific to Neorealism.
Neorealism acknowledges two types of war. What can be termed ‘hierarchic 
war’ is fought over control of the means of governance in the state by actors within 
the state. The other type of war, which can be termed ‘anarchic war’, is fought over 
survival between like units. Such anarchic war is a means of balancing power. Thus, it 
is the objective of warfare which differentiates it. It is often thought that warlords
R. Smith 2005: 1
399 Mueller 2004
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only take part in hierarchic war. In fact, as the following discussion will make clear, 
they take part in anarchic war, since their primary goal is survival.
Hierarchic War
Conflict and war occur inside of states, just as it does in the international system. 
“The difference between national and international politics lies not in the use of force 
but in the different modes of organization of doing something about it.”400 In an ideal 
state, the government is “organized to prevent and to counter the private use of 
force.”401 Doing so maintains a hierarchical system within the state.
Within this hierarchy, the sub-state units may have political conflict over the 
control over the state authority apparatus. They may also escalate the conflict over its 
control to include physical violence. This fluidity leads to some crossover between 
political parties and insurgencies, both as political parties may become insurgencies 
and in that insurgencies may become political parties, as Hamas or Hezbollah are 
becoming.
What we can call ‘hierarchic war’, or civil war,occurs when separate political 
units seek to control the means of governance using force, rather than politics. In 
other words, the actors fight to determine which will be at the top authority in the 
hierarchy. Hierarchic war will therefore start when a sub-state actor attempts to fight 
over the means of governance. It will end when the state defeats or co-opts the sub­
state actor, the sub-state actor takes control of the state, or the state collapses -  
creating an anarchic environment
™ Waltz 1979:103
401
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Anarchic W ar
The nature of the relations of units in a self help system can lead to war. As described 
above, actors in an anarchic system must provide for their own security. In some 
instances this means building up internal power to deter aggressors or otherwise 
creating a balance of power through the use of alliances. All units in an anarchic 
system are pursuing such security goals simultaneously. However, some of these 
security goals may be incompatible. For example, it may be necessary for actors to 
physically defend themselves from aggressors or to preemptively attack other actors 
in order to improve the balance of power by weakening another actor.402 If the units 
come into physical conflict in order to rectify these incompatible goals, it is anarchic 
war. In this way, war “can only determine the allocation of gains and losses among 
contenders and settle for a time the question of who is the stronger.”403
Thus, anarchic war can be seen as, in a sense, a continuation of the attempt to 
maximize security through influencing the distribution of capabilities, i.e. balancing 
power. It is another option, other than aligning or building up power internally. This 
option is used when security goals become incompatible. Actors can use force for 
conquest, which can increase internal power, by allowing them to acquire resources. 
War can also weaken or even completely remove a rival, thereby influencing the 
power distribution in a favorable manner. Conversely, an actor must fight defensive 
war in order to defend itself from an aggressor.404
402 There is a threshold at which civil war becomes anarchic war. In a civil war the government 
continues to have the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence and is organized to counter the 
insurgent’s use of violence. Rebellions are in effect treated like crime. However, when the insurgent 
becomes powerful enough, the government is no longer able to live behind the illusion o f countering 
criminals. Rather, the insurgent comes to gain autonomy from the state -  sovereignty -  and the nature 
of conflict becomes an existential fight for survival.
403 Waltz 1979:112
404 In most instances, however, war will not be a prescribed course of action because of the distinct 
possibility that it will weaken the aggressor as well, and since units are more concerned with security 
than with power, it will in general be more advisable to balance power through alliances or other 
means. In this way, war can be deterred.
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Warlords and War
Having seen how Neorealism approaches war, it is possible to address warlords and 
war. The first point to attend to is that even within states, warlords are not fighting 
hierarchic wars. They do exist within host states and this may lead to the assumption 
that they must then be fighting a hierarchic war over control of the state apparatus. 
Furthering this view is that t is not unusual that warlords will profess the goal of 
taking over the state or some other such ‘moral’ pursuit as its primary goal But, as 
Morgenthau rightly remarks, we must not judge plicy by what is said, but what the 
actions are.405 It is common for states to also profess moral foreign policy goals, but 
in fact their actions are clearly concerned with survival first.
The confusion arises because we assume that the juridical borders <f a state 
dictate the type of warfare being fought by an actor. This is not the case however. 
Warlords exist within the state, but are empirically sovereign -  and therefore 
autonomous from the state -  and thus act as any other sovereign, security motivated 
actor should. The implication is that they are fighting wars for survival. Thus while it 
may be an ‘internal war’ in that it is inside of a state, it is still an anarchic war, in that 
it is over security, not control of the state apparatus. This holds true for fragmented 
and collapsed states.
War inside of a fragmented state for warlords is not necessarily about control 
of the state apparatus, rather it is about survival Since the state’s primary motivation 
is to monopolize authority within its borders, it is constantly attempting to destroy 
armed groups. However, the primary motive of warlords is survival and they will use 
war as a means to attain security. This means that there is a constant state of conflict
405 Morgenthau 1993
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between the two incompatible organizations.406 Chapter 6 will discuss such a war in 
the fragmented state of Uganda in more detail.
In collapsed states, the logic is similar. There are multiple warlords, or other 
armed groups, each with a motive to survive. In such a situation, the logic of the 
security dilemma causes the warlords to wage war on each other just as it does in the 
international anarchic system. Similarly, arms races and the inability to balance power 
in general will cause war to break out. Chapter 5 will discuss the warfare situation in 
the collapsed state of Somalia in more detail.
Warlord war inside of fragmented and collapsed states can cross international 
bounds as well. The warlord may compete with a neighboring state. For instance, the 
LRA has fought both Sudan and Uganda -  a topic to be covered in Chapter 6. 
Similarly, an external state may combat a warlord. For example, the UN forces fought 
Somali warlords -  a topic to be covered in Chapter 5.
To summarize, war involving warlords is not only internal, i.e. against a host 
state or external, i.e. against another, external state. Nor is it always against states, it 
may involve other armed groups, or both states and other armed groups. Rather, we 
can call this form of warfare ‘mixed wars’. Mixed wars are wars which have aspects 
of both interstate wars and intrastate wars. They involve non-state armed groups 
fighting against other non-state armed groups or states. This struggle takes places 
within more than one state or involves actors from more than one state in direct ways.
As with states, warlords will use war for conquest -  to gain power -  and to 
weaken a rival. For example, Taylor fought a war in Sierra Leone in order to gain 
territory rich in alluvial diamonds and thereby added to his own economic resources. 
The LRA uses a strate gy of almost continual war with the Ugandan state to weaken it.
406 Even if  the state were to give up its attempt at monopolizing authority, the logic o f the security 
dilemma would still likely lead to conflict.
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Or, during the early years of state collapse in Somalia, warlords attempted to entirely 
defeat their foes in order to rid themselves of rivals. And, as with states, warlords will 
stop fighting wars when it is in their security interests, as for instance, the warlords in 
Somalia have generally been peaceful since the late - 90s.
Nevertheless, aice survival is ensured, warlords may pursue other goals in 
their conflict. If for instance, the warlord is able to effectively defeat the state in its 
territorial area and remove the threat of extinction, he may turn toward the larger goal 
of conquest for other purposes. It is at this point, once the warlord has ensured the 
level of relative power necessary to survive, that we will see him attempt wider 
conquests, such as taking over a state, or in the case of Taylor, running for President. 
In the same way, it is only after assuring safety of its homeland that states will turn to 
conquest for the sake of goals that are not directly security related
Nature of Warlord Way of Warfare
Based on this understanding of warlords and war, it is possible to better understand 
some of the seemingly inexplicable features of the warlord way of warfare -  in 
particular its aggressive, pointless, and savage nature. Some of the usually ascribed 
motives of warlord warfare have already been illustrated, including greed, grievance, 
and barbarism. However, as has been argued the primary explanatory account of 
warlord warfare is given by recourse to the security motive. It is worth illustrating the 
explanation of some of the features of warlord warfare because in many ways war is 
the primary form of international relation that warlords take part in.
Warlord warfare does sometimes differ from state warfare in its extremeness -  
both in terms of continuousness and orientation toward conquest. In particular, unlike 
states, warlords are almost continually fighting wars, thus giving us their moniker.
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Since warlords are a continual threat to the state, they must continually fight war. This 
leads to an intensification of the security dilemma and thereby to continuous war. This 
incessant fighting is amplified because warlords rely on warfare to gain resources, 
motivate personnel, and retain cohesion. As discussed above, warlord’s means for 
maintaining autonomy involve predatory actions such as the capture of civilians in 
order to replenish numbers or looting in order to gain economic means. War for 
conquest will therefore be a continuing need of the warlord. This ‘warlord paradox’ -  
i.e. that the warlord must fight wars but wars threaten the survival of the organization 
and therefore should be avoided -  cannot be avoided by the warlord, but only 
mitigated by attempting to fight wars against the weakest opponents possible.
Warlords also seem to fight protracted, ‘pointless’ wars, often with no chance 
of taking over control of the state. To outside observers it seems that the warlord 
fights for no reason since it is obvious that he cannot ‘win’ and take over the state. 
Some even come to believe that the warlord continues fighting solely to inflict 
suffering on the local population. The assumption in this view is that he should 
attempt to defeat the state because that is what internal war is all about.
However, the logic of the warlord way of warfare is clear when it is 
understood that the warlord fights wars for the same reason as states. In warlord 
warfare we should expect to see protracted conflicts which seem to be pointless. For, 
the warlord is not fighting to take over the state, but rather is attempting to keep a 
status quo, i.e. their own continued survival For instance, Somali warlords 
continually undermine any peace agreement or state-building measure through 
sporadic, but continual, fighting. This is to be expected because continual war is 
central to their survival. If peace were to come to the state, they would likely be
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defeated by a more powerful state army and thereby lose their fiefdom -  this is a point 
which will be revisited in Chapter 5.
At the same time, the warlord may turn to propaganda which makes it seem as 
if he is fighting for a purpose, however, this propaganda is actually being 
instrumentally used for security enhancing purposes. For instance, the warlord may 
adopt an deology of anti-communism to ensure external backing. More commonly, 
the warlord will maintain the rhetorical goal of overthrowing the state as a method of 
ensuring the loyalty of members of the warlord organization or in order to obtain 
resources from external supporters. The warlord may even believe his own 
propaganda. Or the warlord may begin his war for grievance reasons, but soon realize, 
as Stalin did in regard to the Soviet Union, that the only way to ensure that goals are 
carried out is the first ensure the survival of the group. As Stalin remarked, “[w]e can 
and must build socialism in the [Soviet Union]. But in order to do so we first of all 
have to exist.”407
It is also not surprising that the warlord conflicts take such a heavy toll on the 
local population. The warlord is not like the traditional guerilla, he does not need the 
local populations support to survive nor does he necessarily hope to take over the state 
one-day and thereby come to rely on popular support. The warlord political 
community also considers itself separate from the local political community and 
therefore does not have any moral responsibility for its protection. These two factors 
leave little to block the warlord organization from fighting a ‘dirty war’.408
There are also positive reasons for a warlord to turn to the use of rampart 
destruction and preying on civilians. For instance, fear is a force multiplier for those
407 Joseph Stalin, cited in Mearsheimer 2001: 31
408 I.e. a war in which conspicuous atrocity and fear are used to bring about goals. See Nordstrom 1992 
and Vinci 2005
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fighting asymmetric conflicts.409 For example, conspicuous atrocity can make control 
of the civilian population easier and lead to combat ineffectiveness in the rival army. 
With little to hold them back from using such tactics, the intelligent warlord will turn 
to the strategy that best ensures his goal of survival, whether or not it adheres to 
abstract moral precepts of a Western ideology to which he is not likely educated in 
nor particularly attached to. Hence, from this perspective, the barbaric violence which 
we associate with warlords is completely logical and, in fact, expected.
The LRA provides a good example cf the logic in action. The LRA has been 
fighting a conflict in northern Uganda since 1987, but it is generally accepted that the 
LRA has absolutely no chance of defeating the Ugandan army. Yet, the LRA 
continues to fight on. It can continually fight the much larger Ugandan army because 
it uses fear to multiply its forces.410 At the same time it has no popular support from 
the local Acholi population due to the horrible atrocities it has regularly committed on 
the Acholi people over the last two decades. But it can continue to fight because it has 
developed a system of abduction and initiation to ‘recruit’ new members from the 
Acholi people and uses extensive looting to obtain material needs.
Thus, the generally aggressive, pointless, and savage nature of warbrdism -  in 
many ways its defining features -  is explicable in terms of anarchic war. Warlords are 
pursuing security, just as states are. However, for the warlord, the pursuit of security 
involves fighting a type of warfare which is by necessity: more aggressive, in that it is 
by definition a threat; more predatory, in order to obtain necessary goods and 
personnel; and more savage, in order to overcome asymmetries, than that fought by 
states. Nevertheless, warlord warfare and state warfare are essentially the same. In 
both cases the actors are pursuing security and incompatible goals in a strategic
409 See Vinci 2005 for an example of the LRA’s strategic use of fear.
4,0 Ibid
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manner.411 Therefore war, as with other types of relations such as alliances, is an 
expected relation of warlords, which can be analyzed using a Neorealist approach.
CONCLUSION
Chapter 3 made the argument that Neorealist approach and its conceptual tools could 
be applied to warlords. This chapter built on that basis and applied the approach to 
warlords. The theory of Neorealism was examined in detail. First it was demonstrated 
how warlords could fit into a Neorealist framework. This involved demonstrating how 
the Neorealist approach could be applied to warlords because they fulfilled the criteria 
detailed in Chapter 3. In practice, it meant comparing the standard version of 
Neorealism to a warlord version point for point. For each point, it was demonstrated 
that it made sense to apply it to warlords, in that it could describe and explain their 
actions.
Doing this made it possible to answer the thesis question of this study. It was 
found that warlords relate with states and other international actors in essentially the 
same way as states -  they seek to ensure their survival through the balance of power. 
Specifically, they relate in terms of internal power cultivation, alliances, and war.
The details of what this answer means were then explored. This meant 
examining the constituent concepts of Neorealism, including:
• Internal power cultivation through obtaining and using resources and cohesion 
building
• Arms race
• Alliance
• Hard and soft balancing
411 This can count as an argument against calling warlord warfare ‘new war’ or otherwise qualifying it 
against state war in some way.
• Diplomacy and the demonstration of power
• Security dilemma
• Security dilemma intensifiers
• Predatory motives and the security dilemma
• Hierarchic war, and
• Anarchic war
Each concept of Neorealism was identified, examined, and then compared point for 
point to what a warlord version looks like. Apparent differences in warlord versus 
state versions of the concept were also examined.
In total, this provided an overview of the specific kinds of patterned 
relationships which we can expect warlords to take part in. These specific 
relationships can be taken as a more detailed answer to the thesis question. As the 
concepts do for states, they explain the types of relationships that a warlord will enter 
into with states and other international actors, depending on the circumstances.
More than just answering the thesis question, this examination has addressed 
the broader issue of integrating warlords into our understanding of international 
politics. Neorealism, of course, applies to states and now that it has been 
demonstrated how it applies to warlords, they too can be integrated into a Neorealist 
model of interstate relations. Consequently we are able to obtain a systemic level 
model of the relationships between warlords and other warlords as well as warlords 
and states or related actors. This point will be returned to in Chapter 7.
This chapter provided some examples of how the theory applies to warlords, 
but it has not met the testing requirements detailed in Chapter 1. For each concept of 
Neorealism, when it was applied to warlords, a case example was usually provided. 
However, in Chapter 1, a method for demonstrating the validity of the theory was
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detailed. This involves first inferring hypotheses, applying the theory, and then 
assessing to what degree the theoretical expectations conformed to and explained 
observations.
The following two chapters will do just that and test to what degree the 
application of the Neorealist approach to describe and explain warlord international 
relations is valid. The case studies will examine specific warlords, describe their 
actions, and test the validity of the use of a Neorealist approach to analyze warlords. 
The structure of these case studies will be as such: first the definition and 
conceptualization of warlord provided in Chapter 2 will be applied to specific 
warlords in order to examine whether they are in fact warlords. This will also serve as 
a test of the value of the definition and conceptualization by determining its ability to 
explain the nature of particular warlords. Then the international relations of the 
warlords will be illustrated and explained with a Neorealist account. The validity of 
the theoretical account will be tested in its ability to conform to hypotheses and to 
explain the warlord’s relations. The first case study will examine Somali warlords and 
the second will look at the relations of the LRA.
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CHAPTER 5 -  CASE STUDY: WARLORDS IN SOMALIA
The intent of this case study is to both illustrate and test the theoretical approach 
developed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 and thereby to validate the answer to the thesis 
question. I  will use the definition and conceptualization of warlordism developed in 
Chapter 2 to analyze the seemingly similar armed groups in Somalia and thereby both 
illustrate its use and demonstrate its value for analysis. Then the chapter will 
demonstrate the use of the Neorealist approach to analyze the international relations 
of warlords in Somalia and thereby validate it as a theory for the analysis of the 
international relations of warlords.
This chapter will begin by giving a brief overview of the collapse of the 
Somali state. It will then demonstrate that the state is indeed an anarchic system. In 
addition, the chronological boundaries of this anarchic system will be illustrated.
The chapter will then move on to examine the various armed groups in 
Somalia in order to determine which groups are warlords and which are not. This is 
necessary because in many instances all armed groups in post-state collapse Somalia 
are simply lumped together as warlords, when in fact there is significant 
differentiation. This differentiation is important because warlords can be expected to 
follow the logic of units in a Neorealist framework, while other groups may or may 
not. The concepts developed in Chapters 2 and 3 will be used to make the 
comparisons.
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Specifically, five different types of armed groups in Somalia will be described, 
compared, and contrasted using the operationalized definition of Chapter 2. These 
include:
• faction militias,
• warlords,
• business militias,
• court militias, and
• Islamic militias.
A broad description of the various actors will lead to the observation about whether a 
political community exists and if so, what its nature is. The second step in defining 
which ipecific armed groups are warlord organizations is to document whether the 
group is autonomous and independent from the state. Since Somalia is a collapsed 
state -  i.e. there is no central state apparatus to speak of -  the description of autonomy 
is largely unnecessary. The independence of armed groups will be examined in 
relation to their means of obtaining personnel and equipment. Finally, the purpose and 
motivation of Somali armed groups will be examined. From this analysis we can 
objectively determine which actors in Somalia are warlords. The value of the 
definition and conceptualization of warlords presented in this paper will be based on 
the degree to which it is able to differentiate the diverse armed groups and explain 
their actions.
The second part of this chapter will test the validity of the use of a Neorealist 
approach for analyzing warlords by examining their international relations. In 
particular, the chapter will single out two external actors with which warlords in 
Somalia have had relations -  the UN intervention forces and Ethiopia. It is found that 
an effective way to model the intervention of UN forces into Somalia, and their
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subsequent relations with warlords, is as an anarchic war between Somali warlords 
and the UN forces. Secondly, the Ethiopian-SNF alliance, especially in regard to the 
joint attack on al Ittihad, will be explored. It is found that in fact the situation is best 
described in terms of the balance of power.
The validity of the use of a Neorealist approach will be based on its ability to 
explain the relations of warlords in Somalia in relation to hypotheses of how warlords 
should act if the theory were to be true. There are several hypotheses that will be 
tested These include:
• Somali warlords should be more concerned with the survival of the 
organization than with other factors, such as grievances against particular 
actors.
• War should be over survival, rather than control of the state.
• Conflict between warlords and other actors should be characterized as 
anarchic war, not law enforcement or hierarchic war over control of the state 
apparatus.
• When there are two or more actors present, both of which are upholding their 
security interests, the security dilemma should ensue, creating a spiral 
dynamic of conflict-preparedness and, eventually, a balance of power through 
internal power cultivation, alliance, or war.
• Warlords should make or break alliances based on security interests over all 
other factors.
As will be demonstrated, all of these hypotheses do apply to Somali warlord 
relations. As such, the chapter will make the case that the Neorealist approach is 
useful in analyzing the international relations of warlords in Somalia in that it
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describes the observed relations of Somali warlords and provides some explanation of 
these relations.
HISTORY AND CONTEXT
The first step in this examination will be to present a brief overview of the history of 
Somalia which led up to the collapse of the state. This will lead to a description of the 
nature of the conflict. Lastly, the social context of Somali society will be examined 
before moving on to the examination of the categories of armed groups which have 
arisen in Somalia since the state’s collapse.
Historical Background
The beginning of the end might be traced back to then Somali President Siad Barre’s 
decision to fight a war of the state against Ethiopia to reclaim the Somali Ogaden 
region of Ethiopia. Initially the war seemed to be succeeding, but the Soviet Union 
switched its backing from Somalia to the new communist Ethiopian government and 
Somalia was defeated in 1978. This defeat can be seen as lying at the la art of the 
fracturing in Barre’s dictatorial control over Somalia.
While Barre had attempted to eliminate clanism under his ‘Scientific 
Socialism’ program, it reemerged after the Somali defeat.412 Under Scientific 
Socialism, clan was roughly equated with class and therefore needed to be erased. A 
notable tactic of Barre was to create clan militias by arming them and then manipulate 
them into targeting rival clans.413 He did this with, amongst others, the Hawiye/Sa’ad
4,2 Lewis 1994
413 In general, Barre used patronage as his central ruling strategy. His ability to control access to 
economic opportunity, especially from foreign assistance, allowed him to keep clan elders and other 
potential elites beholden to him. (Reno 2003) Beyond patrimonial linkages, Barre also used 
manipulation of clan competition through his “MOD” regime -  Marehan, his clan, Ogaden, his wife’s, 
and Dulbahante, that o f his son-in-law, cum head of national security.
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against the Majerten/Umar Mahumud, the Dulbahante against the Isaaq/Habar Ja’lao, 
the Gadabuursi against the Isaaq/Sa’ad Muuse, the Harti of Kismaayo against the 
Ogaden, and the Majeerteen against the Isaaq.414 Mark Bradbury sums up the 
devolution of the Somali government after its defeat by Ethiopia
in response to the internal insurgencies that emerged after the defeat in 
the Ogaden, the Barre regime became increasingly autocratic and 
corrupt. Rather than providing protection, the state became a means of 
repression... Clanism increasingly became the main source of 
patronage and protection. The responses of those excluded from the 
regime’s patronage networks were to move outside the state and its 
formal economy, further undermining the legitimacy of the state and
415its institutions.
The excluded did not just leave the formal economy; they also went outside of 
the state’s monopolization of the use of legitimate force and attempted to take part in 
politics with private sources of violence. There was a failed coup attempt by the 
Majeerteen in 1978. After the failed coup attempt, two main factions formed to 
combat Barre. The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) was formed out of the 
regrouped coup plotters. It was based in Ethiopia, but was also backed by Qadhafi. 
Later, the Somali National Movement (SNM), which was largely Isaaq clan based, 
formed because of the long-term exclusion of northerners from the southern 
dominated Somali state apparatus. The SNM found its economic support from the 
large Isaaq diaspora and, later, from the Ethiopian army.
414Compagnon 1998
415 Bradbury 2003: 12
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The SNM and SSDF were destabilizing forces for Barre. At the same time he 
continued support of the Ogadeni Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), which 
caused persistent trouble for Ethiopia. In 1988, Barre and Ethiopian President 
Mengistu Haile Mariam signed a peace accord and Ethiopia stopped supporting the 
SNM and SSDF. When the Ethiopia government withdrew support from the SNM, it 
made a last ditch effort to defeat Barre.
A third faction, the United Somali Congress (USC) also joined the fight 
against Barre. This faction was made up of Abgaal clansmen, from Mogadishu, and 
Habar Gidir, led by the former General Mohammed Farah Aidid. Barre’s response 
was to call on the Darod to kill Hawiye in Mogadishu. Eventually he began using 
artillery on them, at an extremely high cost in human life. This promoted a general 
uprising against the government.416 The SNM, SSDF, and USC pressure on Barre, 
combined with the general uprising, led to the regime’s fall.
The collapse of the Somali state can be traced back to January 27, 1991, when 
Barre fled Mogadishu. At this point the remnants of the infrastructure of the Somali 
state, at least that which was not already looted by Barre, was looted by the occupying 
militias and people of Mogadishu. In particular, much of the government’s arms 
stores were looted. Whatever civil servants and other representatives of government 
who had not already fled did so then. Revenge killings of Darod clansmen, and to a 
certain extent all non-Hawiye, also occurred.
After the state’s collapse, an Abgaal/Hawiye businessman, Ali Mahdi, was 
installed as president. The Isaaqs, who felt that they lost the most in the war did not 
accept the presidency and eventually formed Somaliland in the northwest. The SSDF 
went on to control the northeast and eventually formed the autonomous region of
416 Lewis 1994
222
Puntland. Aidid, who chased Barre out of Mogadishu, did not accept Mahdi’s rule 
either and after a USC party congress, was elected USC chair.417 Tensions rose from 
late 1991, and soon Mogadishu collapsed into interclan fighting.418
Immediately after the collapse the Somali state there occurred significant 
maneuvering of clans and occupations of new positions throughout Somalia. Barre 
fled to Gedo and formed the SNF. The Hawiye, divided between the Abgaal and 
Habar Gidir subclans, came to control much of Mogadishu, which was formally a 
multi-clan area.
Anarchic System
At the point of state collapse and fracturing of the factions, the Somali situation 
became different from other African civil war contexts. In other conflicts, the state 
was generally taken over by one of the factions. However, in the Somalia-case, no 
faction was able to hold and retain the sovereignty of the state. Rather, the situation 
transformed into a series of skirmishes between different militias. The eminent Somali 
scholar, I. M. Lewis sums it up well:
In 1991/92, reactively influenced by the example of the SSDF, the 
SNM, USC and SPM, the general tendency was for every major 
Somali clan to form its own militia movement. Thus clans were 
becoming effectively self-governing entities throughout the Somali 
region as they carved out spheres of influence in a process which, with 
the abundance of modem weapons, frequently entailed savage battles
417 Aidid would go on to form alliances with other southern factions and this militia would become 
known as the Somali National Alliance (SNA).
418 The immense destruction o f the years of fighting combined with the starvation of the Somali people 
led to a UN intervention in Somalia to protect the humanitarian aid workers attempting to feed the 
population in 1992. The intervention will be covered in more detail below.
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with a high toll of civilian casualties. The political geography of the 
Somali hinterland in 1992, consequently, closely resembled that 
reported by European explorers in the 19th century, spears replaced by 
Kalashnikovs and bazookas. These clan areas could only be entered or 
traversed by outsiders (people of other clans, foreigners), with the 
consent of the locals and, usually the payment of appropriate fees or 
‘protection’.419
In fact, it has been noted that since the collapse of the state, fighting has broken out 
between all clan groups.420 Within this context, different types of armed groups 
formed in order to represent their interests in an anarchic environment, i.e. one in 
which there was no hierarchy of power or central law-enforcer. However, this is not to 
say that the situation became a featureless Hobbesian anarchy.
The armed groups and warlords in Somalia created a structural change -  from 
a hierarchical system to an anarchic one. These armed groups removed the state 
apparatus which ha d been able to structure relationships in Somalia. Now, each group 
demanded that it be treated as an equal authority. Disagreements could not be solved 
through recourse to the state, but rather each group could only turn to itself for 
security. Eventually the groups ceased fighting over the control of the state apparatus 
altogether. As such, it was an anarchic (self help) system by definition.
Furthermore, this anarchic system was open to the international anarchic 
system. The armed groups and warlords crossed borders into Kenya and Ethiopia as 
they willed, only being stopped by a show of force by one of these states. Other states 
also crossed into the hitherto Somali state borders as they willed. These included the
419 Lewis 1994: 231
420 Issa-Salwe 1994
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United Nations intervention forces and the Ethiopian state. Both of these examples 
will be discussed below.
Extent o f Anarchy
The relative degree of anarchy has fluctuated over time in Somalia. The hierarchic 
system of the Somali state began to transform in the late 1980s as the state began to 
fail and forced actors to represent their own interests. The civil war, which lasted until 
1991, was a traditional hierarchic civil war in that the means of controlling the state 
was being fought over. It was only after the state collapsed completely and Barre fled 
Mogadishu that it became clear to the actors that control of hierarchical state 
apparatus was unlikely. Even then, there were still battles over the ‘rightful’ leader of 
the state, and the ongoing battles between various factions of the Abgaal and Habr 
Gidir clans might be characterized as such. However, from this point, actors began to 
treat the system as more anarchic than hierarchic in the sense that actors fought less 
for a ‘state’ to control and more for local cities and resources, and even more 
pertinently, survival against other predatory actors.
Periodically since 1991, peace processes have been attempted in Somalia. 
Examples of these peace processes have included the Cairo Peace Conference and the 
First and Second Djibouti Peace Conferences, as well as various UN funded peace 
processes and conferences before, during, and after the intervention. Sometimes, 
warlords and other armed groups in Somalia have attempted to use their military 
ability on the ground in Somalia to influence these attempts at rebuilding a state. For 
example, an actor might attempt to control a specific city in order to convince others 
that he represented a constituency, and thereby gain a seat at the bargaining table. 
Such activities are in a sense fighting over the control of state sovereignty.
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These attempts at a peace process, and thereby the tendency for the anarchic 
system to act like a hierarchic one, have climaxed over the last few years with the 
creation of the Transitional National Government (TNG). The TNG las begun to 
dominate political calculations of many of the actors and thereby in a convoluted 
sense, has meant that actors are fighting over control of the sovereign state. The 
implication is that consequently the system is somehow less anarchic.
This dynamic is of course not complete, as Somalia is still not a state and the 
‘government’ does not actually reside in Somalia; nor is there a sovereign capable of 
monopolizing authority. However, it does seem that a system change is occurring. 
Most battles that occur now are aimed at creating or obstructing the national 
government. For example, by 2002, battles were occurring in Mogadishu between the 
groups who backed the TNG and those who back the anti-TNG Somalia 
Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC).421 More recently, battles have 
erupted over whether Mogadishu should be the location of the TNG when it moves 
from Nairobi.
In the spring and summer of 2006, Somalia experienced another powerful 
change in the nature of the system. The Islamic courts and their militias combined 
into the Union of Islamic Courts. This group defeated an alliance of warlords, known 
as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism, and now threatens 
the TNG.422 This situation is still extremely fluid and poorly understood, as such it 
will not be addressed in this chapter.
These then are the boundaries of the anarchic system. The Somali state faded 
and finally collapsed in the civil war. As this was occurring the leftover actors began 
to treat the system as anarchic, not hierarchic. Eventually international actors came to
421 BBC 28 May 2002
422 BBC 11 July 2006 and New York Time 13 May 2006
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also see the system as anarchic. The UN intervened, as did Ethiopia. State building 
measures attempted to recreate the hierarchic system. While they failed and there is 
still no state-wide sovereign to speak of, there has been a tendency toward hierarchy 
again. Therefore, while it is possible to isolate the systemic relations of warlord actors 
in Somalia during most of this extended time period, the most straightforward time 
period to focus on is between the end of the civil war and the creation of the TNG.
Waltz demands that systems either be hierarchic or anarchic and the Somali 
system should be considered anarchic, at least within the boundaries noted in the 
previous section. There is no dominating government in Somalia and there has not 
been one since 1991. The collapse of the Somali state left multiple units in place and 
these units interacted as equals, without a higher authority. In particular, these actors 
have had to provide for their own security, thus making Somalia a self help system. 
Together, the interactions of these actors have served to create and continually renew 
the anarchic system. In short, Somalia is a system that a Neorealist approach applies 
to. The next question to ask is wha t are the units in the in the anarchic system and 
which actors were warlords.
Social Background
In order to understand how armed groups, and warlords in particular, have evolved in 
the Somali context, it is first necessary to appreciate the nature of the Somali clan 
system. Somalis identify themselves by lineages, or clans, which are segmented based 
on six clan families that break down into various sub-clan units, all the way to the 
individual.423 Clans are led by elders who are responsible for negotiation and dispute 
mediation.
423 These clans are the Darod, Isaaq, Dir, Hawiye, Rahanwein, and Digil.
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An overlaid social unit is the diya-paying unit, composed of close relatives 
who contract to pay (or receive) blood-money, or diya, if one of the members of the 
group kills an individual from or raids the resources of another group.424 The diya 
process is used as a method conflict resolution, short of revenge killings, and requires 
clan elders to negotiate a payment in return for the crime 425 Clans can also interact in 
peaceful ways through xeer, a set of customary laws. The laws are precedent based 
and passed down through oral transmission, within and between units.426 Like 
international regimes, xeer establishes norms and obligations, but does not represent 
enforceable laws.
In Somalia, political entrepreneurs, in general, must mobilize different 
segments of the clan system to support them. The mobilization can be based on 
proximity of relation, or they may mobilize less related groups to align against an 
opponent.427 Clans might also form alliances with related clans in order to counter the 
perceived power of a rival clan (which will also have its own alliances).
Inversely, factions may form for two reasons. Because segmentation 
possibilities are endless within the Somali kinship system, there is ample room for 
factionalization based on the needs of the clan. Factionalization is also possible, 
however, based on the choice of particular political entrepreneurs who make then- 
own rational choice. For example, this seems to have been the case with Usman Ato,
498who split with Mohammed Aidid in 1994.
As noted above, while clans joined together to fight the Somali government, 
roughly equivalent to the Darod clan controlled by then Barre, after the collapse of the
424 Lewis 1988
425 Menkhaus 2000
426 Ibid.
427 Referred to as gashaanbur in pastoral society, in which small lineages ally against a large lineage. 
(Compagnon 1998)
428 Copagnon 1998
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Somali state there was a process of factionalization which occurred within the major 
clan factions. As Ken Menkhaus noted, since 1992 there has been a “devolution of 
warfare to lower and lower levels of clan lineages.”429 In particular, there has been 
significant intra-clan fighting amongst the sub-clans of the Hawiye and Darod clans. 
This has led to a vertical multiplication of separate armed groups.
SOMALI ARMED GROUPS
Along with the multiplication in factions, there has also been a lateral growth in the 
types of armed groups in Somalia since the civil war.430 Briefly: with the collapse of 
the state, the clan or ‘faction’ militias became the security providers and, often, the 
political representatives of the clans. However, some of the militia leaders were able 
to gain independence from the clan, thereby using the militias to represent then- 
personal interests, as such they became warlords. Since the mid-90s, businessmen 
have started their own armed militias to defend their business interests. These militias 
have sometimes been outsourced to the shari’a courts that have formed throughout 
Somalia. Related to the shari’a court militias are Islamist militias such as al Ittihad 
While these categories can overlap, and one will often evolve into another, the 
typology is a valuable conceptual framework with which to make comparisons.
The specific type of armed group that we are interested in are warlords, 
however, it is valuable to compare and contrast to identify real differences in goals 
and structural organization between these groups which can lead to different 
behaviors. Furthermore, by contrasting the different groups, the conceptualization of 
warlord presented in Chapters 2 and 3 will be tested in its ability to make comparisons 
between like actors and to explain the behavior of warlords in Somalia. This
429 Menkhaus 2003: 20
430 This following typology is loosely based on WSP 2004. Also see Vinci 2006b
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comparison will be based on the concepts developed in previous chapters, including: 
political community, C3 and governance, autonomy, independence, and purpose 
(motivation).
Political Community
Somali armed groups can be initially defined by their constituency. Since the Somali 
state is collaps ed, all security is private in nature. Different groups within society have 
created armed groups in order to provide for their security. The following section will 
describe the constituencies which the different armed groups represent and give some 
idea of how and why the armed groups formed.
Faction militias
Faction militias are the most prominent type of Somali armed group. These militias 
are formed along clan lines and within the clan structure. They represent the clan’s 
political aspirations and defend its territory Daniel Compagnon notes that clan-based 
armed groups naturally formed in Somalia during the 1980s when armed groups, such 
as the SNM and SSDF, were forming to combat Barre’s government.431 He also gives 
an idea of why this occurred, noting that the clan-based nilitia organization was 
easier
given the lack of resources (both money and weapons), the unit size 
requirement of guerilla warfare, and the difficulty of giving military
431 Compagnon 1998
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training to individualistic camel herders, it was more efficient to opt 
for a military structure based on kinship segmentation.432
Faction militias are typically composed, firstly, of a ‘warleader’ who is the 
direct military commander of the militia and a representative of the clan. The 
warleader is assigned by the clan elders to lead the militia, but while he commands the 
fighters, they are still loyal to the clan. The tradeoff for the faction warleader is that he 
is completely dependent on the clan, without its backing the fighters might simply 
quit fighting for him. This provides the clan with leverage that can be used to control 
the warleader’s actions. The warleader’s ability to please the clan is based on his 
fulfillment of hs duties to provide protection and uphold its interests as well as to 
provide it with spoils. Failure to do so may result in his abandonment. In this way we 
can see the bond between the warleader, militia, and clan. Yet, the bond goes both 
ways, for even though in stable periods, warleaders are typically not very popular, 
during periods of conflict, the clan will turn to them for help, for “the clan feel[s] that 
they are their savior.. .because they command the firepower.”433
Below the warleader there is a smaller group of permanent, trained officers 
and soldiers, who are under his direct control. Further down is a larger group of 
unpaid irregulars. These men voluntarily enlist and make up the bulk of its forces. 
Similar to conventional reserve systems, they are called up to fight and then can 
demobilize back to civilian life. Thus, faction militias are closest to what we think of 
as true militias in that they are the temporary armed extension of a larger civilian 
political community.
432 Ibid.: 77
433 Interview, UN Source, Nairobi, 30 March 2005
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Even though the warleader may be a representative of the clan and the 
different constituencies, at times, there is a clear difference between the motives and 
actions of the warleaders and the clan elders. This is often apparent in international or 
UN based peace negotiations. For instance, Menkhaus describes an episode which 
occurred during the Jubaland Peace Accord of 1993 in which the Ogadeni clan elders 
broke ranks with the Ogadeni militia leader, Colonel Omar Jess.434
Warlords
In some instances, a warleader may become independent of the clan and control a 
militia without being connected to the clan’s social and economic structure. Such men 
are warlords 435 In most cases, militias exist on a continuum with a mixture of clan 
and personal loyalty. However, in extreme cases, a warleader may come to 
completely monopolize the loyalty of fighters and use the militia for non-clan based 
ambitions. In other instances, a warlord may simply create his own personal militia 
without benefit of the clan, though such warlord organizations are typically much 
smaller.
The warlord breaks off from the greater clan community, but another enclosed 
political community forms. This political community is made up of those who are 
members of the warlord organization and look to the warlord as the sole source of 
authority. Though most individuals in Somalia come from one clan or another, and 
therefore might be expected to be tied to a clan’s political community, this is not 
always the case. Many individuals have broken ranks with the clan and lose all or
434 Menkhaus 2000
435 Hussein Adam (1992) may have been the first analyst to describe the emerging political-military 
actors in Somalia as ‘warlords’. He did this based on a comparison with the analysis o f warlords in 
Chad, put forth by Charlton and May. (Charlton and May 1989)
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most of their loyalty to it. These men, the ‘ mooryaan ’, will be discussed in more 
detail below.
The warlord organization is completely praetorian in nature since it does not 
have any civilian community. This is unlike the faction militia, which is an off-shoot 
of a larger, civilian political community. Thus, while the structure of a warlord militia 
may be similar to that of a faction militia, its directive will differ. It will be driven by 
the interests of the warlord and warlord organization rather than clan benefit.436
Business Militias
Initially, businessmen funded factions and warlords, but, as the conflict progressed, 
this was found to be a losing investment. For example, the two main factions 
controlling Mogadishu in the 1990s, like other factions, received backing from 
businessmen. However, these administrations never put in place the security and 
predictability which businessmen needed and they began to lose money on their 
‘investment’. More generally, security was not always adequate, especially for an 
economy based on services and cross-regional and cross-border trade.437 Clearly, 
more order and security was needed to promote commerce.
For these reasons, many businessmen dropped their support for other types of 
armed groups, including faction militias and warlords, in the late 1990s.438 Thereafter, 
businessmen directly employed freelance militiamen, along the same militia structure 
outlined above, but with the businessman himself as the warleader. The businessman
436 This process o f ‘warlord formation’ may be generalizeable to other instances o f warlord formation. 
For example, a similar process seems to have happened in Afghanistan and to a degree in Tajikistan. 
However, as noted in the introduction, this study is only focused on relations, and therefore will not 
pursue this point. A next step in research might be to apply this logic o f warlord formation more 
systematically and integrate it into the theoretical approach presented in this study.
437 For instance, livestock trading is a lucrative profession in Somalia. In order to move livestock to the 
border for export it is necessary to “negotiate multiple agreements with communities and militias to 
insure safe passage across vast expanses of territory.” (Little 2003: 152)
438 ICG 2002
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might also outsource this role to another experienced person. The militia members 
might be drawn in whole or part from the businessman’s clan, h  some cases the 
businessmen formed coalitions in order to accomplish militia formation and
439management.
Unlike the faction militia or warlord, the businessman’s militia does not have 
a political community. The armed group is more similar to a private military company 
(PMC). Individuals are paid to protect the interests of the businessman. Yet, the men 
still exist within another political community, usually a clan.
Court and Islamist militias
Often the businessmen outsourced their militia to the shari’a courts which have 
emerged in Somalia.440 The courts were established in Mogadishu and elsewhere to 
provide some order through a shari’a law system. They were financed in exchange for 
maintaining social stability and providing (public) protection services. These services 
range from relations with factions like the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) to 
clearing the road from Mogadishu to Merka.441
Related to the court militias are Islamist militias, in particular, the 
fundamentalist organization al Ittihad which has maintained militias at various points 
since 1991. Al Ittihad has controlled areas including Merka and Kismaayo and the 
town of Luuq in the Gedo region.442 While they are organized like other types of 
militias, al Ittihad represents a religious group and in general bases its support on 
religion rather than clan or other factors, such as clan. Though the group initially
439 The effects o f these coalitions were to make cross-regional and cross-border travel easier, thereby 
stimulating the economy via trade with Ethiopia and Kenya. This process served as reinforcement, 
adding to the businessmen’s wealth and the power of their militias.
440 Menkhaus 2003
441 UNDP 2001
442 Menkhaus 2002
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functioned like faction militias, i.e. looking to control territory, more recently they 
have switched their strategy to focus on controlling courts.443
Like a businessman’s militia, the court militia does not have a political 
community. It also is simply a privately hired group of individuals who are loyal to 
some other group. Al Ittihad is different, however, in that there is a political 
community. There is a membership based organization and the men in al Ittihad, at 
least those nearer the top of the organization, belong to it and feel loyal to it.
Warlord Separation from Society
The previous analysis of armed groups in Somalia was based on ideal types.444 In 
reality, there is more of a continuum amongst the different types. It is often clear that 
a warlord is separate from the state, especially in stateless Somalia. A more subtle 
distinction is necessary, however, when attempting to clarify whether an armed group 
is separate from society. In Somalia, the problem is particularly acute because of the 
ubiquity of the clan.
The difference between warlords and faction militias in particular can be 
subtle because of the issue of clan. This can sometimes make drawing the line 
between a true warlord and a warleader a political issue. The problem is compounded 
by the fact that it is never possible to completely divorce armed groups from clans and 
clan politics entirely. Rather, it is degree which differentiates warlords from faction 
militias in Somalia. This should not be taken to deny the ability of the 
conceptualization to classify group, but rather, it merely reflects reality. It will be
443 Ibid.
444 By this I refer to Weber’s notion of lie ideal type, which “isolates those variables central to the 
study of a problem, putting aside those aspects o f the reality which seem inessential to the analysis.” 
(Engerman 2000: 258)
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helpful to examine a specific example of the evolution of a faction militia into a 
warlord and the differences that can be expected between the two.
The SNF is a fairly typical example of a warlord organization which evolved 
from a faction militia. Initially the SNF was a clan-based, faction militia. As a United 
Nations Development Office for Somalia (UNDOS) report points out, “its primary 
role was as a militia for the Marehan clan, to protect the clan territory from external 
threat and to project Marehan force beyond Gedo region.”445 It also seemed concerned 
with representing the clan’s interests in the UN backed national reconciliation 
process.
Eventually the SNF came to represent only its own interests. The real aim 
became not to represent the clan, but for the group to maintain their autonomous 
status and beyond this, for the militia’s leadership to “secure for themselves an 
attractive place at the table in a revived government in Mogadishu.”446 If the SNF 
truly wanted to represent the interests of the clan it would have worked for local 
peace. Even though the SNF continued to maintain that it was simply the militia of the 
SNF community, it is clear from an objective point of view that it was more 
concerned with non-clan goals.
An example of its service to itself over the clan is described in reference to the 
SNF’s actions during the humanitarian aid operation in the Gedo region by the UN. 
The SNF diverted most of the food and other aid which was aimed at the victims of 
the ongoing famine in the region. They looted villagers and took cuts of the food aid 
from the source ty charging high fees for protection to the convoys, as well as high
445 UNDOS 1998:91
446 Ibid.: 91
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rental rates for compounds and equipment, “taxes” on ports etc.447 A UN report notes 
that
[i]n no instances is there any evidence that [the SNF] initiate[d] any 
program of response for the famine victims. On the contrary, there is 
ample evidence that they were responsible for the conditions 
provoking famine, and that they viewed famine relief as an economic 
opportunity -  and, by extension, perceived famine victims as an 
economic asset.448
This is clearly warlord behavior, as it demonstrates the organization’s separation from 
society and orientation toward its own survival Thus, we should conclude that while 
the SNF clearly began with and maintained clan connections, it was a warlord 
organization.
C3 and Governance
The major difference between warlords and the other types of armed groups is that for 
the member of the warlord organization, C3 is governance, whereas members of other 
groups must answer to civil and cultural governance structures. In particular, the 
members of a faction militia are still loyal to the clan. The clan provides over-arching 
law to its members, which flows down from the clan elders and is based on traditional 
rules, such as the diya system. Both the court and business militias are also connected 
with the clan to the degree that they rely on clan-law for structure. Islamic militias
447 Ibid.
448
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also have their own governance system, but it is not praetorian in nature, as there is a 
strong civilian component.
This governance structure overrides any command system by militia leaders as 
militia fighters are voluntary. It makes the militias very undisciplined The reason 
being that discipline, especially execution, would fall under the traditional system of 
diya, in which grievances must be restituted for harm or loss and is therefore not 
frequently practiced.
The warlord organization, on the other hand, is completely governed through 
C3. The warlord’s orders are the laws of the warlord organization. The commands of 
the clan leaders have very little sway over the mooryaan who make up the majority of 
warlord organizations. Moreover, since the warlord’s power over the members of the 
warlord organization is based on patronage, command itself may break down if 
payment is not forthcoming. Nonetheless, when there is payment or other benefits, the 
fighters are loyal to the warlord and can be governed (i.e. commanded) effectively 
enough to function as a cohesive unit.
Purpose
In the stateless society of post-collapse Somalia, the state no longer serves its purpose 
as a ‘buffer’ between the international system and domestic actors. Nor is there a state 
to provide even basic security for individuals. In this vacuum, the various armed 
groups discussed above have come to provide the services once reserved for the state. 
They differ, however, in whom they provide the services to and why they provide 
these services.
The faction militia is concerned with protecting the interests of the faction. 
This, as with the military wing of other civilian political communities, means a
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concern with power and, more basically, survival. The business militia on the other 
hand is orientated toward the making of profit. The militia and its members would 
certainly be dismissed if it was felt that it would be more profitable, thus 
demonstrating that it is not necessarily survival that the business militia is driven by. 
Similarly, the court militia is meant to uphold law and order, not create its own power 
or survive. Al Ittihad initially seemed to be orientated toward power and survival, like 
faction militias, in that it tried to expand its control of towns and to defend itself from 
attack. However, upon defeat at the hands of the SNF and Ethiopia, a topic to be 
covered in more detail below, al Ittihad divested itself of a nilitia and thereby 
confirmed that it had other more pressing concerns than survival as an armed group.
The primary concern of the warlord organization is with survival. Without the 
survival of the entire organization, the warlord would lose his power and similarly, 
the fighters would lose their own individual means of survival. In other words, 
because of the lack of the state, the warlord organization acts as the state for the 
fighters and warlord -  it provides security. While the warlord organization may have 
other interests, such as providing a means for the warlord to gain national level 
recognition, the first concern he and it must have is with surviving. An example of an 
individual warlord and his organization will serve to illustrate this point.
Example o f Warlord Motivation - General Morgan
A good example of warlord purpose in action is Mohammed Sayid Hersi’s (better 
known as General Morgan) motives during the period which he ruled Kismaayo. 
Clearly Morgan was a warlord in control of territory. For example, a UNDOS report 
notes that ‘General Morgan has been able to maintain control over the town and
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prevent the rise of rival civil leaders ”449 The town eventually accepted this control, 
for “[t]he chronic threat of attack has forced Harti clansmen in the city to embrace his 
authority, as the only source of protection in a war environment.”450
However, Morgan did not provide any civilian administration in the town, it 
was ‘Essentially a garrison town.”451 He assumedly did not do so for fear that he 
would lose power to any rival civilian government, since “in peace, most observers 
and local citizens believe that General Morgan would quickly lose his local 
support.”452 This is just as Weber predicts, and as was noted in Chapter 2: ‘[t]he 
charisma of the warlord rises and falls with its efficacy and also with the demand for 
it; the warlord becomes a permanent figure when there is a chronic state of war.”453
Therefore, Morgan should not to be confused with a civilian leader concerned 
with the well-being of a civilian political community, as might be expected from a 
true faction militia leader. Rather, he is more accurately defined as a warlord, for he 
controlled the town because it is what allowed him to remain in power.
The basic means that Morgan used to do this were to create an environment of 
instability by fomenting clan divisions and in general maintain an environment of 
insecurity from which he was the only power that civilians could turn to for 
security.454 This is just the sort of purposeful insecurity that Reno predicts warlords 
will create in order to gain power.455 Thus, in effect Morgan and his warlord 
organization were living off of the town as parasites.
449 UNDOS 1998: 44
450 Ibid.: 44
451 Ibid.: 44
452 Ibid.: 44
453 Weber 1978: 1142
454 UNDOS 1999: 104
455 Reno 1998
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Morgan needed to maintain control because without it he risked not only 
loosing power, but also potentially his own life. For instance, the UNDOS report goes 
on to note that:
Morgan is a political pariah at the national level in Somalia. National 
reconciliation and political normalization would most likely lead to his 
political marginalization or even arrest. Recent international trends 
towards arrests of suspected war criminals makes exile abroad risky for 
him as well. And even local peace in Kismaayo threatens his interests, 
since his power base rests mainly on his ability to protect his 
constituency from external threat. In the absence of a threat, he would 
run the risk of being displaced by a civilian leadership. The fact that he 
belongs to a small and weak sub-clan of the Mijerteen precludes the 
possibility of relying on a narrow clan base to shore up his 
ambitions.456
In other words, without his control over the town, Morgan would lose his power, as 
would the fighters under him. In such a situation they would be at the mercy of other 
warlords, militias, or a state. Clearly Morgan should not be seen as a clan leader with 
grievances against other clans, for he does not even care much for his own clan. Nor 
was the control of Kismaayo a simple means of making money. Rather, the control of 
Kismaayo had much more at stake; it was driven, in essence, by an existential 
motivation by Morgan and his compatriots to survive.
456 UNDOS 1999: 104
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Autonomy and Independence
Warlords in Somalia are clearly autonomous from the Somali state, as no state exists. 
There is no leviathan which could assert authority over the warlords, and as will be 
shown below, even when the UN attempted to institute such an authority, it failed. 
Indeed, the warlords in Somalia are only restrained by their power capability relative 
to other actors.
At times this autonomy has been recognized to some extent by the 
international community. For example, NGOs and the UN have formed 
Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with actors in Somalia. Though these 
MOUs are not official, and cannot be as these actors are not states, for all other intents 
and purposes they serve the same purpose as the same sort of official contracts which 
NGOs and the UN regularly enter into with states. (See Appendix A for an example of 
such an MOU.) At the same time armed groups have been recognized as actors in the 
peace process outside of Somalia, which has involved international states. Although, 
as noted in Chapter 3, this is not necessarily an admission of sovereignty, it is clearly 
an admission of a certain level of autonomy.
However, not all actors in Somalia are independent. Armed groups may be 
dependent on the clan or other internal or external actors. The following section will 
examine the independence of the different types of armed groups based on their 
solutions to the problems of mobilization.
Motivation
Roughly speaking, there are two methods of motivating fighters in Somalia. Either the 
militia leader may rely on clan loyalty (or, in the case of al Ittihad religious loyalty) 
or on direct, economic incentive. Loyalty is tied into the nature of the clan system and
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is dependent, et least tacitly, on the consent of the clan. Faction militias have largely 
relied on loyalty. It has also become possible for militia leaders to directly enlist 
fighters due to the growth in freelance militiamen in Somalia and this has allowed for 
the growth in non-clan based armed groups, including warlord, business, and court 
militias.
Since the late 1980s, many young, unemployed and disenfranchised Somalis, 
or mooryaan, have come to urban areas, especially Mogadishu, in order to find jobs, 
adventure, or to fulfill ambition. These men are distinct from other parts of Somali 
society. Usually they have come from nomadic backgrounds or are otherwise 
separated from their clan. 457 Many are addicted to drugs, beyond the ubiquitous khat. 
They sometimes even speak their own distinct dialect that is “virtually unintelligible 
to outsiders.”458
Initially, they were concerned with finding a place within Barre’s patronage 
networks from which to prosper.459 This was usually accomplished by affiliating 
themselves with a strongman who would arm them and use them as enforcers. This 
practice continued on after the collapse of the Somali state, as their loyalty could be 
sold into the patronage networks of warlords and other militia leaders.460
Since these men normally come from non-local clans, they are able to 
circumvent many of the rules of interclan rivalry.461 Because they are ‘foreign’, i.e. 
not from the local clans, they were free from traditional commitment issues associated
457 There are several contributing reasons why men become freelance gunmen. Some are child soldiers 
who have never had an education beyond warfare. Others have been fighting for over a decade and 
don’t have other skills. There has been a growth in street children and war orphans because of the war. 
Many have been traumatized by war. The term often applied is buufis baa ku dhcay (“the person is 
suffering from mental disturbance”). Poverty is also an important factor in the motivation to fight. 
(WSP 2000)
458 WSP 2004: 29
459 Reno 2003
460 See Marchal 1997 for a more detailed discussion o f mooryaan.
461 Not all freelance militiamen might be considered mooryaan, but the mooryaan make up the bulk.
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with clan life, such as xeer or diya payments for transgressions.462 Thus, looting and 
other generally unacceptable activities are permissible.463 At the same time, the 
situation strengthened the patronage network since the young men would be 
dependent on their adopted patrons for support, rather than their customary clans. All 
together, this meant that there was a reservoir of freelance gunmen that aspiring 
militia leaders and warlords could tap into.
Faction militia
The members of faction militia are typically recruited directly from a single clan. 464 
The council of clan elders will send representatives to each family’s house looking for 
young men to serve. There is no history of forced conscription in Somalia and the 
men are all voluntary recruits. They will likely already be armed or have been 
mobilized before as part of a standby militia. In general, the warleaders use kinship as 
a “ready-made ideology”465 and clan-based loyalty is the necessary basis for the 
formation of a militia.
The solution to the problem of motivation in faction militias is clear. Tradition 
and culture has created a sense of clan loyalty for most members of Somali society.466 
The basis for loyalty still exists and the reciprocal nature of clan loyalty, combined 
with rehearsed social pressures, solve the collective action, coordination, and time- 
consistency problems, as they have done for centuries. At the same time, the process 
of loyalty is reinforced through the self help environment of post-collapse Somalia.
462 Reno 2003
463 Another notable effect o f mooryaanism is that the Somali traditional respect for the safety o f non- 
combatants in conflict, known a birimageydo (“to be spared from the iron”) has broken down (WSP 
2004).
464 Though it is possible that some are former professional fighters or freelance fighters from other 
clans. WSP 2004
^Compagnon 1998: 83
466 This clan loyalty may be manipulated in various ways and the unit to which an individual feels loyal 
may grow or shrink for reasons out of his control.
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Since there is no public security, groups must provide their own, and as has occurred 
throughout most of Somali history, this security has been provided by the clan.
Warlords
The independence of a warlord depends on his ability to support himself 
independently of the clan’s backing. Since the clan elders were necessary to motivate 
young men to fight, they still had to be ‘kept in the loop.’ What truly shifted the 
balance was the use of freelance gunmen. From the perspective of warlords, the chief 
importance of mooryaan is that their loyalty can be bought on a pay-for-service basis. 
In Somalia, where the average young man is at, or below, the poverty line (usually 
calculated at SI per day), the motivation to be paid for combat is strong. Immediate 
economic incentives provide a warlord with the tools necessary to obtain loyalty 
without trus t. This allows the warlords to solve all of the problems of motivation set 
out by Collier -  without using the clan’s loyalty structure. And, therefore, the warlord 
can maintain his independence.
However, the trade-off is that the warlord cannot rely on the loyalty of these 
troops and must keep them from selling their loyalty to a rival. In the absence of 
economic incentives, such fighters may move their loyalty to another patron, set up an 
economic enterprise of their own, or even rebel against the patron. As one aid worker 
put it, “all is well if the militias are getting paid... if not, they run wild, setting up 
their own checkpoints etc...”467 Consequently, the reliance on economic incentives, in 
turn, deepens a reliance on sustainable resource exploitation.
467 Interview with aid worker, Nairobi, 1 April 2005
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Business militias
Like warlords, business militias use immediate economic incentive to motivate their 
fighters. Even though they are usually affiliated with one subclan, they rely even less 
on clan loyalty because business, by its nature, crosses clan lines and is not politically 
orientated.
In many ways, therefore, Somali business militias are more similar to 
mercenary or PMCs than they are to other types of armed groups in Somalia. These 
companies are used to perform security and other offensive or defens ive military 
operations for private (and sometimes public) organizations. And, while P. W. Singer 
defines mercenaries as “individuals who fight for employers other than their home 
state’s government,”468 the concept might also apply in this case with reference to 
clan, not ‘home state’. The men who organize these companies and fight for them are 
not doing so for political reasons, but rather as a business.
Court and Islamist militias
Court militias also rely on freelance fighters, whose loyalty is kept through economic 
incentives. Thus they are in essence similar to the business militia. Though, there is 
likely more communitarian loyalty to these organizations.
On the other hand, Islamist militias can rely on religious belief for loyalty. 
This loyalty can cross over clan lines. For example, in its administration of Luuq, al 
Ittihad also invited its members who were not part of the locally dominate Marehan 
clan to take part in governance 469 However, this Islamic loyalty was more based in 
the upper echelons of the al Ittihad leadership. The lower-level fighters themselves 
were “composed mainly of young gunmen [mooryaan, known locally as y'z'rz], whose
468 Singer 2003: 41
469 Menkhaus 2002
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devotion to tenets of fundamentalist Islam was negligible and who fought in the name 
of al Ittihad only because al Ittihad paid them.”470
Logistics
The sources of Somali armed groups’ weapons and other goods are varied and depend 
on the region and particular history of the armed group. Nevertheless, there are some 
generalizations that can be made about how different types of armed groups in Somali 
meet their logistical needs.
Faction militias
All faction militias looted the Somali state to some degree after its collapse. This 
reliance on looting was a natural evolution of the Somali economic system. Under 
Barre, the evolution of the Somali state’s relationship with society broke down the 
distinction between public and private goods.471 All ‘public’ property, including 
foreign aid, was controlled by one clan or another based on a patronage system. This 
allowed for a straghtforward switch to a looting economy after the state’s collapse. In 
particular, the extensive Somali armory was ransacked by the factions, as Somalia’s 
strategic importance during the Cold War made it one of the most well armed states in 
sub-Saharan Africa.
Businessmen have also been apt to back militias, especially the faction militias 
of their own clans. In general, militias have been financed by businessmen for two 
reasons. In the short term, there are financial rewards from looting or the control over 
certain properties. In the long term, financing a militia is an investment gamble on
470 Ibid.: 113
471 In fact, looting was widespread not just after the collapse of the Somali state, but was already 
practiced by Barre’s army before 1991.
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potential political power. A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report 
details the psychology behind this:
Initially, [businessmen] feared that a new state would not be amenable 
to them, unless controlled by factions they supported. Once the war 
began to dissipate they continued to finance the faction leaders because 
of the clan support they drew. While reluctant to participate in politics 
that might affect their business interests, they could not afford to 
antagonize the clan and go against its political stance; supporting the 
clan is never illegitimate even when the clan is wrong.472
In a sense there is a mutual dependency between the clans and businessmea This has 
put pressure on the faction militias to operate in the interest of business communities 
and thereby has limited their independence. However, as noted earlier, businessmen 
have tended to stop financing factions and instead turned to developing their own 
militias.
Many faction militias are extensions of clans which do have farming or 
nomadic roots and can provide food and other basic survival goods. In a similar way, 
the clan’s diaspora in Europe and America are also common funding sources. This 
reliance on the clan for goods underscores the dependence of the faction militia.
Faction militias may also develop various economic enterprises on their own, 
including looting, the diversion of humanitarian aid and occupation of land. However, 
these enterprises represent the beginning of the slippery slide into independence for a 
warleader.
472 UNDP 2001: 151
248
Warlords
Warlords are concerned with gaining and maintaining their independence. This is only 
possible if they have the economic resources to fund their militias. They therefore 
take part in economic activities with the goal of monopolizing the economic activities 
or relationships with funding businessmen and governments, at the expense of the 
clan. Since the collapse of the state, there had always been this balance between the 
militia leader who controlled the militia, and thereby the resources, and the clan, who 
provided motivation. The balance changed as warleaders could directly control 
resources or access to financiers.
By controlling finances, warlords can buy the loyalty of the men they needed 
as well as the equipment to arm them. However, hrge cash reserves are necessary for 
warlords to be effective, as a firefight can cost $4,000 an hour in ammunition alone.473 
This means that warlords must diversify their economic exploitation in order to 
produce the required funds. For example, Mohammed Qanyare Afrah, based in the 
Dayinle neighborhood of Mogadishu, receives funds from fishing interests and a 
private airstrip, amongst other ventures.474 Even among this diversity of economic 
activities, one feature is common, it is all ‘done either overtly or implicitly, at the 
point of a gun.”475
In general, warlords have created a range of enterprises which are given value 
by their ability to command force. They “[stake] claims to valuable land, towns, 
roads, and public assets such as airports and seaports”476 They then set up 
checkpoints, demand payment for safe passage, tax the use of airports etc. In general,
473 Cost estimate from Menkhaus 2003
474 Noted by Menkhaus 2003. Another independent warlord is Musa Suudi Yalahow, also located in 
Mogadishu. ICG 2002
475 UNDOS 1998:43
476 Ibid.: 43
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they “attempt to monopolize the more lucrative commercial opportunities in the area 
they control.”477
In some instances, they will occupy land and this occupation may become 
institutionalized, where armed groups set up fiefdoms and trade taxation for 
protection from other aimed groups.478 They have even normalized such relations, as 
the warlords intermarried with local women. Such fiefdoms are potentially in the 
interest of the farmers, relative to random banditry. Here we see Olson’s logic of the 
stationary bandit in effect -  i.e. institutionalizing banditry is more profitable for the 
warlord because the peasantry has more of an incentive to be productive.479
Warlords have also utilized international aid in both tactical and strategic 
ways.480 Tactically, warlords can coerce, extort, or manipulate (by pretending to be 
noncombatants) humanitarian aid agencies into giving them aid. Such aid can then be 
directly used for the armed group’s survival. Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) 
camps can also be tactically used to manipulate aid distribution, they can provide 
human shields and IDPs themselves can be used to attract more aid. Strategically, 
population movements can be used to dictate the placement of aid. Importantly, an 
‘aid economy’, such as providing housing or security for the international agencies, 
can be created, which is then tapped by the armed groups for their own funding.
Many warlords provide privatized protection as a paid service. In particular, it 
is common practice for the UN, NGOs as well as local bus inessmen to hire private 
guards. In some cases, a warlord will effectively force the agency to rent their
477 Ibid.: 43
478 Ibid. :3 8
479 Olson 1993
480 LeRichie 2004
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protection services in order to safeguard the agency from potential insecurity, where, 
in fact, the threats may come from the warlord himself.481
Related to this, warlords may rent the services of their organizations to MNCs. 
This is a different situation, however, because the private corporations, unlike NGOs 
and the UN, are themselves in competition. Human Rights Watch details the example 
of the competition between Dole and Somalfruit.482 The companies hired local 
warlords cr, for liability and public relations reasons, had the farmers hire the clans 
for them. The militias were used by both companies to influence farmers to sell 
bananas to them. In exchange the warlords made a profit.
Finally, warlords have turned to external supporters for funding. The SNF was 
funded by ex-Barre government figures living in Kenya.484 In some cases, the armed 
groups acted as proxies of the foreign policies of external states, especially Egypt, 
Libya, and Ethiopia. This has led to Egyptian and Libyan funding of, amongst others, 
Aidid and Ali Mahdi in Mogadishu.485 Ethiopia, for its part, has funded Hachwdle 
(USC/PM) militia and the SNF.486 In some cases this external funding is enough to 
seriously influence the decisions of the group being funded. In fact it is a common 
political attack to say that, for example, someone is a proxy for Ethiopia. However, 
Somali warlords are able to keep themselves independent of external states and in 
general are not very loyal proxies. This will be demonstrated in a hter section of this 
chapter through the example of Ethiopia’s alliance with the SNF.
481 There is a certain amount of overlap which Human Rights Watch characterized as being rather like 
hiring guards from the police force as a guarantee against police harassment. HRW 1995
482 HRW 1995
483 Apparently both were from the same Sa’ad subclan (Habar Gidir clan).
484 UNDOS 1998
485 n-.
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Business militias
Businessmen, on the other hand, are fully focused on economic exploitation. As 
detailed by Bradbury and Peter Little, amongst others, the economic sector in Somalia
48 7is doing relatively well, in spite of state collapse. Moneymaking enterprises, 
include ‘grey’ and ‘black’ market activities like checkpoints and weapons trading, as 
well as ‘white ’ activities which run the gambit from trade in cattle to money transfers 
to providing utilities.
Broadly speaking, in the early 1990s, businessmen focused on grey area trade 
in looted goods, weapons and food aid, but after the UN intervention in 1993-94, they 
made huge sums of money through real estate rentals, money exchange, and transport 
which allowed them to shift their focus to other businesses such as hospitality and 
telecommunications.488 As with warlords, these enterprises provide the cash to buy 
militia loyalty as well as the weapons and other necessary equipment.
Court and Islamist militias
Court militias have been backed by businessmen, and, to some degree, by the clans 
themselves. This is unlike warlord and business militias that have come to find their 
own wealth generating activities. In exchange for heir management of the militias, 
the courts are expected to create and maintain as much predictability as possible. This 
arrangement clearly limits the independence of the court militias, for without the 
businessman or clan’s support, the court militia could not survive.
A1 Ittihad also engaged in entrepreneurship in order to raise funds. For 
instance, they controlled the ports in Kismaayo and Merka. There has also been some 
attempt by al Ittihad to incorporate businessmen into their organization to find
487 Bradbury 2003, Little 2003
488 ICG 2002
funding.489 What differentiates them from other types of militias is that they also are 
funded by international, non-Somali Islamist sources. This is possible because of their 
cross-cutting ideology. It is not clear to what extent al Ittihad had terrorist or ether 
subaltern funding, but they certainly have been funded by Islamic NGOs of various 
guises.
Example -  Mohammed Aidid
Mohammed Hassan Farah Aidid is an example of a faction militia leader who was 
able to become a warlord by transforming the source of his soldiers and logistics, 
allowing him to gain independence. Initially Aidid was selected to head a faction 
militia, meant to protect his sub-clan the Hawie Habr Gidr. He built up his forces by 
using the Hawiye nomads which lived in the central region of Somalia and were 
impoverished because of an ongoing drought490 Aidid then armed these men with 
weapons captured from the Somali military.
After marching on Mogadishu, “many of the veterans of his successful 
campaign married or returned to their families,”491 and Aidid was forced to find a new 
source of troops and support. He turned to the mooryaan. Since Aidid could no longer 
rely on the clan for loyalty, he had to provide the men with “periodic rewards of loot 
and shelter.”492 These rewards came from all the iBual sources, including: raids, the 
occupation of entire neighborhoods, security fees paid by businessmen and NGOs, 
etc.
Aidid was also left with the need to protect his reward system and this helps 
explain why he systematically exacerbated the IDP situation. In particular, Aidid
489 Menkhaus 2002
490 Clarke and Gosende 2003
491 Ibid.: 146
253
needed to make sure that no one would return to take back the homes and other goods 
that he had promised to his forces. In the view of Walter Clarke and Robert Gosende, 
who provide an accurate reading of the events, Aidid ensured that he could protect 
this source of support by weakening the Barre supporters and other civilians who had 
left the city and were exiled to the IDP camps in the “triangle of death” located 
between Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Kismaayo.493 He did this by closing the food 
warehouses and cutting off the flow of aid to these camps. In doing so, this would set 
off the chain of events that led to the UN intervention.
In total, Aidid was able to separate himself from the clan. Through the use of 
economic exploitation and a patronage based system of loyalty with the mooryaan, he 
was able to perpetuate his warlord organization without losing out on decision­
making authority. Although he continued to maintain clan links and rhetoric, he had 
transformed himself from a warleader to a warlord.
Summary
The previous section has illustrated the difference between militias in Somalia and 
from this examination we can separate out which should be classified as warlords and 
which are classic militias are not. The following chart depicts the comparison between 
different types of armed groups in Somalia. The cells highlighted in bold and italics 
represent areas which meet the definition of warlord.
493 Ibid
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As is apparent from this chart, the definition and conceptualization of 
warlordism presented in Chapter 2 has been able to effectively differentiate the 
diversity of armed groups in Somalia. Many of the armed groups have features in 
common with warlords and this causes significant confusion both by the media and 
academics. However, the set of concepts developed in Chapter 2 only apply in total to 
warlords. There is great importance in making this distinction because the warlord 
may relate and interact differently with both internal and international actors. Most 
importantly, warlords will be most concerned with the survival of the warlord 
organization; while other types of armed groups will have different motivations.
The previous examination also demonstrated that warlords in Somalia are 
cohesive, like units. They have instituted a self-perpetuating structure including
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economic resources and ways to motivate new personnel. They also have a 
governance structure capable of allowing them to act as a single unit. This allows 
them to carry out their drive for survival in the anarchic system.
Furthermore, it was demonstrated that warlords are autonomous and 
independent organizations. There is no state which has authority over their actions. 
They have also used various modes of economic exploitation to obtain the equipment 
necessary to defend their autonomy and have used their profits to motivate mooryaan 
to fight for them. Thus, we should consider Somali warlords as SAGs. The 
implication of this is that the Neorealist approach may be used to analyze warlords.
The following section will examine the international relations of warlords in 
Somalia using the Neorealist approach. The hypothesis is that the theory will be able 
to explain their relations. In the following section, warlord’s international relations 
with the United Nations intervention forces will be considered and then in the 
subsequent section, warlord relations with Ethiopia will be examined.
WARLORDS AND THE UN INTERVENTION
The following section will examine the relations between warlords and the UN 
intervention forces. The hypothesis in the case of the United Nations intervention is 
that the warlords and intervention forces should relate in terms of anarchic war and 
that alliances, and all decision making for that matter, should be based on the pursuit 
of security and continuance of autonomy.
256
Background to the UN Intervention
The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) intervention was a major 
internationalization of the conflict.494 This intervention began with UNOSOM I in 
March 1992, which involved a diplomatic mission to broker peace, led by 
Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun. This was followed by the importation of peace 
keepers to protect the Mogadishu airport. In December 1992, a US led peacekeeping 
force, known as the UN International Task Force (UNITAF), entered and stayed in 
the country until May 1993. The peace keeping force then grew to over 30,000, it 
became known as UNOSOM II, and this force stayed in Somalia until March 1995.495
The UN did not have the permission of the Somali state to intervene, as there 
was no state to negotiate with. This was taken into account by the United Nations 
Security Council in its decision to intervene, as permission was and continues to be a 
requirement for intervening in states. However, the final decision to intervene was 
possible because of the logic that
the normative conflict between human rights on the one hand and 
sovereignty and non-intervention on the other was weakened by the 
absence of a government in Somalia. In the case of a failed state, the 
respect of sovereignty loses a significant part of its relevance.496
Therefore the UN took the initiative to intervene in what it felt were “unique” 
circumstances.497 This provides more evidence that the UN, and therefore in a sense
494 See UN 1997 for more details on the UN intervention.
495 In general, these separate involvements are sometimes referred to collectively as UNOSOM and this 
study will continue that practice.
^ R yter 2003: 41
497 The intervention was called unique in order to appease the Chinese who did not want to create a 
precedent for non-consensual intervention.
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the international community as a whole, felt that Somalia was no longer a closed, 
hierarchic system, but rather could be treated as an extension of an open, international 
anarchic system.
The UN came to treat Somali warlords (and faction militias) as de facto 
sovereign, though not necessarily legitimate, actors. This can be traced back to at least 
the appointment of Robert Oakley, the former US ambassador to Somalia, as the head 
of Operation Restore Hope (the US military name of the UNITAF operation) by then 
President George Bush. The (controversial) plan which Oakley carried out was to 
accommodate the warlords in exchange for providing a semblance of order. In 
particular, they awarded policing and juridical powers to Aidid and A1 Mahdi in the 
areas they controlled.498 The logic behind this being that the warlords and faction 
militias had de facto control and to attempt to defeat them would be far too costly, 
both for the UN and Somalis.499
This is not to say that the warlords were legitimized, but that they were a fact 
and therefore had to be treated as recognized actors. For instance, a high-level UN 
source involved with the relations between the UN and warlords notes
de facto power gets acknowledged in any situation... it was the same
here [in Somalia]... though the UN acknowledges an actor, does it
songrant the actor legitimacy or just remain de facto?
498 Clarke and Gosende 2003
499 The plan was and is still considered controversial because, as Laitin notes, “due to Oakley’s initial 
decision to accommodate the warlords, and with the full expectation on the part o f all combatants that 
there would be no significant outside force in the country after May 1994, the warlords had an 
incentive to resist international attempts to construct a civil society.” (Laitin 1999: 162)
500 Interview, UN Source, Nairobi, 29 March 2005
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The general consensus is that the UN did not in fact grant legitimacy. This view has 
been backed by others in the UN as well as NGOs involved on the ground in 
Somalia.501 Nonetheless, it created a logic that “only people with guns could bring the
C M
country together...’ Therefore, only the miitia leaders were “permitted both to 
develop the agendas and to decide who else would attend the [peace building] 
conferences.”503
In a sense, the intervention may be seen as an example of a mixed security 
dilemma. As noted in Chapter 4, mixed security dilemmas occur when states feel 
threatened by warlords. Clearly Somalia as a state was not a threat to neighboring or 
further off states such as the United States, since it was a collapsed state. However, 
the warlords in Somalia did represent a threat to security. They exhibited the security 
dilemma intensifiers, such as primarily using small arms and were notoriously 
predatory in behavior. Accordingly, intentional states aligned in order to rid 
themselves of the threat through an intervention into the Somali state and direct 
targeting of warlords.
Anarchy and Hierarchy
At the same time, the UN effectively declared war on the warlords, in the sense that it 
attempted to implement political goals through force. The mandate of UNOSOM 
(specifically, as set out for UNOSOM n, which was based on UNITAF) was to “use 
all necessary means” to ‘take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to
501 Various interviews with UN and NGO personnel, Nairobi, May 2005
502 Clarke and Gosende 2003: 148
503 Ibid.: 149
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establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance.”504 Its 
main responsibilities included:
• monitoring that all factions continued to respect the cessation of hostilities and 
other agreements to which they had consented;
• preventing any resumption of violence and, if necessary, taking appropriate 
action;
• maintaining control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions which 
would have been brought under international control;
• seizing the small arms of all unauthorized armed elements;
• securing all ports, airports and lines of communications required for the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance;
• protecting the personnel, installations and equipment of the United Nations 
and its agencies, ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] as well as 
NGOs;
• continuing mine-clearing, and;
• assisting in repatriation of refugees and displaced persons in Sanalia.505
In 1994, the resolution was changed to exclude coercive methods for carrying out its 
mission- after the war between the sides had started506
The permissible coercion which was detailed in the peace keeping force’s 
mandate at first seemed to fundamentally change the nature of the Somali system -  
specifically by instituting a ‘leviathan’ that could structure the relationships of the 
actors. In other words, the force’s tried to institute a hierarchic system For example, 
Clarke and Gosende remark that
504 UNOSOM II Mandate, based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 814 (1993), 26 March 
1993
505 Ibid.
506United Nations Security Council Resolution 897 (1994), 4 February 1994
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[t]he US military [which led UNITAF and provide the bulk of the 
forces] decided to use similar tactics to those employed so successfully 
against Iraq in Operation Desert Storm -  a large and robust force to 
overwhelm potential opposition and lessen the opportunities for losses 
in battle.507
The idea was that, as in traditional state formation, an overwhelming force could 
provide the coercion necessary to create and sustain a structure of relations within 
Somalia. This literally meant taking away the means of force from warlords through 
disarmament as well as physically patrolling and safeguarding certain areas such as 
the ports and humanitarian aid locations.
This is not in line with traditional or ‘first generation’ peacekeeping operations 
in which the peacekeeping forces attempt to interpose themselves between combatants 
and then act as an objective observer (and at times enforcer) of compliance by the 
actors toward negotiations, in the same way that a state might oversee civil suits. 
Rather, it seemed that UNOSOM might act as another sovereign which would provide 
a security blanket around the nation under which the various sovereign actors would 
be incorporated into a hierarchic system, with the UN by default on top This would 
have made Somalia a hierarchical system, similar to a state, and, potentially, could 
have led to an end to warlordism as their forces would become so overpowered as to 
make them lose autonomy.
However, it soon became clear that rather than this, the actors simply treated 
UNOSOM as another actor in the anarchic system. Some actors aligned with this new,
507 Clarke and Gosende 2003: 142
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international actor, specifically the Group of 12, which included the backers of al 
Mahdi.508 Other actors aligned against the UN. Specifically there was an alliance of 
armed groups coming under the heading of the Somali National Alliance (SNA), 
which included the USC and was led by Aidid.509 These actors felt threatened by the 
forces, when, for instance, the UNOSOM forces attempted to disarm them
The blatant return to anarchy occurred when the SNA struck back against the 
UN forces on 5 June 1993. On this day the UNOSOM forces were looking for 
weapons stored in the Radio Mogadishu building -  a radio station controlled by 
Aidid. In the resulting attacks 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed.510
On June 12, the UNOSOM forces counter-attacked with air and ground 
operations in Mogadishu. Several other battles ensued, the most famous of these 
battles was the so-called ‘Black Hawk Down’ episode of October 1993.511 This battle 
involved SNA fighters and the United States’ Task Force Ranger (TFR).
Unlike the UN peacekeepers, the TFR force was assigned the task of hunting 
down and arresting Aidid. The strategy for doing this was to use ‘snatch’ missions, 
which involved deploying troops from helicopters to surround a building and capture
ci-n
targets inside. These missions were thus meant to resemble policing missions, in 
which threats to social order were to be neutralized.
During the mission on 3 October 1993, the TFR forces were given intelligence 
that several Aidid lieutenants were inside a building and the task force was to arrest 
them. The particular location of the mission, the Olympic Hotel near the Bakara 
Market, was an area controlled by Aidid and his forces. When the task force troops
508 See UN Peacekeeping 1995 for more background.
509 The SNA preferred that regional powers, i.e. Ethiopia, should help facilitate the reduction in conflict 
in Somalia. (UN Peace Keeping 1995)
510 After the 5 June attack, the UN instituted an investigation which came to this conclusion. (UN 1997)
511 See for instance, Bowden 1999
512 Binney 2003
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landed they met heavy resistance and took heavy loses (relative to loses in previous 
missions). In particular, the US’ major technological advantage, that of its helicopters, 
was to some extent neutralized by the warlord’s counter-tactic of launching large
c n
numbers of rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) at them simultaneously. Using such 
tactics, as well as a tremendous amount of fighters, Aidid’s men were able to apply 
significant pressure on the TFR forces and eventually rout them. The mission was 
considered to be a defeat by many and may be seen as (arguably) the root of the US 
decision to leave Somalia.
Regardless of the debate about the repercussions of the TFR mission(s), it is 
clear that the US and UN were attempting to create a hierarchical system in Somalia. 
The language surrounding the mission, such as “arrest,” point toward this. The 
missions themselves were designed to make the most of the US weapons and tactical 
advantages in order to arrest specific individuals, with as little lose of US life as 
possible.
This is opposed to the warlord side of the equation, for whom the missions 
were severe existential threats. For Aidid and his lieutenants, the snatch operations 
were direct threats to their military organization. Their (arguable) defeat of the TFR 
soldiers in October forced the US to also consider the situation in existential terms, 
i.e. in terms more like a traditional interstate war than a policing operation.
Analysis -  Anarchic War
To summarize: Initially, the UNOSOM forces represented an indirect security threat 
for the SNA as they were aligned with the SNA’s rival, the Group of 12. The 
UNOSOM forces then came to represent a direct security threat as they attempted to
5,3 Ibid.
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actively disarm SNA forces. At this point, the SNA and UNOSOM forces had 
incompatible security goals. The SNA was concerned with maintaining its autonomy, 
i.e. surviving, and this involved having weapons, technicals, militiamen etc. The 
UNOSOM forces felt that their security was best met by disarming the SNA. The last 
resort for the SNA was to use physical, violent conflict to overcome this threat to its 
security. When the opportunity arose to combat these forces in order to coerce the 
actors into exiting the territory which the SNA felt was theirs, they took the 
opportunity and attacked. The ensuing battles were not of the nature of a sovereign 
power attempting to coerce a sub-power, but rather of two sovereign powers 
attempting to battle each other in order to maintain the power capability distribution 
or to change it in its favor.
It was rot a hierarchic war over control of the state. There was no state to 
control and the UNOSOM forces certainly did not represent one. Rather, this was in 
effect anarchic war, where the actors were concerned with survival and the final battle 
would only determine the relative capability distribution in the system. This is finally 
illustrated by the fact that after the intervention, the SNA went back to being just 
another armed group amongst other armed groups -  it did not become the leviathan 
over the state.
Nor were these battles internal in nature. For, the UN forces were clearly 
international, and the fact that the UN intervened without permission from sovereign 
demonstrates that the system was openly and internationally anarchic. Thus, the 
dynamic between toe SNA and UNOSOM forces was one of international anarchic 
war.
In particular, the system was and remained multipolar. The different warlord 
actors interacted with the UNOSOM forces as equals. No actor was able to create
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hegemony in the system. For the UNOSOM forces to have done so would have meant 
fighting and winning a system changing war, but they were unable to do so. Since the 
UN peacekeeping forces evacuation from Somalia, the system has remained 
multipolar. Other international actors, however, have continued to interact with 
warlords in Somalia.
ETHIOPIA, THE SNF, AND AL ITTIHAD
Ethiopia is a major international actor in Somalia due to its shared borders and 
therefore its relations with warlords will serve as a good case to apply the Neorealist 
approach. The following section will focus on relations between Ethiopia and the SNF 
in regard to the two actors’ relations with al Ittihad and the aftermath of the joint 
Ethiopia/SNF attack on al Ittihad
The hypothesis of a Neorealist approach is that the relations of the SNF, like 
those of Ethiopia, should be based on a logic of survival. In particular, the SNF should 
make and break alliances, with Ethiopia or other actors, based only on security 
interests. They should also go to war with actors that threaten them if that is perceived 
to be the only way to eliminate the security threat.
Regional Rivalry
In order to understand the nature of warlord international relations with Ethiopia, it is 
necessary to appreciate the regional context, specifically the dynamic between 
Ethiopia and Arab countries. To summarize the issue, Ethiopia and Egypt can be seen 
as rivals for regional hegemony. An important strategic issue in particular for them is 
the Nile River which both countries depend on and which finds part of its source in 
and runs through Ethiopia before reaching Egypt. Libya has also aligned with Egypt
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in a bid to counter Ethiopia’s potential hegemony of the region. Furthermore, Ethiopia 
is a Christian, secular state with a large Muslim population, which is surrounded by 
Muslim countries.
Combined, these factors have led it to be concerned with Muslim radicals and 
terrorists as a security threat. In particular, it has been feared the Oromo Liberation 
Front (OLF) -  an organization which clearly threatened Ethiopia’s security as it 
desired to secede from the state514 -  could launch or support attacks in Ethiopia.
This regional context, combined with a security concern for the general 
anarchy in Somalia and a desire to create a ‘buffer zone’ between it and its anarchic 
neighbor, have led to a high involvement by Ethiopia inside Somalia. This has led to a 
constantly shifting set of alliances and counter-alliances with Somali actors. Ethiopia 
has carried out its buffer strategy by setting up alliances with armed groups in control 
of land along its border, these have included over the past ten years, the Puntland de 
facto state, the USC/PM militia in Beled Weyn, the RRA, and the Marehan SNF. 
Egypt and Libya have backed factions in Mogadishu, for example, including for 
example the Aidid-Mahadi alliance. In order to balance this, the Ethiopians have 
backed rival groups such as the RRA in its battles with the SNA. Similarly, in 
Kismaayo, the SNA-SNF was backed by Egypt and Libya, while Ethiopia backed 
General Morgan.515
A Mutual Alliance over al Ittihad
In this context of regional rivalry, buffer strategies, and shifting alliances, al Ittihad 
represented a threat to Ethiopia.516 There is no direct evidence that al Ittihad supported
5,4 OLF 2005
515 There is also competition over the eventual shape o f the Somali state. Ethiopia tends to want a 
weaker state, taking a federal form. Egypt and Libya back a stronger, more centralized state.
516 See Menkhaus 2002 for more on Al Ittihad.
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fundamentalists which threatened Ethiopia. In fact, it seems that al Ittihad may have 
been against such threats to Ethiopia for fear of reprisals.517 Yet, for Ethiopia the 
threat was perceived to be real, as al Ittihad did hold many of the same views as the 
radicals which threatened it and likely received funding from similar sources. Even if 
the threat was not immediate it still represented a security threat because if al Ittihad 
were to continue to gain power in the region it might have directly supported radical 
opponents to Ethiopia in the future. As we would presume from a Neorealist logic, 
Ethiopia sought to rid itself of the security threat. Ethiopia therefore had ample reason 
to align with a Somali actor against the threat.
During the same time period, A 1 Ittihad had also become a threat fcr the SNF. 
After UNOSOM’s withdrawal, the SNF began to loose power relative to al Ittihad. It 
had already been atrophying while UNOSOM was present since it no longer had to 
provide security, which had been its raison d’etre.518 In parallel, al Ittihad became 
more relevant. It directly controlled Luuq and had security arrangements with other 
districts, such as Doolow and El Waq. In the district of Bula Hawa, the SNF and al 
Ittihad shared control.
The al Ittihad threat to the SNF was existential. In particular, while the SNF 
did not seem to care much about local politics and stability, and in fact positively 
undermined them, it did use its control over the Gedo region for credibility at the 
peace process bargaining tables. This reportedly was a humiliation for the then 
Chairman of the SNF, Omar Haji.519 Moreover, the comparison of al Ittihad’s 
‘enlightened’ rule, which was stable, not very corrupt, and generally much better for
517 UNDOS points to “some anecdotal evidence that the al Ittihad movement in Gedo region did not 
want any association with terrorist activities inside Ethiopia, and was angry over an Islamist 
assassination attempt in Addis Ababa, for obvious reasons -  the Luuq al Ittihad was the only fixed 
Islamic target in the region, and stood to pay a heavy price for terrorism and adventurism by Islamist 
cells elsewhere.” (UNDOS 1998: 146)
518 I.e. it was in the same situation as that o f General Morgan, which was discussed above.
519 UNDOS 1998
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local residents and the international NGOs than the SNF’s, further undermined the 
organization as it tended to progressively strengthen al Ittihad’s foothold and weaken 
the SNF’s. Moreover, al Ittihad was reportedly receiving funding from the SNF’s 
longtime enemy, the SNA. The threat therefore was a threat to the survival strategy 
of the SNF which relied on a parasitic existence off cf the local population and NGOs 
and needed to play in national level politics and potentially provided a direct enemy in 
its alliance with the SNA.
The SNF and Ethiopia therefore made perfect allies for each other. Al Ittihad 
was a mutual enemy of both actors. The two actors were also joined in their mutual 
animosity toward the SNA. The SNF had been battling the SNA faction since the civil 
war, and Ethiopia felt threatened by the SNA’s funding from its enemies, Egypt and 
Libya.
Sometimes the alliance is seen as Ethiopia funding and controlling the SNF as 
a proxy, however, this was not the case. The alliance made strategic sense for the SNF 
which needed an ally to effectively rid itself of the al Ittihad threat. In fact, it seems 
likely that the SNF exaggerated the threat posed by al Ittihad in order to gain 
Ethiopia’s backing, although it is not possible to conclusively know whether or not 
this is true. This is a common practice for warlords in Somalia; even today various 
factions in Somalia will promote a rival as ‘fundamentalists’ or ‘supporters of 
terrorism’ in order to gain international allies, such of the United States, who they 
perceive as being motivated by counterterrorist goals. Also, as will be illustrated 
below, the SNF was able to and did break off its alliance when it felt that it was no 
longer in its interests. Ethiopia’s involvement should not, therefore, be seen as one 
way.
520 Ibid.
521 For instance, this view was expressed in the UNDOS report on governance in Gedo. UNDOS 1998
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Having determined that the threat would not fade, Ethiopia and the SNF 
attacked al Ittihad in 1996 and then again in June 1997. The second attack was enough 
to drive al Ittihad out of Luuq and Doolow. These attacks forced al Ittihad into the 
countryside, the Bay region, and into Mogadishu. Reportedly in Mogadishu, al Ittihad 
received support from the SNA. After the attack, al Ittihad fundamentally changed its 
tactics and ceased attempting to control towns as a ‘normal’ faction militia, but rather 
has carried out a long-term strategy of preparing Somalia for eventual Islamic rule, 
mostly through influencing the shari’a courts. Al Ittihad was therefore effectively 
defeated by the two allies, in that it no longer represented a direct security threat.
Analysis
The preceding is an example of the logic of balance of power in action. Ethiopia felt 
threatened by Arab states and other potential threats, such as the OLF. The most 
specific threat to its security came from al Ittihad, which was an Islamic organization, 
and therefore a potential ally to Arab actors in the perception of Ethiopia. Al Ittihad, 
for its part, relied on external (Arab) support for maintaining its internal power and 
had a militia to protect itself. The SNF also saw al Ittihad as a threat since al Ittihad’s 
actions in maintaining its security, such as by having a militia and in maintaining a 
more attractive rule than the SNF.
This threat led to an alliance between the SNF and Ethiopia in order to build­
up their mutual power capability and thereby maintain a superior power capability. 
The alliance was made based only on the two actors’ security interests. The point is 
all the more impressive since there were traditional grievances between Somali’s and 
Ethiopia that, from an identity point of view, should have gotten in the way. But,
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these grievances were quickly overcome by strategic necessity and the pursuit of 
security.
This balancing move left the aligned powers with a preponderance of power. 
They used this power to defeat their mutual enemy. This created a more ideal power 
distribution for both actors, since their mutual threat was removed, but it also opened 
the alliance up for change. Since the alliance was based on a logic of mutual security, 
without the benefit of this justification, the alliance could not last.
Changes in the Alliance
The alliance between Ethiopia and the SNF survived the war. However, it began to 
change as the security calculation by each side changed. The following section will 
explore the changes in the alliance between Ethiopia and the SNF. The hypothesis is 
the same -  that is that allianc es should be based solely on a security calculation.
Immediately after the combined attack on al Ittihad, the alliance between 
Ethiopia and the SNF became stronger. After the attacks, he SNF and Ethiopian 
government, “appeared to have a firm, mutually teneficial alliance based on a set of
c y y
common political interests -  combating al Ittihad, and in opposing Aidid’s SNA.” 
Ethiopia’s support allowed the SNF to effectively administer the Gedo region.523 It 
governed using ‘emergency law’, provided regional defense against outside attackers, 
and controlled tax collection
Subsequently, however, the relationship became more complex. The SNF had 
been part of the Group of 12, which was an anti-SNA alliance led by Ali Mahdi that 
came to be known as the National Salvation Council (NSC) and was also backed by
UNDOS 1998: 140
523 Ibid
270
Ethiopia. Ethiopia had been backing the ‘Sodere’ national reconciliation process 
involving this group
In the winter of 1997 Egypt came to sponsor a rival conference, to be known 
as the ‘Cairo Conference’. This would become
a watershed in post-intervention Somali politics, not for achieving its 
intended goal of national reconciliation, but for the process of political 
realignment it set in motion within Somalia, and as the shot across the 
bow which triggered a period of proxy wars played out between 
Ethiopia and her regional rivals in Somalia.524
The SNF’s decisions after the Cairo Conference are interesting to note because 
they demonstrate both that it was not a simple proxy for Ethiopia and that its 
decisions were driven by motives of survival and power. Rather than staying with the 
NSC and Ethiopia, which would seem rational at first glance, the NSF, under Haji, 
switched alliances to a Mogadishu coalition of factions. This coalition was backed by 
Egypt and included the SNA -  the previous enemies of both the SNF and Ethiopia.
The reasoning was that the NSC-Ethiopia alliance no longer provided Haji 
with the maximized security and power that he needed. In die NSC, the SNF did not 
have the fevel of power that it cbsired, since he NSC co-chairs were General Aden 
Gabio, of the Darood/Aulihan/Abssame clan and Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf, of the 
Mijerteen clan.
Another factor came from changes in Kismaayo. The city was controlled by a 
Harti-Marehan (of which, the SNF was mostly made up of Marehan clansmen)
524 Ibid.: 140
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coalition under Morgan. There were tensions in this alliance and in late 1997 the two 
sides clashed and Marehan were driven out of Kismaayo. Control of Kismaayo was 
extremely important because of the city’s economic resources, as it was in a fertile 
region of Somalia, was a trading center, and was a magnet for international aid due to 
the large IDP population. Morgan was receiving funds from Colonel Yusuf and the 
Mijerteen clan. At the same time, foe SNA had forces in foe Jubba valley and an 
alliance with them would provide the SNF with its only means of retaking the key 
city.
In order to maximize its security, the SNF changed its alliance. The factors at 
stake were based on power politics. The new alliance was in line with the logic of 
security and maintaining a relative balance of power, for if an actor has the choice it 
will join an alliance which makes it “more appreciated,” 525 in the sense that it retains a 
better position relative to actors within the coalition. The new alliance also gave the 
SNF the weapons it needed, though now they would come from Egypt, and the allies 
it needed to retake Kismaayo, which it did in June 1999.
However, “whether these options were good or bad for the Marehan 
community in Gedo region was apparently not an issue which weighed heavily in his 
deliberations.” This fact would become an issue for the SNF, as the group split into 
two factions, one controlled by Omar Hiji and another by Ali Nur. Though, this only 
serves to further demonstrate that the SNF, under the control of Haji, was more of a 
warlord organization than faction militia, in that it was concerned with the power of 
the militia rather than the protection of society.
525 Waltz 1979: 127. Though it is important to note that this is only true “provided, o f course, that the 
coalition they join achieves enough defensive or deterrent strength to dissuade adversaries from 
attacking.” (Waltz 1979: 127)
526 Ibid.: 140
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After this break, alliances with states would play out at a sub-SNF level. 
Ethiopia aligned with the Ali Nur wing, against their mutual enemy. Ethiopia was 
irritated with the switch in alliances as it had its troops on the border of areas 
controlled by the SNF. Moreover, it was concerned that the OLF was receiving arms 
and training from the SNA in Lower Shabelle region.527 Of course, the SNA and Haji 
faction of the SNF were now aligned with Egypt, thereby combining many threats 
into one. In April 1999, Ethiopia and the Ali Nur faction jointly attacked the SNA 
backed Omar Haji wing of the SNF in order to cut off the OLF -  this being expected 
from a security calculation perspective.
Analysis
The first point to note about the preceding example is that the breakup of the 
Ethiopia-SNF alliance clearly demonstrated that the SNF was still independent. It was 
able to decide “for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems, 
including whether or not to seek assistance form others and in doing so to limit its 
freedom by making commitments to them.” 528 Based on its perceived relative interest, 
it changed its alliances as it felt necessaiy.
The formation and breaking of international alliances in Somalia was based on 
interest in security and nothing more. The SNF and Ethiopia both aligned out of 
mutual desire to counter a security threat. When the alliance was no longer beneficial 
for the SNF, it broke away and formed an alliance with its erstwhile enemy, the SNA, 
and another state, Egypt, which offered a more beneficial alliance in security terms. 
Again, to reinforce the point, these alliances formed even though there were several 
cultural, historical, social, and even economic reasons for them not to. This further
527 UNDOS 1998
528 Waltz 1979: 96
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demonstrates the point that it was making decisions in terms of survival, not some 
grievances it had with the SNA (though there were many) or any attachments with 
Ethiopia. Thus, a balance of power based alliance between independent, security 
motivated actors formed and broke as predicted.
Such motivations are not found just with the SNF, they are common to 
warlords in the Somalia system. Clearly the SNA, which also considered the SNF an 
enemy, was making similar sorts of decisions about relative power balances. It also 
had hoped to take Kismaayo for some time, as it had stationed troops in the Jubba 
valley since 1993, just waiting for an opportunity to attack. The alliance with the SNF 
allowed it to do so. The conclusion is that the logic was the same.
CONCLUSION
At first glance it may seem that all the armed groups in Somalia are warlords. 
However, after careful analysis it has been found that in fact there are at least five 
different types of armed groups and it is sometimes only subtle differences that 
separate warlords from other types of armed groups. Nonetheless, these differences 
are real and important, as different types of armed groups may have different 
motivations for acting and therefore necessitate different analytical models. By ising 
the concepts developed in Chapters 2 and 3 it was possible to make an effective 
analysis of warlordism in Somalia.
It has also been possible to model the warfare and alliances between warlords 
and international actors in Somalia. The Somali system is clearly an anarchic one. The 
warlord actors as well as international actors, such as the UNOSOM forces and 
Ethiopian state treat it as such. During the UN intervention, the UNOSOM forces 
were not relating with the warlords as a sovereign policing the state, but rather as
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sovereign equals fighting over the distribution of power in a system Similarly, we 
should not see the Ethiopian attacks on al Ittihad as a simple proxy war. Rather, the 
Ethiopians aligned with the SNF to pursue mutual goals and when it was no longer in 
the SNF’s favor, it ended the alliance. This description of warlord international 
relations is both an accurate reflection of reality and an explanation of why the 
relations occurred as they did.
The relations hypothesized by the Neorealist approach held true in Somalia. 
During the UNOSOM intervention, anarchic war erupted between actors, not over 
control of the state, but over existential survival. The security dilemma did arise 
between Ethiopia, the SNF, and al Ittihad. This security dilemma led to outright 
conflict, i.e. war, in order to redress the security threat. Alliances were made and 
broken based on actors’ interest in survival, not grievance or greed or other factors. 
These patterns of relations hips are expected by a Neorealist account. Furthermore, the 
Neorealist approach is able to not just describe, but also explain why war broke out, 
why there was a security dilemma between the actors and why this security dilemma 
led to conflict, as well as why these alliances coalesced and broke up and then 
reformed with other actors.
This case study has demonstrated the applicability and usefulness of the 
Neorealist approach for analyzing warlordism. The concepts and definition developed 
in Chapter 2 have been shown to be helpful in making the subtle classifications 
necessary to differentiate seemingly like actors in Somalia. It has also been 
demonstrated that it is possible to model the international relations of warlords in 
Somalia. Furthermore, this model is a better reflection of reality then might be found 
using other views, such as that Somali warlords were making decisions based on 
grievances. At the same time the Neorealist account has explained the relations
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adequately. These were the criteria for validating the Neorealist approach to analyzing 
the international relations of warlords and therefore we should conclude that the 
Neorealist approach has been validated.
Added to this, the Neorealist account of warlord international relations also 
provides some theoretical predictive power that may be helpful in negotiating with 
and otherwise responding to warlordism in Somalia. For example, alliances between 
warlords and other sovereign actors should be seen through the lens of the pursuit of 
survival; since clan relations or other supposed loyalties have very little effect on the 
decision making of warlords, except as obstacles to be overcome in the pursuit of 
other goals. This is demonstrated in the ease by which warlords decide to break 
‘traditional’ alliances and realign with ‘traditional’ enemies. Therefore, the best way 
to predict the future alignment of a warlord is to calculate the security pa yoff for the 
organization. This opens up the artificial blinders that made a situation like Hiji’s 
decision to break with the NSC and Ethiopia seem so surprising to analysts at the 
time.
Likewise, this perspective explains how the various warlords in Mogadishu, 
who have been fighting each other for years, could align so quickly in order to attempt 
to make Mogadishu the capital for the TNG, after the TNG had discussed going 
elsewhere.529 This event too could have been predicted if an approach to modeling 
their interactions was based on a drive for relative security, rather than presently 
perceived grievances, or even a drive for absolute power. The warlords correctly 
perceived that if the capital was made elsewhere, their forces would be at a 
disadvantage to the much greater potential strength of the TNG, which would have 
been bulked up by international support. Their optimal calculation in such a situation
529 BBC May 2005
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was to align with each other to negotiate and thereby assure their continued relevance 
and strength relative to other armed groups. In the future, the Neorealist approach 
may again be helpful in predicting the actions of warlords in the same way.
The method of aiswering this study’s thesis question has been tested and 
passed. This chapter has described and explained the international relations of 
warlords in terms of a Neorealist account. Additionally, there is evidence that the 
explanation of warlord international relations based on Neorealism is predictive. By 
validating the Neorealist approach it is possible to conclude that the theoretical 
answer to this study’s question is also valid -  i.e. that warlords relate with states and 
other international actors in essentially the same way as states. The further implication 
is that this theory should hold true for other warlords, since it has passed the Waltzian 
test of explanatory usefulness. However, theories must be tested on more than one 
case in order to be validated. In particular, they must be tested in more demanding 
cases and therefore the next chapter will do just that
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CHAPTER 6 -  CASE STUDY: THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY
This chapter will meet Waltz’s requirement for following the test of a theoretical 
approach with a more demanding test case. The LRA and its international relations 
will be examined, since both the organization and its relations are less straightforward 
than the Somali warlords and their relations examined in Chapter 5. In addition, this 
case study examines a warlord in a fragmented state, as opposed to the collapsed state 
examined in Chapter 5, and thereby broadens the application of the Neorealist 
approach.
The LRA is a notoriously difficult to classify as an organization and the nature 
of its international relations are confusing. It has been variously referred to as an 
insurgency, millenarian cult, or terrorist group. The LRA is often thought to be a 
purely Ugandan insurgency, but in fact it is mostly based in Sudan and now the DRC. 
It attacks both Sudanese and Ugandan targets as well as the areas under the control of 
the SPLM/A.
It will be argued that these difficulties in classification can be amended and 
the LRA’s relations can be adequately modeled and explained using the Neorealist 
approach developed in this study. The nature of the LRA organization makes more 
sense when seen h terms of the concepts discussed in Chapter 2. In addition its 
relations -  with Sudan, Uganda, and the SPLM/A- can all be described and explained 
using a Neorealist account, including the specific relationships of alliance, security 
dilemma, and anarchic war.
This chapter will begin with a brief history of the LRA, which focuses in 
particular on how and why the LRA formed as it did. It will then be demonstrated that
278
the LRA is a warlord organization, not insurgency or other type of armed group. The 
LRA’s international relations will then be examined in relation to Uganda, Sudan, and 
the SPLM/A. The Neorealist approach will be applied to these relations as the 
explanatory model, with specific attention being paid to the balance of power between 
these actors.
HISTORY AND CONTEXT
The roots of the conflict in northern Uganda go back, at a minimum, to the colonial 
period. However, the origin of the LRA as an organization occurred after Yoweri 
Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) took control of Uganda in 
1986. At this time, multiple rebel movements arose to combat the take over.
The Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) grew out of the defunct 
Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA) and various other anti-NRM forces in an 
attempt to capture pcwer from Museveni. The UPDA had credibility within the 
Acholi community because of its anti-Museveni stance. This allowed it to recruit 
soldiers with relative ease and therefore use both conventional and guerrilla tactics 
against the NRM and its military wing, the National Resistance Army (NRA). The 
UPDA also knew and used terror tactics, a point of significance to note in regards to 
the future of the LRA.530
Another group, the HSM, founded by Alice Auma (Lakwena) in 1987, also 
attempted to battle the NRA. A lice, who claimed to be possessed by a World War I 
era Italian named Lakwena, had significant Acholi support and volunteers. Also, as 
the UPDA lost some ground against the NRA, Alice recruited some UPDA units. The 
HSM used initiation rituals and so called ‘Holy Spirit Tactics’ based on Christianity
530 Van Acker 2004
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and local beliefs to create a unique religious-military organization. The LRA would 
go on to adopt similar tactics.
Alice’s father, Severino Likoya Kiberu, attempted to reform the HSM after its 
defeat. While Alice had been able to rely on charisma and a willing population, 
Severino was forced to turn to violent means of finding support. To illustrate the 
point, Ruddy Doom and Koen Vlassenroot report that one of Severino’s names was 
otong-tong, which translates as ‘one who chops victims to pieces’. As the LRA 
would also come to do because of its unpopularity, Severino was forced to rely more 
heavily on the use of child soldiers.
In 1987, out of remnants of existent anti-NRA movements, Joseph Kony, a 
high-school dop-out and former alter boy from Gulu district, founded what would 
become known as the LRA. The LRA was formed when the more traditional rebel 
army of the UPDA was combined with the decidedly unorthodox HSM. Kony began 
his war by taking control of a unit of the UPDA. The aviator glasses-wearing, dread 
locked Kony, who is said to be a charismatic leader, then was able to attract more 
volunteers from both the UPDA and the HSM. After HSM’s defeat and the signing of 
a peace accord by the UPDA, there were no other effective military groups to 
represent the Acholi against the NRM/A. Given this, many veterans from both 
movements joined Kony. In particular, it is reported that the most brutal officers were 
attracted to Kony’s movement because they felt that they had no where to go back to, 
due to the atrocities they had committed.
531 (Behrend 1999: 107) The Holy spirit Tactics involved initiation, purification, and ritual through 
which members o f HSM were led to believe that they were invulnerable and that other magical benefits 
were theirs to use, including the ability to turn stones into grenades and bees into allies. These spiritual 
tactics were combined with conventional tactics and an organizational structure modelled on the British 
colonial format (Ibid. 110). While Alice was able to win a major battle in 1986, she and the HSM were 
ultimately defeated in November 1987.
532 Doom and Vlassenroot 1999
533 Cline 2003
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At first Kony’s movement seemed to be a continuation of the HSM. He was 
“the bearer of an apocalyptic vision, a mouthpiece of a widely accepted view that the 
Acholi people [were] on the verge of genocide.”534 Like Alice, Kony claimed to be 
possessed by spirits, including a Sudanese, Chinese, American, and former minister of 
Ida Amin. He also instituted cleansing processes, initiation rites, and practiced 
mystical acts which, amongst other things, allowed him to make his followers 
invincible by ritually armouring them with malailka, the Swahili word for angel. 
However, while the original HSM had strict moral rules of behaviour, which helped 
increase local popularity, Kony’s movement had far looser rules, and never achieved 
the popularity of either the HSM or the UPDA.
The holy spirit tactics were replaced with guerrilla tactics when remnants of 
the UPDA, led by Odong Latek, joined Kony in 1988. Other commanders, including 
Tabuley and Vincent Otti (who is currently considered second-in-command) also 
came over to the LRA voluntarily and have continued to contribute to the guerrilla 
warfare tactics used by Kony. These commanders brought with them guerrilla tactics 
and the military experience of ising terror as a strategy.536 To this day, the LRA can 
be seen as a combination of these two movements, combing the brutal guerrilla tactics 
of the UPDA as well as, particularly in its training and command and control system, 
the spiritual tactics of the HSM537
534 Doom and Vlassenroot 1999: 22
535 Behrend 1999: 114
536 Van Acker 2004: 348
537 The evolution of the LRA can be seen in its name changes. The initial movement was called the 
Holy Spirit Movement II -  a blatant attempt at following the HSM. Then it became the Lord’s 
Salvation Army, presumably to distance itself from the HSM. When many former UPDA fighters 
joined and the army became more of a guerilla force and held less emphasis on the spiritual side, it 
became the United Democratic Christian Force. Finally, with the death o f Latek and return to a more 
spiritual basis, Kony’s army became the Lord’s Resistance Army in 1992.
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The period of the early/mid 1990s is considered to be a major turning point in 
LRA strategy for two reasons.538 It was at this point that the Khartoum government 
began supplying Kony’s army with new weapons and equipment and allowed the 
LRA to establish bases in Sudan. In addition, Kony reportedly began to feel that the 
Acholi people had betrayed him. In particular, he felt this because of the ‘bow and 
arrow’ civil defence militias made up of fellow Acholis, set up by the government, 
and by the failure of a peace process that had been championed by Betty Bigombe in 
1994.539
After this period, the LRA directed much more brutal violence at the Acholi 
people. Major massacres occurred at Atiak in 1995, the Karuma and Acholpi camps in 
1996, and Lokung-Palabek in 1997. Similar massacres continue to the present day.
This behaviour is not uncommon in insurgencies, for, guerrilla movements 
that no longer feel they need the local population to survive may turn against it. This 
occurred during the Greek civil war, where the Communist guerrillas had access to 
bases in countries north of Greece.540 The possession of these bases meant the 
guerrillas “felt free to express their profound, even murderous, contempt for the Greek 
peasantry among whom they operated. ’,541
With the loss of what little popular support there was, the LRA instituted an 
increase in the number of child abductions. From the beginning, the LRA had 
considerably less support than either the UPDA or HSM, and therefore experienced 
difficulties in finding new recmits. This had detrimental effects on its ability to 
conduct a war against the NRA. Although the LRA had committed atrocities, as the 
UPDA before them, and used kidnapping for recruitment, as Severino’s HSM had
538 Doom and Vlassenroot 1999
539 Ibid.
540 Joes 2004
541 Ibid.: 19
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done, the period after the failure of the 1994 peace process fundamentally changed the 
way in which the LRA operated. Starting in the mid-90s, many of the largest 
kidnappings occurred, such as the 1996 Aboke kidnapping, and they became a much 
more regular occurrence in the north.
Since then, the practice has only been further reinforced. The adoption of the 
Amnesty Accord in 2000 threatened Kony’s ability to retain personnel who could now 
opt to return to society. 542 Kony has since lowered the age of desirable soldiers, taking 
higher percentages of these aged nine or ten and letting the mid-teenagers, who used 
to be the most desirable to the LRA, go.543
The alliance with Sudan produced significant military benefit. The LRA 
created rear bases in friendly Sudan which housed large numbers of LRA fighters, 
their wives, and other personnel. Excursions into northern Uganda were used to attack 
soft targets and loot goods. At the same time, forces were used to covertly fight the 
SPLA in southern Sudan. The LRA also used Sudan as an excellent source for 
weapons. At some points in the conflict, the LRA has reportedly even had better 
weapons than the UPDF troops.
Operation Iron Fist in 2002 and Iron Fist II in 2004 have also contributed to
the strategic and operational evolution of the LRA. These operations allowed the
Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) (the new name of the NRA) to follow up
and attack the LRA in southern Sudan after an agreement Uganda made with the
Sudanese government. The assaults significantly weakened the LRA’s fighting ability
and, reportedly, forced it to leave its Sudanese bases. The UPDF’s use of helicopter
gunships has been particularly effective at disrupting the LRA by making it much
more difficult for them to hide. The effect of these operations has been to uproot the
542 The Amnesty Accord gave blanket amnesty to all LRA fighters who returned from the bush. 
Refugee Law Project 2004: 6
543HRW 2002: 21
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LRA and make them even more mobile. The events have combined to allow the LRA 
to revolutionize its tactics and have contributed to its evolution into the organization 
that it is today.
In response to the Iron Fist operations, the LRA dispersed itself across a wider 
area.544 Smaller units have spread beyond the three traditional Acholi regions -  Gulu, 
Kitgum, and Pader. In the middle of 2003 the LRA began attacking further east, into 
Iteso and Langi areas.545 In moving to these districts, they seemed to be attempting to 
recruit other former rebels who also may potentially have disagreements with the 
Museveni regime. The Refugee Law Project reports, “the LRA came with a list of 
names of former UPDA rebels who had fought against the government from 1987 -  
1992. They wanted to know the locations of these ex-fighters so as to activate them to 
fight the “dictatorial” Museveni government.”546
Changes in the Relationships
The most significant recent event for the LRA has been the peace agreement between 
the Sudanese government and the southern rebels. The value of the LRA to Sudan in 
the past -  regardless of analytical approach taken -  has been in their use as a 
diplomatic countermeasure to the Ugandan government’s backing of the SPLA as 
well as being a militia to be used to directly combat the SPLA. Now that there is a 
peace agreement in place, the Sudanese may no longer need the LRA.
Relations between Sudan and Uganda changed to some extent after 1999 and 
greatly after 2001. The two countries had initially agreed to stop funding each other’s 
respective rebel group in 1999 under an agreement brokered by the Carter Center but
544 The LRA may also feel that the traditional districts o f Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader cannot support them 
any longer because they have been fully looted.
545 ICG 2004. ICG reports that “in doing this, Kony may have wanted to shift the dynamic o f the 
insurgency away from Acholiland in order to give it a more national dimension.” (ICG 2004: 7)
546 Refugee Law Project 2004: 35
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the funding did not really stop on either side. In a unilateral move, President Bashir 
announced his intent to cease funding the LRA in August of 2001. In January 2002 
the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) meeting was held in 
Khartoum. President Museveni made the offer to cease his country’s funding of the 
SPLA. These presidential declarations led to more formalized agreements by both 
sides concerning the conflicts.
John Young notes four reasons for why Sudan and Uganda have improved 
their relations.547 Sudan accepted that its attempt to expand Islam failed and therefore 
was looking to improve relations. Museveni felt increased pressure to defeat the LRA. 
The defeat of the LRA seemed possible with Uganda’s withdrawal from Congo. 
Finally, the LRA was officially cast as a terrorist organization by the US and this 
frightened Sudan to break its ties. We can update this reasoning to include the peace 
deal between Sudan and the SPLA which has meant that there is no longer a need for 
backing.
The degree to which funding ended then is debatable, but there was surely 
some lowering by each side. The withdrawal of support from the LRA was supposed 
to be total. President Bashir announced a total withdrawal of support in 2002 and that 
"[w]e have no access and control over Joseph Kony... We are proceeding towards a 
new era based on the fact that Sudan is not supporting any opposition group in the 
region. There have, however, been reports that the Sudanese government gave the 
LRA ‘one last’ (official) shipment of weapons.549 This was reportedly a large 
shipment, meant to supply the LRA until it, assumedly, could find another arms 
source. Beyond this, there are reports of members of the Sudanese army who are still 
supplying the LRA with weapons without direct orders from Khartoum, in order to
547 Young 2002
548 IRIN 2002
549 Noted in multiple interviews, Gulu, January 2005
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relieve pressure of LRA attacks.550 This support looks to be ending as well, however, 
as the LRA is attacking GoS villages and military installations, which reveals at least 
some enmity between the two sides.
Recently, the LRA has begun attacking civilians in southern Sudan. One such 
recent attack occurred near Juba, deep within southern Sudan. The LRA reportedly 
ambushed and attacked southern Sudanese civilians.551 In turn, government of Sudan 
forces attacked the LRA. This apparently signals a definite end of support from Sudan 
and broadening the conflict, however, the organizational changes that might arise 
from such a broadening are unclear as of yet.
Recent Events
In parallel to the end of the conflict in southern Sudan, over the last year there has 
been an on-again, off-again peace process in Uganda. It began in the autumn of 2004 
when Museveni enacted a unilateral ceasefire in certain a*eas of northern Uganda. 
This was to allow LRA leaders to meet safely and discuss the possibility of laying 
down their arms. During this time, the Ugandan internal affairs minister, Ruhakana 
Rugunda, and Bigombe, who is regarded as one of the few people that Kony trusts, 
led a government peace delegation. Samuel Kolo, then the LRA’s chief spokesperson, 
led the talks in person, while Otti also took part in the negotiations.
The process was hopeful. Reportedly, Kony, who has rarely communicated 
directly with the outside world, offered to meet with the local Acholi leaders. 
Simultaneously, President Museveni, who has said in the past that he would not 
negotiate with ‘terrorists’, suggested the possibility of meeting with Kony.
550 Interview, UN Access Advisor, Gulu, 14 January 2005. Confirmed in other interviews.
551IRIN 12 April 2005
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The talks came to a head on December 31st, the day the ceasefire ended. The 
LRA had asked for more time to review the agreement provided by the government. 
However, President Museveni was unwilling to grant the extra time and renewed 
UPDF operations began promptly on New Year’s Day.
Even with this setback, the peace process continued to move forward, though 
at a reduced pace. Bigombe and the negotiation team continued their contact with 
Kolo and Kony. In February, the government declared another 18-day cease-fire. Yet, 
it too ended without peace on February 22nd, and UPDF and LRA attacks began again 
soon afterwards. Since then there have been off and on negotiations.
However, these talks have been complicated by the indictment of the LRA’s 
leadership by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in October 2005.552 The ICC has 
officially called for the arrest and trial of the top five members of the LRA. With the 
possibility that the leadership may be tried and put in prison, something which they 
are certainly concerned with, it is not clear hew the peace process will proceed.
In the summer of 2006, the LRA began another round of high-level peace talks 
with Uganda via the government of southern Sudan.553 At the same time, the LRA has 
reportedly ‘reorganized] its leadership and overall structure and adjust[ed] its tactics 
to offset the improved performance of the Ugandan military.’554 In fact, the size of its 
units seems to be increasing from a traditional size of four to eight fighters to ten or 
even fifty.555 Moreover, the LRA has moved many of its forces into the DRC, thereby 
spreading the conflict even further. The ultimate outcome of these changes in the 
LRA and the peace talks are still in question and in general, the situation continues to
552 BBC News 7 October 2005.
553 IRIN 28 August 2006
554 ICG 2005: 2
555 Ibid.
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be fluid. As such, this chapter will not address these latest changes and will instead 
focus on the LRA up until the spring of 2005.
THE LRA AS WARLORD ORGANIZATION
The LRA is sometimes defined as an insurgency, in the sense that it exists to combat 
the Ugandan government and is therefore fighting a hierarchic war. In some ways its 
history points to this, forming as it did immediately after the take over of the Ugandan 
government by the NRM. Its rhetoric has at times seemed concerned with 
overthrowing the government and clearly it attacks the Ugandan government in any 
manner that it can.
But it is this confusion which is partly to blame for the consistent inability of 
many analysts to adequately explain or predict the relations of the LRA. The LRA is 
not an insurgency; n fact, the LRA is best analyzed as a warlord organization. In 
order to demonstrate this, it is necessary to make an internal analysis of the LRA 
using all of the concepts examined in Chapters 2 and 3. The LRA’s political 
community, organizational structure, purpose, autonomy, and independence will all 
be examined. In the examination of the LRA’s independence, particular attention will 
be paid to the LRA’s relationship with Sudan.
Political Community
The LRA is an enclosed political community. Those who are members, including 
commanders and their wives, are supported by its structure. Those outside of the 
organization are divided into three groups. Either they are abductees, who are second- 
class members of the group, given menial jobs and not trusted until proving their 
loyalty. Or they are the civilians who, though they may be treated like the enemy in
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that they may be harmed or killed, are potential abductees. Or, finally, they are the 
enemy, which includes the UPDF and SPLA.
The exact nature of the LRA’s political community is still poorly understood, 
but it is clearly wrapped up in the organization’s cult-like religion. Frank Van Acker 
has provided one useful way to consider it. He described this inside outside barrier in 
terms of religion. In his discussion of the notion of religious terrorism and notes that:
[rjeligious terrorism, as opposed to secular terrorism motivated by 
political gains assumes a transcendental dimension. Religious terrorist 
are not fighting within the rules of society as they exist, but reject these 
rules. They regard violence not only as a necessary expedient for the 
attainment of their goals, which can be religious, racial or ethnic 
purification, but as divinely decreed, and hence morally justified, 
almost as a sacramental act. What the LRA, under the absolute control 
of Kony, has in common with the HSM, is that it sees itself as the 
righteous few, those who are at once the activists and the consultants 
of their movement. They are outsiders form what they see as a virtual 
world, and terror is a traumatic intervention of the ‘real’ into the 
‘virtual’ world.556
For example, he inside -outside division is reflected in the spiritual practices of the 
LRA. For example, it has been noted that “after the initiation, the soldiers were
c c n
forbidden to touch non-initiates or wash for three days.” It seems clear that there is 
some form of social-religious boundary formed by the LRA and this allows it to
556 Van Acker 2004: 349
557 Lukermoi 1990:49
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separate itself from outside political communities, including the greater Acholi 
population of northern Uganda and southern Sudan.
The LRA’s political community is an exclusive membership and initiation 
based one. It is not based on a contiguous territory, for the LRA moves around the 
rural areas of northern Uganda, southern Sudan, and the DRC on a regular basis. Nor 
is it based on ethnicity, since most Acholis are clearly outsiders. Initiation through 
quasi-religious ritual is necessary to become a member. More to the point, one must 
be “chosen” to become a member, as the LRA no longer accepts volunteers -  instead 
abduction or birth to an LRA member are the routes to new membership.
Also, as noted in Chapter 2, once chosen, one is signaled as a permanent 
member of the LRA. The LRA forces abductees to murder members of their own 
family or village. This separates them from the Acholi community and makes them 
outcasts. Officers in the LRA then continually reinforce this alienation and threaten 
potential runaways that if they return to society they will be arrested or killed.
Organizational Structure and Command
The LRA political community is a praetorian organization. It is loosely modeled on a 
conventional military structure. 555 It is composed of four brigades - Control Alter 
(a.k.a. ‘Trinkle’) which includes the overall leadership, Sinia, Stockree, and Giiva.559 
Each brigade is estimated to have between 300 and 800 members and consists of three 
battalions. Battalions have their own commanders and are divided into sub-units of 
around 15 or 20, lead by field commanders. All life in the LRA is organized around 
this military structure, including for instance schooling and homemaking.
558 Note that the force structure, operations and equipment described here are all idealized forms. In 
practice, the LRA tends to be much more flexible, disorganized, and ad hoc
ICG 2004
290
Kony -  the warlord -  is generally considered to be mad and reputedly has 
spiritual powers. Beyond this, very little is known about him. The list of outsiders 
who have met directly with Kony over the last two decades can be counted on one 
hand. In general, he does not give interviews and does not record speeches.560 Until 
recently, some even questioned whether Kony was still alive and if he was, whether 
he was the one who was really in charge of the LRA.
Nonetheless there seems to be no doubt that Kony has significant influence 
over the LRA. The spirits which he says he is possessed by form the ideological heart 
of the organization. Kony makes the final decisions on strategy and it is only Kony 
who can make final decisions on ceasefires and other diplomacy.
However, as the International Crisis Group notes, “[the LRA’s] 
implementation is very much the responsibility of those who came to the LRA from 
the UNLA and UPDA and who along with Kony make up the high command.” 561 
Specifically, these men have included: ‘Brigadier’ Vincent Otti (LRA second-in- 
command), ‘Brigadier’ Okello Matata (third-in-command) and ‘Brigadier’ Tolbert 
Nyeko (army commander, reported killed in January 2004) as well as Kolo and 
Kenneth Banya (who opted for amnesty in 2004).
Below the leadership, field units tend to be the operational units of the LRA 
and these units also serve as the LRA’s major sub-organizational political units. Field 
commanders are likely to be abductees who have been with the LRA for a long time 
and have proven their loyalty. Each unit also has a mid-level ‘religious officer’ who
560 The Referendum magazine, a southern Sudanese magazine based in Kenya, published an interview 
with Kony in 2004 reportedly given by one of Kony’s former bodyguards. However, the magazine did 
not publish the man’s name nor is there any other collaborating evidence. While it does provide an 
incredible insight into Kony if  it is true, there is no conclusive evidence, as o f right now, to believe it to 
be so. More recently, Kony gave a televised interview on Newsnight (28 June 2006)
561 ICG 2004: 5
562 For instance, to become a field commander one must be shot at least once.
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is responsible for prayer, fasting, and other spiritual duties. During attacks and raids 
the groups may further split into units of 2 or 3 for maximum dispersion. Together 
these units can recombine into larger and larger cells and so on up to the entire LRA 
political community.
As a whole, the organization consists of 500 to 1,000 “hardcore fighters,” i.e. 
adults, probably left over from the HSM and UPDA.564 These men and women are 
junior commanders who also assumedly have an incentive to keep the organization 
afloat. This nucleus is unlikely to grow, as the LRA no longer takes volunteers.565
Outside of this core group that has volunteered for the LRA, there are the 
abductees and those bom into the LRA. The number of abductees in the LRA 
fluctuates, it is commonly estimated that there are approximately 3,000 at any given 
time. The abductees are usually young men and women between the ages of 8 and 18, 
though children abducted at 5 or 6 are not uncommon. Both sexes are used as porters 
and soldiers. However, women usually become a ‘wife’ of one of the commanders at 
some point and then are no longer allowed to serve as soldiers. Finally, there are those 
who are bom into the LRA and have now grown up into soldiers. It is unclear what 
these children’s roles are, but it is said that they are the most brutal, since they do not 
have any ethical grounding outside of the organization.566
The point of illustrating the make up of the LRA is that it demonstrates that 
there is in fact a hierarchical, structured organization. Kony commands this 
organization and his orders flow down through multiple levels of officers before 
reaching the abductees who make up the bulk of the army.
563 Interview with UN source, Gulu, 18 January 2005. Confirmed in other interviews.
564 The exact number is unknown, this number was gleaned from various interviews and analyst 
estimations. Some estimates put the number as low as 200 and others upwards of 2,000.
565 Reported ICG 2004, confirmed in various interviews, January 2005.
566 Interview with UN Acces s Coordinator, Gulu, 14 January 2005
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Purpose
As noted in the historical overview, the LRA formed out of the UPDA and HSM 
movements, which were both rebellions against the NRM takeover. Although not 
explicitly documented, we can assume that the LRA was also initially concerned with 
bringing about political change in Uganda. Yet, since then, the LRA has changed its 
political goals over time, obfuscated those it has hinted at, and, in general, rarely 
communicated with the outside world whatsoever. There have been many points at 
which the LRA could have clearly professed a political goal, yet they have not.
However, we can at least assume that resistance to the NRM government and a 
generally negative impact on the government are motivations. For example, h 2004 
the Kenya based Sudanese magazine The Referendum published an interview with 
Kony in which he said, ‘President Museveni cannot talk peace, he is a killer and he 
wanted to kill me by all means. I have asked the lords of the LRA to kill 
Museveni.” He also confirmed that the LRA “is fighting for the application of Ten 
Commandments of God and we are also fighting to liberate people living in occupied 
Northern Uganda.”568
Nevertheless, these political motivations have tended to become less important 
over time. Jackson specifically addressed the question of whether or not the LRA was 
driven by grievances.569 He noted that since at least the colonial period there has been 
an ongoing rivalry between the northern Acholi people and southern tribes, especially 
the Bugandans. However, he points out that the “clarity of grievance declined as the
567 Reported in BBC News 15 April 2004. Although the interview does give a rare glance into the 
organization, it should be taken with a grain of salt, as it was conducted by a former Kony body guard 
who has remained anonymous.
568 The Monitor 15 April 2004
569 Jackson 2002
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conflict progressed.”570 This is evident from the LRA’s increase in predation on the 
Acholi community since the mid-90s.
In general, the contemporary LRA lacks any obvious political motivations 
which we might use to explain the conflict. It has no realistic political demands which 
it communicates to the outside world. Its complete lack of indigenous support has 
meant that there is not even a dialogue upon which the LRA could build political 
goals. Although the LRA may continue to believe that it is providing a counterbalance 
to the Ugandan government, this does not seem to drive the conflict in any 
meaningful way, since there is no political ‘center of gravity’ which it defends.
Finally, as noted earlier, there is a relationship between an armed group’s 
structure and the goals it has as an organization. The LRA is not structured to carry 
out a definable political goal. For example, insurgencies will often have a relatively 
large portion of its organization devoted to political issues, education, and public 
relations. The LRA is not organized in such a way; rather it is organized simply to 
survive as an organization through continual warfare.571
Economic motivation
Another possible explanation for the LRA’s continuation of the conflict is that it 
serves as a profit making enterprise for those involved. Certainly, the LRA’s primary 
source of supplies is through looting. Interviews with various aid workers, officials, 
and analysts in the northern Ugandan region point to this. Trucks carrying valuable 
goods are regularly looted, especially for anything which can easily be sold in the
570 Ibid.: 47
3/1 Vinci 2005
572 Various interviews, Gulu, Kampala, January 2005.
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trading centers, such as bicycle tires or farm tools. Similarly, the LRA will loot 
villages, IDP camps, and, to a lesser extent, World Food Program (WFP) food aid.
However, the value of this looting economy is limited. Jackson finds that 
while there were economic repercussions from the LRA in the north, in general, 
economic factors have not dominated the conflict. He notes that
[l]ooting did, of course, take place and there were reports in the mid- 
1990s of shopkeepers in Gulu selling items taken in LRA ambushes 
but this has never amounted to more than petty theft or a small degree 
of black marketeering at best. In fact, both the HSM and the LRA have 
been remarkably lacking in any reference to personnel gain.574
This assessment is consistent with my own recent fieldwork. The general consensus 
among informants was that the LRA only takes what is necessary for their survival, 
usually food and medicine.576 On the contrary, its members are reported to be fairly 
frugal.
In general, there are no natural resources to fight over, with the possible 
exception of fertile land. Yet, the LRA does not hold territory in the traditional sense 
and therefore could not take advantage of natural resources even if they did exist. It 
does not even control borders -  a racket that has been found to be lucrative for other
c n n  #
African armed groups. Thus, while there is some degree of regular looting, this 
does not adequately explain the LRA’s immensely violent operations.
573 Interview, WFP head, Gulu, 19 January 2005.
574 Jackson 2002: 47
575 Gathered from various interviews in northern Uganda during January 2005.
576 Interview with NGO Country Director, Gulu, January 13,2005.
577 Collier 2000
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The LRA’s Existential Motivations
The motivations for the LRA’s continuance of its war discussed so far have all been 
instrumental in nature. The conflict is seen as a means for bringing about political 
change or providing economic gain. Although these motivations have played a role in 
the past and may continue to have some effect on the conflict, they offer only a 
limited explanation for the continuance of the conflict. Rather, it is helpful to consider 
the existential motivations behind the conflict and, more generally, the perpetuation of 
the LRA as an organization. These existential motivations can be seen at each level of 
the LRA’s organization.
The highest level commanders in the LRA fear for their safety if they 
surrender and therefore see the LRA as their only means of survival. There is a deep- 
rooted distrust for Museveni and his policies. This makes it difficult for the leadership 
to trust the Ugandan government enough to return to society for fear that they will be 
imprisoned or killed. This general fear is combined with more specific fears about 
revenge for past atrocities. For example, Otti’s massacre of hundreds of civilians from 
his own village reportedly weighs heavily on his mind. Moreover, now that the ICC 
threatens to arrest the uppermost rank of the LRA, there is even more fear of returning 
from the bush.
Secondly, the rebellion has become a vocation, even more than that -  simply 
the basis of life, for many of the men who have been involved in it for 17 years. Kony 
and the other top-level commanders choose their wives.579 These wives and the men’s 
children stay with them in the bush. The families of commanders are provided for and 
abducted teachers educate the children. They also have access to food and other
578 Interview with member of peace negotiations team, Gulu, 14 January 2005.
579 Of which Kony reportedly has between 30 and 100.
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resources such as clothing that they would otherwise most likely not be able to obtain 
as poorly educated citizens in the impoverished north.580 Additionally, the top-level 
commanders enjoy power which is unobtainable in normal society. Since it is highly 
unlikely that the LRA would be absorbed into the state military, as has occurred in 
peacemaking cases in the past in Uganda and elsewhere, there are no professional 
prospects for the career military men who make up the upper-echelons of the LRA. 
Thus, as Walter Ochora, Chairman of the Gulu Local District Council, who has met 
Kony, notes ‘Kony is not mad. He knows what he is doing, very well. For him this 
war has become a way of life...”581
The junior commanders have more mixed motives. Some really subscribe to 
‘Kony’s spiritualist path to Acholi emancipation and might continue to fight for a 
similar cause even if the LRA were to be defeated.”582 Others, and most likely the 
majority, simply feel that there is nothing better for them if they were to leave and 
return to the impoverished life within the IDP camps. Although most members of the 
LRA are abducted, there is anecdotal evidence that the mid-level commanders who 
either volunteered or moved up from the level of an abductee do find some benefit in 
membership.
This turn to war as vocation has been noted in the context of other conflicts. 
Similar motivations were found in Liberia and Sierra Leone during their civil wars, 
where the ‘lumpen’ youth joined the military units for the excitement, money, and
580 The view that the LRA is thought of as a vocation conforms to recent analyses of the LRA’s 
demands in any negotiated peace. For instance, the International Crisis Group notes that it is necessary 
to “[put] on the table a comprehensive settlement that focuses on security and livelihood guarantees for 
both LRA commanders and rank and file.” (ICG 2005: 8) They refer to one person close to the peace 
process who underscores this recommendation, remaking that “[a]lmost everything boils down to these 
two things. Fear for their safety and their economic future are the two things wearing on the LRA.” 
(ICG 2005: 7)
581 Interview with Walter Ochora, Chairman o f Gulu local district council, Gulu, quoted in IRIN 2003.
582 ICG 2004: 8
583 Noted in interviews with local residents in Gulu, January 2005.
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because they ‘had nothing better to do.’ Morten Boas summarizes the point well when 
he notes
...War becomes a trade... Youths join armed insurgencies by 
connecting themselves to respected and feared warlords the advantages 
of doing so include everything from loot, bribes and girlfriends (for the 
boys) to the acquisition of power for protection and revenge. Simply 
possessing a gun can transform a ‘nobody’ into a ‘somebody’. The 
practice of war has therefore broadened from a drama of social
fQyj
exclusion into a way of life and a mode of production.
This is particularly the case for those bom within the LRA. Officers in the 
LRA are provided with ‘wives’ and to these guerilla families, many children have
coc
been bom. These children have no connection with outside society and have grown 
up only knowing the religious and cultural institutions of the LRA. They can be seen 
as the heart of the LRA’s organization -  a core constituency which truly does not 
consider itself a part of wider society. As such, they will seek to uphold it at any cost.
Although the LRA no longer accepts volunteers and torturous abduction is the 
only route to new membership, even these abductees may have an interest in the 
continuation of the organization. After abduction there is a process of initiation 
through traumatization, in which the children will be ordered to torture and kill fellow 
abductees, especially family members. A standard method is to put victims in the
for
middle of a circle and ha\e the rest beat them to death. “This process is designed to 
depersonalize, terrorize, and dehumanize the abductees, alienating them from their
584 Boas 2004: 212
585 The exact number of such children is unknown.
586 Human Rights Watch 1997
298
587  •families, from their friends and from one another, by means of violence.” In domg 
this, the LRA effectively creates an incentive for abductees to not return to society for 
fear of reprisals for killing family members and fellow villagers -  thereby leaving the 
impression that it is only with the LRA that they can find protection and a life.
While the LRA may have some instrumental goals, it is the existential 
motivations which are more helpful in explaining why the LRA continues its conflict. 
The organization quite literally provides for the survival of its members. It also 
provides for secondary existential needs, such as vocation and a sense of belonging. 
For some it is northing more than a survival strategy -  “Survival by the gun”588 -
fO Q
while for others, those who live comfortably in the bush, it is “rebellion as career.” 
Together these factors cause individuals to work for the perpetuation of the 
organization and it is herein that we can see the root of the continuation of the 
conflict As Doom and Vlassenroot note, “it seems that Kony is no longer interested
CQA
in winning a conflict, but that violence has become both a tool and an end in itself.” 
Thus, in a sense, the purpose of the LRA at this point is only to continue to survive.
The LRA should not be seen as a traditional insurgent organization with set 
political goals that define its existence. While it may have such instrumental goals, it 
is a more existential organization. The organization quite literally provides for the 
survival of its members. It also provides for secondary existential needs, such as 
vocation and a sense of belonging. Finally, it provides a political community for those 
considered its members. Together these factors cause individuals to work for the 
perpetuation of the organization and thereby allow the organization to remain 
autonomous and independent.
587 Amnesty International 1999: 56
588 ICG interview with Ugandan official, Kampala, December 2003, reported in ICG 2004
589 Doom and Vlassenroot 1999: 36
590 Ibid., p. 26.
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Autonomy
The LRA is clearly autonomous. It has been combating the Ugandan government 
continuously since 1986. During this time the organization has continued to carry out 
its own foreign and internal policy. The Ugandan government has tried to defeat the 
LRA militarily, but has had little success. At various times, including recently, the 
government has attempted negotiations as a means to end the conflict. These 
negotiations have failed because the LRA has simply continued to prefer autonomous 
existence than any possible peace offer Though some members of the organization 
have taken ip amnesty, the organization as a whole, led by Kony, has continued to 
prefer surviving as a separate entity.
The LRA is able to maintain its autonomy because of its military ability. The 
root of the LRA’s military ability is in its highly survivable units, which allow it to 
combat the much larger UPDF. Specifically, the LRA units are all self-sufficient and 
can survive in the bush for long periods of time.591 Wives and porters are brought 
along. The units loot their food and all other material needs.592 At the same time, these 
units are extremely light, fast, and well coordinated. They can reportedly make it from 
Lira to Gulu, a distance of around fifty miles through heavy bush, in around five 
hours on foot.593 If at any time the unit feels that abducted porters or wives are 
slowing it down, it will kill or release them. The units are closely coordinated by 
radio, or more commonly, cellular phones.594 Even the smallest units are reported to
591 Normally, they do not carry weapons heavier than RPGs and bring only the food necessary for 
survival. If the unit loots a lot of food or other goods, it will temporarily abduct adults or children to 
carry it.
592 They are reportedly particularly fond of sugar cane which is high in energy and easily transportable. 
(Interview with local resident, Gulu, 18 January 2005)
593 Interview with UN Access Advisor, Gulu, 14 January 2005. An incredible speed, and possibly 
exaggerated, but it is illustrative.
594 The LRA reportedly stole radios from the Catholic Church, which still is able to track their 
transmissions (though they are encoded). Often the units will have to walk to known areas o f the bush
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have some sort of communication device.595 Furthermore, this allows them to rejoin 
other units in order to head back to Sudan or combine into a larger attack force. In 
general, field commanders seem to be given a high degree of control over their unit’s 
activities and the self-sustainable nature of the units means that they can carry out the 
field commander’s instructions indefinitely. Finally, the LRA’s light, small, fast 
tactics do not require heavy weapons. Units generally have RPGs for ambushes as 
well as assault rifles, usually the ubiquitous AK-47s. However, the LRA is 
notoriously frugal with its rifles and only select members of the unit, usually just 
commanders, have one.596 The rest of the soldiers use machetes, axes, or even just a 
club.
The LRA’s tactics make it extremely good at asymmetric (i.e. warlord) 
warfare and thereby allow it to survive in long-term war with the much more powerful 
Ugandan state. LRA combat units can outfox the much larger UPDF units and they 
have even learned how to avoid UPDF helicopter gunships. The ability of the LRA to 
be so diffuse makes it almost impossible to pin down in a decisive battle, but its 
ability to move quickly and form into larger units spontaneously allows it to fight 
offensively when need be. Finally, as noted earlier, its strategic use of fear has also 
acted as a force multiplier against the UPDF.597 In this way, the LRA has been able to 
survive for two decades against the odds of forces 20 to 30 times its size -  and in 
doing so, retain its autonomy.
where they can receive cell phone service and occasionally must send someone to buy phone credit 
from a town. There are numerous stories o f dirty, ragged men walking out of the bush and buying a 
million shillings worth o f phone credit. (Gathered from various interviews conducted in Gulu and 
surrounding IDP camps, January 2005)
595 Though they are not in constant communication, as illustrated by left over attacks after Kony called 
cease fires, the units are able to coordinate their movements enough to assure that there is little 
unwarranted overlap.
596 For instance, the penalty for escape is execution, but the penalty for escape with a rifle is execution 
and the execution o f one’s family.
597 Vinci 2005
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Independence - Motivation
The major form of motivation for the LRA is coercion. The group is notorious for its 
reliance on abducted soldiers, sex slaves, and laborers to fill its ranks. Human Rights 
Watch reports that more than 20,000 children have been abducted since 1990.598 The 
level of abductions fluctuates but tend to go up during increased military operations 
by the UPDF in order to replenish numbers and during large scale looting, such as 
after a WFP food drop.599 The horrible future that awaits those who have been 
abducted, in some ways worse than death, makes it a powerful threat.
The typical abduction is extremely brutal. Intimidation and beatings are 
followed by being forced to carry loads long distances. A process of initiation through 
traumatization then takes place, in which the children will be ordered to torture and 
kill fellow abductees. As noted earlier, a standard method is to put victims in the 
middle of a circle and have the rest beat them to death. Then there is ‘registration,’ in 
which each receives fifty or more lashes. This will be followed by months of hard 
labor, regular beatings, food deprivation, and summary execution for disobeying 
orders or attempting to escape. “This process is designed to depersonalize, terrorize, 
and dehumanize the abductees, alienating them from their families, from their friends 
and from one another, by means of violence.”600 Thereby, abduction also serves as the 
initiation process for becoming a member of the LRA political community.
The LRA then builds up the abductees until they are ready to become full 
members of the organization. The abductees may be kept as porters for up to months 
before being trusted enough to be an LRA soldier. This test of loyalty is more 
important than skill development within the organization. There is little information 
on set training regimes in the LRA. It last around 3 weeks. The faining itself is
598 HRW 2004: 20
599 •Amnesty International 1999
600 Ibid.: 56
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probably not very complicated as most combat only involves hand weapons such as 
machetes or small arms for the majority of soldiers.
Voluntary members likely remain with the organization because of the 
previously discussed reasons, including survival and vocation. Retention, for those 
who are not voluntary members, is based on trauma. In particular, a side effect of the 
abduction process is that it guarantees retention to a degree by instilling fear of 
recapture into the abductees.
Independence - Logistics
In order to sustain itself, the LRA has developed a procurement process, or economic 
system. This is not to say that the purpose of the LRA is for economic gain. As 
alluded to earlier, there is relatively little looting by the LRA, and what is looted tends 
to be the basics for survival. There is no looting of natural resource, as occurs in many 
other African wars, since there are no easily transposable natural resources. And in 
general the conflict does not make sense from an economic perspective. However, 
clearly, the LRA must obtain certain goods in order to remain self-sustaining.
The LRA’s primary source of supplies is through looting. Interviews with 
various aid workers, officials, and analysts in the northern Ugandan region point to 
this.601 For instance, the LRA will raid villages or IDP camps for medicine. The most 
important source of food is looting harvested crops. The LRA will often let civilians 
raise their crops without incident and then one day they will abduct people, usually 
the farmers themselves, to harvest the crops and carry them back to the LRA’s camps. 
Combined with this looting, the members of the LRA are known for their wilderness
601 Various interviews, Gulu, Kampala, January 2005
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survival skills. In total, the LRA is self-sufficient when it comes to the basics of 
survival.
Abduction is not just limited to being a means of gaining farm labor or 
soldiers. The LRA will abduct any skilled professionals it needs, whether they are 
doctors to treat the wounded or teachers to instruct the children of officers. In this 
way, the LRA can survive as a political community without the need to actually 
generate its own professional base. However, everything that the LRA needs cannot 
necessarily be gained from looting. In particular, weapons must be provided by 
outside actors.
Weapons Procurement
The other major means for the LRA to gain goods has been through external support. 
Sudan was the primary supplier of the LRA between the mid-nineties and the last 
couple of years, when its support officially ended.
It is not clear where the LRA obtained weapons before Sudan began supplying 
them. The Great Lakes, East African, and Horn of Africa regions have experienced 
multiple wars in the past decades and in general small arms tend to be relatively 
common. It is likely that the LRA was able to tap into the various networks of small 
arms dealing. At the same time they were also likely supplied by other armed groups 
like the UPDA and by taking them from government forces.
Sudan began supplying the LRA with weapons in 1994. These weapons 
include the standard small arms that the LRA uses, such as rifles and RPGs, as well as 
heavier weapons such as anti-tank landmines. Recently, the Sudanese government 
stopped supplying the LRA with weapons (at least to an extent) and it is iDt clear 
where future procurements will come from.
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Yet, the LRA is not as dependent on Sudan for weapons as it may seem. It was 
able to obtain weapons before 1994 and still has weapons now that Sudanese support 
has stopped. In other words, it has -  as a state w ould- diversified its sources.
The LRA is known to have stockpiled weapons that it received from Sudan 
over the years and these weapons have allowed it to continue fighting. As one NGO 
representative noted, “[t]hey were putting arms in the Imatong Hills well before 
Operation Iron Fist. They know how to plan for a rainy day. Besides, their supply 
needs are very low. They only fire something like a hundred bullets a day.” 602 The 
sites where they are buried are usually places that are difficult to remember so that 
even if soldiers are captured or escape, they are unable to remember where the 
weapons are.603 This stockpiling ensures that the LRA can continue waging war for 
long periods even after loosing access to external arms sources.
At the same time, there are others in the Acholi Diaspora community who 
facilitate resources being funneled to the LRA. They may or may not support the LRA 
methods, but they seem to believe that armed struggle is a justifiable means for 
overthrowing the NRM government. Acholi politicians can also capitalize on the 
weakening of the government.604
Compared with many other warlord organizations, the LRA is extremely 
frugal. The most important items are the weapons and ammunition used to main its 
independence through military force. Following closely behind that are food, water, 
and medicine necessary to sustain the lives of those in the LRA. Finally, the LRA 
obtains minimal economic surplus for stockpiling and the luxury of commanders. In 
all cases, the LRA is able to obtain what it needs with minimum dependence on any 
supplier that might limit its decision-making ability.
602 Interview with NGO representative, reported by Refugee Law Project 2004: 19
603 Refugee Law Project 2004: 22
604 Interview, WFP head, Gulu, 19 January 2005
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In particular, while it has received external funding from Sudan, and for this it 
has performed services, these funds are not necessary for it to survive and thus they 
are not truly dependent. As one UN source put it, “they are not the type that would 
allow themselves to be controlled by Sudan.”605 The LRA has continued to exist, and 
to function at similar levels, since the lose of Sudanese support and this demonstrates 
that the organization is independent and should not be considered a proxy.
Conclusions about the LRA
Putting these pieces together, we can conclude that the LRA is a warlord organization. 
The LRA has an enclosed political community and the command, control, and 
communication system in place to effectively direct it, making it a cohesive, unitary 
actor. As an organization, survival is its primary motivation, as opposed to economic 
or other factors. And, it is this motivation which drives the organization as opposed to 
that derived from another state. It has used its military power to maintain its 
autonomy. It has the structural ability to continually recruit new personnel and 
motivate them to continue fighting, even if in the most despicable way imaginable. 
Finally, it has developed the logistical ability to perpetuate the organization 
indefinitely without losing too much decision-making authority. In total, we should 
conclude that the LRA is a warlord organization and therefore it is now possible to 
examine the LRA’s international relations using a Neorealist approach.
LRA RELATIONS WITH UGANDA, SUDAN, AND THE SPLM/A
The LRA has several relevant international relations. However, these relations are 
difficult to characterize. For example, it is usually held that the LRA is fighting an
605 Interview, UN Access Advisor, Gulu, 21 January 2005
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insurgent rebellion against Uganda and therefore its relations with the state are best 
characterized as domestic or internal in nature -  in the terms of this study, a hierarchic 
war. However, the LRA leadership and the bulk of the organization at any given time 
exist inside of Sudan or the DRC, making its relations with Uganda parallel 
international relations. Yet, the LRA is in many ways a Ugandan organization. Most 
of its personnel are originally from Uganda. More importantly, its raison d ’etre -  
beyond survival -  has been based on Ugandan politics.
The situation is complicated by Sudan’s changing relationship with the LRA. 
While Sudan was an unabashed ally of the LRA, the LRA’s basing in government- 
controlled areas of southern Sudan could probably best be characterized as an invited 
military. A parallel might be the nature of the United State’s basing relationship with 
Germany or South Korea. Since the ‘dealignment’ of the two actors, however, it is a 
harder to characterize relationship. The LRA is not officially invited to stay inside of 
Sudan and the LRA’s new found penchant for attacking GoS controlled villages leads 
to the postulation that they are not informally accepted either.
The LRA’s relationship with the SPLM/A is even more difficult to 
characterize. The SPLM/A clearly has had effective territorial control over large areas 
of southern Sudan, even before the peace process. In some ways its borders are less 
porous than those that define the boundary between the Ugandan and Sudanese state. 
For the LRA, movement into SPLM/A ‘liberated’ areas is just as illegal and fraught 
with danger as uninvited movement into a state. Moreover, now that the SPLM/A is 
technically part of the greater government of a united Sudan, it s very difficult to 
conceptualize the relationship between the LRA, its traditional ally the GoS, and its 
traditional enemy, the SPLM/A.
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Neorealist Approach
Neorealism is a valuable approach for describing and explaining the LRA’s confusing 
international relationships with the SPLM/A, Sudan, and Uganda. The previous 
section made the argument that the LRA is a warlord and is therefore autonomous 
from Uganda and independent from Sudan. The implication of this is that its relations 
may be considered in terms of the Neorealist approach. As such, he LRA is best 
treated as a sovereign unit, like Sudan or Uganda. In this way, the LRA’s 
relationships with the Ugandan and Sudanese states, as well as the SPLM/A are all 
best characterized as international in nature.
The LRA certainly treats its relations with the two states and armed group as 
international. It perceives itself as a separate political community that is not 
hierarchically controlled by either Sudan or Uganda, and certainly not by the 
SPLM/A. As such, its actions are guided by the logic of self help.
The other actors also treat the LRA as an autonomous actor. Uganda treats the 
LRA as a rival international actor by default, even though they may not do so 
officially, since it is forced to relate with the LRA as a rival military, not criminal 
organization. While the LRA was aligned with Sudan, Sudan treated the organization 
as an equal ally. Although it is impossible to know the exact nature of the relationship 
between the two actors, it can be safely assumed that it was a two-way alliance, not 
dependent to patron relationship. Finally, the SPLM/A also treats the LRA as a rival.
Based on this view of the LRA and its relations, we can make some 
hypotheses about what its relations should be like. Rather than placing the balance of 
power between Uganda and Sudan, it is more explanatory to place it between Sudan, 
Uganda, the LRA, and SPLM/A. The difference in the two views is that the LRA and
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SPLM/A are considered to be primary, rather than proxy, actors in the balance of 
power. Additionally, we should hypothesize that:
• The LRA is fighting an anarchic war with Uganda and the SPLM/A
• The LRA was in an alliance with Sudan
• This alliance was based on interests of security by both actors
• Once the alliance ended, the LRA and Sudan should become mutual threats
• The LRA, SPLM/A, Sudan, and Uganda balance of power fluctuates
depending on security calculations by each actor
The following section will demonstrate that the above hypotheses are valid. It 
will illustrate the LRA’s relationships with each actor -  Uganda, Sudan, and the 
SPLM/A. For each relationship it will be demonstrated that the relationships can be 
described in terms of Neorealist patterned relationships and that the theory is able to 
explain these relationships as well as provide potential predictions.
Relations between the LRA and Uganda -  Anarchic War
There are some reasons to treat the relationship between the LRA and Uganda as one 
of insurgent to counterinsurgent.606 Throughout it history, the LRA has acted 
aggressively in attacking government forces and civilians in northern Uganda. In 
reply the NRA and UPDF have used three counterinsurgent strategies over three eras 
of the conflict.
• They have used search and destroy methods to find, attack, and kill LRA
members.
606 There are some qualifications to make, in particular, there are rumors of profiteering by high 
ranking UPDF officers abound in the north. In particular, there is talk of officers making land 
purchases and otherwise gaining from the insecurity in the region. There is undoubtedly significant 
corruption involved in the conflict, but the lack of hard evidence makes these issues difficult to theorize 
about and, moreover, they do not seem to have consequences for the broader counterinsurgent 
strategies.
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• They have adopted a ‘protected hamlet’ strategy, in which they have relocated 
northern Uganda residents into IDP camps and set up defensive perimeters 
around these camps.
• The third method has involved all out attacks inside of Sudan against LRA 
base camps using helicopters and large units (i.e., the Iron First operations). 
However, rather than seeing the relationship between the LRA and Uganda as
insurgency to counterinsurgency, we should see the relationship as one of anarchic 
war. There are several reasons to characterize the relationship in this way.
The LRA is not fighting a war for control of the Ugandan state. Even though 
at times its rhetoric has pointed to a war for control of the state, its actions have 
pointed in other directions. It has little if any political ideology or plan for a Ugandan 
state which it would rule, other than an oft-repeated call for ‘governance of Uganda 
by the 10 Commandments’. The LRA does not attempt to mobilize support amongst 
any group within Uganda. Nor is it systematically organized in such a way as to create 
a change in the state or to come to control the state apparatus. The LRA has no such 
organization and should not be considered an insurgency, nor therefore, should it be 
held that it is fighting an insurgency. Rather, the war in northern Uganda should be 
seen as an effort by the LRA to perpetuate itself, i.e. to survive. In other words, it is 
fighting an anarchic war.
Accordingly, the Ugandan government does not treat the LRA as a policing 
matter carried out by a hierarchical authority over a sub-state organization. Initially, 
many of its counterinsurgency strategies were attempting to do just that, but their 
failure is illustrative of the point. The government has been forced to accept that it 
must treat the LRA as an enemy to be fought in a war. It uses the full force of is
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military to attack the organization, just as it might against another state. It also 
negotiates with the LRA in the peace process as it might with a state with which it 
hopes to end a war.
The difference is subtle, but important because it answers some of our 
questions about the conflict. For example, this characterization of the conflict as 
anarchic war helps to explain why the LRA has fought such a ‘pointless’ and 
‘protracted’ war -  two off-noted depictions of the conflict. It is true that there is no 
point in the conflict in the sense that the LRA does not have a specific goal that can be 
obtained in the manner of hierarchic, civil wars. Instead, the goal of the LRA is to 
survive and this means continuing the conflict indefinitely since it needs the conflict 
in order to maintain itself as an organization, and assumedly, the Ugandan 
government will never accept the existence of an autonomous actor inside its defined 
borders. This then also helps to explain the repeated failure of any attempts at peace 
negotiations. The LRA will never allow peace because peace would mean an end to 
its autonomy and the existence of itself as a separate entity. Similarly, the Ugandan 
state will never allow the existence of an autonomous entity in its territory.
Relations between the LRA and Sudan -  From Alliance to Security Dilemma
The LRA’s relationship with Sudan is often characterized as one of a dependent 
armed group as the proxy or extension of the Sudanese state’s foreign policy, 
however, the relationship is better characterized as an alliance. Again, there are 
several reasons to see the relationship in this light.
607 There are some doubts about the Ugandan government’s true desire to vanquish the LRA. However, 
there is no clear proof of a conspiracy by the government to keep the LRA around for political reasons. 
Indeed, its actions point the other way and the government has shifted significant military power 
toward defeating the enemy. The recent alliance with the SPLA and GoS, in particular, points to a true 
desire to defeat the LRA militarily.
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The LRA is an independent organization. This was demonstrated in the above 
section based on mostly on the logic that the LRA survived as an organization before 
Sudanese funding and in general has the ability to remain autonomous without the 
backing of the GoS. The point is backed up by the fact that the LRA has continued to 
survive after losing Sudanese support.
Furthermore, if the LRA truly were an extension of Sudan we would expect it 
to more exactly reflect Sudanese foreign policy, in the same way that we expect in 
other wings of the Sudanese government, such as its army. This is not the case. The 
implication of this is that the GoS would not have the necessary leverage to control 
the LRA as a proxy and that therefore the relationship would be characterized as one 
of negotiations between actors.
The relationship between the LRA and the GoS should be characterized as an 
alliance. Two separate actors with their own interests formed a relationship which is 
mutually beneficial. The alliance increased the security of Sudan by providing it with 
an ally to fight its enemies -  Uganda and the SPLM/A. The alliance also brought 
benefit to the LRA through the increase of its power relative to the Ugandan state, 
since it was able to have more weapons and equipment with which to fight, as well as 
basing rights.
The alliance was made regardless of any identity issues -  it was purely based 
on security motives. As noted, the LRA is a Christian/Animist organization and the 
GoS is Islamic Fundamentalist. These identities are at odds with each other and from 
an identity perspective there would be no reason for them to join. In particular, 
animism is wholly unacceptable to Islamic thought. Instead, it has been the pursuit of 
security that has led to the alliance. The LRA aligned with Sudan when peace talks 
failed with Uganda and Kony realized that he would need to continue the conflict with
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a backer. In parallel, the Sudanese state needed an ally to balance Uganda’s support of 
the SPLM/A.
Finally, now that the alliance has been broken, it makes sense for both actors 
to revert to a relationship of mutual threat, prone to the security dilemma. Sudan made 
peace with the SPLM/A for wider reasons having to do with regional and global level 
politics. This has left no need for it to continue an alliance with the LRA, for there is 
no longer a security threat. Since there are two security obsessed actors in close 
proximity, we should expect a security dilemma to form between the two because 
they may each be a potential security threat.
This did in fact occur and the LRA has begun fighting GoS troops and raiding 
GoS villages. It was even reported that Kony threatened to attack the Sudanese 
government if he felt threatened. In an interview he remarked, “I want to tell the 
Sudanese lords to keep away from us because if they attack us as they have done this
/7 \Q
month [March], we will fight and set their villages on fire."
Moreover, with this threat coming from the LRA, it seems that the GoS has 
begun actively combating it. Sudan and Uganda signed an agreement to allow the 
Ugandan military to track the LRA anywhere in Suda n and that Sudan would join 
forces with the SPLA and Ugandan military to hunt the LRA.609 This turn of events -  
i.e. to an anarchic war -  was to be expected when a security dilemma between the 
LRA and Sudan formed.
Relations between the LRA and SPLM/A -  Anarchic War
The LRA is clearly fighting an anarchic war with the SPLM/A. The SPLM/A like the 
LRA was up until recently a non-state armed group and therefore it is obvious that
608 Reported in IRIN 20 April 2004
609 IRIN 11 October 2005
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there was no state apparatus which the LRA could hope to control through conflict 
with the SPLM/A.
It might be held that the LRA is fighting its war with the SPLM/A in order to 
appease the Sudanese government, in exchange for support of the LRA’s war against 
Uganda. This is true to an extent. Initially it seems that the LRA began fighting the 
SPLM/A as an exchange in its alliance with Sudan. The GoS used the LRA as another 
militia front to target the SPLM/A. These attacks were sometimes made jointly with 
the Sudanese military. Interviews with returned LRA soldiers give an idea of the sort 
of war going on between the LRA and SPLA.'One returnee describes the situation:
After the training, we were given guns and right away went to fight the 
SPLA. We fought many times against the SPLA, especially laying 
ambushes for the SPLA. We would wait along the road for the SPLA 
to collect the food which was brought from Uganda and then attack 
them. Kony told us that the Ugandan government is assisting the 
SPLA. We often fought the SPLA and UPDF together.610
Human Rights Watch interviews point to at least one such battle in 1995 in a camp 
called Biroka in southern Sudan and another in 1997 south of Juba.611 This would 
have been relatively soon after the GoS had begun funding the LRA and long before 
any reconciliation process between the two countries.
Meanwhile, the conflict between the SPLM/A and LRA has continued on even 
past the peace agreement between the SPLA and GoS. Very soon after making peace
HRW 1998b
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with the Sudanese government, John Garang declared war on the LRA. Whether or 
not it is agreed upon that the LRA and SPLM/A were fighting as proxies of Uganda or 
Sudan, it is clear that now that both groups are no longer backed by either country, the 
war is one between the two groups on their own.
The LRA’s relationship with the SPLM/A makes sense from the perspective 
of a survival orientated organization in a self help environment. Just as it is in the 
LRA’s interests to defend itself from state aggression, it is also in its interests to 
defend itself against a non-state aggressor like the SPLM/A. The SPLM/A liberated 
areas border the areas of southern Sudan which are inhabited by the LRA. Two 
militarized actors in such close proximity were bound to have conflict because of the 
security dilemma, in that even if neither one actively preyed on the other, their 
defensive maneuvering would still create an image of threat for each other and lead to 
conflict. Thus, while even though the historical record is too spotty and biased to say 
which group was the initial aggressor, we would still predict that there would be 
conflict.
SPLM/A Relations with Sudan -  From Hierarchic to Anarchic War
Another relationship in the security complex involving the LRA, Sudan, and Uganda 
is that between the SPLM/A and Sudan. While war between Sudan and the SPLM/A 
at first seemed to be a hierarchic one, in its later stages, including the period in which 
the LRA has been active, it can be characterized as anarchic war. (See Appendix B for 
more on the nature of the SPLM/A, the civil war, and its relationship with Sudan.)
The war between the SPLM/A and GoS began as a civil war and was best 
analyzed as such. The SPLM/A was an insurgency using guerilla tactics to combat the
612 New Vision 2005
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government of Sudan and ‘liberate’ areas of the south. However, as the war went on, 
the SPLM/A coalesced into a definable entity which had long-term authority over 
fairly well defined areas and strong authority over a well defined population. Briefly, 
this occurred as the SPLM/A came to not only control, but also effectively govern, 
large swaths of territory and people. Indeed, so ingrained was this control, the United 
Nations developed a relationship with the SPLM/A, known as Operations Lifeline 
Sudan (OLS), which effectively treated the SPLM/A as a recognized international 
actor. In other words, it gained empirical sovereignty and other actors confessed this 
sovereignty, at least tacitly.
By the late nineteen-eighties, the conflict between the GoS and SPLM/A is 
better described as anarchic war, not civil war. The war was no longer an insurgency 
of an armed group to government controlled territory. Rather, it was of one military 
based in well-defined territory battling another army which had its own well defined 
area. The rhetorical purpose of the war remained that of changing a state apparatus, 
but it had continued on for so long and each side had developed into such cohesive 
units, that the dynamic of the war was more like an anarchic war. For example, the 
purpose of many of the later battles was to control small tracks of land in order to 
bolster negotiation efforts. This s the sort of fighting that states take part in. It was no 
longer a question of “settl[ing] questions of authority and right” but rather of
z i  1
“determine[ing] the allocation of gains and losses among contenders...”
The war fits well into a systemic, Neorealist account. The sovereign state of 
Sudan had an interest in maintaining its borders against the incursions of the armed 
group, the SPLM/A; the same could be said for the SPLM/A, it looked to maintain its 
borders against a sovereign Sudan. The two actors were alone in their fighting of the
6,3 Waltz 1979:112
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war, as it was a self help system. Both sides enlisted whatever means to power that 
they could, including aligning with other regional actors.
Now that there is ‘peace’ in Sudan, the situation seems to have changed, 
though by how much is open to debate. For example, it still seems as if the two sides 
have their own independent foreign policies, with for instance, each side dealing 
separately with Uganda over the matter of the LRA. One way to characterize the 
situation is that the SPLM/A and Sudan have aligned. Having decided that continued 
fighting was in neither of their interests, the two units have ended their conflict and 
combined their resources. The alliance is formal, but not as it may seem, a simple 
formation into a state, since it is possible for the south to secede from the north. 
Although this characterization of the current relationship between the SPLM/A and 
GoS is not fully explanatory, it is suitable for the discussion in question -  that being 
the impact on the relationship with the LRA.
Relationship between the SPLM/A and Uganda - Alliance
Although it is generally agreed that there was some sort of relationship, the extent of 
the relationship between Uganda and the SPLM/A is not entirely known. Estimates 
range from moral support to joint military operations.
Museveni claimed that his support for the SPLM/A had been “moral support” 
and humanitarian assistance. After the agreements between Sudan and Uganda in 
2002, the Ugandan foreign minister, James Mugame, admitted support for the 
SPLM/A, but mitigated it by noting that the support was not military in nature. His 
tone in the interview gives an idea of how Uganda hoped to contextualize the issue. 
For instance, Mugame notes: "[tjhere is a lot of confusion about our support for 
SPLA. For us, it is a question of obligation to provide humanitarian assistance in
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southern Sudan. We can't stop humanitarian assistance to the people suffering 
there..."614 In a related interview, Museveni gave his reasons for his support for the 
SPLA, which he had previously admitted as being moral in nature: "We have been 
assisting the SPLA for self-defence from the Kony rebels Lord's Resistance Army 
which had backing from Sudan..."615
Part of this moral support was about a preference for a Christian and African 
regime in southern Sudan and this goes beyond any personal connection Museveni 
may have had with Garang.616 Young notes that “Ugandan regimes of various 
political complexions have always shown sympathy for southern Sudanese dissidents 
and preferred to have their northern Sudanese border under the control of Christians
r i  n
and Africans rather than Moslems and Arabs.” We might describe this as soft 
balancing. However, Ihe alliance between Uganda and the southern Sudanese is 
probably much more real and formal than just moral support.
A likely level of support is described by Young. “[The Ugandan government] 
permitted [the SPLA] to recruit from refugee camps in [Uganda], gave logistical 
support to SPLA operations in southern Sudan, and not infrequently crossed the
rio
border in support of the southern rebels.’ This is a higher level of support that, 
unlike humanitarian aid, directly translates to military support. This more intensive 
level of support seems to cross the line from soft to hard balancing.
Some analysts have described joint SPLA-UPDF missions in Sudan -  a very 
high level of alliance, which is clearly hard balancing. For instance, in 1995, the 
Sudanese government accused Uganda of backing the SPLA in attacks in southern
614 Interview with James Mugame. Reported in IRIN 2002
615 Kenya Times, reported in IRIN 2002
616 It is generally accepted that Garang and Museveni had a personal relationship. For example, the two
were schoolmates at Dar es Salaam University in Tanzania.
617 Young 2002: 5
6,8 Ibid.: 6
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Sudan. Radio Omdurman claimed that Uganda had stationed troops, tanks and 
artillery support inside of Sudan and had attacked Sudanese armed forces in the 
Parajok and Magawe areas which border Uganda.619 While it is debatable whether the 
Uganda military was really involved in the attacks, it is not out of the question to 
think that it did.
It is clear that there is some level of alliance, but equally as clearly, this was 
not a dependent-patron relationship. Uganda never fully funded the SPLM/A or even 
substantially funded it, hit rather it provided some moral and military support. This 
hardly seems enough to form a controlling bond. Aligning suited both of the actors’ 
interests. The SPLM/A needed further allies against Sudan; additionally, spreading 
out its alliances also allowed the SPLM/A to broaden its support base, which further 
assured its independence from any one backer. The alliance also met Uganda’s 
interests, which demanded that it to not only balance the power of Sudan, but also 
combat the LRA inside of Sudan
Since the institution of the peace agreement between the GoS and SPLM/A, 
the SPLM/A leadership has made its alliance with Uganda public. This has become 
possible because the SPLM/A has become an official part of the Sudanese state and, 
(first Garang, but since Hs death now) Salva Kiir Mayardit is Vice President of the 
country. This alliance is more open and typical of interstate alliances. However, it is 
not yet clear whether the alliance is between Uganda and Sudan as a whole or just 
southern Sudan. In general, it is not clear how the southern and northern governments 
in Sudan will approach foreign policy in practice.
619 O’Ballance 2000
620 Uganda even attempted to make its alliance with the SPLA official. In 1997, President Museveni 
went so far as to ask the Organization of African Unity to declare the war a colonial conflict, which 
would have allowed African states to overtly supply the SPLA with material support (O’Ballance 
2000).
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Relationship between Sudan and Uganda -  Balance of Power
The relationship between Sudan and Uganda can be characterized as an oscillating 
history of animosity. Direct war has never broken out between the two countries. The 
two countries have ample reason to fee 1 threatened by each other. They share not only 
a land border, but also a civilizational border.621 The Sudanese state sees itself as not 
so much part of Africa but of the extended Middle East and has been traditionally a 
Muslim and Arab dominated one. The Ugandan state is firmly centered in Africa and 
has always been dominated by Africans and, since colonization, Christians.622 The 
two countries share a long land border and this land border, which for each is also the
• fO'Klocation each country’s most pressmg internal war. There are also potential 
resource issues such as the fact that the Nile River, upon which Sudan is highly 
dependent, begins in Uganda and is therefore, in a sense, controlled by the Ugandan 
state. Finally, the two states are highly militarized from their extensive internal wars 
and this serves as an ever-present threat in security reckoning.
The relationship between Sudan and Uganda could be characterized as a 
classic balance of power. Each state perceives the other as a threat, whether or not its 
actions are for defensive purposes. In order to counter this threat, the two states have 
turned to the use of alliances with armed groups. Sudan has used the LRA as an a lly - 
or proxy -  against Uganda.624 Uganda has used the SPLA as an ally -  or proxy -
621 This civilizational border may really exist within the Sudanese state, specifically in the separation o f  
the ‘Arab’ north from the ‘African’ south.
622 Though, Ida Amin did take up Muslim beliefs in order to please his Libyan patron.
623 There is an ethnic group, the Acholi people; who inhabit this land border and are present in both 
states -  an issue that has led to conflict in other states.
624 IRIN 2002. However, the backing o f the LRA is not the only intrusion into Ugandan affairs which 
the GoS has made. Bashir allegedly also supported another anti-Museveni insurgency, the Allied 
Democratic Forces (ADF) -  this contributed to Museveni’s logic o f support to the SPLA (Noted by 
Kiyaga-Nsubuga 2004). This group operated out of bases in the DRC and this contributed to the 
Ugandan government’s decision to send troops to the DRC in 1997. The foreign policy consequences 
of this invasion were great, including a falling out with Uganda’s ally Rwanda.
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against the Sudanese state. In this way, the regional system has become balanced -  
with the implicit assumption that the balance of power is primarily focused on the two 
states. However, this view does not adequately explain the dynamics of the 
relationships.
The LRA and the Balance of Power
Overall, i is better to treat the relationships between Sudan and the LRA and Uganda 
and the SPLM/A as alliances between autonomous actors. Beyond reflecting reality 
better, the alliance perspective also theoretically explains the situation better and 
provides a basis for predicting dynamic changes in the relationship.
The armed groups are effectively like units in the sense that they are 
autonomous, independent actors and empirically sovereign to the degree necessary to 
presume comparisons. It has been made clear that the LRA is not a proxy and that it 
has its own security goals. The point is made concerning the SPLA as well. 
Treating the armed groups as actors in the relationship better reflects reality. 
Although, the actors clearly differ in capabilities, with the LRA being extremely weak 
relative to a state like Uganda, these differences in capabilities are expected and are 
what allow for system level modeling and prediction of the relations between the 
actors.
By treating the relationships between the different autonomous actors as 
alliances, from a system level the relationships appear to be a balance of power 
between four actors, not two Broadly speaking, the LRA and Sudan formed an
625 The case for the autonomy and independence of the SPLA is made in Appendix B.
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alliance to balance the threats from Uganda and the SPLA who had formed an alliance 
for similar reasons.626
Each of the units has acted within its own interests and this has created a 
negative feedback loop which kept the system in balance. Uganda and Sudan had a 
relationship which was marked by oscillating animosity. Uganda unbalanced the state 
to state relationship by aligning itself with the SPLM/A which was Sudan’s chief rival 
and primary threat to its national security. In order to rebalance this equation the GoS 
aligned with the LRA, the Ugandan government’s chief rival and primary national 
security threat.627 In fact, Bashir referred to his aligned with the LRA in exactly these 
terms of balancing. For instance, in an interview he remarked:
On the previous relationship, we used to support the LRA. We used to 
provide them with logistics, ammunition and everything. That was a 
response to support Uganda used to give to the SPLA. But now the 
situation is different because both parties are committed to peace.628
Similarly, from the LRA’s point of view, there was an overwhelming threat from 
Uganda and an alliance with Sudan was the only way to obtain the power required to 
confront the threat. From the perspective of the SPLM/A, an alliance with the like- 
minded Ugandan state also made sense.
626 This balance of power fits within a larger, regional security complex including neighboring states. 
For example, Ethiopia has switched sides between the SPLA and Sudan depending on its own internal 
political situation over the years. Kenya has broadly speaking attempted to take a neutral course. Egypt, 
which has concerns with Uganda about the Nile River but also about Sudan, has taken a complicated 
and balanced approach Finally, Libya has taken an imperial view of the entire situation. While 
examining this regional dynamic is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is important to note that it exists 
and that the SPLA and LRA can be seen within the context o f these much larger alliances and relations.
627 Although it is not clear when the Ugandan government aligned with the SPLA; nevertheless, if  it did 
so after Sudan aligned with the LRA, the point would still hold.
628 People’s Daily 2001
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It was only when it became clear that the SPLM/A was no longer a serious 
national security threat to Sudan, that Sudan was able to truly wihdraw its funding of 
the LRA. This is a natural extension of the security calculation. Without a threat there 
is no need for an alliance.
Yet, at the same time, the LRA continued to remain a threat to the SPLM/A 
and Uganda and therefore these actors quickly aligned against it. Furthermore, as soon 
as it became clear that the LRA was a threat to the GoS, it too joined the anti-LRA 
alliance.
This model of the situation is predictive. Now that the LRA is threatened by 
Sudan, Uganda, and the SPLM/A, we can predict that it will seek to create another 
strategic alliance. There are various regional strategic and political issues over which 
it could align with neighboring actors. For example, there are tensions between Egypt 
and Uganda over the Nile River. The LRA would serve as a suitable balance against 
any threats from Uganda. Also, now that the LRA has lost support from Sudan, it may 
be a suitable candidate for an alliance with Ethiopia. While these predictions may or 
may not prove true, the Neorealist approach has demonstrated its ability to provide 
some basis for prediction. Whereas, seeing the LRA as a proxy leaves no basis for 
prediction.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has provided a further demonstration of the validity and usefulness of 
using a Neorealist approach to detail the international relations of warlords. The 
previous case study, which focused on Somali warlords, found that these warlords do 
have relations along the lines of the predefined patterns predicted by Neorealism, 
including balancing power through alignment and fighting anarchic war with
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international actors. This chapter attempted a more demanding test in that it focused 
on an actor which was not as clearly a warlord -  the LRA -  and which had more 
complex international relations.
The LRA is generally not considered a warlord, but it was found to be one 
based on the definition provided in Chapter 2. The LRA has an enclosed political 
community, the organization is autonomous and independent from the state, and it is 
motivated by survival. These are the features of a warlord organization and exclude 
classification as another type of armed group. In this way, this chapter has shed some 
light on an armed group which has been very difficult to analyze in the past.
The Neorealist approach detailed h this study has been able to effectively 
explain the LRA’s international relations. It described these relations in regard to all 
the relevant actors -  Sudan, Uganda, and the SPLM/A. The LRA is fighting anarchic 
wars with Uganda and the SPLM/A. It was aligned with Sudan, but it is no longer. In 
general these patterned relations produced a compelling model of the balance of 
power that the LRA fits into.
Most importantly, the Neorealist approach has given reasons for why the LRA 
has acted as it has, such as in continuing to fight the SPLM/A and in targeting GoS 
forces. In deducing this logic it becomes possible to make predictions about the 
future, such as that the LRA will look for another alliance in order to reestablish a 
balance of power. With prediction comes the possibility of preemptive response. In 
this case, it is advisable that Sudan and Uganda attempt to deny the LRA alliances 
with regional governments.
This case study has added to the overall argument of this thesis. The purpose 
of this study has been to answer the question of how warlords relate with states and 
other international actors. The theoretical answer to this question has been that
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warlords relate in terms of the balance of power. In order to validate this answer, it 
was necessary to assess the predicted relations in terms of empirically observed 
warlord international relations. This case study has done just that and has found that 
the LRA has acted in the patterned relations that were expected. In other words, we 
have been able to say how the LRA relates with other international actors. 
Furthermore, based on the Neorealist account we can make conclusions about how the 
LRA will relate in the future.
This case study was a more demanding test than the last, as is required by the 
epistemological schema developed in Chapter 1, and the explanation of the warlord’s 
international relations was found to still be valid. Having passed these tests and 
demonstrated the Neorealist approach’s answer to the question of how warlords relate 
with international actors twice, we should conclude that in general warlords relate in 
essentially the same way as states -  in terms of balance of power.
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CHAPTER 7 -  CONCLUSION
This study has sought to answer the question of how warlords relate with states and 
other international actors. The approach in answering this question was to begin by 
clearly conceptualizing warlords in order to not just provide a descriptive definition of 
warlord, but to appreciate how and why warlords act as they do. It was found that 
warlords are non-state actors that use military power and economic exploitation to 
maintain fiefdoms which are autonomous and independent from the state and society. 
It was also found that this definition could be operationalized in order to differentiate 
seemingly alike actors from warlords.
Having defined the subject of this study, the next step was to provide a means 
to describe warlord relations. A Neorealist theoretical approach was found to be the 
best way to describe and explain the international relations of warlords. However, in 
order to use a Neorealist approach some major conceptual hurdles had to be overcome 
because the theory of Neorealism was not developed to analyze NSAs.
These conceptual hurdles were overcome through an analysis of what the 
theory of Neorealism demands and how warlords function. It was found that warlords 
were the right type of group to be analyzed -  they are cohesive, functionally 
undifferentiated, like units that are empirically sovereign. It was also found that 
warlord action is motivated in the right way -  rather than being concerned with greed 
or grievance, warlords are driven by power and survival. Lastly, the nature of anarchic 
systems was explored in some detail and in certain kinds of states where warlords 
operate -  specifically fragmented and collapsed states -  the system is anarchic and 
openly connected with the international anarchic system. Thus it was demonstrated
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that warlords do meet the minimal criteria of being an actor which we can use a 
Neorealist approach to analyze.
The next step was to describe exactly how Neorealism theorizes that they 
should act. Therefore, the theory of Neorealism was examined in detail. It was 
demonstrated how warlords could fit into a Neorealist theoretical framework based on 
a point by point comparison. For each point, it was demonstrated that it made sense to 
apply it to warlords, given the conceptualization of warlords developed in Chapters 2 
and 3.
Doing this made it possible to answer the thesis question of this study. It was 
found that warlords relate with states and other international actors in essentially the 
same way as states -  they seek to ensure their survival through the balance of power. 
Specifically, they relate in terms of internal power cultivation, alliances, and war. As 
with states, this formula explains how warlords will relate in different circumstances. 
A more detailed answer was provided through an examination of the types of 
relationships which warlords would form and when. These relationships patterns 
included internal power cultivation, alliances, arms race, security dilemma, and 
anarchic war.
Having given the theoretical answer to the question, it was necessary to 
illustrate some specific examples of warlord international relations and thereby to test 
if the theoretical answer was valid. This was accomplished in two case studies.
The first case study examined Somali warlords. It began by noting that the 
Somali state is collapsed and, at least between the end of the civil war and beginning 
of TNG, was an open anarchic system. The case study then moved on to compare and 
contrast the different types of armed groups in Somalia and thereby explained which 
groups were warlords and why. This served as a means of validating the efficacy of
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the definition and conceptualization of warlord presented in Chapters 2 and 3. The 
case study then examined the international relations of two specific warlord 
organizations, the SNA led by Aidid in relation to the United Nations forces, and the 
SNF led by Haji in relation to Ethiopia. It was found that in fact the warlords did 
relate with these international actors as hypothesized: they followed the patterned 
relationships of war, the security dilemma, and alliances based on the need to ensure 
their survival. Thus, the case study validated the use of a Neorealist approach to 
describe the international relations of warlords and the posited answer to the thesis 
question that warlords relate with states and other international actors in such a way as 
to ensure their survival through the balance of power.
In the second case study, the LRA’s relations with Uganda, Sudan, and the 
SPLM/A were examined. This case study provided a more demanding test of the 
theory, in that the LRA is less clearly a warlord, its relations are murkier, and it 
existed in a fragmented, not collapsed state. It was found that the LRA is better 
considered as a warlord organization and that it does relate as warlords should based 
on a Neorealist account. The Neorealist approach was able to adequately describe, 
explain, and predict the relations of the LRA by treating it as a separate actor in a 
balance of power relationship with Sudan, Uganda, and the SPLM/A. Thus, this case 
study further validated the usefulness of the theory of Neorealism to analyze the 
international relations of warlords and thereby to answer the thesis question.
The conclusion is that the hypothesis put forward in the introduction to this 
study has been found to be correct. Warlords relate with states and associated 
international actors in esseitially the same way as state s -  they seek to ensure their 
survival through the balance of power. Specifically, they relate in terms of internal 
power cultivation, alliances, and war. The validity of this answer has been
328
demonstrated theoretically and then assessed through comparison with empirical 
observations. While, like other social science theoretical accounts, it is necessary to 
continue applying this theory and finding evidence for its validity, there is enough 
evidence to conclude that the question has been answered. It is now possible to 
explore some of the implications of this study.
Warlords and International Relations
This study has brought out some specific insights into how warlords relate with other 
international actors. It is now possible to explain some features of their international 
relations which might have seemed incomprehensible before. Many of these 
interesting finding have been referred to throughout the text. For instance, it is 
possible to understand why warlords fight such prolonged, seemingly pointless wars 
and, moreover, what it would take to stop them from fighting such wars -  i.e. the 
guarantee of their survival. It has become possible to explain when and why warlords 
will make or break alliances with states or other international actors. For example, 
there is a clear explanation for why the SNF formed an alliance with Ethiopia and 
then why it broke that alliance. It can also be understood when and why warlords will 
pursue other goals, such as taking over a state. For example, Taylor would only move 
to run for President when his security was guaranteed.
In general, warlord relations should no longer be seen in a one sided view 
which assumes that they are based either on greed, grievance, or simply on an innate 
barbaric tendency. Their relations can be seen in the correct perspective of 
instrumentally ensuring survival and this perspective is a better fit to empirical reality. 
It explains why warlords so easily drop the fa9ade of loyalty to a clan or ethnic group 
as well as why they would continue fighting a prolonged war, even when they were
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losing money in doing so. Their barbarism is also put in a rational framework 
explaining why it occurs, rather than assuming that they are simply ‘crazy’ or ‘evil’. 
Thus we have been afforded a more rational analysis of warlords.
Moreover, instead of being left to other fields for analysis or borrowing other 
research methods, such as the comparative approach, warlords can now be theorized 
about in the same way that states can. Just as analysts have gone about applying 
Waltz’s theory to individual states, regions, and the system as a whole, analysts can 
now apply a Neorealist approach to individual warlords and to regions where warlords 
exist such as the Horn of Africa. Thus, this study has been able to bring about, as Rich
o n
called for, the “widen[ing of] the compass and range of IR as a discipline” in order 
to take into account warlordism.630
This allows warlords to be directly compared with states and the two types of 
actors’ relations can be modeled together and this brings theoretical as well as 
practical benefits. The payoff is that relations between the United States and Dostum, 
for example, can make sense in relation to the United States’ other commitments in 
the Central Asian region. For instance, a change in relationship between Dostum and 
Uzbekistan can be modeled in relation to the US and Uzbekistan’s evolving alliance. 
Accordingly, it will be possible to model how changes in one relationship will lead to 
changes in the other. These relationships could potentially then be incorporated into 
models of the US’s global balance of power.
629 Rich 1999: xvi
630 It may also be possible to apply Realist, rather than Neorealist concepts to the analysis o f warlords 
at a unit level. While this thesis has focused on Neorealism, it also demonstrated the possibility of 
applying Realism to warlords in Chapter 3, since Realism’s requirements are sub-requirements o f those 
for Neorealism. Thus, many o f the insights which Realism brings to the analysis o f state actors may 
also be used to analyze warlords. For instance, it may be a useful theory for understanding the 
psychology of warlord leadership.
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Armed Groups and International Relations
This study began with the call for IR as a discipline to address armed groups in its 
analysis of international politics. NSAs have become increasingly important in the 
world and have become the purview of IR to some degree, however, the NSAs which 
are typically covered are MNCs, IGOs, and NGOs. Armed groups are not generally 
entered into theoretical accounts of international politics. Terrorism is an exception to 
this rule, as it is increasingly becoming a major issue of analysis. Yet, armed 
groups of all types are increasingly taking part in international politics and therefore 
must be effectively analyzed if we are to explain international politics.
The analysis that followed laid the foundation for this pursuit. Warlords are 
only one type of armed group, but their analysis using Neorealist theory, and therefore 
their potential integration into Neorealist models of interstate relations, demonstrates 
that armed groups can be theorized about in the same way that states are. The next 
step is to ask to what extent the findings of this study apply to other types of armed 
groups.
The degree to which the argument pursued in this study applies to other armed 
groups is correlated to the degree to which these groups resemble warlords in certain 
key features. In particular, it depends on the same argument made in Chapter 3 about 
the conditions which armed groups must meet in order to be considered by 
Neorealism. Specifically, whether the armed group is the right kind of group and has 
the right kind of motivation.
631 See for instance Layne 2004.
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Group Condition
The group condition demanded that actors be functionally undifferentiated like units, 
which have empirical sovereignty. As was detailed in Chapters 2 and 3, this meant 
meeting several requirements including:
• the presence of an enclosed political community,
• the ability to govern and command this community of individuals and thereby 
make it act as a single, cohesive unit,
• the ability to perpetuate the organization while retaining independence,
• and finally a de facto autonomy and independence from the state.
In total, the actor must be a sovereign armed group.
There are other SAGs. This study has noted some of them. De facto states 
meet the requirements set out above. They are even more state-like than warlords. 
They have a civil political community, which is separate from other political 
communities and is often held together by nationalist ties, like states are. This 
political community is governed by a complex administration. In general, de facto 
states will have some form of military which is effectively commanded and can keep 
the de facto state autonomous from other states. In short, the de facto state is 
empirically sovereign, though it is not juridically sovereign for the same reasons 
noted in Chapter 3. An example of a de facto state is Somaliland.
Clans and their militias, in collapsed or fragmented states, may also be SAGs. 
The clan forms a political community, which in a failed state may coalesce into a 
cohesive unit that develops the ability to maintain autonomy. This generally means 
developing a militia made up of clan members, which can defend it from aggressors. 
The faction militias discussed in Chapter 5 are an example. It is important to note that 
these militias should not be taken as groups which are separate from the civilian clan
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since either one without the other would not fulfill the requirements for analysis. 
Instead the clan and the militia together form the relevant group.
In some instances, traditional insurgencies can become SAGs. This occurs 
once the insurgency is able to maintain complete autonomy from the state and 
develops the ability to maintain independence from other actors, such as foreign 
governments which may support it. The insurgency will resemble the warlord in many 
ways except that the nature of the insurgency’s political community will differ from 
the warlord in that it will incorporate the civilian population and rely on them to some 
extent -  as discussed in Chapter 2. This makes it more difficult to definitively say 
whether an insurgency is truly autonomous from the state. However, in extreme cases, 
such as the SPLM/A which clearly controlled large tracts of southern Sudan and 
governed the people who lived there for a long period of time, it is obvious that the 
group was sovereign and autonomous from the state.
Survival Motivation Condition
The second condition is that groups are motivated by survival. This is a more subtle 
requirement to reach because while some of the actors noted above may be 
immediately motivated by survival, as they are in a conflict with the state or because 
they exist in a collapsed state, they may not be striving for these goals in the long­
term.
De facto states meet this condition. They have autonomy and are clearly trying 
to maintain it at any cost. A cursory examination of the international relations of 
Somaliland points to such similarities. Somaliland has acted to maximize its security 
and retain its autonomy through various formal and informal diplomatic relations with 
states as well as its physical defense in response to the threat posed by Puntland.
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Secessionist guerillas are clearly motivated by survival and autonomy from the 
state. They are armed groups which are trying to attain and maintain autonomy from 
the state and in that sense, continue to survive at any cost. An example of such a 
guerilla organization was the EPLF. Though of course, it is not possible to 
conclusively say whether an insurgent organization is a secessionist group, since this 
would fall into Morgenthau’s fallacy of motivation -  i.e. an insurgent might say that 
he wishes to secede, but in fact be concerned with other issues, such as overthrowing 
the state or acting as a warlord. Nevertheless, in the idealized form, these insurgencies 
are motivated in the right way.
Both secessionist guerillas and de facto states meet the conditions for analysis 
using a Neorealist approach. They are SNSAs and are motivated by survival; 
therefore they should act in a manner consistent with the patterned relationships 
detailed in Chapter 4. In fact, this does seem to occur. For example, the EPLF acted in 
a manner consistent with predictions. It fought an anarchic war with Ethiopia and did 
eventually achieve juridical sovereignty.
Other SAGs are not necessarily motivated in the same manner. For example, it 
is clear that Somali clans and their militias have been focused on protecting the clan’s 
interests and on maintaining their autonomy from other militia-based aggressors. 
However, these clans tend to want the return of the state. This is unlike warlords or 
states which will tend to deliberately attempt to undermine any restrictions on their 
sovereignty. When a credible state alternative does arise, such as the TNG, we should 
expect that the clans will attempt to integrate themselves into a new state, whereas we
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can expect that warlords will not. This has actually been the case, to some degree, 
with clans and warlords in Somalia.632
A similar difference arises for traditional insurgent movements. On a day to 
day basis, guerillas are concerned with survival and the maintenance of autonomy. 
However, insurgents are by definition fighting civil wars -  they are fighting over the 
control of the government. Therefore, in a sense they are not attempting to be separate 
from the state. If given the chance they would allow their organization to be destroyed 
if it meant the ability to take over the state. Their primary motivation is thus not 
necessarily the maximization of security, but rather the overthrow of the state.
Therefore, strictly speaking, in the cases of clans and traditional guerillas, the 
Neorealist account would not completely apply. The Neorealist approach demands 
that actors be primarily motivated by the pursuit of security. If they are not, it means 
that, for instance, an actor would be best analyzed as fighting a hierarchic not anarchic 
war. It would also make predictions of an actor’s motivation to form an alliance less 
exact.
However, the lines are blurrier than this. Some insurgencies, clans, and similar 
groups turn to anarchic war when the conflict continues on indefinitely. This may be a 
general tendency in warfare. For example, Martin Van Creveld argues that:
...over time any war will tend to turn into a struggle for existence,
provided only hostilities are sufficiently intensive and casualties
sufficiently heavy. This is because, the longer and more costly the
conflict, the more likely it is that the reasons for which it was
originally launched will be forgotten. The greater the sacrifices made,
632 This may be partly attributable to the fact that clans are more likely to be recognized as legitimate 
actors by the international community. Because of this it is more likely that they will be able to take 
part in eXemal peace processes or external governments like the TNG.
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the more pressing the need to justify them in the eyes of the world as 
well as one’s own. Given that existence is the supreme goal, the result 
is that, on the declaratory level and often in practice as well, any 
prolonged war between equally matched opponents that does not peter 
out is likely to turn into a life -and- death struggle.633
This is particularly the case where the group comes to control territory for long 
periods of time. A similar argument was made concerning the SPLA in Chapter 6. 
Over its two decade-long war with the government of Sudan it seemed to move from 
being an organization concerned with overthrowing the state to one more concerned 
with survival in a manner consistent with state motivation.
While these groups may, given the opportunity, allow themselves to become 
part of state, it is possible to treat them as being motivated by survival. This is a 
similar argument as that made concerning anarchy in Chapter 3. Actors may perceive 
the future state as one in which they will be part of a state and give up their autonomy, 
but on a day to day basis, they can be predicted to act as i f  survival as an autonomous 
organization was the primary goal. In essence, the hierarchic ambitions of a clan or 
insurgency can be seen as a supplemental goal of the organization, to be met in 
situations where survival is already assured. Therefore, the theory may still be helpful 
in the analysis of these actors.
The extent to which this survival motivation would apply needs to be tested in 
the same way as the Neorealist approach was tested in Chapters 5 and 6. Prima fasciae 
it seems to apply, since for instance, it seems that the SPLM/A made decisions based 
on security maximization when it aligned with the Ugandan government. We can take
633 Van Creveld 1991:145
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the Neorealist predictions to be true as long as they are qualified to apply to those 
instances where the armed group is not specifically in a position where it must chose 
between survival and hierarchic goals.
Other Armed Groups
It is also possible to extrapolate that a Neorealist approach may be applicable to the 
analysis of other types of armed groups, which do not meet the requirements of a 
Neorealist approach, by qualifying its predictions. These qualifications would have to 
be made based on an individual analysis of the armed group and its motivations. The 
degree to which the armed group differed from the conditions of a Neorealist 
approach would then have to be taken into account. A prediction of the armed group’s 
actions based on a Neorealist account would be made and then it could be modified 
based on the particular qualifications of the group.
Take for instance an armed group like RENAMO. RENAMO meets the group 
requirements of a Neorealist approach. It functioned as a cohesive unit and was 
autonomous from Mozambique. However, it was not an independent group in that it 
was heavily funded and controlled by outside actors, i.e. South Africa.634 In an 
analysis of RENAMO it would first be necessary to calculate the degree to which it 
was controlled by South Africa and how this might bias its decisions ceteris paribus. 
For example, we might conclude that RENAMO would make decisions on a day to 
day basis as to how to strategically relate with country A, but in regards to country B, 
it would defer to South Africa. Then in an analysis it would be possible to say that 
RENAMO would effectively act to increase its security in some cases, but not in 
others.
634 Vines 1995
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Thus, while such a theoretical approach to other types of armed groups might 
not be a universal solution, it could provide some insight into the organization. 635 
Again, the only real way to tell the degree to which the theory would be helpful, and 
therefore if it were more helpful than other theoretical approaches srch as a 
greed/grievance approach, would be to perform case studies comparing hypotheses to 
observations. Thus, a next step in this line of research could be to apply the Neorealist 
approach developed in this study to specific armed groups in order to calculate the 
degree to which it was able to explain these group’s international relations.
Broadly speaking, the implication is that it may be possible to integrate armed 
groups other than warlords into models of international politics in a rigorous manner. 
Just as it was shown that warlord international relations could be modeled with a 
Neorealist approach, the possibility for modeling other types of armed groups has 
been opened up. The implication is that there is the potential for a new field of 
research in IR.
Adding Armed Groups to the Research Agenda
The study of the international relations of armed groups should become a legitimate, 
separate area of study in IR. It could be similar in nature to the study of international 
institutions, which is a sub-fie Id of IR that has its own assumptions and theories, but 
which can be integrated into the broader theories of IR. Unlike in its current residence 
in the field of Security or Development Studies, the field of ‘Armed Group 
International Relations’ would be much broader than just security issues. It would
635 Such a qualified approach is not necessarily at odds with similar needs in a detailed analysis of 
states. For instance, in the situation of hegemony as described by Michael Doyle (1986), i.e. the foreign 
though not domestic policy o f a state is effectively controlled by another state, the state’s foreign policy 
would be dictated by another state to some degree. This would leave us with a view of the state that is 
modified from traditional Neorealist account. Like the proxy example above, the state would be able to 
perform some survival functions, such as internal military build-up, but not others, such as alliance 
formation.
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also include diplomacy, such as a study of the OLS agreement, as well as more 
theoretical questions about the nature of sovereignty and anarchy.
This thesis has laid some of the groundwork for the inclusion of the 
international relations of armed groups into the discipline of IR. It has, for instance, 
provided a bridge between the greed and grievance literature and the IR literature 
through illustrating how instrumentalist thinking can be a link. It has also provided a 
similar link between the failed states literature and systemic theories, specifically 
Neorealism. By delving deeper into these literatures the links can be strengthened a 
thereby a holistic account of armed groups and interstate relations may be possible.
There are, however, many obstacles to such integration, including that armed 
groups differ from each other in so many respects, that armed groups seem to be 
motivated by very different factors than IR normally assumes, and that IR is state- 
centric. This study has addressed some of these issues, such as the relationship of 
armed groups and sovereignty and of how hierarchy and anarchy work in failed states. 
In this way some of the ground work has been laid for a broader integration of armed 
groups into IR. At the same time a test case of incorporating one particular type of 
armed group -  warlords -  has proven that it is possible to make this sort of 
integration. With further study, we can come to a more exact understanding of armed 
groups and how they relate with states and other international actors, and in this way 
we will come to a more effective understanding of international politics in general.
International Relations Theory
There are numerous implications for IR theory which arise from the analysis 
presented in this study. It is worth addressing a couple of the issues which are 
comparatively important for the study of armed groups. In particular, the analysis
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presented in Chapters 3 and 4 uncovered some apparent contradictions in IR theory 
that need to be addressed more fully. These are that the notion of sovereignty in 
relation to NSAs should be seen in a different light and that it is also now possible to 
make a more subtle distinction between anarchy and hierarchy.
Sovereignty
Chapter 3 developed a bifurcated understanding of sovereignty. Sovereignty was 
shown to consist of empirical sovereignty, which described an actor being de facto the 
highest authority over territory or a population. Juridical sovereignty referred to the 
admission by the international community that an actor is sovereign as well as the 
granting of the rights and responsibilities which go along with such an admission.
It was found that this distinction had significant theoretical implications for 
analysis. Specifically, it provided an avenue for making sense of what seemed to be a 
contradiction: warlords are not considered to be sovereign actors, but there is also no 
sovereign with authority over them, yet the assumption is that some group or another 
is sovereign over all territory and people. Indeed, the distinction afforded an accurate 
reflection of reality. This study has not been the first to make such an admission; Bull 
and Jackson have also done so.636
Jackson offered a similar framework of sovereignty in which states may have 
positive sovereignty and negative sovereignty. Negative sovereignty is international 
empowerment, and is exactly what this study has called juridical sovereignty. 
Positive sovereignty refers to a state having the “capabilities which enable 
governments to be their own masters: it is a substantive rather than a formal
Bull 1977, Jackson 1993 
^Jackson 1993
638 Based, in fact, on Jackson.
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condition.’ The concept also refers to a government’s ability to provide political 
goods to citizens within its territory.
The notion of empirical sovereignty and positive sovereignty are not exactly 
the same, however. Positive sovereignty refers to a broader concept than empirical 
sovereignty. It involves not only authority, but also legitimacy, in that it also includes 
a state’s ability to meet other, more normative, requirements of statehood -  such as 
the provision of public goods to its citizens or the representation of a people.
Nevertheless, the findings of this study lend credence to the idea of dividing 
sovereignty into different forms. At its most basic, one of these aspects refers to the 
empirical reality of an actor’s authority and what it does with that de facto reality. The 
other aspect refers to the perceived aspects of an actor, including its inclusion in 
extra-organizational groups, legal treaties, and other agreements between actors. 
These idealized aspects exist only as a product of formal relations between actors, 
whereas the empirical aspects exist as empirical realities.
This study, Jackson’s, and Bull’s demonstrate that such a bifurcated 
framework reflects reality and is a useful distinction to make. In this study, the reality 
of the distinction was noted in regard to non-state actors. First it was demonstrated 
theoretically in Chapter 3 and then illustrated empirically in regard to Somali warlords 
in Chapter 5. This study found such a framework valuable in that it allowed for a 
theoretical understanding of NSAs. Jackson was able to use it to theorize about the 
nature of states, specifically to what he called quasi states. Together this leads to the 
conclusion that the distinction is real, is worth making, and should be used by 
theorists in analyses of the international system.
639 Jackson 1993: 29
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A next step is to further explore the nature of this bifurcated view of 
sovereignty in relation to NSAs. For instance, to what degree does empirical 
sovereignty allow non-state actors to gain some aspects of juridical sovereignty? An 
example is the OLS agreement between the SPLM/A, Sudan, and the United 
Nations.640 The SPLM/A clearly had empirical sovereignty and this made 
humanitarian aid missions impossible without their support. In order to rectify this, 
die UN set up the OLS agreement between themselves and the SPLM/A, as a way to 
effectively regulate and organize humanitarian aid missions. However, the OLS 
agreement was very close to be ing a formal, international treaty. It was clearly written 
as such, in that it resembles similar treaties with states. It was not enforceable under 
international law, but it certainly had (and continues to have) the standing of formal 
law in the view of the actors. While OLS is not a conclusive proof of juridical 
sovereignty it is a mid-way point and one which was brought on by the SPLM/A’s 
empirical sovereignty.
Similar questions can be asked in relation to peace processes and other 
negotiations. For example, during the years immediately after the collapsed of the 
Somali state, warlords were able to obtain seats in negotiations and various peace 
processes or state building attempts based on their demonstration of power. If the 
warlord could demonstrate that he had some constituency, or otherwise was a major 
authority in Somalia, then he would be invited. In other words, it was necessary to 
demonstrate some level of empirical sovereignty. Such questions regularly come up in 
decisions of which armed groups to negotiate with during or after internal conflicts. 
The invitations are in a sense an admission of recognition and possibly even
640 See Appendix C for a copy of the OLS Ground rules Agreement, which details the ‘contractual 
obligations’ between the two organizations.
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legitimacy. Again, this is a step toward juridical sovereignty and the processes behind 
it and its implications need to be explored.
Anarchy-Hierarchy
This study also has brought out implications for the nature of the distinction between 
anarchy and hierarchy. This distinction is fundamental to the study of international 
relations. One of the insights of this study is that the anarchy-hierarchy distinction 
does not necessarily take hold at the boundary of the internationally enfranchised 
state. Empirically sovereign units can exist within the state, making the seemingly 
hierarchic interior of a state in effect an anarchic system.641
As noted in Chapter 3, Waltz also wrestled with the need to differentiate 
anarchy and hierarchy in states with warlords. This study presents one possible 
solution to the problem of dividing all states, even failed ones, into anarchic or 
hierarchic system. It has done this through expanding the anarchic system to include 
those portions of the state not under the control of the state apparatus. This is a 
relevant defense of the value of Neorealism.
An argument against the value of Neorealism as a theory s that it does not 
apply to the more complicated post-Cold War, globalized international system, in 
particular in Africa. Philip Cemy has used the model of ‘neomedievalism’ to describe 
overlapping sovereignties in the current globalized system.642 Duffield has applied 
Cemy’s theory to the analysis of Africa and failed states more generally.643 The 
implication of these arguments is that the conventional breakdown of anarchy and
641 This is a separate critique of the nature of anarchy from that made by Constructivists like Wendt. 
Wendt (1999) theorizes about the construction of anarchy. This study does not question the reality of 
anarchy, nor its nature. Indeed, the anarchy which is argued for is one which is the same as that in the 
international system and which is identical in nature to that described by Waltz.
642 Cemy 1998, Cemy develops his theory from Bull’s earlier work. (Bull 1977)
643 Duffield 2001
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hierarchy are not possible in the present international system, and therefore that 
Neorealism cannot be used to effectively analyze large parts of the international 
system.644
This study has presented an alternate approach to analyzing the current 
international system. Rather than relying on a system of overlapping sovereignties, 
this study has presented a picture of more subtly defined sovereignties, but no less 
rigid ones. States are bounded by borders which are defined within and by the 
international community. In most cases, empirical sovereignty overlaps with these 
defined borders. However, this is not the case for warlords (and some other armed 
groups) -  they force us to consider empirical rather than juridical borders as the 
defining feature of sovereignty. In effect therefore, this study has rearranged the 
anarchy/hierarchy balance along empirical, rather than juridical lines. In this way, it 
has been possible to continue to assume the strong break between hierarchic and 
anarchic systems, and thereby to incorporate a seemingly blurry system into the more 
mechanistic -  and one might argue more rigorous -  view of systemic theories like 
Neorealism.
A further application of the thinking behind this study would be to apply the 
breakdown of anarchy and hierarchy based on empirical rather than juridical lines to 
other states and to the international system as a whole. These could be states which do 
not necessarily contain warlords. Then it would be possible to determine if a better 
analysis, using Neorealism, can be found in this way. One of the first steps in doing 
this would be to see to what degree other types of armed groups are sovereign -  an 
issue discussed above.
644 Earlier, Ruggie made a more general argument that the medieval system had a different balance of 
anarchy and hierarchy than is present now and that Neorealism was not equipped to understand such a 
system. (Ruggie 1986)
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Policy Implications
Even more important than these theoretical concerns, the international relations of 
armed groups, and especially warlords, are important to understand fcr practical 
policy reasons. By making the right decisions about how to interact with a warlord or 
other armed group states, IGOs, or NGOs can help to ease or completely relieve the 
threat of conflict. In order to make the right decision about how to act, however, they 
must know how warlords or other armed groups are motivated and will act. 
Miscalculations about how a warlord will respond to changes in the environment can 
lead to incorrect and potentially dangerous responses.
This study has been an attempt to understand how warlords relate and to 
provide a basis for predicting their actions and this may be directly helpful to policy 
makers. For example, it has been argued that rather than basing predictions of warlord 
action on the assumption that they will seek to obtain material wealth, it is better to 
base our assumptions on their motivation to ensure their own survival and increase 
their power in general. This helps to understand, for example, why warlords do not 
simply quit their conflict once they reach a climax and begin losing money through 
continued conflict. It helps to understand why Savimbi continued fighting on long 
after losing the election in Angola and had lost his international backers. Similarly, it 
helps us to understand why the LRA may never end its war and why it preys on the 
Acholi people.
Also, the insights found in the broader study of international politics based on 
the theory of Neorealism now potentially become helpful in the specific case of 
warlords. Neorealism has produced useful insights into interstate politics, such as 
allowing for the prediction of a region’s balance of power, and more indirectly, as a 
basis for incorporating other theories, such as Game Theory. These same insights may
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now be applied to the international relations of warlords. Conversely, warlords may 
be integrated into Neorealist analyses of states and may help to provide practically 
applicable insights for those analyses.
From these insights we can gain direction in deciding on practical responses. 
For example, from a foreign policy perspective, aligning with warlords is a 
possibility, but relying only on monetary compensation to bring about these alliances 
may not be enough. Rather, making assurances to warlords about the potential for the 
continued existenc e of the warlord organization after the conflict is over may be the 
best way to enlist his support.
Also, in terms of ending protracted conflicts, traditional peace negotiations, 
which involve demobilizing the warlord’s army, may not be as effective as teating 
the situation more like peace negotiations between states. For instance, the warlord 
may respond better to the idea of aligning his forces with the state’s, than to 
demobilizing his organization altogether. Another implication is that a warlord may 
be more interested in becoming the governor of a province, which is effectively his 
and allows him to continue having a separate army, than a parliamentary 
representative, which would demand his move to a capital city and the disbandment of 
his organization.
Noting that warlords are disconnected from the society and state which they 
may exist in leads to useful response options as well. For instance, in demobilizing 
warlord fighters, we must be sure to make programs which reintegrate warlords into 
local political communities, instead of assuming that they still feel like they are part 
of those political communities. Without taking such a step, the fighters may continue 
to feel alienated and turn to banditry.
346
Finally, the general insight that warlords are best analyzed as international, not 
domestic actors, leads to the conclusion that they must be addressed as regional issues 
by coalitions of states, rather than as domestic problems for the host state. This 
perception of the situation could, for instance, make the argument for intervention 
stronger. This international perspective is also important because by beginning from 
the assumption that warlords are only local actors, it is significantly harder to block 
their logistical system.
Thus, this study may be useful in easing or abating warlord conflicts. While 
there is a continual debate about the degree to which theoretical understanding may 
helpfully inform real world decision-making, clearly there is some value to be gained. 
If only for this reason, the study of warlord international relations is valuable and 
should be pursued. The next step after this study should therefore be to illustrate in 
more detail the practical application of a theoretical understanding of warlordism in 
order to find effective ways to counter the continuing threat of warlords to 
international peace and security.
347
APPENDIX A -  EXAMPLE OF SOMALI ‘MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING’ (MOU)
Agreement for the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance in Gedo Region of 
Somalia645
This Agreement is between the SNF/JVA in Gedo Region (hereinafter referred to as 
the ‘SNF/JVA’), represented by all sub clan elders and political leaders currently in 
support of the SNF/JVA; and the International Aid Community (hereinafter referred 
to as the ‘IAC’) composed of all international humanitarian organizations and their 
local implementing partners.
General Agreement
Article 1. The SNF/JVA and the IAC are in agreement that the people of Gedo 
Region are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, and that the delivery of 
assistance, especially food, must receive first priority.
Article 2. The SNF/JVA and the IAC are in agreement that the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance should represent the first steps in a peace process that will 
aim to establish a lasting peace in the region.
Article 3. The SNF/JVA and the IAC agree that the internationally accepted 
humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, proportionality, and transparency 
will be adhered to during the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Responsibilities of the Two Parties
The sub clans under the SNF/JVA hereby commit themselves to the following:
1. A complete cessation of hostilities be enforced for at least the duration of the 
humanitarian deliveries, including food and non-food commodities;
645 Due to the unofficial nature of relations between non-state actors and members o f the aid 
community, this document cannot be officially attributed.
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2 Allow humanitarian access to all beneficiaries who need humanitarian 
assistance as defined by the LAC, regardless of political or clan affiliation;
3. Guarantee the security of humanitarian staff, contractors, properties and 
vehicles;
4. Guarantee the safety of the beneficiaries of the humanitarian assistance;
5. Provide safe passage for humanitarian supplies through their areas of control, 
including the lifting of mines and control of militias;
6. Ensure the right of free movement of beneficiaries while moving to 
distribution centers and returning to their areas of chosen settlement, whether 
permanent or temporary.
7. Facilitate the LAC in conducting assessments, and the monitoring of 
humanitarian deliveries during and post distribution as required.
Responsibility of the I AC
The IAC hereby commit themselves to the following:
1. The LAC will follow the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and 
proportionality in distributing humanitarian assistance to all in need, 
regardless of political and clan/ sub-clan affiliation;
2. The LAC will provide necessary information concerning humanitarian 
deliveries, including assessment and monitoring information, to the leader of 
the SNF/JVA in the interests of transparency.
Signed on behalf of the SNF/JVA:
Signed on behalf of the IAC:
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APPENDIX B -  AN EXAMINATION OF THE SUDANESE PEOPLE’S 
LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY
SPLM/A
The other major warlord actor in the security complex detailed in Chapter 6 is the 
SPLM/A. The following appendix will provide more detail about the SPLM/A as an 
actor and demonstrate that it can be seen as a SAG for the purposes of analysis. This 
section therefore serves as a further illustration and more robust argument to that 
made in Chapter 6. It also provides a supplementary historical overview of the 
conflict in Sudan in order to better illustrate the context of the security complex.
Importantly, this appendix will mainly focus on the SPLM/A during the period 
most relevant to Chapter 6’s argument. Specifically, the appendix will examine the 
time period between the mid-1980s to around the time in which the SPLM/A was 
incorporated into the Sudanese government. This cut-off is also helpful because since 
the peace agreement between the GoS and SPLM/A, the SPLM/A has been in a 
transitional stage in which it has retained some of its traditional armed group features 
but has increasingly taken on the features of a government.
History
In the late nineteen-seventies Ethiopia began supplying the armed opposition groups 
in Sudan with active support in response to Presided: Nimeiri’s support for anti-Derg 
forces.646 These opposition forces included former Anya-Nya personnel and mutinied 
government battalions, including die 104th and 10^h, an incident which led to John 
Garang’s own defection from his station as a Colonel in Ihe Sudanese military. 647 
There were multiple separate opposition groups but the Ethiopian funded ones were 
able to impose order.
646 Johnson 1998. Johnson and Prunier describe the situation which led up to Ethiopia’s funding in 
more detail. “The overthrow of Haile Selassie in 1974 was followed by a deterioration in relations 
between Ethiopia and the Sudan. Nimayri was persuaded by other Arab governments to give active (if 
often discreet) support to Eritrean secessionists. In 1976 Ethiopia informed a Sudanese delegation, led 
by the then Regional Minister of Information, the late Mading de Garang, that unless Sidanese support 
to the Dergue’s opponents stopped, Ethiopia would begin to support Nimayri’s own internal enemies. 
When Nimayri did not heed this warning, Ethiopia began arming Anya-Nya dissidents then resident in 
the border providence of Illubabor and els ewhere.” Johnson and Prunier 1993: 122
647 Anya-Nya was the name o f the southern forces which fought the GOS in the first Civil War. Garang 
had been called to the south to negotiate with the 104* and 105*.
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Eventually Ethiopia backed a single commander, John Garang, which allowed 
for the formation of a single southern Sudan opposition group, the SPLA. Garang’s 
monopoly on external support gave him an advantage and the SPLA consolidated its 
power by incorporating most of the other groups.
The first years of the SPLA were spent consolidating its power. This included 
contacting military leaders such as Akuot Atem and Samuel Gai Tut as well as 
independent Anya-Nya II bands in the south.648 One issue in particular was that the 
SPLA was seen as a ‘Dinka Army’, in reference to its being made up of mostly 
individuals from the Dinka ethnic group, including Garang himself. The government 
did its best to promote this feeling.
Opposition groups in southern Sudan were first contacted by the SPLA and 
then incorporated as sub-units. This incorporation centralized the war against the 
north under the command of Garang, for once incorporated these groups were 
restrained from taking part in their own operations. The SPLA also moved to expand 
the war to areas which did not necessarily have an existent armed opposition. Johnson 
describes the process by whic h new areas were drawn into the war in the 1980s:
the SPLA generally followed a three-year pattern of drawing new areas 
into the war. Typically this included sending small ‘mobile units’ or 
‘task forces’ to an as yet unaffected area where they undertook Imited 
military operations and political mobilization, leading to recruitment.
New recruits were sent back to Ethiopia where they spent the next year 
training in camps such as Bonga and Pagak. In the third year these 
recruits would return to their home areas to recruit among their kin and 
generation. Government retaliation against villages which earlier 
recruits were known to have come from generally drove more people 
over to the side of the SPLA.649
New recruits were then sent to Gambella in southern Ethiopia for training and 
they would come back with a full force of up 1,000 men -  a battalion. This battalion 
would become associated with a particular region or province for which it was
648 Johnson and Prunier 1993
649 Johnson 1998: 58
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assigned. Several battalions could form together into divisions which would be used 
to conquer other areas such as the Nuba Mountains.
Initially the SPLA relied on harassment of the Sudanese military. Small, 
mobile units would infiltrate areas where the GoS forces were and use traditional 
guerilla warfare tactics to ambush the enemy. Johnson and Prunier note that during 
the first years of the renewed civil war, the SPLA’s “tactics resembled those of the 
first civil war; they overran police and army outposts, but then abandoned them to be 
reoccupied by the government.”650 They were also concerned with securing their 
supply routes from Ethiopia.
By the mid-80s, the SPLA’s growing forces were able to confine the GoS 
forces to smaller areas and their bases in provincial towns, these tactics were 
reinforced by the interdiction of relief convoys. By 1987, the SPLA could take and 
hold some of the GdS’s smaller garrisons.651 Eventually, the tactics completely 
changed from guerilla warfare to conventional, entrenched sieges of the major cities 
in southern Sudan.
The nature of the conflict, and the SPLA as an organization, began to change 
radically during the late 1980s and into he early 1990s. The situation changed in 1991 
with the collapse of the Mengistu government, the SPLA’s primary external backer. 
The SPLA had refused to communicate with the rebels groups that were to take power 
in Ethiopia. This left it without its long-time ally in Addis Ababa and, even worse, a 
new Ethiopia government with close ties to the Sudanese military.652 The SPLA was 
forced to evacuate its camps and personnel from Ethiopia. In turn, tiis forced the 
SPLA to find new logistical support within southern Sudan and from other external 
actors.
Also in 1991, the SPLA split into factions, roughly along ethnic lines.653 Riek 
Machar’s Southern Sudan Independence Army/Movement (SSIA/M) was the most 
prominent of several breakaway factions which sometimes found backing from the 
GoS and/or had different goals from the mainstream SPLA, such as calling for 
secession. Factionalization is a typical outcome for insurgencies and forces the main 
group to consolidate its power. This held true for the SPLA.
650 Johnson and Prunier 1993: 131
651 Johnson 1998
652 Johnson and Prunier 1993
653 Riek Machar, a Nuer leader and Dr. Lam Akol, a Shilluk leader, negotiated separate peace accords 
with the GoS. (Prendergast and Mozersky 2004) Scroggins 2002 provides an account o f this break 
between Machar and Garang.
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The other major factor leading to change was that the famine of the mid to late 
1980s led to the creation of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). In 1988 a quarter 
million people died from the famine.654 Humanitarian aid organizations, including the 
large NGOs like Save the Children and the United Nations, were willing to provide 
aid for the famine, but the ongoing war presented the organizations with a significant 
obstacle for reaching areas deep into the south -  a massive area with little 
infrastructure.
In order to deal with the escalating death toll United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) began making ad hoc agreements with both the GoS and SPLA in which 
the parties agreed to respect ceasefires along “corridors of tranquility” as well as other 
basic rules of access. These agreements were codified with the negotiated OLS 
Tripartite Agreement in 1994 and Ground Rules Agreement in 1995. While the 
famine, which led to the death of many of the SPLA’s would-be supporters, might 
seem damaging to the organization, the creation of OLS led to a major restructuring 
of the SPLA and its further assertion of sovereignty.
SPLA as De Facto State
These historical factors led to the formation of the major features of the SPLM/A. The 
following section will illustrate the nature of the SPLM/A organization and argue that 
it can be seen as being effectively similar to a warlord organization as defined in 
Chapter 2.
Leadership and Organization
The SPLM/A was a strongly hierarchical organization with Garang at its top for most 
of its history. Garang’s power flows from his control over resources. Ethiopia initially 
chose him as the device through which their funding would flow. This allowed a 
centralization of the movement against the GoS which had not been possible up until 
then. As sources of resources waxed and waned, Garang continued to monopolize 
control over them and it is this which has allowed him to continue his control over the 
organization and keep it centralized.
654 The GoS contributed to the famine in several ways, including by funding militias and cutting off and 
then reselling food; while the SPLA contributed by laying siege to government towns, the strategic 
destruction of roads, through shooting down aircraft, the destruction o f villages, and the forced 
requisitioning from and looting of villages (De Waal 1993).
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The hierarchy of the SPLM/A is based on patronage, even if it has been 
regimentalized and bureaucratized to some extent. Garang’s control over the inflow of 
resources allowed him to control where it flowed. This allowed him to determine who 
the members of the organization would be and maintain authority over their actions 
with the implicit threat of cutting them off from power. It also allowed him to control 
the overall direction of the organization, including the specifics of its mission and 
terms of negotiations with the GoS. Finally, it limited factionalization because it 
forced any potential factions to find their own sources of funding, a difficult 
proposition, though one that has clearly been met in some cases.
There is also a strong ethnic basis to authority within the organization. Many 
of the top members of the SPLM/A are Dinka tribesmen and related to others in the 
leadership. This made it possible for Machar to enlist support from fellow Nuer 
tribesmen who felt cheated. However, Garang was aware of the issue and adopted 
multi-ethnic measures to enlist more widespread support within and outside of the 
organization.
The SPLM/A’s command and control structure is reinforced by an effective 
communication system. It uses radios and satellites to stay in communication. 
Recently, cell phone towers have even been set up in SPLM/A controlled areas.655 
While transportation is limited in southern Sudan due to the lack of infrastructure, 
airplanes and four-wheel drive vehicles do allow some movement, especially during 
the dry season.
The SPLM/A organization has traditionally been split into three distinct 
pieces. The SPLA is the army which has traditionally been tasked with combating the 
Sudanese state. It is the de facto core of the organization and members of the other 
sections generally serve in it first. The SPLM is the political wing of the organization 
and is responsible for the internal administration of liberated areas and for external, 
diplomatic relations. The Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) -  now 
known as the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SRRC) -  is the 
humanitarian wing of the organization and has been tasked with interacting with the 
humanitarian NGOs and UN since the creation of OLS, as well as with other duties, 
such as providing travel permits.
655 Field observation Rumbek, April 2005
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As the peace process progressed, and now that the SPLM is being 
incorporated into the Sudanese state, these features of the organization are changing 
and new divisions forming, such as ministries of education and health. However, 
again, this appendix will focus roughly on the organization between the mid-80s and 
early 00s when it was most mature, but had not begun orientating itself to 
incorporation into the Sudanese state.
The SPLM/A is organized like a conventional military organization, in other 
words it is a praetorian organization. Its almost continuous funding by and training 
with conventional militaries, including the United States Army, has assured this. 
Garang himself attended the Advanced Infantry Training Course at the United States 
Army’s Fort Benning. The ranking and organizational structure of the SPLA is based 
on conventional military systems. For instance, Second Lieutenant give way to 1st 
Lieutenants, to Captain, to Majors, to Lt. Colonel’s etc; squads of seven soldiers form 
into platoons of fifty-one, four platoons are a company, a Battalion has six companies, 
and three Battalions form a Brigade.656 Within these units there are artillery, infantry, 
signals, engineers and logistics divisions. Command is strong and discipline is 
relatively high. Officers are professional, for instance, they are expected to attend 
Cadet Colleges before commissioning and have formalized training throughout their 
career.659 Since the SPLA is the de facto progenitor and core of the SPLM and SRRC, 
its structures form the informal basis for those organizations.
This praetorian organization is combined with a budding organizational 
structure based along the lines of a proto-government. By late 1989, the SPLA had 
effective control of large areas of the southern Sudan. The regional SPLA battalions 
provided not only the military extension of the SPLM, but also constituted the civil- 
military administration for these areas. These administrative areas were intentionally 
organized based on the existent province structure in order to minimize any ethnic 
basis for conflict. The civil administration which was set up was embryonic at best 
and was generally concerned with controlling the population through administrative 
procedures rather than the direct use of force. This was not only necessary in regard to 
the SPLM/A’s relationship with the local population, but also in regard to the various
656 Interview with SPLA Commander, Gulu, 22 January 2005
657 Ibid.
658 Based on field observation, Rumbek, April 2005
659 Interview with SPLA Commander, Gulu, 22 January 2005
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tribal and other factions in southern Sudan who have had traditional as well as more 
recent qualms with each other.660
In order to better work with OLS, and, importantly, to better take advantage of 
the outpouring of international aid, the SPLA set up the SRRA. The SRRA is legally a 
non-profit humanitarian organization, which is technically supposed to be impartial 
and independent, like other international humanitarian organizations, but it is in fact 
staffed by former SPLM/A soldiers, and is controlled by the SPLM organization. But 
the creation of the SRRA was only one of the much more complex changes happening 
for the SPLA. In effect, from the late 1980s, the SPLA was becoming almost a de 
facto state which was recognized as (de facto) sovereign.
De facto state
The SPLM/A administration evolved to the point of being close to the level necessary 
to call the SPLM/A a de facto state, well before the peace agreement with the north. 
There has been a hierarchical system of command within the military and an entirely 
separate, at least in form, civilian hierarchy. The civilian ‘government’ involves 
multiple layers of administrative bureaucracies, including governors, country 
secretaries, and town mayors. There are also various branches of the administration 
which deal with welfare issues. These departments include: Woman and Children’s 
Welfare, Youth and Sport, Education, Health, Administration for Police and Prisons, 
Judiciary, Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Agriculture and Forestry, Wildlife and 
Environment, Communications and Transportation, and Finance and Planning. 661 The 
SRRC is concerned with relations with the international humanitarian aid 
organizations and through them, welfare for the southern Sudanese; they are also 
responsible for controlling foreign travel into the south. There are also branches 
concerned with health and education. Finally, the SPLM has instituted a taxation
f jf f)system, work permits for foreign workers, and an education curriculum.
Yet, the Sudanese government continued to assert its sovereignty over all of 
Sudan throughout the civil war. All of the government’s communications attest to 
this. In fact, it has been standard GdS strategy throughout both main civil wars and all
660 In many cases, these feuds were actively encouraged by the GOS for strategic reasons. Johnson and 
Prunier 1993.
661 Interview, SRRC representative, Rumbek, 5 April 2005
662 Discussions with various SPLM/A and NGO personnel, Rumbek, Gulu, January and April 2005
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other internal conflicts, to treat the SPLM/A and other armed groups as local 
rebellions or as criminals.
However, civil administrators in the south on both sides pragmatically 
recognize d and mutually acknowledged each others jurisdictions. While these borders 
were not precise, it is not difficult for international actors to recognize who is in 
control.663 This is particularly the case in
negotiating terms of humanitarian access, for example, all parties to the 
conflict concede unofficial maps depicting conflict zones, transitions 
zones, and ‘corridors of tranquility’. These negotiations imply and 
even chart at least temporary SPLM/A control over the regions in 
question.664
The SPLA de facto control over large areas of the country began in the midr80s due to 
the aforementioned military victories and maturation of the insurgent strategy.
Nevertheless, tie SPLA exercises a relative monopoly of force in the areas 
under its control.665 The use of force outside of official bounds will generally result in 
SPLM/A court involvement. Blood feuds may fall outside of the SPLA realm of 
control and be settled by traditional leaders and practices, as they do in formal states 
in the region. However the SPLM/A will still involve itself to the extent that it can in 
order to maintain a general peace. This was observed during recent field work in 
which a blood feud was taking place over the death of a local man who was run over 
by another local man -  the SPLM/A had taken note of the incident and enacted a 
curfew to ease tensions and maintain order.666 There also exist roving cattle raiders 
and other violent gangs in the south, however, these men likely either have an 
affiliation with the SPLM/A or are active at a relatively low level, comparable to that 
seen within neighboring states like Kenya.
Beyond the GoS, the most major threat to the SPLM/A’s monopoly over the 
use of force has probably been provided by the so-called ‘Other Armed groups 
(OAGs) in southern Sudan. These groups formed into a loose coalition known as the
663 Crossly 2004
664 Ibid.: 136
665 Observed during field work, April 2005. Also noted by Crossley (2004)
666 Fieldwork, Rumbek, April 2005
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f& lSouth Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF). They can be classified into militia 
representatives of local populations and former members of the SPLA which have 
become to more or less proxies of the GoS. While these groups do threaten the 
SPLM/A to some extent, they pose no more of a threat to the SPLM/A than do minor 
rebellions in many countries throughout Africa. We can conclude that the SPLM/A 
does have and has had a monopoly over the use of force within its ‘liberated’ areas. 
This monopoly has been further reinforced by the SSDF’s recent agreement to join 
the SPLA.
The SPLM/A administration has also performed many other 
quasigovemmental services, which are expected of sovereigns. Its humanitarian wing, 
set up to interact with OLS, issues standardized travel permits. Representatives also 
meet visitors at airports and other entry areas for registration. The Health and 
Education Commissions perform many of the services expected by a government. 
Though we should not exaggerate the capabilities of these organizations too much and 
must keep them in the relative perspective of the typical government services to be 
found in other African states with as much poverty and conflict as southern Sudan. 
Also, like many other governments in Sub-Saharan Africa, the SPLM/A 
administration is highly reliant on outsourcing to humanitarian aid organizations or at 
the least on using joint projects.668
There is even some degree of legitimization by the bcal community for the 
SPLM/A. However, the legitimization comes more from a mutual anti-GOS 
perspective than from a positive feeling toward the SPLM/A. Yet, the sentiment is 
“sufficiently strong that wherever SPLA troops move, they will usually be fed and 
tended by supportive-ish populations living in the areas under SPLA control.”669
More interestingly, the SPLA has been recognized and legitimized by the 
international humanitarian aid community and United Nations to some extent. The 
various OLS agreements are predicated on the recognition that the SPLM/A is a 
cohesive, recognizable entity that has de facto sovereignty over areas of the Sudanese
667 See ISS 2005
668 Crossley argues that the low levels of service mean that we should not treat the SPLA as a de facto 
state, however, it seems that he has a very high standard by which to judge the SPLA. Crossley also 
speak of the irrelevance of the SPLA for the day to day life o f the semi-nomadic people o f southern 
Sudan as opposed to the traditional leaders o f families and villages. However, again, the SPLA seems 
no more irrelevant han many state government’s in sub-Saharan Africa in regard to their rural 
population. (Crossley 2004)
669 Crossley 2004: 137
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state. While the agreements themselves are very careful to avoid being too specific 
about this, so as not to upset the GdS during the war, it is implied in the very fact that 
there is such an official document.
The OLS agreement also instituted certain requirements on the aid community 
which further added to the SPLA’s official recognition. Aid organizations were 
required to have official SPLA travel documents. Sudanese UN staff could be taxed 
and rent could be paid by the UN, though the UN was otherwise exempt from taxes. 
The UN continues to make concessions to the SPLA to this day. For instance, forming 
joint programs with the SRRC, such as the Joint Taskforce on Demobilized Child 
Soldiers -  a similar joint system implemented in state controlled areas of other 
disaster zones. The UN funds much of the SRRC administrative costs and otherwise 
contributes to the perpetuation of the organization. On the other hand, the UN refused 
to provide aid directly to the SPLA or the SPLM.
However, the local community continues to have its own independent rule in 
most cases. The chiefs are seen as the legitimate authority. The SPLM/A tends to 
function through the chiefs, though they may overpower them if they like, due to their 
greater military ability. Even over the last few years with the instituting of more 
intrusive quasigovemmental apparatuses, the SPLM still functions through these local 
leaders. The SPLM/A is thus parasitic on these communities. Because of this 
parasitism the SPLM/A could be seen as a warlord organization, not de facto state.
Diplomacy
The SPLM/A took part in extensive diplomatic relations with external states well 
before becoming an official part of the Sudanese state. SPLM representatives, i.e. 
diplomats, have been placed in ‘Chapter Offices’, i.e. Counsels, important countries 
including: African countries like South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, and Rwanda; 
Arab countries including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Libya; as well as the United States, 
and the United Kingdom.670 The diplomats’ relationships depend on what the 
SPLM/A hopes to gain from the relationship. The SPLM representative to Ethiopia 
and the AU characterizes some of these relationships thus:
670 Interview, SPLA commander, Gulu, 22 January 2005
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For instance in Egypt they tell the Arab states that the south is not 
against Islam. It is not an Arab conflict. In London, we promote Sudan 
as being important because of the colonial legacy in Sudan. He tries to 
make it clear that we feel that we are a victim. Try to influence the 
conflict. In Washington human rights is a more active issue. [Human 
rights] Violations are reflected in the office. ...Basically, [we ask for] 
humanitarian aid and intervention. 671
These relationships are very similar in nature and content to those between states. 
Interests are promoted, whether economic or military in nature, and relationships 
strengthened in order to counter an enemy, i.e. Sudan.
In many cases, the relationships between the SPLM/A and other states were by 
default in recognition of its de facto authority. For instance, the SPLM representative 
to the AU notes: “in order to mediate, the AU or IGAD needs a counterpart to Sudan.
£' 7*y
A government representative.” The SPLM provided such a representative. 
Similarly, border issues with Ethiopia demanded representation from the de facto 
authority, not the Sudanese government, which has no influence in the border region. 
The SPLM representative notes: “[Ethiopia] need[s] to know who is responsible. If 
there is a problem on the border, they need a contact office; an authority to deal with 
the issue.”673
While de facto relationships are accepted, de jure relationships are not 
necessarily. For example, the SPLM’s relationship with the United States government 
typically goes through human rights groups who then lobby Congress on behalf of the 
SPLM.674 On the other hand in Britain there is more direct communication and 
interaction with Parliament.675
This de facto recognition by part of the international community has generally 
been combined with some legitimacy. The creation of the SRRA combined with the 
pressures to from receiving aid and, in general, working closely with humanitarian aid 
agencies over a long period of time, has led the JPLA to adopt significant liberal 
views. The organization has adopted prohibitions against the use of child soldiers and
671 Interview, SPLM representative, Addis Ababa, 24 March 2005
672 Ibid.
673 Ibid.
674 Ibid.
675 Ibid.
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other human right s violations. For instance, in the preface to the Ground Rules 
Agreement, the SPLM/A acknowledged its acceptance of the Geneva Conventions 
and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.676 Its mission statements and other 
external communications also use the language of freedom and democracy to justify 
their cause. In general, the organization talks the talk of human rights and liberal 
democracy and this has granted it a significant public relations victory over the years. 
While it is not by any means comparable to a western liberal democracy, the SPLA is 
certainly never grouped along with many of the more terrifying insurgencies Africa. 
This has assured it continued aid from international humanitarian organizations as 
well as making it easier to justify other forms of aid from western states.
Significantly, when Machar broke off from the SPLM/A, he was represented 
by Lam Akol at negotiations with the UN over whether to be part of OLS. The Nasir 
group was excluded on the grounds that it could not demonstrate control of any 
territory where the UN needed corridors of tranquility.677 Crossley notes the 
ramifications of this: “[t]he government, the SPLM/A mainstream, and numerous 
subsequent splinter groups suspected that by securing UN recognition, the opposition 
movement was securing international acknowledgement of de facto administrative 
control.”678
Motivation
The SPLM/A has been in some ways a fairly typical rebel movement and used many 
of the same practices as traditional insurgencies to motivate its personnel. It has a 
clear ideology and mission. It also appeals to the impoverished with economic 
incentives and relies on many ethnic and other loyalty inducing incentives. Finally, in 
many instances, SPLA personnel are motivated by self-defense against a predatory 
northern government.
Anti-GOS sentiment was the main motivating factor of the SPLA. There has 
been significant marginalization of many of the tribal people in the south, denial of 
the basic welfare expected from a government, including health and clean water, as 
well as second tier needs like education and political representation. Beyond these
676 See Appendix C for a copy of the Ground Rules Agreement. These acknowledgements, however, 
were not legally binding.
677 Crossley 2004
678 Crossley 2004: 142 He goes on to note that “[s]imply by isolating the SPLM/A as the primary 
interlocutor, the OLS bestowed a certain pride of place on one armed movement over others.” 
(Crossley 2004: 142)
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issues there are issues of religious, language, and racial persecution. As one SPLA 
Commander put it, “I believe that we are being supported because we have a cause... 
Our people are marginalized.... We are left behind, in darkness. That’s why we took 
up arms and fought.”679
Poverty s an issue in the motivation of individuals to fight as it is in many 
sub-Saharan African conflicts. Southern Sudan is one of the poorest areas on Earth. It 
also has high levels of illiteracy, poor healthcare, lack of employment, etc. These 
factors make the military one of the few sources of social movement left to young 
men, particularly, young men from pastoralist societies with strong traditions 
concerning conflict and coming of age. Consequently, the SPLA can rely on a large 
source of recruits for its forces. For example, it is clear in areas of southern Sudan that 
many of the young men in nicer civilian cloths and who are generally better off are in 
some way affiliated with the SPLM/A.680
Tribalism also plays a role in motivating personnel to fight in fie SPLA. 
Individual tribes are targeted by the northern government in favor of other tribes 
which are selectively armed. This leads to tribal motivations to fight. However, the 
same tribal factors have led to factionalization within the SPLM/A. There are 
divisions between the Dinka tribesmen who hold the bulk of the offices in the 
SPLM/A, compared to minority tribes such as the Nuer. These divisions are an 
interesting feature of the SPLM/A because they demonstrate that there is at least some 
cross-tribal loyalty and enthusiasm for the organization. While there has been 
factionalization during some of the war, the bulk of it has been fought by a multi- 
tribal organization. In many ways, this resembles the multi-ethnicity found in states 
more than the usual mono-ethnicity of most armed groups.
Logistics
The SPLM/A has developed many separate sources of funding over the years and this 
diversity is a basis for the organization’s longevity and cohesion. External funding has 
come from many different sources, including from states to Sudanese diaspora. 
Humanitarian aid has increasingly served as a basis for funding, though only in 
specific areas, since the creation of OLS. Financing has come from various forms of 
formal and informal taxation within Sudan. Finally, there is funding, to a certain
679 Interview, SPLA commander, Gulu, 17 January 2005
680 Field observation, Rumbek, April 2005
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extent, form natural resource exploitation, or at least, the promise of natural resource 
rights to outside sources.
External funding has come from the United States, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, 
and Uganda at various times during the civil war. Up until 1991, Ethiopia served as its 
major source of support. After the change in the Ethiopian government, the SPLM/A 
found alternate sources. The United States has also been involved in funding the 
SPLA and its association demonstrates the sort of strategic thinking behind external 
supporters when working with the SPLA. Global Security describes the situation:
In 1996 the US government decided to send nearly $20 million of 
military equipment through the 'front-line' states of Ethiopia, Eritrea 
and Uganda to help the Sudanese opposition overthrow the Khartoum 
regime. US officials denied that the military aid for the SPLA and the 
Sudanese Allied Forces (SAF), described as 'non-lethal' -  including 
radios, uniforms, boots and tents -- was targeted at Sudan. The 
Pentagon and CIA considered Sudan to be second only to Iran as a 
staging ground for international terrorism. CIA Director John Deutch 
made a 3-day visit to the Ethiopian capital in April 1996, where he 
noted that funds had been significantly increased for a more activist 
policy including preemptive strikes against terrorists and their 
sponsors. Reportedly several Operational Detachments-Alpha (also 
called A-Teams) of the US army were operating in support of the 
SPLA.681
The military nature of the funding was also hidden and included training. Most 
interestingly for this study, the United States, like other governments, seems to have 
seen the SPLM/A as a balance for Sudan, which was threatening regional stability.
Funding for the SPLA also has come from various formal and informal 
donations and taxes taken out by he SPLA on Sudanese civilians. Reportedly these 
are 10% for local staff. There are also taxes on goods bought at local markets and 
in some cases a fee for car licenses.683 The large southern Sudanese diaspora around
681 Globalsecimty.org 2005b
682 Interview, aid worker, Rumbek, 14 April 2005
683 Interview, aid worker, Nairobi, 6 January 2005
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the world helps fund the organization. Inside of southern Sudan, local civilians are 
expected to feed and cloth the SPLA soldiers, even when they themselves are starving 
and receiving food aid from the World Food Program (WFP).684 It should be noted 
that by no means are these civilians necessarily forced to provide support, in many 
cases they do sincerely feel a duty to help the soldiers. Though, some degree of 
pressure is also probable and there are, of course, instances where commanders, with 
or without the leadership’s consent, force civilians to provide them with supplies.
Humanitarian aid is redirected by the SPLM/A for its own strategic and 
tactical purposes. The southern Sudan famine led to a massive influx of humanitarian 
aid. While there have been restrictions on the SPLM/A’s use of this aid it has 
nevertheless been enlisted into its logistical system. As already noted, transportation 
and communication abilities are gained from the partnership with the humanitarian 
aid community. More importantly, the aid has acted as the basis for the SPLM/A’s 
welfare system for those civilians which fall into its area of control. This allows the 
SPLM/A to focus the vast majority of its resources on warfare rather than 
administration.
There are some minor natural resources in southern Sudan which are used 
toward the SPLA’s war such as timber, however, the most important natural resource 
has become oil. Large oil reserves were discovered along the border between the 
north and the south in Sudan and have therefore become one of the major areas of 
contention between the two sides on both a military and diplomatic level. The 
SPLM/A did not use them so much as a route to immediate economic gain, as it did 
not have the large infrastructure necessary for extracting oil. Rather, the oil has acted 
as more of a diplomatic tool used by the SPLM/A to enlist support for the 
organization from states interested in exploring the oil (once peace was reached).
Independence and Autonomy
The SPLM/A achieved empirical sovereignty in the 1980s. It clearly has had complete 
authority over its internal and external affairs since the period at which it was able to 
control territory continually. The de facto sovereignty admitted by the OLS agreement 
point to this, as does the SPLA’s consulates in foreign countries, and its 
administration of liberated areas.
684 Scroggins 2002 describes some of these instances.
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The SPLM/A has also been able to perpetuate its organization. It can 
continually recruit new members and motivate them to fight It also has an 
organizational structure which is cohesive enough to be considered as a unitary actor.
While it has been indebted to various foreign government’s for funding, it has 
been able to repeatedly wean itself off of those funds and continue on as an 
independent organization. Diversifying funding, as with investment, hedges bets and 
grants increased independence from any single source of funding. It has in effect 
given the SPLM/A the ability to negotiate better terms with any single source of 
funding. This kept it from becoming dominated by any single foreign entity.
It is arguable that the internal and external policy more similar to that of an 
idealized warlord than de facto state. Crossley makes the observation that the SPLA is 
best analyzed in the way prescribed ty Mark Duffield, i.e. that “[t]he goal [of long 
term conflict] is no the long-term benefits of successful warring for society; the goal 
is fruitful perpetuation of war for the enrichment or empowerment of the warriors.” 685 
From this perspective, Crossley notes that “the populace is not treated as a beneficiary 
of conflict fought on their behalf but is, rather, a resource to be controlled.” 
Crossley may be correct to note that the SPLA is not efficiently analyzed as fighting a 
war for the benefit of the populace. Nonetheless, the best way to see the SPLM/A is in 
general not from Duffield’s perspective that the war is about the personnel gain of 
members of the SPLM/A.
As with other analyses of warlords, the issues separating warlord 
organizations from insurgencies may often come down to the decision of whether or 
not the organization should be seen as being separate from society and therefore a 
parasite, or as a legitimate representative of society, which could not separate itself 
fully. It is an arguable point which depends on the particular historical period in 
question and subjective measures of society’s relationship with the SPLM/A. For 
instance, does the SPLM/A’s ‘taxation’ of local civilian’s food aid demonstrate a 
standard, if primitive form of governance or predatory behavior? The final decision is 
somewhat arbitrary as the SPLM/A has the factors necessary to make it analyzable 
using the Neorealist approach, i.e. it is an autonomous, independent organization, 
which has been (arguably) motivated by survival during the second phase of the war.
083 Crossley 2004: 138. 
686 Ibid.: 145
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SPLM/A Relations with Sudan - War
Chapter 6 briefly illustrated the nature of the conflict between the SPLM/A and the 
GoS. The following section provides more detail.
History o f the Conflict
The origin of the Sudanese civil war, and hence the relationship between the Sudanese 
government and SPLM/A, goes back to 1955 when the Torit garrison mutinied. The 
soldiers were joined by civilians, the police and prison guards. This popular uprising 
was based on structural problems which arose from the British handing over power to 
the northern elite and leaving the south relatively uneducated and without power.
This was due to the fact that the British indirectly ruled the south. They 
empowered the southern traditional chiefs. There was never extensive interest or 
investment in the south by the north. The official policy of ‘Closed Districts’ in the 
south kept economic investment low and this continued after independence. Similarly 
the colonial policy of ‘benign neglect’ left the south without an elite or much 
education beyond missionary work. As Taiser Ali and Robert Matthews note, the
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“’separate development’ of the south was not only economic but political as well.” 
After independence the northern elite, which was mostly Islamic and of Arab decent, 
monopolized political and economic power. Upon independence the Khartoum 
government began its policy of Arabization of the south. For instance, higher 
education was conducted in Arabic.
In 1969, the popular frustration with the sectarian parties helped Brigadier 
Nimeiri and several other officers take power through a coup d’etet. However, 
“having alienated both right- and left-wing forces, lacking any strong base of support 
at home, and cut off from his principal foreign ally, the Soviet Union, Nimeiri found
zoo
himself vulnerable.” For this reason he attempted to create peace in the south. He 
succeeded in 1972 with the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement.
The backing the United States and discovery of oil fundamentally realigned 
the situation in the south for the Khartoum government. Nimeiri attempted to redefine 
the borders to the south to shift oil producing areas into the northern authority. He 
also moved northerners to key positions in the south and otherwise demonstrated a 
renaissance of control by the north of the south. Most importantly, Nimeiri imposed a
version of Islamic law on Sudan, thereby fueling the discontent that had plagued the 
country since the enactment of the agreement a decade earlier. Nimeiri enacted the 
laws in order to sure up his power in the north from political opposition.
These factors, led to the creation of the SPLA. As discussed earlier, the 
Ethiopian government backed opposition movements and finally settled on the SPLA, 
led by Garang.
Again in 1985, the unions formed together, this time as the Trade Union 
Alliance (TUA) and used massive demonstrations and a general strike to topple the 
government. A transitional government was installed and the Umma Party (UP) 
eventually won the majority of seats in 1986 and installed Sadiq al-Mahdi as Prime 
Minister. The party became directly concerned with ending the conflict and this led to 
the Kokadam Declaration of 1986.
The so called September Laws enacted by Nimeiri continued to be unpopular 
and were to be overturned in December of 1988, when the National Islamic Front 
(NIF) party used militias and some units of the army to take power. Brigadier Omar 
Hassan al-Bashir was put in control of the country. He ended peace programs and 
returned to an attempt at a military solution for the ongoing civil war. Bashir was 
helped in his pursuit by the fall of Mengitsu’s regime in Ethiopia, the fracturing of the
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SPLA, and increased backing from Iran, Iraq and China for his own government. 
Hypocritically, as the government pursued a military solution it advertised for a 
peaceful solution through arranging engagement with the SPLM/A outside of Sudan, 
in order to shift attention away from the war and gamer international support for the 
regime.
The situation changed along with geopolitics in the early nineties. Sudan 
backed Iraq in the Gulf War and was punished for it by the United States with a block 
on aid. A significant change came from the famine that began in the later 1980s which 
led to the OLS agreement and brought the GOS, SPLM/A and UN together into an 
agreement.
During the mid-nineties Osama bin Laden took up residence in Sudan in 
exchange for financial support to Bashir. Bin Laden’s residence led to US cmise 
missile strikes on Sudan after the 1998 terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania. Sudan also became an official state supporter of terrorism which
689 Ibid
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damaged its international credibility and ability to receive aid -  an issue which it is 
currently trying to overcome through tacit and explicit support for the War on Terror.
Conclusion
This appendix has provided supporting materials for Chapter 6. It argued that the 
SPLM/A can reasonably be theorized about using the Neorealist approach developed 
in this study in that it may be seen as a warlord organization or possibly a de facto 
state. The appendix also provided some more in depth history of the SPLM/A and its 
war with the GoS.
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APPENDIX C -  SPLM/OLS (OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN) 
AGREEMENT ON GROUND RULES -  669
[NB. The example which follows is the agreement signed between the SPLM/OLS. 
Although signed separately the content of the agreements with other movements was 
to all intents and purposes the same.]
This agreement is intended to lay out the basic principles upon which Operation 
Lifeline Sbdan (OLS) works and to lay out the rules and regulations resulting from 
such principles. It seeks to define the minimum acceptable standards of conduct for 
the activities of OLS agencies and Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association 
(SRRA), as the official counterpart in areas controlled by the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).
We, the undersigned enter into this agreement in a spirit of good faith and mutual 
cooperation in order to improve the delivery of humanitarian assistance to and 
protection of civilians in need.
In signing this agreement we express our support for the following international 
humanitarian conventions and their principles namely:
i Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989
ii Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 
Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions
A. Statement of Humanitarian Principles
1. The fundamental objective of OLS and SRRA is the provision of humanitarian 
assistance to populations in need wherever they may be. Such humanitarian 
assistance seeks to save life, to ease suffering, to promote self-reliance, self- 
sufficiency and the maintenance of livelihoods. The right to receive humanitarian 
assistance and to offer it is a fundamental humanitarian principle.
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2 The guiding principle of OLS and SRRA is that of humanitarian neutrality -  an 
independent status for humanitarian work beyond political or military considerations. 
In other words:
i. Humanitarian aid must be given according to considerations of human need 
alone. Its granting or its acceptance must not be made dependent on political 
factors or upon race, religion, ethnicity or nationality. It must not seek to 
advance any political agenda. Where humanitarian assistance is inadequate to 
meet the needs of al priority must be given to the most vulnerable.
ii. The passage of humanitarian assistance to populations in need should not be 
denied even if this requires that aid passes through an area controlled by one 
party in order to reach the needy in another area provided that such passage is not 
used for military advantage.
iii. Relief assistance is provided solely on the basis of need: those providing 
assistance do not affiliate themselves to any side in the ongoing conflict.
iv. The only constraints on responding to humanitarian need should be those of 
resources and practicality.
3. All humanitarian assistance provided is for the use of identified civilian 
beneficiaries. Priority must at all times be given to women and children and other 
vulnerable groups such as the elderly, disabled and displaced people.
4. Those carrying out relief activities under the auspices of OLS must be 
accountable to the beneficiaries and their representative structures in first place, and 
to those who fund the activities. This places the following obligations on the various 
parties:
i. those rendering humanitarian aid have a duty to ensure its appropriate end use. 
This includes a right to monitor and participate in the distribution of humanitarian 
aid on the ground in partnership with SRRA.
ii. local authorities through the SRRA must ensure that aid is distributed fairly to 
civilian beneficiaries. Diversion of aid from intended beneficiaries is regarded as 
a breach of humanitarian principles.
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iii. decision-making on the selection of beneficiaries and the monitoring of the use of 
inputs and resources must be and be seen to be transparent and responsive to 
broad-based decision-making at the level of affected communities. Local 
authorities and relief agencies should involve local representatives of 
communities in the processes of targeting and monitoring of aid. Where possible 
this should be done through the Joint Relief and Rehabilitation Committees 
which include elected community representatives.
5. OLS is based on the complete transparency of all its activities. This means that 
local authorities have the right to expect that OLS agencies provide full information 
regarding the resources to be provided. In return, it is expected that local authorities 
will report honestly and fairly in all their dealings with OLS with respect to needs 
identified populations in need use of resources etc.
6. All humanitarian actions should be tailored to local circumstances and aim to 
enhance not supplant locally available resources and mechanisms. Strengthening 
local capacity to prevent future crises and emergencies and to promote greater 
involvement of Sudanese institutions and individuals in all humanitarian actions is an 
integral part of OLS’s humanitarian mandate.
7. The fundamental human right of all persons to live in safety and dignity must be 
affirmed and supported through appropriate measures of protection as well as relief. 
All those involved in OLS must respect and uphold international humanitarian law 
and fundamental human rights.
8. Bona fide staff members of OLS agencies and others living working or traveling 
in Sudan under the auspices of OLS have the right to go about their business freely 
and without restraint provided that they adhere to these Ground Rules and to local 
laws and customs. In all their dealings relief workers and local authorities must 
demonstrate mutual respect.
B. Mutual Obligations
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1. All externally supported programmes and projects in SPLM/A-controlled areas 
must be approved by the SRRA (both locally and at SRRA head office) prior to their 
implementation. NGOs or UN agencies are responsible for ensuring that such 
approval is obtained in writing. Project implementation should be based upon a letter 
of understanding between the agency. SRRA and OLS which defines roles 
responsibilities and commitments of all sides plus procedures for resolving 
differences and grievances.
2. All UN/NGO workers are expected to act in accordance with the humanitarian 
principles previously defined: provision of aid according to need, neutrality, 
impartiality, accountability and transparency. This includes non-involvement in 
political/military activity. NGOs and UN agencies must not act or divulge 
information in a manner that will jeopardise the security of the area.
3. All UN/NGO workers much show respect for cultural sensitivities and for local 
laws and customs. Relief agencies must ensure that their staff are familiar with these 
laws and customs.
4. UN agencies and NGOs shall strive to offer the highest possible standards of 
service to their beneficiaries. This means that all agencies commit themselves to 
recruiting only those staff judged to have adequate technical and personal skills and 
experience required for their work.
5. UN agencies and NGOs must ensure that all their staff living, working or visiting 
Sudan are bearers of valid entry passes from the respective political authorities.
6. The SRRA must commit itself to the humanitarian principles defined above and 
not allow itself to be motivated by political, military or strategic interests. It should 
seek to provide an efficient and effective coordinated information and planning 
service for relief and rehabilitation activities.
7. The SPLM/A recognises and respects the humanitarian and impartial nature of 
UN agencies and those NGOs which have signed a letter of understanding with 
UNICEF/OLS and SRRA.
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8. The SRRA should facilitate the flow of relief goods and services and provide 
accurate and timely information regarding the needs and the situation of civilians in 
their areas.
9. Local authorities assume full responsibility through the SRRA for the safety and 
protection of relief workers in areas under their control. This responsibility includes:
i. providing an immediate alert to relief workers in potentially insecure areas
ii. facilitation of safe relocation when necessary
iii. protection from any form of threat, harassment or hostility from any source: 
relief staff or agencies are not expected to pay for such protection either of 
themselves or of their property.
10. UN/NGO compounds should be respected as property of these institutions. Those 
living in these compounds have the right to privacy and compounds should only be 
entered with the permission of their residents. No military or political activity should 
take place in these compounds and no personnel bearing arms may enter them except 
when the safety or their residents is threatened.
C. Use of relief property and supplies
1.
i. All UN/NGO property including vehicles and property hired by UN/NGOs is to 
be controlled and moved at the discretion of UN/NGOs or their agencies, unless 
such property is formally donated to another party. Project agreements between 
NGOs, SRRA and UN/OLS should clearly define which assets will remain the 
property of the agency concerned and which are project assets which must remain 
in Sudan even when the agency concerned leaves temporarily or permanently.
11. Those assets defined as agency assets remain the effective property of the agency 
at all times and may be removed whenever a project terminates or an agency 
withdraws from a location for whatever reason.
iii. Project assets are those which are for direct use by project beneficiaries or are 
integral to the running and sustainability of the project. These goods remain the
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property of UN/NGOs until formally handed over to the SRRA or local 
communities and their leaders’ decisions regarding the distribution and use of 
such items should be made whenever possible jointly between NGOs and local 
authorities under the auspices of the Joint Relief and Rehabilitation Committee 
following the humanitarian principles stated above.
2. UN and NGO flags are for exclusive use by these agencies.
3. UN and NGO staff will be allowed unrestricted access to their communication 
equipment and to exercise normal property rights. Except for emergencies, all 
messages should be written and recorded. Use of UN/NGO radios or other 
communication equipment will be limited to information on relief activities only. All 
messages will be in the English language. Operation shall be by a locally designated 
radio operator seconded and selected jointly by the local authorities and relief 
agencies. Whenever necessary UN/NGO personnel will be allowed to transmit their 
own messages.
4. No armed or uniformed personnel is allowed to travel on UN/NGO vehicles, 
planes, boats or cars. This includes those vehicles contracted by UN/NGOs.
D. Employment of staff
1. All UN agencies and NGOs have the right to hire there own staff as direct 
employees. These agencies should be encouraged to employ appropriately qualified 
and experienced Sudanese as part of a capacity building strategy.
2 In the cases of Sudanese staff seconded to an NGO supported project (e.g. health 
staff) appointments and dismissals are made by the local authority in consultation 
with the agency which is expected to support payment of that worker’s incentives. 
The number of workers to be supported must be agreed jointly. An NGO or a UN 
agency may ask the local authorities to withdraw seconded staff considered 
incompetent dishonest or otherwise unsuitable for their jobs.
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3. Local authorities should ensure that the Sudanese staff of UN/NGOs and 
especially those staff who receive special training programmes to upgrade and 
improve their skills are exempted whenever possible from military or other service so 
that they can contribute to the welfare of the civilian population.
E. Rents, Taxes, Licences, Protection money
1. No UN/NGO should be expected to pay rent for buildings or areas which are part 
of their work, for example, offices or stores when they have built these buildings 
themselves or where they are donated by the local authority.
2 In the case of public buildings which are being rented by an NGO as living 
accommodation a reasonable rent may be paid by the NGO/UN agency to the civil 
administration. Genuine efforts should be made to make moves towards 
standardisation of these rents.
3. All OLS agencies shall be exempt from customs duties for supplies (including 
personal supplies) and equipment brought into Sudan. Any taxes to be paid will be 
agreed between the agency concerned and the local authority as party of the project 
agreement.
F. Implementation of this agreement
1. All signatories to this agreement must accept responsibility for ensuring that it is 
disseminated to all their officials and staff working in Sudan. It should also be 
publicised in public places in Sudan to ensure that local communities and 
beneficiaries understand its principles and rules.
2 UNICEF/OLS together with the SRRA will be responsible for ensuring the 
holding of workshops and meetings in all key locations in which the principles and 
rules of this agreement are explained and discussed with all relevant personnel.
3. The SRRA is fully responsible for ensuring compliance with this agreement by 
the local authorities and communities.
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4. Joint Relief and Rehabilitation Committees established in all relief centres and 
involving all relevant actors should meet together on a regular basis to plan 
implement and monitor the delivery of humanitarian assistance. These committees 
will be regarded as the custodians of the principles of this agreement at local level and 
responsible for ensuring that the rules are upheld and respected by all sides.
G. Mechanisms for resolving alleged violations of Ground Rules
1. In cases where allegations of non-compliance with this agreement are made, all 
parties commit themselves to resolving differences as speedily as possible in an 
attitude of good faith.
2 Where alleged violations of Ground Rules have occurred the allegation should be 
documented in writing by the complahant.
3. The issue should then be taken to the local Joint Relief and Rehabilitation 
Committee where this exists.
4. If unresolved it should then be discussed at local level with meetings between the 
area secretary of the SRRA the county Commissioner and the bcal head of the 
UN/NGO together with the UNICEF/OLS Resident Project Officer where 
appropriate.
5. If the issue remains unresolved at local level it should be referred to central 
authorities in writing to be dealt with by the senior officials of the agencies concerned 
i.e. the SRRA head office, the head of the NGO and, if appropriate the UNICEF/OLS 
coordinator.
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